

SINCERITY, INSINCERITY, LIE

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Abstract: *The assumed aim of this article is to point out that “the most common definition of lying” has conditions that suit to some logics from the family of the modals such as the assertoric, the doxastic-epistemic and the teleological ones. Even so I have considered that the three announced concepts lack at least a dimension, the one that also holds to modal logics, namely, the deontic dimension. I don’t claim to solve the sensitive problems of the domain. I propose a systematization-tool meant to assimilate the analysed cases.*

Keywords: *lie, insincere, sincere, assertion, doxastic logic, epistemic logic, teleological, deontic logic.*

The assumed aim is to point out that both the concept of lie and the sincerity and insincerity ones have conditions that suit to some logics from the family of the modals as the assertoric, the doxastic-epistemic and the teleological ones. For this I try to unify ideas of some present day writings with the inherited ideas from Professor C. Popa.

There are no universal accepted definitions of the lie¹. All of them entail problems. The most widely accepted definition says that lie is a statement whose content, the speaker believes to be false and which is sent with the intention to deceive the listener’s respect to that content. And the author is Bernard Williams².

Interested in the problem of lie and insincerity is also Shelly Kagan. One of his works is Normative Ethics³. He allotted a paragraph to the constraint scope connected to idea of the doing harm⁴. The very next chapter is also allotted to other constraints against a doing harm species that is the lie. Kagan is concerned with this problem from the first paragraph of this chapter⁵.

As regards Bernard Williams, at least in the chapter concerning the truth, assertion and belief there are visible both the concepts of his definition and the ones of the grid proposed here. So he connects both truth with assertion⁶ and with belief⁷, and assertion with knowledge⁸. It does not follow from here that

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¹ Kagan S., *Normative Ethics*. Boulder: Westview Press 1998, p.113.

² Williams Bernard, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p 96.

³ Kagan S., *Idem*, pp.70-106.

⁴ Kagan S., *Idem*, pp.85-94.

⁵ Kagan S., *Idem*, pp. 106-116.

⁶ Williams Bernard, *Idem*, p 66-76.

⁷ Williams Bernard, *Idem*, p 79-84.

Bernard Williams intends to define the truth⁹.

Starting from these four prerequisites there can be detained in the definition of a lie: 1. the explicit statement; 2. the statement maker believes his statement is false, which means untruth; 3. the existing addressee, different from the sender; 4. the intention that the addressee believes that the false statement is true. Each of these prerequisites has terms to be elucidated¹⁰.

Cornel Popa maintains the qualifying as *liar*, *insincere* or *sincere* only based on three elements: facts, assertions and beliefs-knowledge¹¹. Starting from this grid I have developed it both with the teleological dimension and with the dimension of normative qualifying and with variants of the false sincerity or of the true insincerity. However, not even C. Popa considers two situations. The condition of truthfulness of the statement does not exclude the option of the false assertion. And the condition of true statement does not exclude the option of the insincerity. It happens sometimes and I added them here.

1. Common sense about insincerity and lie

In the following lines I propose a characterization of the lie both from the alethic point of view, and mainly from the point of view of the ideas of *purpose* and *norm*.

Usually, insincerity and lie are thought of in a limited way and identified with the false, while sincerity is identified with truth. Consequently, insincerity and lie are opposed to the truth and sincerity to the false. It would follow that insincerity and lie, as well as the false, consist of a disagreement between the assertoric and extralinguistic.

As a relatively more extended vision includes also the fact that the asserter x , believes/does not believe, ($B(x, p)$) or knows / does not know the asserted, ($K(x, p)$). The more extended vision means disagreement between assertion and belief. Thus, while x believes p , $B(x, p)$, he asserts to y $\sim p$, $Z(x, y, \sim p)$.

Even this relatively more extended vision is only partly suitable, because of some reasons. *The first* reason of being only partly suitable is as follows. There are both circumstances when truth is sincerely uttered and circumstances when the false is insincerely uttered. *The second* reason is that not all untruthful statements are lies¹². This can be specified through the existence of circumstances when the *false* is sincerely uttered. And it may happen during the history of science. The class of these circumstances may be extended with those in which truth is insincerely uttered. Both situations may happen during trials for example.

So far the attempts to define the concepts have resorted only to assertoric logic¹³. That is not enough. This asks for a combined modal logic¹⁴. *The third*

⁸ Williams Bernard, *Idem*, p 76-79.

⁹ Williams Bernard, *Idem*, p 63.

¹⁰ James Edwin Mahon, The definition of lying and deception, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, First published February, 2008, <http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html>

¹¹ Popa Cornel, *Logic and metalogic, vol. II*, Ed. Fundației României de Măine, Bucharest, 2002, p.411.

¹² Cornel Popa, *Modal Logic and socio-humanistic subjects*, Milena Press, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 207-208.

¹³ Cornel Popa, *op.cit.*, pp. 188-206.

reason of being only partly suitable refers to the conflict between two other elements: the teleological, and the deontic ones. Both the aim of the insincere person and of the liar is to be believed when the false is asserted. And this aim conflicts with at least one norm hence with the deontic element.

2. The elements of a possible definition

I propose the following classification of these elements: E1, *circumstances-elements* and E2, the *teleodeontic-element*. I detail these elements as follows:

E1, *circumstances-element* refers to *circumstances* like factual, assertoric and doxastic/epistemic ones.

E1.1 – *factual circumstances* mean here the presence/absence of the state of facts, $p/\sim p$ that the reference sentence p refers to.

E1.2 – *assertoric circumstances* refer to two aspects: the kind of assertoric behavior and its content. The kind of assertoric behavior may be active: x says to $y...$, $Z(x, y, ...)$, or passive x is silent to y as regards..., $T(x, y, ...)$. And the content of the assertoric behavior may be an affirmative, p or a negative one, $\sim p$. The passive behavior, meaning silence, is needed to simplify some combinations like: x does not say to y that p , $\sim Z(x, y, p)$, x does not say to y that not p , $\sim Z(x, y, \sim p)$. I replaced these with the equivalent referring to silence. Thus, x does not say to y that ..., $\sim Z(x, y, _)$ is equivalent to x is silent to y as regards..., $T(x, y, p)$.

Says

1. $Z(x, p) \equiv \sim T(x, p)$
2. $Z(x, \sim p) \equiv \sim T(x, \sim p)$

Does not say

3. $\sim Z(x, p) \equiv T(x, p)$
4. $\sim Z(x, \sim p) \equiv T(x, \sim p)$

E1.3 – *doxastic circumstances* are: beliefs, opinions as regards to the state of things, expressed by the statement x believes that..., $B(x, _)$. One of its alternatives is: x does not believe that..., $\sim B(x, _)$. Here I also replaced with the epistemic equivalents thus: x does not believe that p , $\sim B(x, p)$ has as an equivalent x knows that not p , $K(x, \sim p)$; x does not believe that not p , $\sim B(x, \sim p)$ has as an equivalent x knows that p , $K(x, p)$.

Believes

1. $B(x, p) \equiv \sim K(x, \sim p)$
2. $B(x, \sim p) \equiv \sim K(x, p)$

Does not believe

3. $\sim B(x, p) \equiv K(x, \sim p)$
4. $\sim B(x, \sim p) \equiv K(x, p)$

Combinations of only these three elements could be found in C. Popa even before 2002. But they are reduced to E1.1., E1.2 and E1.3. already mentioned¹⁵. The extension with the teleodeontic element, that I propose, just follows.

E2 – *teleodeontic element*, refers to two subelements: to the *teleological one* according to which x aims p : $S(x, p)$ or, on the other hand, *avoids p* : $E(x, p)$ ¹⁶ and

¹⁴ *Idem*, p. 208

¹⁵ Popa, Cornel, *Logic and metalogic, vol. II*, Ed. Fundației România de Măine, Bucharest, 2002, pp 411-413.

¹⁶ Popa, Cornel, *The theory of action and formal logic* Ed. Științific și Enciclopedic , Bucharest, 1984, pp 476-477.

to the *deontic one* according to which a law maker authority, z , forbids x a state of things $F(z, x, p)$, allows it to him, $P(z, x, p)$ or compels him to that state $O(z, x, p)$. Of course, the author that gave a mature form to the deontic logic is Georg Henrik von Wright in the article *Deontic Logic* from review *Mind*, in 1951¹⁷. Aim-states like this are consequently possible¹⁸ but supposing they become actual, this happens in deontic governed spaces, that is where classifiable (at least) trihotomic norms apply. As a consequence, purposes and norms may be either in concordance or in conflict¹⁹. For the problem of insincerity, as well as for the lie one, *the teleodeontic element* turns into *teleodeontic conflict*.

We owe Prof. Popa Cornel, PhD, the existence of both a logic of the purposes, *teleological*²⁰, and of a teleodeontic logic (teleological mixed with deontic logic)²¹.

More explicitly, in the case of the teleological and of the deontic we have the state of belief of the receiver y : $B(y, p)$. This is, on the one hand, an object of the teleological: x 's purpose is that y believe p : $S(x, B(y, p))$. The same is, on the other hand, an object of the deontic qualifying, for example, as forbidden: z forbids x to do such as y believe that p , of course varying the circumstances c : $F(z, x, B(y, p), c)$. I consider circumstantial elements as if they were three sets: $\{p, \sim p\}$, $\{Z(x, p), Z(x, \sim p), \sim Z(x, p), \sim Z(x, \sim p)\}$, $\{B(x, p), B(x, \sim p), \sim B(x, p), \sim B(x, \sim p)\}$. Based on this I obtain the following Cartesian product:

$\{p, \sim p\} \times \{Z(x, p), Z(x, \sim p), T(x, p), T(x, \sim p)\} \times \{B(x, p), B(x, \sim p), K(x, \sim p), K(x, p)\}$ ²²

Its application gives thirty-two triplet-elements. Positioned ones under the others, these are as many rows. The elements of the triplets are columns. All of these gather in the following table. That is why I refer to the number of these lines.

1. <F>	2. Z	3. B/K	4. S	5. D
1. <p >	Z(x, y, p)	B(x, p)	S(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
2. < p >	Z(x, y, p)	B(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
* 3. < p >	Z(x, y, p)	K(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
4. <p>	Z(x, y, p)	K(x, p)	S(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
5. < p >	Z(x, y, ~p)	B(x, p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
6. <p>	Z(x, y, ~p)	B(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
* 7. <p>	Z(x, y, ~p)	K(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)

¹⁷ *Idem* p 293

¹⁸ *Idem* p. 463, for the characterization of the purpose as a possible state of things.

¹⁹ Popa, Cornel, *The rational behavior and the logic of the practical discourse*, in *Praxeology and logic*, Ed. Academiei RSR, Bucharest, 1984, pp. 25-28

²⁰ *The theory of action and formal logic*, Ed. Științific și Enciclopedic, Bucharest, 1984, p 463, see the footnote that numbers the articles that contain the teleological and reviews that published these papers.

²¹ Popa Cornel, *The rational behavior and the logic of the practical discourse*, în *Praxeology and logic*, Ed. Academiei RSR, Bucharest, 1984, pp. 25-28, repeated in *The theory of action and formal logic*.

²² I am referring to the mentioned for $\sim Z(x, p)$, $\sim Z(x, \sim p)$ equivalent T-formulas and to the mentioned for $\sim B(x, p)$, $\sim B(x, \sim p)$, equivalent K-formulas.

8. < p >	Z(x, y, ~p)	K(x, p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
9. <p>	T(x, y, p)	B(x, p)	E(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
10. < p >	T(x, y, p)	B(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
* 11. < p >	T(x, y, p)	K(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
12. <p>	T(x, y, p)	K(x, p)	E(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
13. < p >	T(x, y, ~p)	B(x, p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
14. <p>	T(x, y, ~p)	B(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
* 15. <p>	T(x, y, ~p)	K(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
16. < p >	T(x, y, ~p)	K(x, p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
17. <~p>	Z(x, y, p)	B(x, p)	S(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
18. < ~p >	Z(x, y, p)	B(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
19. < ~p >	Z(x, y, p)	K(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
* 20. <~p>	Z(x, y, p)	K(x, p)	S(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
21. < ~p >	Z(x, y, ~p)	B(x, p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
22. <~p>	Z(x, y, ~p)	B(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
23. <~p>	Z(x, y, ~p)	K(x, ~p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
* 24. < ~p >	Z(x, y, ~p)	K(x, p)	S(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
>				
25. <~p>	T(x, y, p)	B(x, p)	E(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
26. < ~p >	T(x, y, p)	B(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
27. < ~p >	T(x, y, p)	K(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, p))	P(z, x, B(y, p), c)
* 28. <~p>	T(x, y, p)	K(x, p)	E(x, B(y, p))	F(z, x, B(y, p), c)
29. < ~p >	T(x, y, ~p)	B(x, p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
30. <~p>	T(x, y, ~p)	B(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
31. <~p>	T(x, y, ~p)	K(x, ~p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	F(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
* 32. < ~p >	T(x, y, ~p)	K(x, p)	E(x, B(y, ~p))	P(z, x, B(y, ~p), c)
>				

The first three columns contain the circumstances: factual, active/passive assertoric and doxastic. These are completed based on the mentioned cartesian product. The next two columns are filled with the teleodeontic element.

The fourth column, contains the purpose, respectively the teleological component of the teleodeontic element. The insincere as well as the liar asserts discordantly to his beliefs, following also an aim: to be believed by the receiver, let it be y, with respect to what he asserts. The teleological column is filled depending on the second and third columns. The first gives the receiver y and the statement. The second gives the doxastic element. Above these a teleological operator is added.

Thus in the lines 1-8, 17-24, *assertoric behavior is active*, $Z(x, y, _)$. The teleological operator associated is *assuming as a purpose* a state of belief with the same content as the asserted one: $S(x, B(y, _))$. The asserter aims to have his statement²³ believed.

²³ It's about only the context lie, -insincerity - sincerity. It is not about the claim of a universal quantified conditional: "If x says to y p then x aims that y believes p". This has as counter-models the cases when y constraints x physically or by arguments. This is not in the situation to aim that y

While in other lines: 9-16, 25-32, the *assertoric behavior is passive*, $T(z, y, _)$. And the teleological operator associated is *avoiding a belief state* with the same content as the asserted one: $E(x, B(y, _))$. The one that is silent as regards some statement avoids having that statement²⁴ being believed.

The fifth column contains the second component of the teleodeontic element, the deontic one, that is the norm.

The real or only the possible states of things, as the ones in the scope stage in someone's mind are the object of the modalization by deontic operators under the hypothesis of materialization.

The purpose-state assumed by a sincere person is allowed by the norm. While circumstances of line 1, x is allowed to persuade y that p , not because p is true but because x 's statement "p" is according to x 's belief. Similarly, while circumstances of line six, although the state p happens, and x asserts and believes not p , however x is allowed to persuade y about his belief. Not because p would be the truth, but because x 's statement "not p " is according to his belief. To memorize that permission is that x makes y believe the false, on the background of x 's sincerity.

On the contrary, under the circumstances of line 2, x is forbidden to persuade y about p , although it is the truth, because x 's statement " $\sim p$ " is not according to his belief. Similarly, line 5 displays circumstances in which x 's statement is false. This is not the reason why x is forbidden to persuade y that "not p ", but the fact that while x asserts "not p ", he believes "p".

Thus the doxastic state, $B(x, _)$, object of the teleological, is deontically qualified not depending on the truth value but on the assertorico-doxastic circumstances. By the deontic qualification of the doxastic state itself $B(x, _)$, higher or lower degrees of concordance or of *teleodeontic conflict*²⁵ are set up. Both are present in some particular cases.

Lines 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 31 contain the *teleodeontic agreement*. In lines 1, 4, 6, 7, 17, 20, 22, 23, x 's aim that y believe a sentence, is allowed by norms. But also when x avoids that y believes some sentence that x believes false we have again a *teleodeontic agreement*, as in lines: 9, 12, 14, 15, 25, 28, 30, 31. The more general situation is avoidance of a forbidden state of things²⁶.

Lines 2, 3, 5, 8, 19, 21, 24 contain *teleodeontic disagreement*. x 's aim is that y should believe a sentence, while this state is forbidden for him, as in these lines. The more general situation is that the purpose, being forbidden by the norms, is

believes p . On the contrary, y already believes /knows p and aims that x asserts this. In other words, x does assert p aiming to ..., but because of...

²⁴ Similarly, it is about only the same context. Neither here is it about the claim of a universal quantified conditional: "If x is silent to y as regards p then x avoids y believes p ". This has counter-models the cases when y is indifferent teleo-logically on what could y believe as regards p .

²⁵ Popa, Cornel, *Rational behavior and the logic of practical speech*, in *Praxiology and Logic*, coordinator Prof. dr. Cornel Popa, Academiei Publishing House, RSR, Bucharest, 1984, pp. 24 -28

²⁶ Popa, Cornel, *idem.*, pp 26-27, more exactly TDE1, TDE 3, TDE5, TDE6, TDE9 contain more cases of teleodeontic agreement.

in *teleodeontic disagreement* with these ones²⁷. On the other hand, when x avoids that y believes a sentence and that belief state of y is *allowed* we have a *teleodeontic agreement*, as in the lines: 10, 11, 13, 16, 18, 26, 27, 29, 32. The more general situation is avoidance of what is allowed for.

The teleodeontic agreement or disagreement appears as a consequence of the deontic qualifying of a purpose. And this happens depending on the assertoric and doxastic columns.

That means x's purpose, that y should believe p , $B(y, p)$, is deontically qualified as allowed when x says what he believes or what he knows. But the same aim is deontically qualified as forbidden when the statement and the belief don't tally. In other words, the same scope is differently deontically qualified varying with the different circumstances.

On the other hand, we have teleological opposite assumptions, by *Purpose* and *Avoidance*, applied to the state $B(y, p)$. These are identically deontically qualified, namely as *allowed*, for different circumstances: when x asserts what he believes $Z(x, y, p)$, $B(x, p)$) on the one hand, and when x keeps silent as regards to what he thinks to be false ($T(x, y, p)$, $B(x, \sim p)$). In other words, opposite teleological assumptions are identically deontically qualified.

In all the lines I used the abbreviation "c" for the rendered circumstances in the first three rows. For example in line 1 the circumstances c are: p happens, (p), x says to y, p ($Z(x, y, p)$) and x believes p ($B(x, p)$). In the deontic expression $P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$, we may replace "c" with these circumstances: $P(z, x, B(y, p), (p, Z(x, y, p), B(x, p)))$.

3. Proposals for some definitions

Some of the lines in the initial table outline definitions which may be paired. And from a pair we may synthesize a third definition. A first such group is the lines 1, 4 from the domain of sincerity, directly and 2, 3 from the domain of insincerity. The synthetic definition is the one that I interpreted in natural language. In numbering the proposed definitions, I keep the number of lines in the table. In the initial proposed table, I find outlines of the definition of the sincerity in the lines: 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29 and 32.

3.1. Proposals for definitions of sincerity

(1) $\text{Sin}_{1Z} \langle p \rangle (x, y, p) =_{\text{df.}} \langle p \rangle, Z(x, y, p), B(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(4) $\text{Sin}_{1Z} \langle p \rangle (x, y, p) =_{\text{df.}} \langle p \rangle, Z(x, y, p), K(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(1, 4) $\text{Sin}_{1Z} \langle p \rangle (x, y, p) =_{\text{df.}}$

$\langle p \rangle, Z(x, y, p), B(x, p)$ or $K(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(1, 4) x is sincere, asserter truthful to y as regards p =_{df}

during the presence of fact p, x says to y "p" and x believes or knows "p" and x aims y believes "p", which the norms allow him.

²⁷ Popa, Cornel, *idem*, more exactly TDE2, TDE 4, TDE7 contain more cases of teleodeontic disagreement.

(6) $\text{Sin}_{oZ<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(7) $\text{Sin}_{oZ<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(6, 7) $\text{Sin}_{oZ<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p) \vee K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(6, 7) x is sincere, asserter untruthful to y as regards “non- p ” =_{df} during the presence of fact p , x says to y “non- p ”, and x believes or knows “non- p ” and x aims y believes “non- p ”, which the norms allow him.

(10) $\text{Sin}_{iT<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(*11) $\text{Sin}_{iT<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <p>, T(x, y, p), K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(10, *11) $\text{Sin}_{iT<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p) \vee K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(10, *11) x is sincere, truthful, omissive to y as regards “ p ” =_{df} during the presence of fact p , x is silent to y as regards “ p ”, and x believes or knows “non- p ” and x avoids y believes “non- p ”, which the norms allow him.

(13) $\text{Sin}_{oT<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(16) $\text{Sin}_{oT<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <p>, T(x, y, \sim p), K(x, p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(13, 16) $\text{Sin}_{oT<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, p) \text{ or } K(x, p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(13, 16) x is sincere, untruthful, omissive to y as regards “non- p ” =_{df} during the presence of fact p , x is silent to y as regards “non- p ”, and x believes or knows “ p ” and x avoids y believes “non- p ”, which the norms allow him.

(17) $\text{Sin}_{oZ<\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(20) $\text{Sin}_{oZ<\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, p), K(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(17, 20) $\text{Sin}_{oZ<\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, p) \vee K(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(17, 20) x is sincerely, untruthful, asserter to y as regards p =_{df} during the absence of fact p , x says to y “ p ”, and x believes or knows “ p ” and x aims y believes “ p ”, which the norms allow him.

(22) $\text{Sin}_{iZ<\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(23) $\text{Sin}_{1Z <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(22, 23) $\text{Sin}_{1Z <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df}$
 $<\sim p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p)$ or $K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(22, 23) x is sincere, truthful, asserter to y as regards “non- p ” =_{df}
during the absence of fact p , x says to y “non- p ”, and x believes or knows
“non- p ” and x aims y believes “non- p ”, which the norms allow him.

(26) $\text{Sin}_{0T <\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <\sim p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(27) $\text{Sin}_{0T <\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <\sim p>, T(x, y, p), K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(26, 27) $\text{Sin}_{0T <\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df}$
 $<\sim p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p)$ or $K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, p)), P(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(26, 27) x is sincere, omissive, untruthful to y as regards “ p ” =_{df}
during the absence of fact p , x is silent to y as regards “ p ”, and x believes or
knows “non- p ” and x aims y believes “ p ”, which the norms allow him.

(29) $\text{Sin}_{1T <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <\sim p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(32) $\text{Sin}_{1T <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df} <\sim p>, T(x, y, \sim p), K(x, p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(29, 32) $\text{Sin}_{1T <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df}$
 $<\sim p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, p)$ or $K(x, p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), P(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(29, 32) x is sincere, truthful, omissive to y as regards “non- p ” =_{df}
during the absence of fact p , x is silent to y as regards “non- p ”, and x believes
or knows “ p ” and x avoids y believes “non- p ”, which the norms allow him.

3.2. Proposals for the definition of insincerity

In the same table, there are outlines of the definition of insincerity in the
lines: 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 28, 30 and 31.

(2) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z <p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(3) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z <p>}(x, y, p) =_{df} <p>, Z(x, y, p), K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(2, 3) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z <p>}(x, y, p) =_{df}$
 $<p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p)$ or $K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(2, 3) x is insincere, truthful, asserter to y as regards “ p ” =_{df}
during the presence of fact p , x says to y “ p ”, and x believes or knows “non- p ”
and x aims y believes “ p ”, which the norms allow him.

c) (5) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.} <p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)),$

c) (8) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.} <p>, Z(x, y, p), K(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)),$

(5, 8) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.}$

$<p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, p) \text{ or } K(x, p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)), c)$

(5, 8) x is insincere, truthful, asserter to y as regards “p” =_{df} during the presence of fact p, x says to y “p”, and x believes or knows “p” and x aims y believes “p”, which the norms forbid him.

c) (9) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1T<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.} <p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, p), E(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)),$

c) (12) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1T<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.} <p>, T(x, y, p), K(x, p), E(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)),$

(9, 12) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1T<p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.}$

$<p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, p) \text{ or } K(x, p), E(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)), c)$

(9, 12) x is insincere, truthful, omissive to y as regards “p” =_{df} during the presence of fact p, x is silent to y as regards “p”, and x believes or knows that “p” and x avoids y believes “p”, which the norms forbid him.

(14) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0T<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df.} <p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p)), c)$

(15) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0T<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df.} <p>, T(x, y, \sim p), K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p)), c)$

(14, 15) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0T<p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df.}$

$<p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p) \text{ or } K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p)), c)$

(14, 15) x is insincere, untruthful, omissive to y as regards “~p” =_{df} during the presence of fact p, x is silent to y as regards “~p”, and x believes or knows “~p” and x avoids y believes “~p”, which the norms forbid him.

(18) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0Z<\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)), c)$

(19) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0Z<\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, p), K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)), c)$

(18, 19) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0Z<\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.}$

$<\sim p>, Z(x, y, p), B(x, \sim p) \text{ or } K(x, \sim p), S(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p)), c)$

(18, 19) x is insincere, untruthful, asserter to y as regards “p” =_{df} during the absence of fact p, x says to y “p”, and x believes or knows “non-p” and x aims y believes “p”, which the norms forbid him.

(21) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z<\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df.} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), B(x, p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p)), c)$

(24) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) \equiv_{df.} <\sim p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), K(x, p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(21, 24) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1Z <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df.}$

$<\sim p>, Z(x, y, \sim p), B(x, p) \text{ or } K(x, p), S(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(21, 24) x is insincere, truthful, asserter to y as regards “non-p” =_{df} during the absence of fact p, x says to y “non-p”, and x believes or knows “p” and x aims y believes “non-p”, which the norms forbid him.

(25) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0T <\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.} <\sim p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, p), E(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(28) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0T <\sim p>}(x, y, p) \equiv_{df.} <\sim p>, T(x, y, p), K(x, p), E(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(25, 28) $\sim\text{Sin}_{0T <\sim p>}(x, y, p) =_{df.}$

$<\sim p>, T(x, y, p), B(x, p) \text{ or } K(x, p), E(x, B(y, p)), F(z, x, B(y, p), c)$

(25, 28) x is insincere, untruthful, omissive to y as regards “p” =_{df} during the absence of fact p, x is silent to y as regards “p”, and x believes or knows “p” and x aims y believes “p”, which the norms forbid him.

(30) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1T <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df.} <\sim p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(31) $\sim\text{Sin}_{1T <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) \equiv_{df.} <\sim p>, T(x, y, \sim p), K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(30, 31). $\sim\text{Sin}_{1T <\sim p>}(x, y, \sim p) =_{df.}$

$<\sim p>, T(x, y, \sim p), B(x, \sim p) \text{ or } K(x, \sim p), E(x, B(y, \sim p)), F(z, x, B(y, \sim p), c)$

(30, 31) x is insincere, truthful, omissive to y as regards “~p” =_{df} during the absence of fact p, x is silent to y as regards “~p”, and x believes or knows “~p” and x aims y believes “~p”, which the norms forbid him.

The idea of lie supposes to make a statement. Therefore among the insincerities, the assertoric ones stand for the definition of lie. „Insincere” and ”asserter” are contained in the definition of lie. A liar is an insincere asserter. And „insincere” and ”asserter” are contained in the definition of the omissive insincerity.

The next species of insincerity stand for the lie. Thus „insincere” can be replaced by „liar” in these ones. As many definitions of the insincere asserter, as many definitions of the liar we have. I only mention their numberings: (2, 3), (5, 8), (18, 19), (21, 24).

What preserves our intuitions about how we reason on these concepts. Unlike „insincere asserters”, „insincere” includes also the omissive ones. Of course this grid does not have only the role to preserve our intuitions, but also to make possible the decision of whether we have or not have a lie in some difficult cases. Finally we can think like this: 1. Liars are insincere asserters ($M(x, y, p) \bar{a} \sim\text{Sin}_z(x, y, p)$). 2. Insincere asserters are insincere ($\sim\text{Sin}_z(x, y, p) \bar{a} \sim\text{Sin}(x, y, p)$).

3. Therefore liars are insincere (3. $M(x, y, p) \bar{a} \sim Sin(x, y, p)$)

4. Conclusions

Both truth and false can be asserted sincerely and insincerely.

Among the combinations included here are the ones referring to unassertoric behaviors.

The agreed norms set in this case do not qualify either the teleology in itself or the teleology connected to the facts. In other words the deontic element doesn't sanction as allowed neither x's aim to be believed the truth by y, nor the purpose to have believed the false. But the accepted norms set sanctions for the teleology connected with assertions and beliefs-knowledge. That is deontic element qualifies as allowed x's purpose to be believed on the background of the agreement between belief and utterance. The same deontic element sanctions as forbidden the same purpose on another background namely the disagreement between belief and utterance.

The norm code aimed, but unspecified, is a weak one, rather a moral than a criminal code. This allows the false sincere assertion that can be serious in some circumstances. Such a code is compensated by others that stimulate or compel the truth assertion.

Finally some questions are raised: Is a sincere guider preferable on the way of false to an insincere one on the way of truth? For every statement, based on the upper ones, is it decidable if it is: lie or sincere or insincere? Is it decidable for every such a statement if it is forbidden or allowed or otherwise deontically qualified?. I didn't offer an answer to these questions, but an organon for analyzing various cases, organon that can be improved..

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