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Address: 176 Splaiul Unirii, Bucharest
Phone: 021.330.79.00, 021.330.79.11, 021.330.79.14
Fax: 021.330.87.74
E-mail: cogito.ucdc@yahoo.com

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THE DESIGN OF TRANSCENDENCE IN ROMANIAN PHILOSOPHY

Mihai D. Vasile

Abstract: The present paper tries to prove that the transcendence problem finds subtle solutions in Romanian philosophy. As for example, Mircea Florian’s metaphysics construction starts with the fundamental object of the traditional metaphysics research, namely God, acquiring Immanuel Kant’s doctrine about God as regulative ideal of pure reason, in order to reveal its two metaphysical hypostases, i.e. the ontological transcendence and the epistemological transcendence. As collatio, it is brought out to complement Lucian Blaga’s metaphysics insofar as it refers to transcendence (Great Anonymous) and, also, to include Constantin Noica’s reconsiderations.

Keywords: God, Immanuel Kant’s metaphysics, transcendence, soul’s immortality, The Great Anonymous, The Universal of Romanian Soul.

It is assumed that “The principle, Transcendence (T) is part of subsistence (S) different from Existence (and Being, Reality and the Real Existence), which transcends, being also different, but close to the Supersistence (Ss ) and the Transcendental (Tt) and also different from the Protosistence (Ps) and Episistence (ES)”¹.

Transcendence “has two etymological explanations: lat. trans + scando, to mean ‘go beyond more than anything’ and ‘overcome’, and also lat. trans + ascendere, which would mean ‘to climb over’, as the Greek hyperechein (from hyper + echo), with the meaning of ‘to take himself over’ or ‘to wear (something) above’. However, the shift towards Divinity, toward divine intelligence suggests elevation. But both senses of passing, namely crossing beyond and crossing over, remain, in the Romanian acceptation of the verb ‘to transcend’, louder being the meaning of ‘beyond’”².

The name of transcendence depends on the signified content of the transcendence. For example, “St. Thomas speaks about four transcendences: ens, unum, verum, bonum, which he considers in Deo. Ens refers to the essence of Divinity, unum to the person of The Father, verum to the person of The Son and bonum to the person of The Holy Spirit”³.

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² Ibidem, pp. 84-85.

³ Ibidem, p. 86.
It should make another statement, namely that human transcendence, relative to the human, is trans-human, and accepting that transcendence is an “elevation”\textsuperscript{4}, then it comes that transcendence is super-human.

In this respect, Vasile Conta speaks of the transcendence as “fear of unknown”\textsuperscript{5}, the metaphysical fear without any specific object: “The fear of unknown ... is called even by theologians, fear of God, according to the Holy Scriptures, which say that ‘fear of God is the beginning of wisdom’. Fear of God is therefore monotheistic religious feeling ... inseparable from the idea of God, which for juveniles is the highest metaphysical idea, God being the cause of causes”\textsuperscript{6}. Consequently, the metaphysical fear received the name of God and for the content “the credence that over the all world is a single master, God, so powerful that the whole world would not withstand; therefore, man can not even think of God without a feeling a deep fear, accompanied with the feeling and his most complete nothingness conviction compared with the infinite power of God”\textsuperscript{7}.

It is noted that Vasile Conta (1845-1882) surpassed Rudolf Otto’s thinking out of \textit{Das Heilige} (released in 1917) on the report between the numinous object and the humans characterized by “the feeling of absolute dependence” as “the feeling of the creature status” that plunges into its own nothingness and loses himself in front of what is above any creature\textsuperscript{8}... \textit{The feeling of the creature status} is likely a subjective side element and an effect, it is like the shadow of another feeling (namely ‘the fear’), which, no doubt, also binds it in the first place and direct, of an object outside of me. And this is precisely the numinous object\textsuperscript{9}.

Among other Romanian philosophers, Titu Maiorescu, in his \textit{Philosophische Einiges in gemeinfasslicher Form}, published in Berlin in 1861, it stated more philosophico, his conception about transcendence. Thus, “after making several psychological forays, dealing in particular with the associations between representations, Maiorescu raises questions on theism and atheism. As Ludwig Feuerbach, under whose influence is in this respect, for Titu Maiorescu the notion of God is merely a synonym for the abstracted notion of humanity”\textsuperscript{10}. Consequently, Titu Maiorescu overturned the biblical essay design of creation, in the sense that “not God created man in his image, on the contrary, man created God in his image. Wherefore God is not to be found outside but within man himself, ‘the purest expression of his human essence ’”\textsuperscript{11}. In this regard, Titu Maiorescu reworded as popular adage: “Tell me your God and I will tell you who

\textsuperscript{4} Ibidem, p. 84.  
\textsuperscript{6} Ibidem, p. 394.  
\textsuperscript{7} Ibidem, p. 393.  
\textsuperscript{9} Ibidem, p. 16.  
\textsuperscript{11} Ibidem.
you are”\textsuperscript{12}. That is why, in Titu Maiorescu’s view, theology it is only an abstracted anthropology\textsuperscript{13}. In his view, any theoretical discourse about God must be conceptually and in this case, the problem of transcendence has one solution, as: “God, that some will to develop as a supernatural entity, is fully human”\textsuperscript{14}.

The concept of God is - in the sense of Titu Maiorescu - a completely different role, although fundamental, to the human progress, “because it is the eternal image of the Greatest Good”: “The concept of God, which is progressing with the evolution of the humans, constitutes the criterion of mankind civilization, for he is the very image of what its spirit is better and more enlightened; it is immortal because humanity is immortal, because the concept of eternal youth is alive”\textsuperscript{15}.

Retaining the identity: \textit{unum, bonum, verum, aeternum, absolutum}, focusing on \textit{verum}, Titu Maiorescu believes that “nothing can claim to immortality than what is spiritual”\textsuperscript{16} and therefore “Truth is maintained regardless of time and place; millennia before, what was true remains true after millennia; which was really good and beautiful in the past will be good and beautiful in the future”\textsuperscript{17}.

To Mircea Florian\textsuperscript{18}, \textit{God} is a being assumed realistically naive, in traditional metaphysics, Who enriches successively, starting with the three hypostases of Plato’s Demiurge\textsuperscript{19}, lingering on “the God of Descartes”\textsuperscript{20}, flowing directly - in a logic of intuition – from the Cartesian \textit{Cogito}, in order to reach Immanuel Kant’s architectonics - taken as a basis for his outstanding purchases on \textit{God} as transcendence, and His hypostases typology of expression in metaphysics, as the two transcendences, \textit{epistemological} and \textit{ontological} ones.

So, it is a common good of the traditional metaphysics the fact that: “These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are God, freedom (of will), and immortality. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial

\textsuperscript{12} Ibidem, pp. 25-26.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibidem, apud ibidem.
\textsuperscript{18} The considerations concerning Mircea Florian represent a synthesis and a recension of the ideas out of my articles devoted to metaphysics and transcendence types theorized by Mircea Florian. Partially, some fragments about Mircea Florian were published in Mihai D. Vasile, \textit{Exercises and Philosophical-Theological Syntheses}, (Exerciții și sinteze filosofico-teologice), Pitești, Tiparg Publishing House, 2014 - n.a.
\textsuperscript{19} Mircea Florian, \textit{Metaphysics and its Issues, (Metafizica și problematica ei)}, Bucharest, Romanian Society of Philosophy Press, 1932, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{20} Léon Brunschvicg, \textit{René Descartes}, Paris, Rieder, 1937, p. 34.
object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics — a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.... But as this process does furnish a real priori knowledge, which has a sure progress and useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which, to given conceptions it adds others, \textit{a priori} indeed, but entirely foreign to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself$^{21}$.

Learning Kant’s lessons by Mircea Florian - on traditional metaphysics and the understanding of God as transcendence - is justified due to the fact that in all systems of ideas and religious beliefs of the world there is a word (term, concept, category) referring to the link between human and super-human understood as - as theorized Remus Rus in his \textit{Manual of History of Religions}, written along with Fr. Alexandru Stan - an autonomous entity, independent of man, that by corrections - punishments and rewards - compels man to a certain behavior expressed in ceremonial acts.

\textit{Super-human} - partially covered by the concept of \textit{God} - it is totally autonomous, sufficient to itself, can not be controlled or destroyed by man, not determined by anything, but rather determines everything. In relation to the super-human, the human is in a situation of total dependence as dual being composed by a perishable and mortal body and a and non-material soul, but with an uncertain temporal determination: mortal or immortal; or partially mortal and partially immortal. Immortality of the human soul is the great issue of traditional psychology as part of metaphysics.

By extending indefinitely the permanence and the temporal unity of the human soul, it was born the great illusion of classical psychology, namely the thesis of immortality of the soul - not that the soul is not immortal, but in the sense that the statement, taken as conclusion, lacks any rational demonstration.

Immanuel Kant called \textit{paralogism} the reasoning by which the epistemic subject concludes the immortality of the soul, though - Immanuel Kant says – “In respect of their result, such inferences are thus to be called \textit{sophistical} rather than rational inferences”$^{22}$.

The Kantian argument to prove the psychology illusion is very rigorous, thus:

“\text{A logical paralogism consists in the falsity of a syllogism due to its form, whatever its content may otherwise be. A transcendental paralogism however has a transcendental ground, for inferring falsely, due to its form. Thus a fallacy of this kind will have its ground in the nature of human reason, and will bring with it an unavoidable, although not insoluble, mental illusion... I think is thus the sole text of rational psychology, from which it must develop its entire wisdom... The topics of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which everything else it may contain has to be derived, are therefore the following:}

\begin{footnotesize}


$^{22}$ Ibidem, p. 409.

\end{footnotesize}
1. The soul is substance

2. In its quality, simple

3. In the different times in which it exists, numerically identical i.e., unity (not plurality)

4. In relation to possible objects in space

From these elements, at least through composition, spring all the concepts of the pure doctrine of the soul, without any other principle being cognized in the least. This substance, merely as an object of inner sense, gives us the concept of immateriality; as simple substance, it gives us that of incorruptibility; its identity, as an intellectual substance, gives us personality; all these points together, gives us spirituality; the relation to objects in space gives us the interaction with bodies; thus it represents the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, i.e., as a soul (anima), and as the ground of animality; and this - limited by spirituality - is immortality... The proposition, “I think” is, however, taken here only problematically; not insofar as it may contain a perception of an existence (the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum), but only in its mere possibility, in order to see which properties might flow from so simple a proposition as this for its subject (whether or not such a thing might now exist)”.

It is but a fact of religious experience that we come across a human with super-human with major implications for the ontology of the human. First, there is a “split level” in the real texture between sacred and profane, followed either by the break out of the super-human in the profane, or by the “jump” of the human in the Absolute. Following the mirabilia intersection, the human is saturated with mysterium tremendum and undergoes an existential transformation - called “conversion” - reflected in changing man’s attitude in front of the cracked real, inhomogeneous in its levels, meaning man’ s abandon to the mystery of the super-human being where he finds its fulfillment.

Meanwhile, super-human as a mystery, “does not convert in an object of the world” – for then die as transcendent in profane – but he can choose to live in a physical entity by the side of the human, as for example God’ Shekinah in the

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25 Ibidem, p. 221.
temple of Solomon, Amon-Ra between the stylized horns of bull, or the saints in icons.

Implications of religious fact in the human ontology are significant, as emphasized by Mircea Florian: “So, the metaphysical – super-human – n.n. -order is inevitably trans-sensitive, transcendent, by its very structure. The sensitive is encumbered by imperfections that require, as a logical complement, an unalterable perfection; he himself to be explained postulating the over-sensitive. Change bound up with degradation (sense) is attenuated by focusing them into Existence, in the eternal, in the perfect; this here impurity is justified by kneeling in the front of the purity beyond”26. Or, super-human is transcendent, perfect, pure, eternal, against which the human is “a split level”27, which occurs - as Mircea Eliade describes the phenomenon - either by the break out of the super-human in the human, as for example in the Annunciation, or by an earnest and prayerful man’s search dedicated to the divine, like the fight of Jacob with the angel.

Consecutively, it takes place the saturation of the human with “the holiness of God”, “where all the religious facts bathe”28. Finally, it takes place man’s metamorphosis, his conversion to what is “the way, the truth and the life” and source of his faith in his salvation29, “by recognizing God as the only power able to offer salvation to him”30.

Mircea Florian put at the center of his metaphysics the immediate sensible wagging - as well as all the empiricists - to make then “the jump” to the over-sensitive, justified by a reformulation of the ontological argument, namely "the human need for transcendent”, for the super-human. But what is present in the texts of major religions is that super-human can “live” in mundane entities, and then the physical objects become “hierophaning” 31 or “hieroforing”, gaining the ability to send human to super-human as an invisible hyper-reality that is present in the sensitive32.

For man “affected” by a religious experience with the super-human, “all dimensions of its existence, and also the acts of his life” has so acquired religious significance, so for him, it “will be not possible to maintain the legitimate autonomy they have different human spheres: scientific, technical, ethical, political, a.s.o., autonomy that our secularized situation forces us to recognize it”33.

To Mircea Florian, such a consequence of the intrusion of super-human in real, is hard to formulate - and to agrees, and that is why he keeps super-human within the limits of Kantian metaphysics - as object of metaphysics and concept

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28 *Ibidem*.
30 *Ibidem*, p. 220.
31 *Ibidem*, p. 221.
32 *Ibidem*.
33 *Cf. ibidem*, p. 223.
of reason - Regulator as Idea and Ideal of Pure Reason: “But (one will ask further) in such a way can I still make use of the concept and the presupposition of a highest being in rationally considering the world? Yes; that was really why things were grounded on this idea of reason. Yet may I regard purpose-like orderings as intentions, by deriving them from the divine will, though of course mediately through predispositions toward them set up in the world? Yes, you can do that too, but only in such a way that it is all the same to you whether someone says that the divine wisdom has ordered everything to its supreme ends, or that the idea of highest wisdom is a regulative one in the investigation of nature, and a principle of the systematic and purposive unity thereof in accordance with universal laws, even where we are not aware of it.”

In Mircea Florian’s view, the idea, of the absolute Being abstraction without any determination, is present, in the world of human reason, as two hypostases of transcendency, namely the ontological transcendency (or metaphysical) - by Mircea Florian understands the noumenal being, in Kantian’s sense - and the epistemological transcendency - that Mircea Florian understands the divine ideal of total knowledge. Between the two transcencies there is a relationship of “ontological symmetry” - in the sense that both of them are ontologically transcendent each other - and a relationship of an “epistemological asymmetry” - in the sense that the act of knowing involves a logical anteriority of the object in which subject is ontologically included. In other words, between the two transcencies there is, ontologically, a space of absolute freedom of one another, but form an epistemological point of view, the human cognition permanently enslaves the epistemological transcendency to ontological one.

In fact, the two transcendencies behave as limits of knowledge and being against human out of hiding through whom God draws, tempts and seduces man “on the moving paths” of becoming.

Lucian Blaga reduces Mircea Florian’s transcendencies to one, namely “the transcendent censorship” beyond which lies the Great Anonymous.

The philosophical approach of the religious phenomenenon, performed by Lucian Blaga, offers a complementary view to the metaphysically original reconstruction accomplished by Mircea Florian.

In his first study out of the Trilogy of Knowledge - namely Dogmatic Aeon - Lucian Blaga addresses the philosophical theme of the religious dogma, explaining it as a special type of knowledge that put in relation to history, theology and philosophy. Religious dogma analysis “from a philosophical point of view” aims to clear “the theological substrate, i.e. the heavenly clay of

36 Ibidem, p. 151.
37 Ibidem, pp. 151-152.
38 The present considerations concerning Lucian Blaga, review and summarize my personal and previous researches published in various collective works, on religious metaphysics of Lucian Blaga - a. n.
revelation, without by this, dogma, as a kind of thinking to remain with roots in the wind” 39.

The way to reach God is achieved - as Lucian Blaga expressed – by revelation: “The idea of God as something cryptically revealed transcends the empiricist and imaginary design of knowledge” 40. Great Anonymous is to Blaga, the metaphysical center, as the Christian God, although it was given to God different names in different faiths of the world, just as the metaphysical received many names, Blaga notes: “By metaphorical abuse, the metaphysical imagination named it, at a time, when ‘substance’, when ‘absolut I’, when ‘immanent reason’, when ‘extramundane Father’, when ‘Unconscious’, when ‘Conscience’ etc. No matter how varied, there is not an absolute incompatibility among these names given to this native factor” 41. Even if there are and are admitted a plurality of forms and names, although there are various religions and religious beliefs, however, in the end, religion is one, and God is one, because the whole multitude of religious beliefs lead to unity. There is no incompatibility between the variety of names and forms attributed to the Absolute, Blaga argues.

To Lucian Blaga, Great Anonymous is a supreme metaphysical principle, unnamed but God, not confusing the notion narrower theologically and dogmatically, the author preferring a symbolic name: “to name simple and good: Great Anonymous” 42. The Great Anonymous nature transcends “the coverage possibilities through reason”, Blaga put in relief, and named the Great Anonymous by a synonymous expression: “primary creative center”. Blaga said that “Great Anonymous is in possession of a positive-appropriate knowledge and unlimited ... but beyond the logical spheres of understanding” 43. The Luciferian effort of man - in any case sinner, derogatory or damned, but very painful and even tragic - slams the transcendent censure “although it is in fact a metaphysics of knowledge” that Blaga intended it as “an eventual doctrine about Great Anonymous” 44. Blaga is more concerned about the doctrine of transcendent censure and less about the metaphysics of Great Unknown, something that makes him close to Mircea Florian’s epistemological transcendence.

Appointed by Blaga “metaphysical center”, Great Anonymous is still something but the world, whereas it is beyond the world, as the existence to whom any other existence owes its life, He is the origin of all generic and

43 Ibidem, p. 523 sq.
44 Ibidem, p. 539.
partial, physical, spiritual and mental beings. Lucian Blaga associated to Great Anonymous attributes as “infinity”, “absolute”, “all-mighty”, “all-creator”, “fullness” etc., so that Great Anonymous is “an integer whole of a maximum substantial and structural complexity, an existence on fully autarchial, self-sufficient” 45, that has the ability to reproduce itself indefinitely, without exhaust, without any outside help, because inexhaustibility is found in its nature.

Great Anonymous generates “divine wholes equal to itself”46, thereby producing “divine differentials” – substantially minimum - carrying a virtual monadic structure or fractals of Great Anonymous. But there is an essential difference between the thinking of Lucian Blaga and Mircea Florian’s concept of divine transcendence, namely, Blaga postulates that Great Anonymous, in order to save the centralism of His existence, lays obstacles in the way of the human towards the mystery substance. The human access to the essence of Great Unknown is slid carefully, because otherwise the entire process would degenerate into an anarchical decentralization of existence.

In Lucian Blaga’s system, man becomes a competitor of Great Anonymous by overriding tendency of revealing Him, to which Great Anonymous behaves like a “Trickster” masters of house of the Lord, so that to the human aspiration to become God, Great Anonymous answers laying obstacles against the way of the human, tempting and fascinating him with the essence of His delusions, in order to save the centrality of His existential, giving to him “dissemble revelations” with specific methods of censoring: “Since this censure has its center originator beyond our chrono-spatial horizon, we call it ‘transcendent censure’”47. In this way, it is prevented any absolute individual knowledge. The transcendent censure is applied by Great Anonymous to the human being and it is structurally graved in the individual knowledge in all its modes, in the current conditions, in order to “defend the existential mysteries to be known by anyone other than Himself”48.

Unlike reconstruction Mircea Florian’s metaphysical reconstruction, where the relationship between man and the two transcendences of God remains stable and clear, Lucian Blaga’s transcendent censure is moving, impassable, cruel to human endeavors to be like God, and can not be exceeded in any way and never. Censure is transcendent to human condition, and has a positive function only to Great Anonymous to whom it protects His existential mystery against any human touch that would affect the universal equilibrium.

In a masterly paragraph out of Transcendent Censure called metaphorical Ontology of Censure, Blaga exemplry says c that truths have their origin in God’s perfection, and errors in human imperfection49, and he continues to distinguish between individual knowledge and divine knowledge, among

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46 Ibidem, p. 69.
48 Ibid., 452.
49 Lucian Blaga, Transcendent Censure, (Censura transcendentă), ibid., p. 471.
which there is a permanent crossing but only from the divine to the human, because transcendent censure obstructs the perfect knowledge of the Great Anonymous. Great Anonymous put the man “the irrevocable urge towards truth, urge really founded in the very nature of knowledge, but by His transcendent censure, He refuses it to us. We positively encouraged to - and definitely stop at one and the same thing. What’s the point of our settlement between this imperative friends and the brakes of that denial - it's hard to say”50.

Constantin Noica tries to answer this question51, saying that the tension between unman and super-human is capable of releasing out of the hiding state the universal of Romanian soul with the vocation of eternity. “Sometime weather rests and Sometime weathering, but man aging”, so that what happens inside “weathering” appears as futility. Romanian Eternity is not a historical plenitude, has not major achievements, but Eternity is the feeling that “in fact, there is a plan to which all historical kneading is waste and loss”52. Noica sees but a “rift” between history and eternity, but he believes that the destiny of the Romanian people is integral to an unchangeable plan, because Romanian people “remains, because he participates in his way to the eternity of being” 53, due to the fact that the participation to the eternity of being is the royal road to access to the universal.

In the case study of Lucian Blaga’s philosophy, Constantin Noica points out that in his reception speech on his election as a member of the Romanian Academy in 1937, Lucian Blaga, “the staff of the Romanian creators today praises what is most impersonal, anonymous, ahistorical in Romanian soul”, namely eulogies Romanian village mirrored in the art height of folk poetry, the present Mioriţa case, in an impressive analysis of the Romanian phenomenon in terms of its philosophy about style and metaphor, entitled Mioritic Space, which goes beyond the periphery of culture and tempting the universal.

“Collating” Lucian Blaga with Mircea Florian equates with a comparison between a “metaphysician” and a “religious rationalist” as particular types of Christian thinkers. “The religious rationalist”, devoted to “reason governing people”, refers to the revealed Absolute as a surveyor, drawing, within certain limits, original interpretations, rational committed - and as “objective” as possible - in relation to the definition field. “Metaphysician” is a philosopher - as genuine as possible – in rational fight, but not only, with the Absolute,

50 Ibid., p. 542.
51 Cf. in part, these considerations about Constantin Noica are contained in the volume of communications from the National Symposium Constantin Noica “Pages about Romanian Soul”, 3rd edition, Iassy, 5 to 6 May 2011, Mihai D. Vasile, The Universal of the Romanian Soul in Constantin Noica.
53 Constantin Noica, What is eternal and what is historical in Romanian culture, (Ce e etern şi ce e istoric în cultura românească), in: Idem, Pages on Romanian Soul, (Pagini despre sufletul românesc), Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2008, p. 11.
concerned by pride, “to separate him from religion through his own efforts, and even to completely ignore it”, exhibiting exclusively his own intellectual purchases.

The difference between them requires a judgment with special measures.

For example, Lucian Blaga qualifying as “theologian”, due to assimilation of Great Anonymous and God, involves to declare Blaga as “heretic” - that has happened, if it remembers the contention between Dumitru Stănilea and Lucian Blaga. And if Mircea Florian is qualified as a rationalist philosopher obedient to Marxism - that also has happened – then the today teachers are the same as yesterday (like in Dumitru Radu Popescu If novels series, where, in order to safeguard equality principle, communist activists had changed the crosses on graves).

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54 Dumitru Radu Popescu, famous Romanian novelist, author of novels cycle If, which describe the terrifying destiny of real socialism principles, reflected in the tragic fate of honest or evil characters, in the period 1948-1989.


THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE WITH EMINESCU

Gabriela Pohoată,*
nagabriela_pohoatâ@yahoo.com

Mihaela Mocanu**
rmocanu99@yahoo.fr

“For almost two thousand years we have been taught to love each other, but we have been ripping each other to shreds.”

Mihai Eminescu1

Abstract: Although Eminescu has not developed a philosophical system of his own as Lucian Blaga did, we assume that his philosophical vision has left its mark on all his poetry. If his creation means love and love is metamorphosed through creation, then the philosophy of love with Eminescu concerns the sense of existence, love being the highest form of human existence and a sine qua non condition of happiness. Not only does love have metaphysical connotations as a principle of existence and life, but it also acquires a profound moral sense, as a salvation solution in front of life suffering, in other words as a universal solution meant to give an answer to the great philosophical, existential, social, economic questions and themes of the epoch.

Keywords: love, creation, the sense of existence, philosophy, Absolute, sheer longing.

It is difficult to write about what Eminescu thought or felt about love, given the depth of the ideas expressed both in his poetic and theoretical creation. However, there are thousands of books written about his love poetry, but much fewer about his philosophy, which is preponderantly addressed collaterally, from the perspective of his poetic creation.

We dare point out that little has been written on the philosophy of love with Eminescu, as long as it has not been accepted that Eminescu also represented something else for the Romanian nation, apart from being its greatest poet. It is also the reason why an undesirable confusion between what love meant to Eminescu and his vision of love still persists.

* Prof. PhD. Hab., Faculty of Judicial and Administrative Sciences, “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, Bucharest.
** Lecturer PhD., The Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures, “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, Bucharest.
1 Mihai Eminescu, The Time, 16th April, 1878.
Our research is based on two ideas we consider essential for the purpose of our approach:

1. Love is the highest form of human existence in Eminescu’s vision;
2. The sense of existence in Eminescu’s thinking lies in love, which is the prerequisite of happiness.

In our argument, we bring into discussion original texts of Eminescu’s thinking in order to highlight his philosophical vision in general, supporting in particular the ideas which point out the existence of a philosophy of love in his work. In this respect, we consider revelatory for his metaphysical attitude, love included, the definition that he gives philosophy in the manuscript 2285, f.185: “In fact, Eminescu wrote, philosophy is not something absolute. Man creates it himself and tailors it according to the circumstances. It is the plan of the soul that knows how to comfort us in the toughest situations of our life, even through sophisms our thinking itself does not believe in. It is the life that makes us believe it still has a meaning, even when it did not seem to have any. There is a philosophy of love, one of poverty, one of despair and, besides all these, each man has a philosophy of his own. Relativism - visionary relativism, this is all.”

Staring from the above mentioned ideas, we can clearly understand that the philosophy of love with Eminescu is not reducible to his erotic life, that it cannot be identified only with the feelings of love for his sweetheart or with the love of nature, homeland, etc. In this respect, Mihail Dolgan tried to get to the essence of the phenomenon of love with Eminescu, both in terms of lived experiences for the prose of life, of praxis, but also within its intensely existential living and in the imaginary field, where its complexity increases by symbolical, metaphysical, parabolic and allegorical projections. It strives, therefore, to keep these areas separately, joining them only asymptotically, without identifying them.

In the author’s view, creation and love identify with each other, they form a unity under the sign of value completeness: “It is true that with Eminescu we can speak of love through creation and of creation through love, of the fact that the thirst for love is doubled for him by the thirst for creation and self-knowledge, the interweaving of erotic with creation being an aesthetic and spiritual dominant of the entire Eminescian work - as a means of complete fulfillment, as a soul reconciliation and uplift, as a determining factor in granting charm and value to life”.

It is also true that along their existence everyone builds their own philosophy of life and, therefore, of love. There is no universally valid philosophy of love, because everyone participates in existence according to their own capacity for understanding and feeling. The philosophy of love with Eminescu fits in with his vision of existence, implicitly on

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knowledge. In other words, we can speak of a double connotation of love with Eminescu: an ontological one and a gnoseological one. Thus, love is felt as a cosmic connection or as a manifestation of the transcendent. At the same time, love is also a call of the Absolute: it is sheer longing. Love is hyperbolic in the sense that it encompasses everything: nature, woman, homeland, ancestral land etc. It is the principle of life, the cosmic principle harmonized, understood as the last step of perfect initiation as it appears in Plato’s work in The Banquet. It is a spiritualized love.

Inspired, at the same time, by the contemplation of Jesus’ sacrifice on the Cross, Eminescu expresses the true meaning with an amazing force, defining love masterly: “Thus, sacrificing oneself for his fellow men not out of pride, not out of a sense of civic duty, but out of love, has remained ever since the highest form of human existence.” One can understand that the mystery of the Cross of Christ is revealed here from the bottom of its depth: existing in truth means existing in love. “God is love.” Jesus Christ, God and man, shows the world love as the law of existence, discovering it alive, as supreme divine love incarnated in the sublime-tragic experience of Golgotha.

And this revealing act enrols itself not only in an ethical-philosophical plan: “...It’s easy to believe that through theoretical moral precept, through science, somehow, man improves himself, Eminescu noticed.” He thought fundamentally, from the ontological plan of the being belonging to a sick world. Thus, we appreciate that the essence of the philosophy of love with the Romanian thinker is concentrated in the following text: “Love, Eminescu invoked, is that kernel of truth that dissolves the deep disharmony and acrimony of the struggle for existence that haunts the whole nature.” This teaches us that love as a principle of existence and life has not only metaphysical connotations, but also acquires a deep moral sense as a universal solution meant to answer the great philosophical, existential, social, economic questions and themes of the epoch. Thus, we rally to Mihail Dolgan’s position who argues that Eminescu “managed to conceptualize philosophically the Meanings and Moral Heights of Love” in his entire creation.

This is the strongest argument we rely on when we venture to write about the philosophy of love with Eminescu. To proclaim love as the absolute principle of healing a world dominated by corruption and injustice, misery and irreconcilable contradictions, is a proof of a brilliant vision capable to boldly assert a unique position in a world that otherwise manifested itself radically. In front of the ontological reality of life suffering, of the irreversibility of time, the saving solution is love.

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7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
9 Ibidem.
10 Mihail Dolgan, cited works, pp.94-95.
There is a true heroism in the poet’s attitude which has nothing in common with the pessimism forcibly assigned to Eminescu. Like all those exploring human solitude and pain to the full, Eminescu never refused to accept reality ... And reality, for him, was the isolation of man in the Universe, man is born and dies in absolute solitude, but this loneliness is populated with dreams, chimeras, illusions. Wisdom advises to a calm reserve in front of these illusory temptations, which do not identify themselves with the stoic ataraxia, which remains an unattainable ideal for Eminescu who, at the same time, used to love life, adore beauty and could not dominate his passions. “If Mircea Eliade proposed, in assessing Eminescu’s personality, instead of pessimism, a tragic sense of life, Edgar Papu suggested not to talk of pessimism, but dissatisfaction.”¹¹ This man was not afraid of suffering, he did not intend to give up, nor did he want to save himself by the stoical apathy of the Glosses or on the sidereal lands of Hyperion.

Fully included and involved in the rhythm of becoming which is loss, but also development and growth, Eminescu wanted not only to live sharing completely the joy and pain, beauty and degradation, even if living in this way is possible only at the cost of accepting suffering.¹² Life is sad, but worth living with love and for love. It is only love that can confer meaning to life. As a confirmation of this idea, Eminescu lived life to the full, trying to save himself from suffering through love, through creation.

Eminescu is, and still remains, through his intimate and irreducible structure, a mystical rationalist longing for the Absolute¹³, for an absolute from which all the other values take the guarantee of permanence: the eternal. The Nostalgia for the Absolute, before being pushed from an intellectualist point of view to the instance of a problem which has no response, rises and, at the same time, reassures, through love, which is the most authentic existential category for Eminescu. This feature of absolute of the love experience will render intolerable remoteness and relinquishment, will attach a particular emphasis to reproach: “Who has sunk my dream world?”¹⁴ Of course, here is at stake man’s personal destiny. The assertion is unanswerable in its sheer dramatism. “Everything existed under the sun because you exist”.¹⁵ He can see nuns identifying the power of Eros with the power of God himself.

In the upward movement of consciousness towards unity and absolute, the eros itself, as a fundamental component, tends to an absolute hypothesis. “It would be wrong, considers Sergiu Al George¹⁶, to believe that the existence of an absolute stance of the eros, its metaphysical experience, would be possible with Eminescu or would be achieved in the absence, or inability to love sensually, earthly. Without the paroxystic tension of this earthly love, transcendence and metaphysical meanings would not have been possible.”

¹² Ibidem, p.28.
¹³ Rosa Del Conte, Eminescu or on the Absolute, Cluj, Dacia Publishing House, 1990, p.131.
¹⁴ Ibidem.
¹⁵ Ibidem.

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But it is not to the woman, rejected and adored, good always expected and always lost, that Eminescu will offer the highest and purest of his lyrical word. He will gain it only when his heart, freed from the memory of a particular image, will indulge in that love of love that is pure aspiration, a pure wish of that “longing” where aspiration to happiness identifies with the desire for death, voice to a truly universal unrest, and that we find expressed as an indefinable melancholy in the “auroral” lyricism of the Romanian folk poetry.

We pointed out above that for Eminescu sheer love is sheer longing and, in order to support this idea we bring to attention the fact that in the poem “O'er the Woods” Eminescu expresses longing in its purest essence: striving not for this good or for another one, but for a fulfillment that we seek here, on earth, without ever reaching it, for attaining it would mean achieving the Absolute. It is the same desire that makes God bend over his creature and it is called love too.

By means of the ecstatic eros, this desire allows us to guess that only through death will we achieve that idea of ‘self’ we are preoccupied with, as the idea of the statue preoccupies the artist until he gets to materialize it.

“O’ver the woods the moon’s afloat
Leaves move softly in the breeze,
Midst the branching alder trees
Sounds the horn its plaintive note

Farther through the forest deep,
Farther yet, and yet more faint,
Blows again its sweet complaint,
Promise of eternal sleep.

While my heart to you is born
Why does fade away your sound?
Will you come for me resound
Melancholy hunter’s horn?”

In the horn notes, the ceaseless deaths cry for the eternal “passage” of the universe. But the music comforts those tears, revealing to us a new measure of time and a new figure of space. From this perspective, the pain of love can become a form of knowledge, as a time experience, leading us to a high revelation of the being. Thus, we can see that with Eminescu love manifests itself beyond the degree of intensity, shapes and shades, under the generalized sign of an ontological plenitude, which is part of a main experience which requires the being’s total commitment. Everything falls under the Absolute, under the pressing call of destiny itself, of longing with all its spectral complexity.

Tudor Vianu stated that “Eminescu’s eroticism falls into the romantic category of that infinite greed that blends the thread of voluptuousness with that of pain. That endless and aimless aspiration lies in the very nature of romantic

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18 Rosa Del Conte, cited works, p 232.
love, as only a star of strength can rouse within a human heart.”

“The association between the expression of voluptuousness and pain, Vianu also remarks, occurs with Eminescu in three circumstances, on the occasion of music, love and death.”

We can assert without fear of being wrong that love defeats death in Eminescu’s work. We think that the Christological drama left its print on the Eminescian spiritual life that culminates with the expression of his own self in the Ode (in Ancient Meter). So, we remind in the context, the famous line “I never thought that I would ever learn to die”. Dying being in love and loving dying is not a mere pun but a way of life for Eminescu, a philosophy of life. It is the experience of the man who lived life intensely with each flame of it, a way of living in a purifying way, specific to the man of genius.

It is natural for this existential way to be reflected in his creation that meets a timeless anxiety because it is of metaphysical nature. There is direct evidence that metaphysics, understood as a supreme aspiration towards problem solving, remained the ultimate exigence of his spirit.

Not long before he died, in his last article, he wrote, indeed “Auguste Comte’s positivism makes no progress, the French philosophers study only psycho-physiologia, the English philosophy no longer deserves the name of metaphysics and deals with second hand practical stuff, not with solving universal problems”.

This exigency of the divine, which is a search for truth and absolute values, remained imprinted as a feature of his work, dominated by love that emerges with Eminescu from a vivid sense of the sacred. Naturally, the sense of sacred is an a priori in whose essence participates only the one who has experienced it by himself. Not in vain did Plato declare in Timaeus that if it is hard to find God, it is even harder to communicate our discovery to the others. The idea of divine grace that falls upon the true poet and philosopher highlights Eminescu’s deep vision.

For Eminescu, God is inwardness and mystery: “we are those with fine hearing / And caught the whisper of divine mystery ... “Eminescu had written.

We know where this notion of a religiosity that can only be autonomous comes from, because the true God is only the one who identifies himself with his very inner consciousness. Apart from Kant and Schopenhauer, this truth can be found in St. Augustine’s work. Eminescu conferred it a solemn form, with an accent that, although reminding of St. Augustine, has a musicality specific to his

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24 Rosa Del Conte, cited works, p.405.
25 St. Augustine, *Confession*, III, VI, 2, “Deus interior intimomeo...”[“God deep inside my heart..”]
artistic spirit. God is neither in heaven nor on earth. God is in our heart.\textsuperscript{26} We have understood that a man can have everything having nothing, and nothing having everything.\textsuperscript{27} An idea that can signify a genuine existential creed. When you have truly discovered God, you understand that life should be lived only in love regardless of the existential vicissitudes. Eminescu had reached such a level of understanding and assumed his tragic condition. Here lies the greatness and the meaning of his philosophy about love.

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\textsuperscript{26} Ibidem, [Don’t go outside, come back to yourself, it is inside man that the truth lies...]

\textsuperscript{27} I.E. Torouţiu, \textit{Literary Studies and Documents}, IV, Bucharest, 1903, p.106.
THE PRACTICAL CAMIL PETRESCU: A THEORY OF VALUES. ETHICS AND NOOCRACY

Viorella Manolache*
vio_s13@yahoo.com; viorella.manolache@ispri.ro.

Abstract: The present article (as a first stage documentation for what aims to be a series of volumes dedicated to the Encyclopedia of Romanian Political Thinking included in an ongoing project of the Institute for Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy’s “Ion I. C. Brătianu” Institute of Bucharest) accepts, through the syntagm “The practical Camil Petrescu” an architecture of the chapters – A theory of values. Ethics and Noocracy from The Doctrine of Substance, absolutely practical and illustrative chapters of the philosophical system developed by Camil Petrescu, parts that complement and extend ontological considerations by ethical-political reflections, individualizing the political philosophy of the author. In this regard, we highlight the key nodes that may confer upon the Camilpetrescian system in general and noocracy in particular, both the qualities of Platonic tests and the values of a practical philosophical and political theory.

Keywords: Camil Petrescu, The Doctrine Of Substance, Ethics and Noocracy, Theory of Values.

1. The scientific exposure of the substance

The Doctrine of Substance (discussed in the light of "the totality of world science") is presented as an ample endeavor, clarifying the organic significance (of a substance) and contesting the improper awarding of a sense of philosophy, science or system to the concept of substance: “Entirely would be accomplished, in the present work, those things which for a long time were considered as being either philosophical disciplines, or life sciences; or, finally, noological sciences in the true German meaning of the term Geisteswissenschaften. This is the uppermost area of history, the substance itself, with all its structural organicity. It is followed by a strictly scientific statement, of course after the concept of positive science was set in its authentic significance (...) The whole body of rationalist philosophy is put aside, and intuitionistic philosophy is substantiated”.1

A “fundamental work,” refusing any schematic - literary placement within an area “beyond the new structure” (a proposal announced and theorized in

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* Scientific Researcher III, PhD., Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations “Ion I. C. Brătianu”, Romanian Academy, Bucharest.

“Theses and Antitheses”) The Doctrine of Substance constitutes an act of “repositioning the philosopher in the context of interwar Romanian thinking”2.

Camil Petrescu3 interprets and reconsiders the ratio between form (traditional philosophical system) and background (overcoming “dialectical solutions”) for any issues addressed, severely critical of earlier philosophical systems, but also developing “ways of thinking enabling appropriate knowledge of the given concrete situation”4.

Edited in two volumes, embodying the second Camilpetrescian indication, which includes the introduction into the body of the text of additions in “suitable places”, faithful to the manuscripts (with Annexes, Notes, Name Indexes and with a single change of summary regarding matters to be referred to in a peculiar chapter - Chapter 8 – Noocracy) The Doctrine of Substance subsumes the following chapters: The Ontology of the concrete; The Substantialist method; A Theory of Knowledge; Orthology I and II, Ortogenesis and structure of history; A theory of values; Ethics.

As projection of an unfinished philosophical system, “strictly scientific exposure of the substance itself”5 “grand project, beyond the powers of

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3 Refusing, in 1919, the proposal (submitted by P.P. Negulescu) to accept a university career in philosophy, as a student and, later, doctor of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Bucharest (with the thesis The Aesthetic Manner of Theater, published in 1937), Hillel scholar (1914), involved in the formation of the Romanian opera (1914), Camil Petrescu was an outstanding personality of his time: novelist, poet, playwright, journalist, elected Member of the Romanian Academy (from 1948) and Director of the National Theater (during the period 1939-1941). In the publishing field, Camil Petrescu was a collaborator for the journal Sămănătorul (The Sower), editor-in-chief of publications such as Banatul/Banatul românesc (Banat/Romanian Banat) (1919-1921), Limba Română (The Romanian Language) (1920), Țara (The Country) (1920-1921), editor of the Săpătămâna muncii intelectuale (Intellectual Labor Weekly) (1924), Cetatea literara (The Literary Citadel) (1925-1926) and of Universul literar (The Literary Universe) (1927-1929), editor of the Revista Fundațiilor Regale (The Magazine of Royal Foundations) (1940-1942) and member of the Shrătorul (The Flyer) Cenacle (from 1920 until the moment of public separation from the aforementioned assembly, in 1933).

His tumultuous, spectacularly nonconformist biography [although reticent in offering autobiographical details] (Anton Adâmuț), sincere and genuine (Maria Voda Căpușan), lacking “meaningless civil details” (Irina Petraș) begins in the Obov neighborhood, and will later record the mission assumed by Camil Petrescu as a campaigner for Romania’s entrance into the War, and then as a volunteer in the Romanian Army (1916) where, being wounded (and losing hearing in one ear), he ends up as a prisoner (in the Sopronyek camp). Returning to Bucharest in 1918, Camil Petrescu debuted in 1913 in the Rampa (The Ramp) magazine, signing with various pseudonyms: as Raul D, in the pages of the magazine Facla (The Flame, 1914); or as R, Radical and K-Mill in Cronica (The Chronicle). Scientific research will complement the continuous literary-cultural activity of Camil Petrescu, consisting in the publication of novels, short stories, poetry volumes, notes, records, plays and theatreology, such as: Teze și antiteze (Theses and antitheses, 1936), Modalitatea estetică a teatrului (The aesthetic Manner of Theater, 1937), Husserl—cu o introducere în filosofia fenomenologică (Husserl—with an introduction into phenomenological philosophy, in The Philosophical Encyclopedia, 1938) and Doctrina substanței (The Doctrine of Substance, 1940).


5 Ibidem.
philosophical fulfillment”⁶, with “the essential intent of constituting an ontology”⁷, elaborated during a decade and drafted during the 1939-1941 period (with a final variant reviewed between 1954-1955 and expected to appear in 1986) The Doctrine of Substance represents “a work of maturity” (“I will return to philosophy when I am 40”⁸), a rethinking of the world from the perspective of substance⁹. A difficult labor, creating maximum discomfort, a “relentlessly interrupted”, delayed and postponed process of elaboration of the work, at the same time unevenly influenced and constrained by a multitude of disturbing events and the “assembly of difficulties arising out of a world war”, by various health problems (liver disease) of the author and the ostentatious envy of his colleagues¹⁰. In the stated context, the proposed project could be completed only in two small volumes (being originally planned in 14-15 volumes).

Launching a coherent and unitary system of ideas, in the rigorous spirit of philosophical architecture, Camil Petrescu emits and funds a particular attitude built with “theorizing force”, impregnated by the ideatic power of attraction of both Bergsonian intuitionism and Husserlian phenomenology¹¹. Camil Petrescu's interior structure is marked both by “passionate intensity” and “cerebral, lucid analysis”, enlisted into links with substantial (non-reported) valences¹².

As an “intellectual of exemplary value”, defined by the talent – intelligence - pathos¹³ triad, Camil Petrescu is an “innovator philosopher” who formulates and launches a method of philosophy that combats modernist empiricism, being concerned with out-performing and overcoming the blockages of “modernist rudiments without theoretical coverage”. But he is equally an artisan of autonomous philosophies (Noica insists on the original, privately-Camilpetrescian vision, which, though “momentarily” joined with phenomenology, manages to become autonomous from it)¹⁴, given any component levels of architectural structure - the theory of knowledge-sociology-aesthetics, and recognizing, as its starting point (not gnoseology but) sociology, Camil Petrescu’s philosophy respects the prerogatives, perspective and

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⁹ Zamfirescu, cited works, p.17.
¹⁰ Camil Petrescu, Doctrina substantei (The Doctrine of Substance), p. 51.
¹¹ Aurel Petrescu, Opera lui Camil Petrescu (Camil Petrescu’s Work), The Didactic and Pedagogical Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972.
¹² Lucian Raicu, Sensul autenticității (The Sense of Authenticity), in Viața Românească (The Romanian Life), no. 5, May 1958, p. 25.
¹³ Ovidiu Ghidirimic, Camil Petrescu sau patosul lucidității (Camil Petrescu or the Pathos of Lucidity), Scrisul Românesc Publishing House, Craiova, 1975.
¹⁴ Constantin Noica, Introducerea lui Camil Petrescu la Doctrina substantei (Introduction to Camil Petrescu, at the Doctrine of Substance), in Manuscriptum, no. 3, 1983, p. 68.
coordinates emitted by the “French personaliste groups” as his sources, or resources, through deports from Descartes, Hegel, Bergson, Husserl and Kant. Anticipating observations of wordy and confusing expressions, “painstakingly” attached to the philosophical work, as well as the status of “explicit non-philosopher” deferred to Camil Petrescu, Constantin Noica established in a prefatory manner the originality of his concepts and emphasizes the value of his ideas and their prophetic overtones.

Integrated in a series of “contradictory” authors (fantastic, seriously headstrong, “self-important solitary”), Camil Petrescu “continues to entangle his interpreters”; The Doctrine of Substance is “harder to overcome” (in reading) than Blaga’s Trilogies (in a comparison between Camil Petrescu and Lucian Blaga, I. Ianoși remarks upon the first philosopher’s advantage, excelling through his profile of “exuberant Latin, willing to jump, directly over the heads of any so-called unilateral logicians, straight to his own Proustian insights [...])

Ion Dur believes The Doctrine of Substance to be “a progressive description” which, in agreement with the author's mathematical background, replaces logical definitions with the resistance structure of postulates”, without omitting any “slips into essay-ism” already glimpsed by Noica. To the specifications set forth by Noica, Ion Dur adds the exclusivity and ultra-specialization of a categorizing apparatus, the luxuriantly-complicated form, the apodictically-ambiguous explanation and, sometimes, a lack of precision and an emptying of meaning. All of these, however, do nothing to diminish the effect of “powerful antidote for the laziness of the mind”, or the “extreme tension of maintaining intelligence in the act”, which imprint and obsess Camil Petrescu’s “actual, living and exciting philosophy”, “from its first manifestations”, until the submission of the Doctrine manuscript to the Vatican, in October 1942.

The Doctrine of Substance reveals those requirements of philosophy already found in a “cult of the real”, in the “primacy of a concrete sphere of reality needed in one’s travels towards the knowledgeable pole”, and its corollary, expressed through the “installation in history”.

2. Theory of values. Ethics and Noocracy

Theory of values. Ethics and Noocracy, practical and illustrative chapters of the philosophical system developed by Camil Petrescu, are parts that complement and extend his ontological considerations by ethical-political reflections, individualizing the political philosophy of the author, in the direct

17 Ion Dur, cited works.
18 Ibidem.
and innovatory sense in which “noocracy represents, inside his system, what the political, as expressed in the Republic, represents for Plato’s system”.

Placing itself within the near scope of Hans Driesch’s Ethics, which he allows to be corrected by the insistent analysis granted to the term “value”, Camil Petrescu believes in its vital contribution, in the absence of any studies clarifying the value of philosophy, of not being considered anything other than a “missed” adventure. Through such optics, any hierarchy of values is synonymous with “a preference scale of preferences”, any prioritization of the criterion being invested with an essential plus for any conscious activity. This stresses the view that ethics is identified with noocracy: noocracy represents, as an act and a process “of coordinating historical preferences with the hierarchy of structures”, the very formulation of orthology; and the ethical criterion is the historical equivalent of noocracy.

The practical character and connection criterion for the current period (of careful attention given to “problems debated during the drafting of these notes”), found in the present chapter, show the importance given to “organic purity” considered as a hybrid, an antithetic element of history. Between the influence of the biological in social thought and the birth of bio-politics, disregarding the data of substantial equation, through the confusion of structure and meaning, “an organic inequality has become dogma”, involving old forms - inequality of individuals - and new methods - ethnic and racial inequality. Launching important clarifications, included in the sphere of moral concerns in the political domain (“organic inequality is evident in outlying areas, or even in higher ones, but there is a common organic pool, much deeper, more structured and more meaningful”), Camil Petrescu believes “that the masses are sensibly equal” and refers to differences regarding “the quality of categories which create great stylistic differences”, the solution of racist purism being, from the point of view of substance, a priori flawed. Noocracy is called upon to express both the function and the aim of identifying appropriate solutions for the situation “because, for the time being, it would follow that such a dialectic ethnicity would create, on the one hand, nations conductive of culture, but without substantial agents - and, on the other hand, peoples which, by the number of hybrid individuals (...) (we note) would constitute a hostile, destructive environment for any substantial agents.” The Dactilogram of the text contained in the Attachments contains an appendage focused on noogenics, perceived as practicing a “kind of racism” based, however, on a doctrine which is different from the honest, jointly and politically solidary imposition of diversity policies upon the act of fecundity.

Reaffirming a degree of implicate danger for the idea of method in knowledge (there is, in the Camil Petrescian Dactilogram, a Reminder centered on page 926: “The scientific spirit has betrayed Science”), Camil Petrescu claims

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21 Zamfirescu, cited works, p. 37.
22 Camil Petrescu, Doctrina substantei II (The Doctrine of Substance), pp. 86-87.
23 Ibidem, p. 105.
24 Ibidem, p. 110.
25 Camil Petrescu, Doctrina substantei (The Doctrine of Substance), Camil Petrescu Fond, 21440, The National Museum of Romania Literature, dossier 8, 726.
that the dialectic gap, automatism and mechanical resolutions, as well as the incidence of deviation angles can be applied, in equal measure, to the case of political activity. And this area also advertises the method of folding activity upon specific reality, in a noosic vision, through identifying “objects consisting of repetitions of facts” supporting ortotechnics through the substantialist method26.

The chapter focused on the subject of noocracy offers favorable arguments to the statement whereby each party group admits the primacy of intelligence, investing it with the powers of an exclusive criterion offering parties the right to leadership. The Camilpetrescian postulate determines that noocracy is individualized by the technique of conquest of power (by referencing material and moral objectives, and a harmonization of political programs and their active elements with its political aims) and through the implementation of the program, noocracy being defined here solely as a method of governance27.

Except for the concrete, substantiate method, all other options are ordered under the sign of needed dialectical laws (with reference to the philosophy of the Enlightenment or to French liberalism), and any previous political methods are considered forms of social mechanics. Opposed to both authoritarian and totalitarian doctrines, liberal doctrines possess a dialectic mechanism of slow functioning: “liberalism creates minor capitalism, minor capitalism creates democracy, i.e. the anonymous society in commerce, which creates the one in politics, and democracy creates major capitalism (...). In the end, revolution becomes inevitable, and both liberal and democratic capitalism are overthrown”28.

“The real sovereign is the one who has decisive and executive power, not the nominal one” says Camil Petrescu, launching the postulate of sovereignty, a demonstration already certified by its “suitability to thinking about itself” and by involvement of logic in the executive decision. Repeatedly bringing the problem to the attention of public opinion, Camil Petrescu believes that “sovereignty belongs to public opinion”, and to the sovereign's ability to shape and manipulate public opinion, the latter becoming the deciding factor for the baseline of the law. The political ideal would therefore consist of noocratic sovereignty, marked by continual analysis and proper thinking, capable of taking instant decisions, in permanent contact with the immediately real and with public opinion, while the sovereign remains connected to specific laws, to necessary and psychological realities29. Any correlation between the sovereign and the social opinion involves two private cases - the ruler is a genius and the ruler is a man; in both cases sovereignty is manifesting itself effectively in the light of their impact on the formation of public opinion through positive or negative actions30.

Camil Petrescu predictably comments on the impediments that affect “any sincerity in feeling and sincerity in thinking”, those inconveniences that falsify the rules of the game and pervert good faith (in this respect, the chapter The

26 Camil Petrescu, Doctrina substantei (The Doctrine of Substance), p. 133.
27 Ibidem, pp. 131-132.
29 Ibidem, pp. 146-147.
30 Ibidem, p. 149.
common sense practical method considers political myopia as a dangerous method, complementary of common sense in politics\(^{31}\). It also notes that more serious difficulties occur in relation with social opinion and with present reality, considered “the definitive Court that decides the fate of the sovereign and the community”. Hence one can conclude that the imperatives of noocracy are: to formulate a “code of social opinion”; and to guarantee defense from any undisturbed noocratic selection through “false values, dangerous myths or misperceived criteria”.\(^{32}\)

Recommending the French example as “model of the apologetic experience”, Camil Petrescu states, as an objective of noocracy, “refuting errors and the unification of intellectual function by establishing its primacy”\(^{33}\), proposing, in that sense, an array of tests for identifying genius children, and insisting on a differently specialized dialectic system, meant to “combat specialization of the relationship and regulative functions of a community, which demonstrates that political values, which are essential values of the State, do not differ from substantial values; and that there is no political specialization and no organizing criteria for the establishment of specific political values”\(^{34}\). Thus reevaluated in a pragmatic way, any theories consolidated by emphasizing the selection of historical values in noocracy will be focused on the way in which “the value criterion requires the structure of a State”, noocracy being now summoned to counter and to fight the erosion of values, by creating an “inscription in the structure of a community” and through innovative elements such as industrial technicization or a codes of intellectual labor.\(^{35}\)

Noocratic values take into account: a selection of essential values, stated and circulated in the activities of government; unveiling and resolving any confusion created between substantive and dialectical values; and the imposition of a climate represented and oriented by the example of the noos. Thus, the noocratical - ortotechnical method in politics recognizes as its specific objective the establishing and explaining of the substantial-dialectic dichotomy, through the mediation of an active political noocracy, able to prescribe rules of conduct and suitable for the identification of appropriate solutions. In fact, noocracy constitutes a form of exceeded organicity, objectivized, with a role in the formation of collective safety patterns, requiring a new dimension of regulative functions, here called “monumental creations of noocracy” – which will be included both in the code of political Justice and in the intellectual labor code\(^{36}\).

3. A Platonic trial, and a practical philosophical and political theory

In this regard, we highlight the key nodes that may confer upon the Camilpetrescian system in general and noocracy in particular, both the quality of Platonic test and the value of practical philosophical and political theory. The

\(^{31}\) Ibidem, p. 157.

\(^{32}\) Ibidem, p. 156.

\(^{33}\) Ibidem, p. 160.

\(^{34}\) Ibidem, p. 179.

\(^{35}\) Ibidem, p. 187.

\(^{36}\) Ibidem, p. 200.
first would express the explicit inference from the proposed title of *The Doctrine of Ideas*, and the second would recommend Plato as a gauge for any differences between science and philosophy (later culture), an influence acknowledged by placing *the Required Noocracy* of the goal, as a motto, at the beginning of the essay; *the world is asking to be governed by philosophers.*

Answering the interrogation “what does the one who looks for a method actually want”, Camil Petrescu proposes a rule that would lead from judgment, through strict enforcement, to knowledge. Moreover, any analysis altogether changes the original data of the problem, by surrendering the essence and focusing on objects\(^{37}\). This particular perspective certifies the idea that “substance is the very principle of history, its marrow” and that “any historic structure is a structure insofar as it participates in substance”: “the science of substance is the substance that is returned upon itself”, and the method no longer belongs to a fixed and automated rule: “the substance is, at the same time, an unpredictable type of becoming”\(^{38}\). Camil Petrescu defines, clarifies and repositions the sense of “understanding” (cross compliance, integration and unification of intuition) and of “right thinking” (indefinite, uninterrupted, rigorous maintenance of the *noosic* pole and the structure of the concrete/reality sphere), within an appropriately-noosic perimeter of “permanent presence, obtained also by transferring concrete substantiates”\(^{39}\).

More than a primacy of the ontological\(^{40}\), or an approach to the revelation and preeminence of the substantalist method of knowledge\(^{41}\) and closer to a viable formula for “the application of the theory of culture and its intrinsic values”\(^{42}\), the reasons underlying the system created by Camil Petrescu are amplified against the backdrop of a particular reaction: the term noocracy is created in order to “atone for a mistake”, powered by “the contempt that social trends and the parties they represent” show towards the intellectual\(^{43}\), with the goal of coagulating a genuine solidarity of intellectuals “in a land of their own, with their own social passport”\(^{44}\).

Camil Petrescu takes on the “intuition of what is and what should be”, an idea formulated by Plato, “augmenting its action on the reader” by augmented contradictions and extrapolated antinomics.

It is necessary, however, to employ a supplementary clarification that is already looming in the “Camil Petrescu Dactilogram” (File 8, 21440/1361-1689), by recourse to a conceptual alternative: any intervention operated on terms such as *intelligentsia* and *intellectual* acts through their substitution with *noocracy* –

\(^{38}\) *Ibidem*, p. 129.  
\(^{40}\) Zamfirescu, *cited works*.  
\(^{42}\) Dur, *op.cit*.  
\(^{43}\) Camil Petrescu, *cited works*, pp. 246-247.  
\(^{44}\) *Ibidem*, p. 248.
noocrat; and any intervention operated on terms such as the verb absolutizes, acts through its substitution with the contextual variant of substantiates.

The destiny of *The Doctrine of Substance* faithfully mimics the significance Camil Petrescu provided for *The Doctrine of Ideas*, as “the huge joke of a genius who gave up”, specifying, however, the uninterrupted itinerary and “long life” of hybrids - a category to which he too belongs, substantiated, through the confluence of science with literature and philosophy. 

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45 *Ibidem*, p. 251. 

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DAVID HUME AND THE CRITIQUE OF MAINSTREAM WESTERN RATIONALITY

Adrian-Paul Iliescu*

ad.paul.il@gmail.com

Abstract: Hume has offered a substantive critique of classic rationalism and his objections to the mainstream principles of rationality are often very convincing. But do they amount to a set of sufficient reasons for abandoning the mainstream ideal of rationality for a new, empiricist and conservative, one? I shall argue that Hume’s approach, as defended by Donald Livingston in his famous book Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, appears to be both promising and (still) much too tentative, insufficiently articulated and vague. On one hand, Hume’s arguments detect correctly many intellectualist errors, but, on the other hand, the suggestions made for replacing the mainstream ideal of rationality with something new are not developed and clarified enough to be convincing.

Keywords: experience, reason, classic rationalism, the critique, human rights.

The publishing of Donald W. Livingston’s seminal book on David Hume’s ‘pathology’ of philosophy, Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, can be seen not just as a turning point in the area of Hume studies, but also as an important moment in a process of ‘revival’ of the Conservative Mind. If Livingston’s interpretation of Hume’s thought is correct, the great Scottish thinker has, at least partially, laid the foundation of a new understanding of rationality, an understanding much closer to conservative ideas and empiricist views than the mainstream „continental” understanding developed inside the Descartes – Kant rationalist tradition which has founded the progressive (even revolutionary) movements and the familiar intellectualist paradigms in Western thought. The Humean understanding has for centuries been ‘buried’ under a ‘mountain’ of classic, mainstream, rationalist works, but its originality deserves an adequate, even if quite late, recognition.

My aim in this paper is neither to assess the validity of Livingston’s interpretation of the Scottish philosopher’s work, nor to defend Hume’s suggestions for a different type of rationality than the one developed under the influence of continental rationalism and programmatic liberalism. The limits of the paper forbid such ample aims. I shall only try to argue that Livingston’s

*Professor, PhD., The Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Director of DIRESS – Center of Research on Intergenerational Justice, Sustainability and Social Responsibility

suggestions and Hume’s ideas (as interpreted by Livingston) are both very promising and (still) much too tentative to stand theoretical scrutiny. Thus, my approach will exhibit a quasi-paradoxical feature, being both supportive and very critical. I shall dwell on Livingston’s ideas and rely entirely upon his original interpretation of Hume, but I shall express a lot of skepticism and restraint as to their applicability (at least as long as their present form is maintained).

Perhaps the best starting point consists in retracing some of the most important features of modern rationalism and their impact in social and political life.

Seeing humans as individuals endowed with (and defined by) Reason, classic rationalism is entirely committed to abstract reasoning and to its supposedly true, inescapable conclusions. Systematic thinking is seen as a triumphal march reaching final, reliable, general truths, in total contrast to any examination of experience which, due to its scarcity, incompleteness and disconcerting variety, is bound to leave us confused and doubtful. Abstractions (principles, axioms, general ideas etc.), as opposed to empirical findings, can be proven as certain, and therefore practice should be founded on them, not on (uncertain or prejudiced) suggestions of experience.

Reason, as the only force capable of reaching final and certain conclusions, must possess the exclusive authority of examining and assessing all results aspiring to compose both theoretical and practical knowledge.

Even if Descartes, the undisputed founder of the modern rationalist tradition, has never said that explicitly, the general implication of this approach to human affairs is that the whole human civilization should be brought in front of the Tribunal of Reason, and, according to its the sentences, should be rebuilt from scratch, so that nothing inside it be left to survive in virtue of dubious origins such as tradition, custom or a venerable history. Consequently, human life, society and institutions should be founded in reason, which is the only authoritative component of our fallible universe. Reason is autonomous, while action, tradition, practice are not – which means that they should simply conform to it.

Continuing the opposite tradition of British empiricism, David Hume interprets human affairs in a sensibly different way. While rationalists stick permanently to the axiom that men and women are individuals endowed with the (quasi-magical) capacity to think, Hume has always in mind the apparently banal and ordinary, but in reality extraordinarily important, fact that humans are born as helpless little beings living, growing and developing inside a family, a community and a society. We are not born as thinking, reflective, individuals; we are actually born as members of human environment, and can only become mature, rational persons by participating in the practices already developed in this environment. Long before we are able to claim our noble and sophisticated status of rational beings, we are creatures of habit, being capable to live and evolve only inside the web of customs and practices that characterize any human community. And that is not just a matter of personal history: generations too, before ripening and reaching the stage at which they can challenge and eventually change the social, moral or intellectual status quo, are living and growing inside the same received status quo, being thus undoubtedly one of its
products. It is only by practicing inside a society and by adopting (for a long time) its customs that humans can develop their rational capacities, critical thinking included; that is why not reason, but social practice, should be seen as the defining element of human personality.

Someone might think that invoking the history of individual and generational development, when we are actually interested in human nature and its enduring cognitive and social achievements, is an error springing from confusion; after all, what a human being is and how she/he has come to be what she/he is now are two different things which should never be confused for each other. While strictly speaking this distinction is correct, the accusation implied in the above objection is not. On one hand, the presence and influence of custom and practice are not just a part of everyone’s past evolution, but much more than that. Practice not only helps us exercise rational thinking, but also gives it meaning, relevance and validation instruments. The primacy of practice does not come exclusively from historic precedence; it comes mainly from its status: we reason about life, in order to solve real life problems, and ultimately confront our theories with real life results. No theoretical result, no rational conclusion, be it as grandiose as we can think, can survive indefinitely to negative verdicts given by practice and real life. On the other hand, Hume’s intention has never been to substitute historical matters (‘how exactly did we manage to become what we are’) to substantive issues like ‘what is human nature’. His point is just that we can never hope to understand correctly human affairs and its fundamental concepts (like human nature, society or freedom) if we neglect human history and abstract its concepts away from the real life situations they were originally embedded in. Here is a good example mentioned by Livingston in his book:

“There is no timeless object called liberty or freedom about which a philosophical spectator can devise a theory. Liberty is a practice that has evolved over time. [...] Hume’s understanding of liberty is not presented through a speculative theory but through narratives of the evolution of the experience of liberty as shaped by the conventions of a common European life. The task of theorizing is to methodize and correct the practices illuminated by these narratives [...]”.  

This reaction of Hume to the exaltation of liberty in his time (a frenzy which was destined to reach its climax 13 years after his death, during the French Revolution) is paradigmatic: freedom should not be seen as the embodiment of an abstraction (the philosophical idea of freedom, or at least a general concept of freedom applicable in all cases); it should be taken as a social phenomenon resulting from various human practices and evolving inside them. Accordingly, human rights, contracts and social contracts, society in itself, institutions, the state etc. are all products of human practice, not materializations of abstract ideas that philosophers can create or elucidate for the rest of helpless,
unknowing, human beings. Reason has, of course, played a major role in the development of all these crucial elements of human life, by criticizing and making proposals of improvement. But reason itself is a product of practice, a faculty shaped by real life problems and functional only inside a particular human practice; it cannot be seen simply as the very foundation of good practices, since it is always also a result of them and of examining them.

According to such an interpretation, thus, man’s fundamental instrument is not abstract reasoning, but custom, and his main, foundational, activity is not reflection, but practice. Abstractions - general ideas, principles etc. - should always be seen as elements in their original context and in their connections with practice, not as self-sufficient, self-standing or independent, bricks composing a rock-bottom on which any human endeavor should be founded. They can be used as abstract ingredients in our attempts to interpret correctly and improve practices, but they are not independent from them and cannot be transformed in universal standards for them. As Livingston remarks, Hume is very critical of the modern habit of treating abstractions as absolute guiding factors of human life:

“The moderns are especially guilty of inverting the proper relation between the principle, rule or ideal and the practice, which is always particular and has a history. For Hume the principle is merely an abridgment of the practice. As abstract principle, it does not constitute the practice and does not ‘guide’ it. Insofar as principles are useful at all in ordering practice, they must themselves be interpreted, not by another abstract rule, but by participants skilled in the practice itself. A principle, being an abstraction from or aspect of a practice, cannot in any particular case illuminate a practice without considering its relation to other aspects of the practice that may be relevant to the issue at hand. And this knowledge is not and cannot be contained in the principle itself”. ³

At this point we can already discern some of the traits of classic rationalism that Hume is criticizing and rejecting. First of all, the tendency to treat abstractions (principles, rules, general ideas) as independent from practices, as self-standing eternal truths to be simply followed mechanically in real life, constitutes a huge error. In fact, the very meaning and usefulness of abstractions depend upon the original practices they were embedded in (and abstracted from), so that any correct understanding and application of them requires a good grasp of those practices. Only people who have such a good knowledge of the original practices can interpret and use adequately the corresponding abstractions. It is thus not the case that by simply invoking general ideas or principles anyone could shape adequately practice in new instances, without paying attention to the original connections between such abstractions and the practices they were from the very beginning rooted in. As a matter of fact, a real capacity to use abstractions in real life implies to be able to compare the original practice, which has inspired our abstract ideas, to new ones, and check the

³ Ibidem, p.122.
relevant similarities; in the process of comparing and understanding practices, we realize what the abstractions derived from the original practice really mean and we can use them accordingly. But that never means that by simply being familiar with the definition of some general idea we could use it correctly in order to shape and direct practice.

Let me provide an example which could illuminate the sense of the above remarks. Contracts are fundamental instruments of human interaction in the modern world, since they support coordination between agents by compelling them to fulfill their promises. Carrying out the tasks implied by the contract is the defining obligation for all contracting parties. Thus, for the modern mind, contracts are ‘sacred’ (in a figurative, non-religious sense of the world), i.e. they exist to be respected and not to be broken. Anyone can understand the abstract idea that ‘contract’ means a series of obligations to be fulfilled by the contracting parties. The original practice in which the idea of contract is rooted was the agreement between equally well-informed and equally free agents, who knowingly accepted their respective benefits and costs. Such agreements are of course fair, and all parties can legitimately ask that obligations implied by the contract be fulfilled in due time. People who only know the abstract definition of a contract might expect that in any particular case contracts are binding, since they are ‘sacred’ for the parties involved. But in real life, there is often the case that one party takes advantage of the weaknesses of other contracting parties, such as lack of relevant information (e.g., there is an asymmetry of information between contracting parties, so that one party can extract unfair benefits at the expense of other parties) or duress (e.g., one party is compelled by its difficult, inescapable, situation to accept excessive costs or less than adequate benefits, while another party extracts excessive, undeserved, profits from the agreement the former had been compelled to accept). Who is only familiar with the abstract idea of contract and is guided by the simple feeling of ‘sanctity’ of contracts, will never be able to deal with such special situations. On the contrary, by relating the abstract idea to the original practice, one can notice that enforcing the contract in such particular situations is a different practice from the one in which the very idea of contract was embedded and rooted: while the latter involved equally well-informed and equally free parties, the former is based on asymmetry of knowledge and of freedom. If, instead of applying mechanically the idea of contract and enforcing the contract in virtue of its ‘sanctity’, we realize that the original practice was deeply different from the present one, our conduct will change: we shall decide that the present contract had been unfair, since one of the parties has taken advantage of the weaknesses of the other, and ask for a suspension of the obligations imposed to the latter. In such a case, therefore, it is not the abstract idea of contract that guides us, but rather a deeper understanding of what contracts were meant to be, according to the original practice in which they were rooted.

And what is the source of this ‘deeper’ understanding? Its source is definitely not abstract thinking, but rather return to the original practice, to what custom and tradition tell us about contracts. Wisdom, thus, consists more in a
capacity to recover the original meanings preserved by custom, than in an abstract reasoning detached from tradition.

It is at such points and in such cases that Hume’s suggestions for a new understanding of rationality can be grasped. While continental rationalism - the ‘Descartes line’- claimed that real life situations should be solved exclusively according to the conclusions of abstract (certain) reasoning, as if reason was autonomous, self-sufficient and endowed with full founding power, the kind of rationality suggested by Hume is based on the idea that not reason, but custom is autonomous and powerful enough to guide human conduct. As Livingston puts it,

“Hume’s reform brings to awareness a new principle that I shall call the autonomy of custom, which places limits on the previously unrestrained autonomy of reflection. Where emancipated philosophy has presumed custom to be false unless certified by autonomous reflection, Hume’s new principle is that custom is presumed true unless shown to be otherwise, and where showing it to be otherwise presupposes the authority of custom as a whole”.4

It is important to remember that Hume attributes the cult of Abstraction - the error of taking abstractions as constituting the rock-bottom of wisdom and practice - to theoretical thinking and especially to philosophy. Philosophers often think that they possess a special kind of knowledge, autonomous from common life and thought, from practice and tradition, in the light of which they are entitled to judge customs, ordinary ideas and principles, inherited values and rules, widespread human ideals and aims. David Hume has no such illusion. According to him, philosophical wisdom is not a separate source of definitive sentences on ordinary knowledge, history, and practice, but simply a specialized, nuanced, systematized part of it. Philosophical conclusions are not, as it were, gems brought from another planet to the Earth in order to replace the ordinary stones to be found everywhere on our planet, but rather finely cut and well XXX pieces made from these stones. As he specifies in his famous Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, “Philosophical decisions are nothing but reflections of common life, methodized and corrected”.

But mainstream rationalism neglects this important truth. Reason, as used by many philosophers who occupy a main place in the dominant Western tradition, is always prone to go too far, to transgress the limits of what may be deemed as ‘reasonable’ and to impose its abstractions in areas where they are not justifiably used. Philosophers, Hume claims, are characterized by two strong and persistent vices: a special kind of enthusiasm, the effect of which is that unbound and uncontrolled imagination takes the lead (the typical philosophical vice is enthusiasm;5 and arrogance, which has the consequence that reason neglects its own limits and its own dependence upon experience (custom, practice). The latter generates the permanent tendency to separate abstractions from practice and to treat them as self-sufficient, self-standing, reliable instruments to be used.

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5 Ibidem, p. 227.
in solving both theoretical and practical problems, and also in judging (evaluating) everything else. The former determines one to push abstractions too far, beyond the limits in which they can be legitimately used. Philosophers are particularly prone to adopt this mistaken strategy:

“There is one mistake, to which they seem liable, almost without exception; they confine too much their principles, and make no account of that vast variety, which nature has so much affected in all her operations. When a philosopher has once laid hold of a favourite principle, which perhaps accounts for many natural effects, he extends the same principle over the whole creation, and reduces to it every phenomenon, though by the most violent and absurd reasoning. Our own mind being narrow and contracted, we cannot extend our conception to the variety and extent of nature; but imagine, that she is as much bounded in her operations, as we are in our speculation”.

How should we make sense of this critique? First of all, it should be mentioned that although here Hume speaks explicitly about philosophers, his diagnosis refers to a more general mistake, an intellectualist one, by which principles (abstractions) are transformed from limited and local explanatory means (subordinated to the practices they are abstracted from) into general, or universal Procrustean schemes to which everything should be subjected. The whole diversity (to be found in the real world and in real life through experience) is artificially reduced to a philosophically-constructed unity, a sort of man-made abstract monotony is substituted to the natural variety of things and features. By some sort of intellectual alchemy or magic (the mistaken strategy of the intellect is alchemy), heterogeneity is transformed into an artificial homogeneity.

In order to clarify these ideas about the reduction, transformation and deformation that Reason imposes to reality, I think that one should concentrate on the following list:

By applying its procedures, Reason changes abstractions and principles from

i/ context-dependent to context-independent

ii/ relative and tentative to absolute and certain

iii/ subordinated to certain practices into something that practices are supposed to conform to

iv/ an instrument useful for understanding some practices (or some particular cases) into some supreme metaphysical scheme that any practice should conform to (into a norm); all cases, not just some, are thus bound to be seen as illustrations of a general scheme which, though, had been ‘extracted’ just from some particular cases.

v/ thus, something we have tried to understand nature through becomes something that nature is expected to conform to. Real world simply becomes the embodiment of our abstractions.

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6 D. Hume, The Sceptic, p. 159-160.

7 D. Livingston, Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, cited works, p. 43, 91.
Several examples, the presentation of which will not be made here since they are extensively described in Livingston’s book, can illustrate this fallacious strategy. Perhaps the most telling is the classic philosophical move, made in the 17th and 18th centuries, from contracts (as specific ingredients of a particular human practice) to the founding Social Compact; which supposedly has founded civil society. In the modern world, contracts (as particular agreements between particular agents) are everywhere present, their reality and importance are obvious; we cannot do without them, they are extremely important to us, we cannot imagine how could we manage without them – it is thus nothing wrong with giving contracts a very prominent place inside civilization. But the “founding social compact” is something else, a completely different matter. There is, and can be, absolutely no real trace of such a contract, no experiential or historic background for it. The grand social compact is, in fact, nowhere – it is rather a philosophical invention, a figment of imagination. Thus, the «Original contract theory is a corrupt form of the philosophical act: a fragment of experience (contractual relations) is spiritualized into the whole, thereby concealing real differentiations in common life».8

A similar error, also a good illustration of the same mistaken Rationalist strategy, is the familiar modern tendency to move from rights acknowledged inside a civilized society (a legitimate political practice) to natural human rights that should found society (and any kind of political practice) – which can hardly be detected in history. If we pay attention to real facts, we can easily notice that although societies may recognize and guarantee certain rights, there is absolutely no society or community which was founded on rights. In opposition to associations, which can be founded upon explicitly granted rights and explicitly specified duties, society is never actually based on rights and duties, although rights and duties can be acknowledged inside it. The explicit rights and liberties are always provided inside an implicit form of life: that is, rights are defined within practices, but they can never founded them.

Once one has noticed this major feature of social reality, one can easily explain the primacy of experience over principles on which a non-rationalist rationality could rely. Indeed, we have to acknowledge that experience simply is

a/ the source of inspiration for our principles

b/ the background knowledge against which we interpret principles (for, of course, abstract principles can be interpreted in various, not necessarily reconcilable, ways, and we often need a guide in order to find the right interpretation for them)

c/ the context inside which we can test principles and find empirical reasons to choose among rival principles.

Consequently, principles and abstractions should never be seen as independent from, or in general superior to, experience, but rather the other way round, as Hume would probably claim in accord to his inclination to see

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8 Ibidem, p. 129, 186.
9 Ibidem, p. 364; see also p. 133.
10 Ibidem, p. 364; see also p. 310.
principles as *mere abridgments of practices*. In the light of the three arguments for the primacy of practice or experience over reason listed above, we can only agree with Hume’s conviction that “philosophers do not and cannot philosophize independently of pre-reflective custom”.\(^\text{11}\)

The second error, committed from arrogance, is considered by Hume as particularly pernicious, since it brings with it a new, very special, kind of barbarism: *the barbarism of refinement*. Refinement, in the context of Hume’s critique of rationalism, is not a term of praise, but rather the label of process by which natural, valuable, things are transformed into unnatural, pernicious ones:

> “ ‘Refinement’ is used here not in the sense in which the awkward motions of the body are refined by the art of dance into graceful movements, but in the sense in which refined sugar is unhealthy”.\(^\text{12}\)

In its single-mindedness, its obsession with generalizations and its permanent tendency towards abstractions, Reason extracts some ingredients from real things, labels them ‘essences’, and preserve them as the only important items of reality – and in this process throws away other valuable components which have not be acknowledged as important. Multidimensional real things are thus reduced to unidimensional artificial objects. For Hume, refinement is akin to “a chemical refinement whereby the bouquet, color and body of wine is refined away, leaving the poison of mere alcohol”.\(^\text{13}\) The abstractions, so much praised by rationalism, are often - according to Hume - mere expressions of a barbarism of refinement.\(^\text{14}\)

In his offensive against the barbarism of refinement, Hume rejects universal principles as the main method of regulating conduct, and treats them not as self-standing indicators, but as synthetic extracts of practice, which are underdetermined by practice, not imposable to it.\(^\text{15}\) He rejects theoretical constructions based upon such principles, abstract universal models, and social engineering enterprising resulting from such models. The Scottish thinker prefers to use rules and principles as mere means to methodize and improve practices or customs,\(^\text{16}\) not as a means to build up from scratch something entirely new (a new society, a new form of life etc.).

But even if we empathize with David Hume’s anti-rationalist approach, with his precaution against indiscriminate use of abstractions, unidimensional principles and generalities, we still need to look very carefully into the matter of ‘various rationalities’ which is brought in the forefront here. The main question, I submit, is whether the critique of classic rationalism made by Hume amounts to laying the foundations of a new type of rationality, or it is simply an approach that points out the weaknesses of ‘continental’ rationalist thought and warns us

\(^{11}\) Ibidem, p. 56.  
\(^{12}\) Ibidem, p. 43.  
\(^{13}\) Ibidem, p. 219.  
\(^{14}\) Ibidem, p. 128.  
\(^{15}\) Ibidem, p. 44.  
\(^{16}\) Ibidem, p. 56.

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about its risks. Does Hume’s critique show that mainstream rationalism is fundamentally flawed, so that we are bound to engage in a completely new enterprise of developing a new kind of rationality? Or is it just a much-needed complement and antidote to its errors, which should be corrected but not taken as sufficient reasons for its demise? In order to answer these questions, we have to assess the full force and effectiveness of Livingston plea for the ‘Conservative’ wisdom hidden in Hume’s work.

Confronted with this task, we soon discover that what we face here is a very familiar situation: the critique made by Hume (and supported by Livingston) to mainstream rationalism is convincing and useful; taking it seriously we might feel the inclination to agree on the conclusion that a new type of rationality can and should be developed starting from Humean premises. But, at the same time, when trying to articulate the main elements of such a new kind of rationality, we also feel that we are very far from being ready to describe it and to count on it. In other words, the negative component (the critique) is strong; but the positive ones (the pillars for a new construction) are still weak and insufficient.

The first point to be made is the following. While it is undeniable that many philosophers who were faithful to the mainstream rationalist tradition, and rationalist thinking in general, have often extended the use of abstractions beyond reasonable limits and have overstretched the applicability of general principles, it is still hard to decide whether what we actually need is ‘a new type of rationality’ based on experience and custom (instead of reason and principles), or simply a set of corrections and amendments to the classic rationalist strategies. It is indeed the case that intellectualist-minded thinkers tend often to over-generalize, to separate principles from experience, or at least from their original real-life contexts, and to treat them as absolute truths. Thus, the critique made by Hume appears as useful and promising, in the sense that it might be very fruitful.

But what does that exactly imply? Should we condemn the very use or only the abuse of abstractions and principles? Should we abandon classic ideals of rationality (based on the idea that reason guides practice), or should we merely correct its mistakes, deviations and exaggerations? Do we really need a new type of rationality, based on experience and custom instead of reason and principles, or we only need a much better technique of using principles and abstractions? The answer to these questions is not obvious at all. Many people will be tempted to say that the instrument (reason, classic rationality) cannot be made responsible (and dismissed) for the wrong use given to it by some intellectualist authors.

The second point is that sometimes the guiding ideas provided by the plea for a ‘new rationality’ are much too vague and inconclusive. Take, for instance, Livingston’s thesis that for Hume, principles are «abridgment of the practice», not a guide to it. What should we make out of that? Even if principles are ‘abridged’ from practice, they should be capable of meaning something, of making a claim and consequently of being used as indications or partial guides in

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17 Ibidem, p. 122
other instances. Why wouldn’t abridgments of past practice be usable as guiding items for future action? Their origin (in past practice) shouldn’t preclude their use as guiding elements for future activities: \textit{original source is not a substitute for future use.} If principles and abstractions cannot be, or shouldn’t be, used as guides, we still need to be told why: the complete set of reasons for this restriction don’t seem evident. Until then, we might suspect that there is some confusion behind the suggestion that principles cannot guide practice because they are abridgments of it.

Then, the idea that the role of reason should be replaced by the role of ‘critically examined tradition’ is also unclear and (as it stands) potentially confused. It is obvious that tradition does not simply ‘speak for itself’. What tradition consists in and how it should be assessed is heavily dependent on how we understand it, how we interpret it, how we evaluate it. But if we are to fulfil these tasks, we need to use reason – for how else could we understand, interpret and assess experience than by applying rational thinking to it? Here again we might suspect there was a confusion behind the apparent exclusive disjunction ‘either reason, or the ‘critically examined tradition’. None of these two elements can be in charge alone: reason needs experience as its object, while experience needs reason as interpreting capacity. The above disjunction, as an exclusive one, is simply false. Moreover, tradition can be interpreted in various ways, according to different principles, general ideas and premises; acknowledging this leads us to suspect that also the exclusive disjunction ‘either tradition, or principles’ is false too.

The next point is that we are not told clearly how exactly the ‘critically examined tradition’ could operate in order to replace principles as the driving factor and as the source for improvements. Consider for instance the modern women’s claims to equality of status and opportunities, claims which are now largely accepted both by progressives and by conservatives. Invoking abstract principles (like ‘all human beings are born equal’) has undoubtedly constituted an useful instrument in the attempt to support women’s emancipation. The universal principles, be they as dogmatic as they could be (or as one could perceive them to be), could be used to promote women’s rights and emancipation in virtue, perhaps, precisely of their ‘absolute’ and ‘context independent’ character. In contradistinction, it is very unclear what an alternative strategy of promoting women’s rights would have been. It is hard to see how a ‘conservative’ re-examination of traditions could have led to the progressive conclusion that the women’s status should be changed and new rights should be granted to them. A similar question can be raised about racism. The ‘liberal-progressive’ idea of the original equality between men has obviously contributed to promoting ideas of equality between races. What exactly could a conservative re-examination of traditions, as required by the supposed new ‘rationality ideal’ suggested by Hume, do in order to promote the idea of equality between races is not obvious at all. It is the burden of the proponent to clarify such things.

It would be extremely useful to have a vivid example of how a certain political problem could have been solved, or how a justified political ideal could have been promoted, by simply scrutinizing and criticizing traditions, instead of
applying abstract principles of the kind the classic Rationalist tradition relied upon. But, as far as I know, no developed, convincing, example of this kind has been given.

A quite strong argument for Hume’s approach is that the rationalist principle ‘everything should be subjected to rational critique and accepted only after Reason has certified its truth or adequacy’ is extremely unrealistic. In fact, we never doubt everything, we never try to subject all our ideas or traditions to rational critique: we only check the reliability of some ideas or customs, principles or traditions, and that happens only when we feel that such a verification was needed. Thus, “Hume’s new principle” that “custom is presumed true unless shown to be otherwise”\(^\text{18}\) appears to be very convincing. But what does “unless shown to be otherwise” mean? Showing that what is customary thought or assumed as valid is true implies an exercise of reason, within which some general ideas or principles will necessarily be used. But then, while it is correct that we often presume customs to be true and we don’t subject them to rational verifications (as Descartes would have required), it is also correct that sometimes we need to acknowledge that we have been wrong – which again presupposes rational verification. Consequently, it is not clear at all that relying on custom, not on reason, as the ‘foundation’ of human knowledge and civilization could dispense us of relying on reason.

Livingston highly regards the Humean idea that ‘the task of theorizing is to methodize and correct the practices’, not to reject practices altogether and to invent new ones (for experience, and not reason, tradition, not abstract invention, are the pillars of civilization). But we might doubt that a strategy of merely amending permanently the same old practices can be very successful in the long term. By methodizing and correcting, one is stuck to a permanent «mending and fixing» policy and to continuous adaptive attempts. Such a pragmatic and incrementalist policy is less exposed to the errors springing from great universal recipes (such as laissez faire fundamentalism or socialist fundamentalism) but it is not completely error proof, for not only dogmatism (ideological rigidity) but also opportunism can lead one astray. Pragmatic decisions might be wrong, in exactly the same measure (although not in exactly the same way, since they don’t spring from dogmatism) as ideologically-oriented decisions. When horrified by the mistakes generated by ideologies, we can be tempted to think that pragmatic incrementalism is always to be preferred. But the pragmatic/incrementalist strategy can become very costly, and this can be shown by appeal to an analogy. The conservative politician could be compared to a scientist who refuses to abandon one’s old theory and keeps mending it – maintaining it afloat by endless adding of ad hoc hypotheses and excepting clauses. Can such a strategy be always successful? To what extent? Any theory can be saved (from falsification) if enough many supplementary hypotheses and excepting clauses are added to it; but the whole system would, in time, become hardly manageable and efficiency would gradually be lost. In the same vein, we are entitled to ask: doesn’t a moment come where the old system of political and

\(^\text{18}\) Ibidem, p. 21
economic arrangements (traditions, customs) needs to be abandoned, for a newer and more efficient one? Couldn’t there be a certain point where mending and fixing have to stop, while global reconstruction should step in? And if such moments can arrive, what conservatives should do at the critical points, since they do not possess any «book» (any theory) about how things should ideally work? What or who is expected to prompt them the right way of arranging things and of solving problems?

The plea for a new type of rationality, based upon experience (methodized and corrected), not on reason, on custom (examined critically), not on principles, on traditions, not on revolutions, did not yet provide adequate answers to the above questions. One cannot exclude the possibility that further arguments could consolidate the claim that a new type of rationality should be developed, starting from Humean suggestions. But, for the time being, neither Hume’s original remarks, not Donald Livingston’s plea for them, have the full force and clarity that are needed for such an achievement.

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Abstract: The article is devoted to philosophical explication of the nature and content of contemporary Intellectual Property (IP) conception, its features, main contradictions and possible ways of their smoothing or even resolving in the context of post-industrial information-dependent society. There was made an attempt of systematic presentation of controversial aspects inside the existing models of intellectual property relations. Some of those contradictions treated as a driving force of development in the intellectual sphere.

There were traced some significant episodes in cultural genesis of Intellectual Property institution, its ontological foundation, possible social-philosophic typology for the intellectual property, its justificatory problems in the open society. An important question for this research is reconsidering of the ethical and informational aspects of IP nature, the meaning of lobbying phenomenon, a correlation between knowledge and innovations, and the growing influence of NBIC-convergence.

In conclusion it was made an emphasis on the strategic role of the Intellectual Property institution in human progress. It’s supposed that the future positive dynamics of the IP institution’s development is connected with global liberalization of intellectual property law, in complex with other essential measures appropriate to their time.

Keywords: intellectual property, society, social institutions, intellect, innovations, information, knowledge, creativity, humanitarian development, monopoly over knowledge, free culture.

Introduction

Selected problematic’s relevance is determined by the increasing weight and significance of intellectual property at the Information age. The Intellectual Property institution has become an inalienable sociocultural attribute of post-industrial society. The reflection on mentioned issues is performed within the social-philosophic doctoral research for Intellectual Property Institution as one of the most significant social institutes of information-dependent & postmodern (in some aspects) society.

* PhD. in Philosophy, Doctoral applicant / Philosophy, Sociology & Sociocultural activities management department, South Ukrainian National Pedagogical University named after K.D. Ushynsky, associate professor of Odessa National Maritime University / Faculty of Law (Odessa, Ukraine) [http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8001-4223]
**The aim of research** is the social-philosophic comprehension for controversial aspects of the Intellectual Property institution’s existence, functioning and development in the context of global informational & cultural processes that determine the important vectors in life of contemporary society.

**Methodological grounds** in respect of studying for social contradictions inside the Intellectual Property institution are based upon a systemic approach, as well as comparative, dialectical, formal-legal, historical, structural & functional methods.

1. **Reflections on the ontological foundation of intellectual property**

Socio-philosophical definition of intellectual property can not be inferred without ontological foundation’s analysis in respect of this type of property. The difference between two branches of the property – “intellectual property” and “property in rem” – is based on the ontological distinction between “the ideas” and “the things”\(^1\).

While considering the results of intellectual and material activities, the fundamental difference does not arise between these two products. However, there is a difference at the preceding level – while creation of conditions for the conversion of a product into commodity. The difference consists in a strategy of “rarity creation”. This is a main condition for the sale of any goods, as so called “artificial rarity” causes the increased demand. It is naturally impossible to sell the product if the customer has already possessed it.

In case of material things (property in rem) the rarity of goods emerges due to singularity of the thing existing. In a sense, the reality itself helps to ensure compliance with the law. If the manufacturer of goods produced and sold it – then he has none of these goods no more. Accordingly in the case of “property in rem” the “bundle” of rights is associated with a specific unit of product. But if the composer has created a new tune and made it a commodity – has sold someone the license rights for the song – it still remains with him actually, also becoming the property of those who has purchased a license. I.e. in case of the intellectual labor products, the rarity (an absolute rarity, if we talk about masterpieces) occurs only at the stage of creation, as a manifestation of the creator’s identity. At the stages following the creation – stage of copying and stage of distribution – the intellectual labor product is no longer rare. Consequently in order to make it a commodity, it is necessary an “artificial rarity” to be created and maintained at the reproduction and distribution stages\(^2\).

This fact (meant the difference in the socio-economic and legal-philosophic status of the production making property “in rem” and “intelligent” production) was not so obvious in the “pre-computer” era, because the copy still had been a

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rather resource-intensive tangible operation associated with significant costs (as keeping of printing houses, press machines, reproducing equipment, etc.). Moreover, the resulting copy of the authentic work has always been tangibly real, that allowed to provide some binding to the rights of “real property”. But situation has changed dramatically with the massive introduction of information technologies into life – mechanisms of instant copying and extremely fast long-distance mass transfer of information with minimal costs, that have appeared in the last decade of the XX century and become accessible for common use, did the issue of “artificial rarity” for intellectual products extremely acute and vital.

Setting aside the legal approach, but using a cybernetic approach, we can fix that any image, text or sound (as a copyright objects) could be represented in binary code. From the viewpoint of Cybernetics, information is a code structure, which gives to the idea a capability to be realized. The data medium (a particular material embodiment) loses any significant role in this case. Accordingly, in such a way intellectual property can be represented as “ownership for structure”, embodied in any medium. The term “structure” allows us to move away from the dichotomy of “the ideas” and “the things”, becoming the basis for another specification.

Thus, reasoning about the ontological basis of intellectual property, we come to understanding that, above all, the essence of intellectual property is a unique information structure, embodied in a particular physical medium. The intellectual property itself, in the context of social philosophy, could be considered as a special form of public relations arising on the possession, disposal, property enjoyment in respect of objects, that have the unique information structure, which is protected by a patent or a copyright certificate. And because the information after its publication objectively loses its “natural rarity”, to support further demand for it, legally sanctioned mechanism of “artificial rarity” is used. That one associated with the restriction of free access to this information structure within the time period, indicated in the form of terms of legal protection for different types of intellectual property.

2. A possible social-philosophic typology for the Intellectual Property

Philosophic approaches enable some new grounds for expansion of the existing intellectual property’s typology. However, the implementation of any new, not so obvious varieties of intellectual property should be confirmed and illustrated with examples from reality, and shouldn’t go against the legal classification. It should not make unsolvable contradictions.

Abstracting from the juridical classification of intellectual property, it becomes evident an existence of broader horizons for possible classification criteria, than the law offers in respect of this specific kind of property. In particular, the social philosophy may provide a supplement to existing law typology with such less obvious grounds as intellectual property’s classification by origin, by substance and by certain other criteria.

While studying various social relations connected with intellectual property, we also have to take into account the realities of open civil society, global
informatization, post-industrialism and postmodernity, as well as the private law specificity of the Intellectual Property institution. So we need compare social-philosophic patterns of intellectual property and legal ones, in accordance with national laws and international conventions.

There is some ambiguity can be seen in the sense of private and personal property and their conjunction. In fact the phenomenon of ownership has an extremely controversial social assessment. The history of philosophic thought knows very different views of the property, sometimes even antagonistic. Thus A. Smith\(^3\) considers a property as a “foundation of social stability” and “a basic system of natural liberty”. Another vision that “the division of labor and the private property are identical effects” shows K. Marx\(^4\), giving his sentence: “a property is possession of results of the others’ work”. In the first chapter of his treatise “What is property?” P. Proudhon\(^5\) expounds the main motive of whole work: “property is a theft”. According to F. Engels\(^6\), a property is prerequisite and one of underlying causes for the state genesis. Some of these aspects were already enlightened in another scientific paper, dedicated specially to the problem of social-philosophic typology for the Intellectual Property\(^7\).

Such a variety of ideas about nature of the property does not improve the understanding of intellectual property phenomenon, exactly as does not resolve the controversy about its typology. Sometimes we have to refer to the logic of the legislation in the field of intellectual property, in order to clarify the nature and some features of intellectual property’s different types.

In philosophic discourse we suggest to make a difference between following non-juridical types of intellectual property: 1) «newly generated» and «disseminated»; 2) «a priori» (copyright & related rights) and «a posteriori» (that requires an official legitimization); 3) «personal» intellectual property (individual ownership) and «collective» (joint ownership); 4) «natural» (coming as a result of self intellectual, creative working) and «appropriated» (if exclusive rights were acquired due to the contract, under the law, by inheritance, or with another generally accepted methods); 5) «presently valid» (if exclusive


commercial rights are in force) and «already expired» (becoming a public domain)\(^8\).

3. Intellectual Property in the Open Society: the problem of justification for IP Institution existence in contemporary realities

The IP institution in Open Society context requires reconsidering, especially taking into account the actual socio-cultural topics (as postmodern shift, augmented reality, trans-humanism and others). A similar reconsideration could be realized in the course of a comparative analysis of the so-called «Open» and «Closed» societies and those preconditions that created by different types of societies for the development and functioning of the Intellectual Property institution.

It’s possible to assert that intellectual property (as a kind of private, individual ownership) becomes meaningless in conditions of Closed Societies (closed with taboo, or magical or tribal or collectivist or plan-market or totalitarian society). The all-round complete development of the Intellectual Property institution is only possible in a space of the Open Society, which provides and encourages an ideological, economic and other diversity, a competition and social mobility, when individual interests, rights and freedoms are guaranteed\(^9\).

Thinking of the most relevant ways of “justification” for the intellectual property in contemporary conditions, according to the IP interpretation as a specific social institution, as a socio-cultural and legal phenomenon, it’s possible to classify the main ways of the intellectual property’s being justification on the basis of two criteria – institutional and substantial.

The institutional approach\(^10\) offers to justify the ownership “legitimacy” for intellectual property, considering the viewpoint of such social institutions as the law, the morality, the tradition. The substantial approach\(^11\) is associated with the existence of such “justificatory schemes” for the intellectual property as follows: 1) due to the personal labour; 2) from the initial appropriation; 3) under the agreement; 4) under the principle of “infrastructure contribution” to the intellectual property creation (so-called “instrumental” justification); 5) according to the public benefits’ maximizing principle.

The society and the law with the greatest possible assurance would consider as reasonable and would accept the subject’s moral right to possess, to use, to manage and to dispose with intellectual property in that case if the owner (the

\(^8\) Ibid.
author, the right-holder) justifies his possession of intellectual property object by his own intellectual, creative labour.

At the same time, taking into account the realities of open civil society, global informatization, post-industrialism and postmodernity, as well as the private law specificity of the Intellectual Property institution, we may conclude that justification by the law, under the agreement, upon the “infrastructure contribution” principle also have the right to existence.

4. Reconsidering of the ethical and informational aspects of nature of the Intellectual Property institution

For better understanding of the nature of intellectual property relations we have to analyze such areas of social life, as so-called “information power”, public morality, public information and mass-media information. They have become closely related in the information-dependent society. Comprehension of their cross-correlations and mutual determinations is an important matter on the way of Intellectual Property philosophic research, via studying of interconnections of those categories in the IP context.

At first glance, the relationship amidst the “information power”, public morality, public information and mass-media information together is not quite obvious, as well as their relation to the Intellectual Property institution. But it becomes clearer when we define each of those aspects. Synthesis of a sociosophical vision for nowadays mutual determination and correlation of mentioned four aspects of social reality gives us an opportunity to make appropriate extrapolation of these links and interdependencies into a social institution of Intellectual Property.

The phenomenon of “information power”12 is functionally associated with the Intellectual Property institution: countries-innovators maximize their organizing (political & legal) and technological efforts to maintain a monopoly for intellectual property protected products as long as possible. In particular that applies to the objects protected by industrial property laws (i.e. patents), and the objects of copyright (for literary works, software, other “intellectual capacious” products). On effective protection of this monopoly it may depend the whole prospects of domination of some countries in the post-industrial world. Sometimes we can observe that the use of “information power” ignores the principles of public morality, leaving the ideas of humanism, equality, freedom of information exchange, free access to knowledge and technologies, and some other noble postulates declared by the governments of leading countries regularly.

In its turn public morality institution is essential to the substantiation of intellectual property, to the legitimization of this kind of “monopoly for knowledge” in information-dependent society. The state of public morality 13 makes an influence upon the ideology formation inside different societies,

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13 Bergson, A., Dva istochnika morali i religii [Bergson H. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion]; transl. into Russian by A. Gofman. – Moscow, 1994, pp. 179-180.
including mental manifestations of their attitude towards the property itself, and intellectual property in particular.

*The public information* is rather capacious notion. In the context of intellectual property it is most applicable to cases where the validity of intellectual-legal monopoly expires, and the product of creative or intellectual activity goes into the category of “the public domain”\(^\text{14,15}\). For example, if we would restrict ourselves by terminology of Ukrainian legislation about information, then we could conclude that “public information” is almost incompatible with any monopoly on information. Therefore the right to distribute the information subjected as “a matter of public interest” (i.e. public information) sometimes comes into logical conflict with intellectual property rights. And further everything will already depend on a philosophical interpretation, as any intellectual product has its value for society’s growth potential. So almost any object of intellectual property may be considered a priori as one that is “a subject of public interest”. But here we should recall the constitutional principles of the private property inviolability, and respect to the author’s exclusive rights to own, to use and to dispose with the results of his own intellectual or creative work. After all, any work must be fairly rewarded, and the intellectual work especially.

The term “mass-media information”\(^\text{16}\) is not the same as the “public information”\(^\text{17}\). The mass-media info is not so much related to the content, as to the audience towards it meant to be distributed (i.e. to unlimited number of people), and depends on the means and methods of broadcasting (using various media). A social significance of the mass-media information also varies. The Intellectual Property institution “meets” the mass-media institution in communicative space.

The media are able to promote intellectual property commercialization very effectively. It’s obvious that the media often do a popularizing effect, a distribution function for the newly created intellectual property objects. At the same time creative & intellectual products affect directly to the media ranking, filling their pages and diversifying their broadcasting by interesting creative production, which surely finds its audience.

### 5. The Intellectual Property and phenomenon of lobbyism

The relevance of research of the lobbyism problem in a social-philosophic perspective is obvious due to the fact that this social phenomenon governs significantly the entire political process. And as any civilized society deals with policy (in various levels) that mediated by the legal system, we should draw


attention to the following: any attempts to provide an explicit or latent influence upon the political (including legislative) process generate social conflict spectrum, which contains both socio-economic and mental-cultural expression.

Anyway, lobbying is a factor that specifies certain trends, and shapes some of patterns for the social development. Lobbying mechanisms acquire its own specifics in conditions of the information society. So now our purpose is making a brief overview of the most relevant models of lobbying, as well as to assess its influence degree in respect of law-making culture in the information society, and upon the intellectual property law generally.

The lobbying (or lobbyism) is a highly controversial institution of legislative technique. Its role for a lawmaking system development, and the impact to certain spheres of legislative process, its capabilities and technologies are the subjects of numerous discussions between political scientists, philosophers, sociologists and other researchers. The term “lobbyism” could be broadly depicted as any private attempts to make influence upon the state governments or parliamentarians. Following The Encyclopædia Britannica, “lobbying” can be defined as “any attempt by individuals or private interest groups to influence the decisions of government; in its original meaning it referred to efforts to influence the votes of legislators, generally in the lobby outside the legislative chamber. Lobbying in some form is inevitable in any political system”18.

In lawmaking process lobbying development requires a number of conditions: 1) the presence of groups in society that capable to articulate their unifying purposes in a normative form and mobilize their efforts, organizational capacity and material means and funds, aiming for these goals' realization in current legislation; 2) differentiation of interests within society, recognized by the state, and a willingness to take this into account in the legislative process; 3) the opportunity to participate in the legislative activities for various political and social groups (real parliamentarism). Therefore lobbying is inevitable for lawmaking of most modern countries. Lobbyism however is almost impossible inside totalitarian states where is no real possibility to differentiate the interests of various social groups and achieve social consensus in law.

Lobbying finds its expression in various forms. The most famous in the past and the most common form of influence upon legislators made by interested groups is lobbying with material incentive. This form is usually associated with simple bribery – the award of some participants of legislative activity by sums of money in cash or by transfer to bank accounts. However in present, in conditions of existence of anti-corruption mechanisms in developed countries, taking in mind a legislators' incomes monitoring, this method of lobbying is difficult applicable and rare. On the contrary, such transfer of funds is an excellent way to discredit political opponents.

Intelligent lobbying is another model (or mechanism) of influence upon the legislative process. This kind of lobbying is the least harmful. It’s may be an intelligent assistance to the participants of legislation procedures for the purpose to give a certain direction to their work. Such kind of lobbying may be carried by

the person who’s in possession of legislative technique or who is an expert in the field of regulated public relations. By the way it’s a very important form of assistance for legislative activity, not only the influencing factor.

Intelligent lobbying can find implementation of the following forms: consulting of legislative activity members (both on legislative techniques, and on regulated relations); a proposition of ready alternative draft bill; presentation of the results of independent public opinion researches, relevant to the legislative regulation; performance of the draft bill’s analysis in special committees with following discussion; scientific development of the legal regulation and its enlightening to the persons engaged in the legislative process; theoretical and practical conferences with participation of legislative and executive authorities representatives, etc.

Another kind of influence on the legislative process is so-called psychological lobbying, which supposes making psychological pressure upon the members of legislative process to guide their activities in a certain way. As examples of possible methods of psychological lobbying could be such as overloading of legislators by written applications in order to imitate a “popular activity”; psychological pressure campaigns in the media; organization of “thematic” riots and demonstrations; threats, a provoking of all sorts of obstructions that bring instability to politicians; finally, it could be just an ordinary blackmail19.

Since the current era of human development is characterized by the process of information society building, the sphere of intellectual property rights, which is regularly exposed to lobbying, is one of the most sensitive areas for this society. Socio-philosophical nature of a question about the lobbyism’s role in legislative process leads towards ontological and axiological dimensions of social existence.

In particular, lobbying as a factor of influence upon the legislative policy raises a following dichotomy: 1) whether the law is that a real social value, that mechanism aimed at protection and defense of public and private balanced interests? 2) or the law (that is embodied in the norms and regulations) is mainly the result of strong pervasive influential lobby groups, that transform legal system for their narrow private interests, which always prevail over the common, but sometimes they are antagonistic at all?

In second case, the law to be considered only as a legal instrument for manipulation carried by various elites that exist in every society. In the realm of intellectual-legal relations that is leading to such lobbying displays, as unreasonable extension of copyright in some countries in spite of international rules, a raising pressing of anti-counterfeiting laws, making controls on the Internet more strict, an unjustified interference into private information, and so on.

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6. Social-philosophic reflections on “intellectual property”, “information”, “knowledge” and “innovation” interconnections

In order to perform a multilateral social-philosophic studying of the Intellectual Property institution, we have also to enlighten the problem of interconnection for such categories as “information”, “knowledge”, “innovations”. Because Intellectual Property is a kind of social institutions that can be explored after the clarification of cross-correspondence of phenomena mentioned above. Such clarification is necessary for the comprehension of Intellectual Property institution in contemporary sociocultural realities. We also should analyze the process of information’s subjectification (when abstractive “information” transforms into “knowledge”) and the process of objectification of knowledge (when one’s own “knowledge” turns into “sociocultural information”, and the last one may embrace intellectual / creative results).

The analysis for designated processes (i.e. that chain of transformations “information – knowledge – intellectual product”) in various forms of their interdependence will obviously contribute to better understanding in respect of intellectual property institution's actual value in today's social life in all spectrum of human relations. Some investigators\textsuperscript{20,21} in post-nonclassical science and philosophy consider that a lot of ideas, seemed as certain self-evident, in fact appear as wrong or illusive. The same principle is applicable in general also to relations in the realm of Intellectual Property. Contemporary complicated surrounding world with its variety of cognition models, with so much insinuations, doubts, interpretations of reality, as well as algorithms for self-organization of social system and human being and thinking and consciousness\textsuperscript{22} may be considered as one of the contradictions’ sources in relations of intellectual property.

Naturally post-nonclassical science and postmodern thinking make their essential effect on cognitive approaches to Intellectual Property institution. Some relations in mentioned sphere are no longer clear and definite. For example, such immutable and indispensable principle, approved by long time practice, as copyright term limitation has been revised repeatedly (by copyright extension acts) in United States, despite the consolidation of mentioned rule by several international treaties (particularly by The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works & The Universal Copyright Convention). This example gives a demonstration how even “countries-guarantors” of copyright law principles allow themselves to infringe common rules and general terms. Those actions weaken steadily and consistently a whole international Intellectual Property legal architecture, showing harmful and ideologically destructive


precedents. Thus we can say that some cases in the intellectual-legal sphere are not so evident as it seems.

Then we suppose that the problem described above is connected with changing interpretation & understanding of “information” phenomenon (it’s important to mark because the intellectual property is a kind of information with high added value). In spite of the term “information” is frequently used, its nature and definitions are rather different & polysemantic. Neither the legal definition (for example in Ukrainian law), nor existing structuralistic & post-structuralistic determinations (e.g. as a random memorized selection done by the system in a process of structure formation while moving from chaos to the order23) actually doesn’t clarify information phenomenon’s content entirely.

And what is “the innovation” comparatively to “the information”?

The problem of innovation in the context of Intellectual Property becomes actual as the society’s development moves from the economic, technical and juridical paradigms towards the sociocultural paradigm. Therefore we have to pay some attention to the social-philosophic study of the innovation concept’s genesis, the process of innovative problematic consolidation in the context of intellectual property, as well as the interpretation of innovation as a social-cultural phenomenon. In particular, the semantic analysis for the concept of “innovation” in its correlation with the notions of ”discovery”, “invention”, “new modification”, “novelty” has a great significance for identifying the essence of innovation itself.

It’s emphasized the importance of innovation’s research in the socio-cultural context, taking into account the specific ontological status for innovation in its integrity with Intellectual Property institution. In the studying of innovation (as the very substantial aspect of intellectual property) it becomes evident that interpretations of this phenomenon are frequently concentrated within technical, economic and juridical paradigms. However, today the innovation is primarily a social and cultural phenomenon caused by the specifics of appropriate sociocultural environment.

In general we can accept the following definition of “the innovation”: it is the creation of a new way of doing something, whether the enterprise is concrete (e.g., the development of a new product) or abstract (e.g., the development of a new philosophy or theoretical approach to a problem). Innovation plays a key role in the development of sustainable methods of both production and living because in both cases it may be necessary to create alternatives to conventional ways of doing things that were developed before environmental consideration was central to most people’s framework for making decisions24.

It is logical that changes’ vector related to the information and technological novelties, now shifts from technical, economic and legal fields to the sociocultural dimension. Following the production sectors, other areas of life became the objects of conscious and deliberate innovative activities, that allow us to fix

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the transition towards an innovative model of social and cultural development, and the corresponding increase in the value of intellectual property institution in today's post-industrial world.

This is why the innovation has become one of the main types of nowadays practical activity with intellectual or creative content, and it's perceived as an essential precondition for further civilized development. Thus, the innovation appears as a complex socio-cultural phenomenon that requires to be understood as a core of the IP, its inner substance. The innovation contains inside all the newest contemporary trends, and simultaneously it's aimed at the future.

7. Intellectual property & NBIC-convergence

Those questions raised in previous chapter bring us to a task of studying NBIC-convergence phenomenon. The relevance of social-philosophic research for current specifics of intellectual activity is connected, as we mentioned, with the latest trends in the development of informational, scientific, technical, cognitive and other types of intellectual activity. All these affect the entire institution of intellectual property fundamentally.

However there are the so-called “classical standards” of intellectual property law, which are almost oblivious to the trends mentioned above. Naturally that gives rise to a range of contradictory points as a philosophical and socio-economic and legal. The new format of intellectual activity and innovative development changes the world’s modern picture essentially. The specifics of intellectual activity are going through changes in the context of such complicated phenomena as globalization, NBIC-convergence, postmodern shift, Hi-Hume and others.

In the most general terms we’d understand the intellectual activity as any type of activities that are original and could be associated with the creation of intellectual property objects. Intellectual activity frequently has such qualities as creativity, innovativeness, rationality, social relevance and others. The dominance of certain qualities depends on which area the intellectual activity takes place in: is that a field of technology, or art, or fundamental science, or experimental science, or academic, or other areas.

At the same time Intellectual Activity does not always correspond to real demands and humanitarian needs. We often can see the development of innovation for the sake of innovation, not for people. Conversely is that innovations really popular in society (in the fields of pharmacy, medicine, alternative energy, etc.) – those really useful for people intellectual achievements are seemed to be sealed with seven seals. The newest knowledge strives to be monopolized, isolated from society’s free access through a system of patents, by copyright mechanisms, and also by introduction of more stringent anti-counterfeiting laws.

Another problem of intellectual activity is that the use of new technologies requires appropriate education, a certain level of prosperity. But for mass of society an effective access to high technologies and up-to-date knowledge actually is blocked by socio-economic factors (low incomes or inaccessibility of
good education) and by legal mechanisms as inadequate copyright policy regarding the results of intellectual activity25.

Such inequality inside the information society increases continuously. Thus the gap within the society gradually grows into the gap between societies. That gap is becoming increasingly overwhelming. Abovementioned global patent system and rather aggressive pervasive “copyright” either enhance this “information inequality” within and between societies, or at least they preserve the status-quo. It seems that global “information gap” becomes a very dangerous disease, and humanity has not produced any vaccines against it yet.

Socio-philosophical analysis of intellectual activity’s specifics, considering current social and cultural conditions, determines the necessity to make a focus on the following points. Firstly it seems the civilized progressive society is changing its approach to cognitive activity. The current level of convergence trends in the field of scientific research shows the transformation of cultural and semantic discourses. So intellectual activity, in the diversity of its forms, has an important role in whole process. In this regard, facing the trend of a significant change of intellectual activity’s specifics, we have to realize that intellectual property law, in the form which it now exists in, looks as ultraconservative global social institution that must be reformed.

The situation existing in the realm of legal regulation for protection and enforcement of intellectual activity’s results, could be described as counterproductive, almost “medieval”, considering its impact on the development dynamics of contemporary culture and science. Because that nature of uncompromising standards which constitute the existing intellectual legislation’s dogma, was inherent to medieval times. Meanwhile the modern post-industrial civilization needs more flexible legislation concerning the ownership on intellectual activity’s results.

It is necessary to make allowances and amendments for the fact that the world is changing far more dynamic at the “Information Age”, especially compared to epoch when “authors’ privileges” has been provided by sovereigns. And now it’s evident that it’s impossible to support those outdated standards eternally.

All that is marked by the term “NBIC-convergence” – a lot of convergent processes in engineering, natural sciences, humanities, computer science, ecology – requires essential liberalization for the regulation of intellectual activity. The prospective purpose for social sciences, including social philosophy and jurisprudence, is a search for balance between the interests of various intellectual property owners (and other stakeholders), and the interests of open information society.

At present, there is no universal recipe for emancipation of intellectual activity out of strict law imperatives. However, all civilized mankind has to agree on the new standards in this area, taking into consideration that all

Conclusions

The Intellectual Property is one of the fundamental social institutions of our time. The intellectual factor makes a powerful impact on ideology, economics, politics, the legal system, the culture as a whole. After all it makes an impact upon the lifestyle, value system, social psychology etc. Intellectual activity has always been the one key component that gave impetus to human development.

The social-philosophic comprehension of interrelations amidst information, knowledge and innovations, as well as IP ontology, justificatory models, typology, informational and ethical nature of Intellectual Property, other aspects enables to create a more objective view of the transformation’s character for this specific kind of property at current sociocultural realities. Thus, Intellectual Property Institution appears as heterogeneous, differently directed, multidimensional, polymorphic & multifunctional public institution that has a system-making meaning in respect of the contemporary post-industrial, postmodern (in some respects), information-dependent society.

It was also found that global informatization has a specific impact for the Intellectual Property institution. One side is that globalization has a reason to be characterized as a catalyst for the transformation of intellectual-legal relations towards commercialization, making IP a substantial socio-economic, legal and cultural institution of present time. However, current trends in the reform of protection system for intellectual activity results threaten to remain unbalanced with the public interests. There is an obvious need for harmonization of various relations in the realm of intellectual property.

Optimal regime for the IP securing and protection probably may be found in more flexible legislation, with ensuring of correct implementation of international standards into intellectual-legal relations of all countries. But it should be done in compliance with the key principle, which is demanded by contemporary post-industrial reality: the greater free access to knowledge and innovations for the Society has to be granted & guaranteed. That is possible to achieve by the wide provision of free licenses, through shortening of terms for exclusive intellectual property rights, by reducing the cost for legal access to intellectual products, more active introduction of open content, etc. On the whole it should come to expanding of the “public domain” concept's meaning, and narrowing the “copyright” total monopoly.

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Abstract: The Islamic mysticism’s problem begins by a step when we become aware of our life, especially by searching deep into ourselves. The truth of the present is the truth and experience of our lives. It is thus that by faith it discloses the answer to the value of the other.

Keywords: God, Jesus, mysticism, sufi, al-Fanāʾ e al-Baqāʾ, the tree of life, Corano, mujahede, deep, consciousness, faith, universal, love.

a. Introduzione: la letteratura del Sufismo
Il Sufismo è stato e continua ad essere aspetto nonodale di una letteratura di largo respiro e variegata dimensione culturale e anche cultuale, espressasiprincipalmente nell’ambito delle letterature araba e persiana, ma ha in seguito recepito espressioni anche in molte altre lingue (turche, indiane, maleo-indonesiane ecc.), trovando, proprio nella stessa diffusione del credo islamico, un suo punto di caratterizzazione specifica tra riti e devozioni, liturgie in senso stretto e meditazione mistica complessa sul mistero della vita dell’uomo e sul suo legame con il divino.

Infatti tra i generi coltivati si annoverano: i testi cosiddetti devozionali (orazioni, meditazioni, esercizi spirituali ecc.); i testi celebrativi, contenenti le biografie e le sentenze dei Sufi più noti; i testi che illustrano le dimore o stazioni della vita spirituale; infine, i trattati teorici di molteplice argomento, spesso di natura, anch’essa in questo caso, elogiativa. Un’altra tipica espressione del Sufismo è stata nella letteratura in versi che annovera poeti di straordinaria grandezza sia di espressione araba (per esempio Ibn al-Farid e Ibn ʿArabi) che persiana (Farid al-Dīn al-Attar, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Hafez, Gohar Shahi)².

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¹ Questo saggio è dedicato a tutte le vittime, danzatori Sufi e bambini, indù, islamici e gente comune, martiri dell’attentato avvenuto il 16 febbraio 2017 nel tempio di Lal Shahbaz Qalandar nella città di Sehwan, provincia di Sindh, a circa 200 chilometri a nord-est di Karachi.

Pertanto grazie anche ad una caratteristica rielaborazione poetica il Sufismo ha raggiunto vette di particolarissima comprensione del trascendente, osservando come nella realtà il circuito mistico e l’elevazione meditata a Dio potessero scoprirsi all’interno stesso dell’uomo, nel suo più intimo ed esclusivo mistero. In questo il Sufismo rivela evidenti punti di contatto con la mistica sia cristiana che ebraica, entrambe infatti considerano la realtà un cammino di raggiungimento dell’esperienza diretta con Dio, poiché per mezzo dell’istante immanente si meditano le stesse fenomenologie del divino, in questo contributo individuate mediante alcune semantiche coraniche principali: quelle di al-Fanāʾ (cessazione di sé in Dio) e di al-Baqāʾ (mantenimento di tale stato); alcuni cenni saranno inoltre dedicati anche alle semantiche di al-Tawbah (contrizione) e di al-Maʾrifa (conoscenza interiore).

**b. Aspetti comparati delle dimensioni ontologiche di cessazione ed estinzione tra teologia cristiana e semantica coranica.**

I concetti di al-Fanāʾ e di al-Baqāʾ, rispettivamente indicanti cessazione, estinzione di sé in Dio, e mantenimento di tale stato mistico (al-Baqāʾ), secondo Abū l-Qāsim al-Junayd⁴, seguono tre distinti stadi o fasi: innanzitutto l’oblio degli attributi del sé, in particolare quelli riguardanti l’antinomia dei desideri e l’entelechia (un divenire che è materiale, formale, efficiente e finale) del proprio sé mediante l’esperienza trascendentale, non esterna ma interiore; in secondo luogo l’oblio del piacere nell’obbedienza, per completarsi tale esperienza (terzo stadio) totalmente, assolutamente ed esclusivamente in Dio.

Infatti l’oblio dell’autocoscienza, la dimenticanza di sé nel proprio aspetto fisico, agisce e, si direbbe, permane proseguendo, cioè non estinguendosi, perché la persona non ha più un’individualità cistica, imperfetta e dolorosa, ma coniugata al presente del suo proprio essere-nel-mondo-indeterminabile. In questo modo la transizione dall’esistenza alla non-esistenza o da definirsi “esistenza primordiale”, non convergerebbe in un totale disfacimento, dal momento che il Sufi non si riduce a un puro nulla estatico: il nulla mistico osservaviutosto una risoluzione radicale rispetto al contenuto immanente del mondo, presentandosi al Sufi nel mondo stesso nella misura in cui si dissolva come materia, ben riconoscendo quel potersi-spegnere-in-Dio, bagnandosi e profumandosi di Lui, quale vertice di meditazione e approdo finale. Su questo dice chiaramente Rumi: “La Luce di Dio non ha, in tutto ciò che esiste, un opposto con il quale, tramite quell’opposto, la si possa rendere manifesta (...). Sappi che la forma esce dallo spirito come il leone dalla giungla, o come la voce e il discorso dal pensiero”⁵.

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Siamo dunque di fronte ad una purificazione dell’essenza del Sufi, portata agli stati supremi dell’essere e poi assorbita in Dio. Il momentocritico di questo passaggio è raggiunto quando il Sufi si spoglia del suo stesso essere, come un serpente quando muta la pelle, vidimando la stessa coscienza di sé. Quindi mutando l’ordinaria percezione di sé – quel sé identificabile in un corpo di una persona – il mistico raggiunge il vero sé, quello che diviene l’essere-unò-con-Dio in maniera del tutto profonda e definitiva. Ed allora per approfondire tale prospettiva è opportuno considerare cosa sia immanenza mediante ciò che si considera in questa sede quale **istante mistico e intuizioneriflessa** di Dio in sé.

Non essendo l’istante divisibile, l’istante non sarebbe che sempre identico a se stesso, come sosteneva Aristotele, non potendovi in esso immaginare né quiete né moto. Ragion per cui un qualsiasi tempo che desividesse lo stesso moto per un oggetto, non potrebbe che rendere tale oggetto sempre diverso e non identico a sé, come Dio, invece, sempre-è, essendosi Dio rivelato in Cristo che è uomo, cioè solo e unico uomo identico a Dio, e che tuttavia vive il tempo, attraverso la sua nascita e la sua morte.

Ciononostante, nell’ambito della teologia cristiana, Gesù si avvera accadendo come attimo, proprio perché il Figlio può ugualmente causare e distaccare assente da sé il tempo, essendo indipendente dal tempo, pur tuttavia permanendo il tempo dipendente dall’istante della Creazione, cioè proprio da Dio, affinché in Cristo avvenisse il vertice dell’istante mistico, il ricongiungimento al Padre, quandorisorsestoricamente e quando nel rito eucaristico **risorge indeterminabile presente**, intatto e perfetto corpo di uomo nel mondo a immagine fisica e viva di Dio Padre. Nell’istante, allora, si completa l’assenza del tempo, esattamente come in quel **bardo** che ci proviene quale esperienza trascendentane dall’elaborazione filosofica e dalla tradizione buddhista tibetana.

Analogicamente l’esperienza, poiché di tale concreta evidenza si tratta, dell’al-Fanāʾ si traduce in una sospensione del tempo nell’istante in cui s’intravede perfettamente la natura divina dell’uomo, creatura, che si riunisce metafisicamente ad un concreto vissuto e ad un passaggio divino.

Nel passaggio cristiano di trascendenza ed esperienza in Cristo emerge la consapevolezza di un avvenimento che si radica interiormente perché rivelazione della vita, offerta in sacrificio per una salvezza comune: “Dio, che ti ha creato senza di te, non può salvarti senza di te”6. In quel “non può” agostiniano si concentra in effetti ogni percezione di una trascendenza di grazia, di un riscatto ottenuto, ma non in quanto tale “reclamato” a non poter essere rifiutato, addirittura protestato perché debba essere accolto ad ogni costo: se così fosse proprio la libertà dell’uomo di fronte a Dio, al suo Creatore, non avrebbe più

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5 “Ancora, chiamiamo quiète ciò che mantiene in modo uguale se stesso e le sue parti, sia ora che prima; ma nell’istante non vi è un prima; pertanto, in esso non vi è neppure quiete. È dunque necessario che ciò che è in movimento, sia mosso nel tempo, e anche ciò che è in quiete, lo sia nel tempo”, così ARistotele, *Fisica*, a cura di Luigi Ruggiu, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano, 2007, pp. 237-249.

senso nella storia del mondo e nella custodia che l'uomo stesso previene del creato, suo in maniera esclusiva.

Da ciò si può dedurre che in quanto concepimento immacolato, eppure momento vissuto di morte come uomo, il corpo di Cristo ritorna alla terra come dalla terra sorse Adamo, l'uomo-creato da Dio; e la luce stessa del fiat della Creazione trasforma e trasfigura la morte dell'uomo nella dimensione di quella Vita perennemente illimitata, e non più condizionata dalla dimensione di fine mondana. È dunque in quello specialissimo, impercettibile battito del divenire e dell'accadere, coniugati in un vissuto ontologico indeterminabile eppure presente, che si forgia e si fenomenizza la straordinarietà ineffabile della vita dell'uomo-creato da Dio, e che Cristo, in quanto egli stesso Dio, rivela nella sua pienezza.

Nell’acquisizione del Baqāʾ, sovente considerato maggiormente compiuto rispetto al Fanāʾ, il ritorno all’esperienza del mondo come questo è, ritorno successivo alla transizione mistica perfetta, tratteggià non una semplice condizione a uno stato precedente a quello del fanāʾ, dal momento che il vissuto di quella dimensione ha fornito al mistico una nuova visione per percepire la sua inadeguatezza e sforzarsi a perfezionarsi continuamente, ma corrobora tale perfezione di una certezza umana, nella quale la fede è frutto della tolleranza e della reciproca e vicendevole salvaguardia della vita.

In tale interpretazione possiamo considerare che l’annullamento del proprio sé (self) nel mondo identifichi direttamente l’istante della transizione dal mondo a Dio perché la stessa contemplazione della presenza di Dio assuma valore ontologico pieno, cessando di esistere temporalmente il mistico in Dio e in Lui solo dissolvendosi. Quando un mistico risolve tutto il suo essere ed esistere nell’Fanāʾ, lottando contro il desiderio di ritornare al mondo e vincendo tale desiderio, la sua funzione assume la caratteristica di avvicinarsi a quella del Profeta, costantemente e contemporaneamente con Dio e col mondo, per trasmutare il corso della storia attivando la divina Verità religioso-morale: solo quando il mistico perde l’identità con se stesso, sperimenta l’identità con Dio.

Nella percezione di raggiungimento del proprio sé in Dio, il tempo accade (geschieht), generando la sua stessa trasformazione, in quelle discontinuità che caratterizzano i passaggi dal passato ad un transito mistico vissuto al presente, un presente che radicalizza i precedenti passaggi di stato e ne consente la valutazione ontologica in una dimensione di completa presenza interiore e psichica. Perciò nel mistico Sufi, unicamente nel presente, il passato è l’avvenuto transito a un ricongiungimento finale, e non astratto, del proprio corpo in Dio, dove interiorità psichica ed anima individuale manifestano una tangibilità ottenuta mediante la conoscenza di sé (al-Maʾrifā) e la contrizione di sé (al-Tawbah) di fronte al mondo e al contenuto del vissuto (Erlebniss), cioè constatazione di esperienza esistenziale.

Nell’estasi che si produce dalla consapevolezza di essere in Dio, sfinendo ogni proprio sé in Lui e cessando mondanamente per ontologicamente ritrovarsi

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in Dio, il Sufi svolge la sua realtà presente in una condizione esistenziale che racchiude il passato e la possibilità del futuro, annullandosi lo stesso Sufi in quell’indeterminabile presente che è vivere l’esperienza di Dio. È questa un’estasi di amore profondissima, un vertice di assoluta certezza che indica come la speranza e la fede in Dio abbiano trovato lo stretto legame che ne permette la pienezza vissuta, cioè l’amore.

Si tratta di quell’amore che discende da un sacrificio redentivo, dove l’Uomo compie la sua perfetta offerta di riscatto della creatura e della creazione stessa. Il corpo del Creatore, allora, invisibile nella sua immortalità, ma presente in sé stesso accanto al tempo percepibile e vivibile dall’uomo, corpo tuttavia eternamente evidente all’uomo nella sua storia come eucaristico essere, metamorfosi della vita di Gesù una volta risorto e asceso, assurge completamente e nella sua pienezza di rivelazione all’uomo, quale vera speranza del mondo, quale amore avvertito e fede interiorizzata, cardinalità percepita (empfunden), infine, come materia di sofferenza attraverso cui riscattarsi per donarsi pienamente all’esperienza fisica del Creatore mediante il sacrificio eucaristico, momento in cui la fede cristiana ritrova il suo nesso di congiunzione con l’immolazione del corpo di Cristo. L’uomo pertanto entra in relazione con la trascendenza di Dio, forma e immagine in Cristo rivelata e da Cristo annunciata, cioè tempo che descrive il corpo e ne permette l’accadere secondo il suo inizio e la sua fine.

c. Ogni forma del tempo è insieme rivelazione di elementi discreti del mondo: il vuoto nella realtà del movimento è privo di tempo. La salvezza cristiana e lo stato dell’esistenza intermedia (bardo).

Essendo l’universo “vivente”, lo è nella misura in cui possiede un’anima, cioè la sua durata, la coordinata del suo spazio, tanto infinito quanto intellegibile unicamente in Dio: tempo e anima, misura e sospensione dell’intero universo. L’esperienza del fanāʾ, d’altronde, non rivela il mero termine della vita dell’individuo, ma lo sviluppo di una più ampia e finita sua identità, grazie al completo cambio degli attributi ottenuto mediante l’influenza di Dio: Fanāʾ non ci indica pertanto unicamente l’esperienza dell’essere sciolti dal vincolo dei circuiti di esistenza, anche perché l’Islam non accetta la reincarnazione e considera una blasfemia l’idea di karma, piuttosto l’Islam considera unicamente la realtà dell’anima individuale, come i cristiani.

Fanāʾ non è innanzitutto un concetto etico, quanto invece fondatamente teologico: l’uomo si annienta e prende gli attributi di Dio, e ciò è il significato del hadith in cui il mistico si completa e si rivela negli attributi divini. Si trattadunque acquisire la consapevolezza di una prova e di una tregua rispetto al mondo, cambiando interiormente attraverso un costante sforzo mentale (jihad o mujahede, propriamente “sforzo interiore”) le qualità di base con le meritevoli qualità con cui Dio ha descritto Sé Stesso nella rivelazione coranica.

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La perfezionepropria del discepolo che diviene e incarna la via del trascendente complesso, cioè la pratica nell’immanente del suo desiderio di ricongiungersi con Dio, è raggiunta tramite regolari azioni di concentrazione, attraverso tre gradi di sviluppo indicativi già da Louis Massignon: \textit{Fanāʾī Shaykh} (lett. \textit{Fanāʾ nel Maestro}), estinzione nel piano astrale; \textit{Fanāʾī Rasūl} (lett. \textit{Fanāʾ nel Profeta Muhammad}), estinzione nel piano spirituale; \textit{Fanāʾī Allāh} (lett. \textit{Fanāʾ in Dio}), estinzione nell’astratto. Dopo il passaggio attraverso questi tre gradi, si raggiunge il più alto stato di \textit{Baqāʾī-bi-llāh} (lett. \textit{Baqāʾ in Dio}), estinzione nell’eterna coscienza e mantenimento di tale esperienza che è vissuta ontologicamente e rivelabile spiritualmente esattamente quale vertice di quel coniugare la creatura al suo Creatore, il creato alla Bellezza di Dio\footnote{In tal modo e con riportate prospettiva e riflessione concentra la sua valutazione della problematica mistica Louis Massignon,}.

Da tale contesto si evince come l’uomo sia stato redento nella sua libertà senza condizione alcuna, ma in maniera assoluta. Si tratta di una libertà però che ha già comunque fatto salvo, a sua volta, altrettanto incondizionato, l’amore di Dio per l’uomo, potendo quest’ultimo tornare a peccare nonostante lo struggimento della Vita di Cristo donata. Da tale acquisizione si racchiude l’attualità dell’affermazione agostiniana in cui quel “non può” (richiamato alla nota 5) di Dio si riflette nella scelta ontologica dell’uomo per la tutela di sé e del suo simile perché creature, azione che si esplica nella custodia di sé medesimo nell’ambito di quel creato donato da Dio, in un tratto di esistenza che è prova e salvezza. Quindi in ciò il discreto del tempo, cioè la sua temporalità, permane come accesso a ogni sua trasformazione. Bisogna però sempre intendere tale trasformazione all’interno della tradizione di essere e divenire del mondo in cui il tempo sopravvive al mondo, permettendone a sua volta l’esistenza\footnote{In questo modo si esprime Martin Heidegger in idem,}.

Dio, pertanto, si rivela istante ontico che scuote, in un soffio cosmico, tutto quanto da Lui creato, e che in virtù d’essere primo moto immobile, acquisisce divenire, mosso dall’impercettibilità di un accadere simile a quello del concepimento fra un uomo e una donna, di cui loro stessi non ne scorgono attimo né certezza sensibile. Quell’insieme semplicemente accade nella rarefazione delle loro coscienze, nel loro amore eterno nella loro vita, presente non-determinabile, schiudersi del battito di una sola, unica vita. Così nell’ambito della meccanica razionale dell’universo, la Creazione avviene vita dell’amore di Dio, mutando costantemente nello spazio in un movimento infinito.

\footnote{Si rinvia anche di Gabriel Mandel Khan, \textit{La via al Sufismo nella spiritualità e nella pratica}, Bompiani, Milano, 2004; e di Alessandro Bausani, \textit{“Il pazzo sacro” nell’Islam}, Luni, Milano-Trento, 2000, pp. 38-54 e ss.}

\footnote{9 In tal modo e con riportate prospettiva e riflessione concentra la sua valutazione della problematica mistica Louis Massignon,}.

\footnote{10 In questo modo si esprime Martin Heidegger in idem,}.

\footnote{10 In questo modo si esprime Martin Heidegger in idem,}.

Talvolta vengono presentate per Fanāʾ due interpretazioni parallele: il raggiungimento di una piena consapevolezza della transitorietà e caducità di tutte le cose, incluso dello stesso mistico, sino all’assenza della cognizione di questo andare oltre per lasciarsi completamente “invadere e pervadere” dall’abbandono della certezza di Dio (concetto espresso nell’Islam anche come al-Tawakkul12); e, dall’altro lato, il fanāʾ si rivela come annientamento delle incompiute specificità (distinte dalla sostanza individuale) della creatura per la sostituzione di questi con gli attributi perfetti che appartengono a Dio.


La cristallizzazione essoterica nell’Islam è divenuta universalmente nota come Shari’a, Legge Divina o Canone; quella esoterica si ebbe nella Tariqa, la Via. La prassi e gli obiettivi della Tariqa divennero noti successivamente quali tasawwuf, o Sufismo.

Proprio per tali sviluppi esoterici il fanāʾ talvolta è stato avvicinato ed accomunato all’esperienza di nirvānānella sua variegata semantica buddhista. Nonostante molte analogie, però, fanāʾ non indica l’estinzione della vita su un piano individuale; fanāʾ non è infatti il mero punto d’approdo della vita dell’individuo, ma lo sviluppo di una più vastaidentificazione mistica con Dio, grazie al completo compenetrarsi nel mondo, ottenuto mediante l’influenza di Dio: Fanāʾ non denota la pratica dell’essere liberati da un doloroso circolo di esistenze, anche perché l’Islam nega assolutamente, come già abbiamo rimarcato, l’idea di karma e accetta la realtà dell’anima personale. Peraltro nell’ambito stesso della creazione, ciò viene evidenziato come kunfayakun13, cioè

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11 Corano, Sura LV, vv. 26-27, cit.
12 Cfr. Il Corano, cit., Sura LXV, v. 3: “Questi (Dio) gli offrirà via d’uscita, – e provvidenza da dove meno se l’attendeva: ché per colui che confida in Dio, Dio è aiuto bastante. In verità Iddio è Colui che la Sua mèta sempre raggiunge, e ad ogni cosa ha dato Iddio destinata misura”, cit., p. 430; si vedano anche la Sura XIV, v. 12, sulla piena fiducia in Dio e la Sua infinita protezione, p. 183; la Sura XCII, vv. 14-21; la Sura XCVI, vv. 8-19, cit., pp. 476 e 480; sugli stessi profili anche la Sura XVI, V v. 42 e la Sura XXV, v. 3.
tutto ciò diviene, proprio perché la Creazione della natura del mondo e dell’uomo non occupa uno spazio definito, ma perpetuamente progressivo. Nella Creazione non sorge quella contraddizione che invece si delinea successivamente e che si constata nel mondo a causa dell’incrinarsi del vincolo d’amore tra Dio e l’uomo, vincolo in Cristo solo e mediante il suo sacrificio ricomposto, ci si riferisce alla contraddizione che nasce tra vita e morte, tra amore e odio. Il senso del mondo è perciò sempre in costante trasformazione, ogni apparente contraddizione nella Creazione, in realtà, riconduce al tempo come quel limen mediante il quale appare definirsi l’esistenza umana vita di ogni singola creatura umana, soltanto in Cristo tuttavia pensabile, essendo Lui la ricomposizione del vincolo d’amore infranto dal peccato originale.

14. Per mezzo di tali sfumature semantiche delineate, si possono intuire e comprendere al meglio come vere quelle parole del poeta mistico indiano medievale Kabīr, quando sostiene che solo svanendo ogni nozione di terra e cielo, di vento, di sole e di stelle, unicamente quando si sia fatto spazio (inteso proprio “luogo”), quando si sia dato accesso di liberazione alla propria coscienza, soltanto allora l’anima individuale (Ātma) si ricongiunge all’anima universale (Paramātma)14. E lo stesso Kabīr non esiterà dal sostenere: “L’uomo affolla il suo mondo d’illusioni, e diventa pertanto cieco al punto da non ravvisare in se stesso l’Ineffabile”15.

Peraltro se il traguardo paradossale, ma inconfutabile, della vita è la sua morte, se obiettivo bizzarro del tempo è provenire da un passato invisibile, o solo fluidificato in appannati ricordi, per continuare verso un futuro ignoto e, peraltro, assolutamente insistente, se non in immaginazioni umane che rendono la speranza un volgare “magari”, allora Dio, di cui si discute in questa sede, si rivela peculiarmente in Gesù che promette integralmente la sua Vita, attraverso il suo stesso amore, testimoniandola come inconfutabile verità, constatazione apparentemente contraddittoria e tuttavia irrinunciabile del tempo privo di inizio e senza fine, perché tempo di sé stesso, di sé in quanto infinito e illimitato, eppure finito e periodicamente all’interno della vita di ogni uomo. Il sacrificio allora dell’amore di Dio, avvenuto in Cristo, avrebbe permane in quella circostanza storica, piuttosto si riflette costantemente nell’anima dell’uomo quale vessillo del suo singolare essere uomo.

15. Da un lato l’uomo è libero di non riflettere quella Verità, essendo tuttavia dall’altro lato ugualmente libero, tuttavia, di manifestare quella Verità, comprovandola e vivendola come indeterminabile presente, configurandosi ogni uomo nella possibilità di esistere in quel sacrificio di amore, affinché ogni torto trovi la sua risoluzione soltanto nel martirio dell’amore, nello smacco dato alla giustizia, nello sfregio che deturpa la speranza, appunto perché soltanto da quella

servono Lui, - creatore nuovissimo dei cieli e della terra, che quando ha decretato una cosa non fa che dire: «Siil! ed essa è”, locuzione che in arabo è: kun fayakūn; Sura III, vv. 45-47, ibid. p. 40, dove si riprende l’incarnazione di Gesù per opera di Dio in Maria Madre.

14 Cfr. Laxman Prasad Mishra (a cura di), Misticì indiani medievali, UTET, Torino 1971, p. 245.
15 Ibid., p. 537.
mutilazione dell’amore e da quell’apparente disfatta irrimediabile dell’uomo risorge, successivamente, come fulcro proprio di quel sacrificio, il trionfo del riconoscimento della verità aggredita. È da tale acquisizione, allora, che il dolore del martirio si esplica quale testimonianza più concreta della verità che Dio rivela, una volta avvenuto e accaduto Lui stesso in Cristo e manifestatosi come pienezza del suo amore per l’uomo.

16. Pertanto da tale aporetica evidenza non si può far altro che afferrare, non la sicumera dei carnefici, piuttosto la certezza che l’involucro della vita non possa che essere intuito e compreso addirittura nel suo opposto, come se quasi tutto il mondo funzionasse nella paradosralità del contrasto dato da un’aporia. Tuttavia, grazie proprio a tale aporia, è possibile comprendere e affermare l’incontrovertibile presenza di Dio, non conflutabile attraverso paradossi logici, giacché Dio vive in noi allo stesso modo di come il tempo compia il suo accadimento, descrivendo innegabilmente il mondo di cui siamo parte.

Tuttavia pur non potendo avvicinarci al moto perpetuo del tempo e al movimento del mondo nel tempo per ghermirne materialmente la sua meccanica razionale, si può meditare il tempo nel mondo e il mondo in virtù di quanto affermato, per così accettarli metafisicamente come l’ineffabile mistero della realtà del nostro proprio esistere. L’essere, invece, quale incontrovertibile evidenza, permane ineguagliabile nel suo mutamento, affinché si trasformi nell’uomo quella coscienza in grado di accettare il dubbio, esattamente ed efficacemente, nell’ineludibile accadere della vita dell’uomo nel mondo, perché attraversata questa vita dal suo stesso tempo.

17. Difatti che senso avrebbe una vita terrestre infinitamente vivibile, odiosamente quindi priva di tempo appunto perché innocua alla fine? Proprio su questo si può riflettere qualora si ripercorressero le tappe spirituali verso quella che diviene anche perfezione ontologica in Dio, dove si realizza da un punto di vista antropologico un amore totale, però vero e reale in quanto offerto all’uomo tra una vita che cessa consapevolmente nel consumatum est cristiano, ad esempio, esclusività di una missione, ed una Vita risorta che materialmente tocca l’uomo come indeterminabile presente, cioè realtà inconsumabile nell’uomo nel suo mondo e incontrovertibile tendenza per l’uomo nel tempo del mondo. È piuttosto nel tempo, traguardo e misura della vita, che emerge “senza scrupoli” cosa si sia fatto di questa vita: Pascal non esitò a sostenere che in Lui (Cristo) e solo in Lui si capisce chi sia Dio e chi sia l’uomo, cosa sia la vita e cosa sia la morte.

D’altronde è giustamente dal movimento del tempo in ognuno che si riconosce la differenza fra successo, fallimento, ricchezza, fama, povertà, salute, malattia, piacere e dolore; tale differenza si rivela in ultimo nella dannazione o nella salvezza: quale sarebbe allora il proprio vantaggio nel guadagnare il mondo intero, perdendo però la propria anima?\[16\]

\[16\]Mt 16, 26.
18. D’altronde è al limite dell’elemento discreto dove appunto si profila il mondo caratterizzandosi *mondano*, cioè rendendo l’elemento discreto possibile perché vissuto (nel senso di *erlebt*): nel momento della cessazione di sé nell’Illimitato e nell’Indeterminato, cioè nel *Fanā*’, si rivela l’armonia dell’anima di quanto inconcepibile eppure imprescindibile nella vita dell’uomo, benché l’uomo *soffra* la libertà di esserne privo e di potersi porre lontano da lui: appunto da Dio.

Il tempo specifica ogni limite di quest’armonia tra uomo e mondo, stabilendo onticamente un rinvio a una forma continua, – proprio l’anima –, che è poiché *discretamente* parte della vita dell’uomo nel suo mondo attraversato dagli elementi discreti che compongono il tempo, e che pur interrompendolo, esattamente in quanto interrotto, ne permettono la durata in eterno\(^\text{17}\).

19. Tale ambito ci lascia d’altro canto intuire come peculiarmente in questo limite alla comprensione si rivelì la condizione umana della vita indissolubilmente legata al suo contrario, e invirtù di ciò, grazie a tale contraddizione, altrettanto indissolubilmente stretta alla sua dimensione divina. S’afferra in tale contesto ontologico e teologico, come realtà antropologica esistita ed esistente in Cristo, quella differenza circa la qualità del tempo astratto e del tempo concreto: il tempo *concreto*, tempo del mondo, consiste in un unico “ora”, che ciononostante non rimane stabilmente consistente, ma che neppure potrebbe esser sostituito da un altro o da altri “ora” dello stesso genere\(^\text{18}\). In realtà quanto in noi invisibile, cioè la nostra coscienza, si perpetua nel tempo *astratto* come sostanza di quell’“ora” visibile, nel ricordo dell’trasformazione del proprio tempo *concreto*, della sua evoluzione esistenzialmente storica e che riconduce quanto concreto all’esperienza astratta (nel senso di *Erfahrung*, non *Erlebnis*), esperienza impercettibile eppure percepibile del tempo esterno al nostro mondo, tempo da Aristotele\(^\text{19}\) già individuato e posto nell’infinito che a sua volta rivela, perciò, unagrandezza analogamente infinita, quella eterneamente di Dio, vissuta antropologicamente in Cristo in quanto Dio in-sé e per-sé, rivelato nell’amore *della* Croce e nel *limen* tra la sua vita e la sua morte alla sua Vita risorta, testimonianza concreta per l’uomo della vittoria dell’amore *sulla* Croce.

La dilatazione, quindi, verso il passato e verso il futuro converge nel presente, concreta eternità in Cristo vivibile perché da Cristo estesa, formadell’infinito che promana e che deriva da Dio, che imperscrutabile evento, sia infinito sia intera compiutezza sussistono, seguitando ad accadere. L’infinito, misura che richiede ineludibilmente, secondo Aristotele, un’aggiuntapermanente inestinguibile, e la compiutezza, cioè formadell’interoperfetto, creatosenza creatore, accadono nel mondo e svolgono il


\(^{19}\) Aristotele, *Fisica*, cit., pp. 243-249.
loro essere nell’universo, onticità unica perché-Dio e in-Dio, quali inizio e ritorno continui del mosso.

d. Rilievi di comparazione ermeneutica tra Sufismo e mistica cristiana

20. In tal modo essendo la morte in maniera ineludibile legata alla temporalità dell’esistenza, l’aspetto della forma della Creazione lascia apparire il tempo come circoscritto, determinato: una prospettiva mondana che induce l’uomo a cadere nell’inganno della sua vita come limitata unicamente da un suo “inizio” e da una sua “fine” in quanto corpo materiale. Così però non è, piuttosto siamo indotti a crederlo per effetto del mondo che sembra sempre doverci sopraffare. Eppure, come ci rammenta san Paolo, “noi non abbiamo ricevuto lo spirito del mondo, ma lo Spirito di Dio per conoscere ciò che Dio ci ha donato”

E qual è l’approdo, quindi, a quella donazione di Dio?

Ciò si traduce nel fatto secondo cui la Creazione rivela che proprio noi stessi 

siamo stati donati,

rendendo la vita esperienza mondana che accade nell’ambito di un luogo e di un soffio: la nostra esistenza. Questa esistenza, tuttavia, è immediatamente superata dalla constatazione di un corpo materiale, involucro dello spirito, che esiste in virtù del fatto d’essere e divenire senza averlo voluto e deciso ex sibi, giacché nessuno sarebbe identico, comune, uguale, o alternativo o analogo a un altro suo...

simile. Infatti essendosi Dio rivelato unicamente in Cristo, proprio da quest’ultimo il vincolo d’amore tra Creazione e spirito è risorto, attirando ogni sé al superamento della temporalità, per essere l’uomo di

nuovo nel tempo di Dio e della sua Creazione: quanto già nella filosofia platonica e dopo, venne ad essere identificato come aióv rispetto a καιρός.

21. In tal modo ci si compenatra nel fatto chela Creazione sospinga l’elemento discreto nell’evento, proprio come la forma della natura produce la pluralità di fenomeni naturali nel mondo. Giungendo poi a ponderare quanto l’anima dell’uomo aneli a Dio indeterminabilmente nel presente del corpo e nell’assenza di ogni temporalità, si può riconoscere corrispondente al vero che l’amore tra Dio e l’anima sia di una tale perfezione, così straordinaria, da rivelare appunto come l’anima contempli un piacere inimmaginabile in Dio, per cantarvi lode e riconoscenza senza dover cessare mai, secondo quanto ci ha detto e ci ha testimoniato con il sacrificio della sua stessa vita Edith Stein

La filosofia del tempo si traduce allora in un’osservazione dell’ordine del mondo nel Tempo di questo mondo governato da Dio che è eterno, giacché né l’inizio né la fine, di questo mondo, ci sarà dato conoscere. E per eterno non si può che intendere proprio ciò di cui si perde concetto, poiché non si perviene a cogliere quando il Tempo abbia avuto inizio nel segnare il movimento dell’universo, né potendo stabilire la durata di questo stesso Tempo, cioè efficacemente poter rispondere al quesito: quanto tempo resta ancora al...

Tempo?

20 Cor I, 2, 10-13.
22. Allo stesso modo nessuno di noi sarebbe in grado di stabilire con sicurezza la cessazione del suo movimento nel mondo nel potersi caratterizzare l’inizio del suo essere-altro una volta terminato il suo peculiare esistere nel mondo, cioè il suo destino, appunto la sua meta, come vuole il significato della parola “destino” nella lingua spagnola. Posso nondimeno essere a “conoscenza” del mio cammino umano, soltanto ponendo fine a me stesso, il che però mi costringerebbe ad andare contro il mio specifico esistere, cosa che funzionerebbe in virtù di un’insolita ragione, contraria appunto rispetto proprio al mio esistere e al mio stesso essere, portato si alla morte, l’heideggeriano (Sein zum Tode), non però obbligato a recidere se medesimo per il semplice fatto di comprovarne convincente l’unità di esistere in quanto essere
tale irrisolvibile indecibilità si perviene alla concreta dello spirito ermeneutico aristotelico che segna il Tempo pervaso dal prima e dal poi, successiva acquisizione in Agostino, il quale constata tuttavia la percezione di Dio non poter essere più accantonabile e separabile dalla vita dell’uomo e dalla sua “esistenza”.

Proprio intuendo obiettivamente la vita come cammino, come destino, che, suo malgrado, deve raggiungere un traguardo paradossale nel suo opposto, la vita stessa colta e interpretata in esistenza, rivela l’antinomia del Tempo essere esplicazione del dilemma teologico: credo?

23. In sostanza la fede acquisisce certezza nel momento in cui si è altrettanto sicuri di non poter mai decidere, come quando ci si ritrova di fronte alle comuni scelte razionalmente esistenziali, appunto perché Dio è una scelta irrazionalmente esistenziale, allo stesso modo di come la vita siaparadossalmente legata in maniera in scindibile al suo opposto, la morte, giacché è questo suo contrario che ne permette il riconoscimento quale realtà incontrovertibile che esiste solo e solo se non-mort.

L’accadimento più irrazionale nella vita, il verificarsi del suo contrario, necessita il mistero di Dio, legittima ontologicamente proprio la vita dell’uomo, permette uno sguardo sul Tempo, quasi che la morte fosse la “carta d’identità” della vita. Eccò perché il mistero della salvezza in Cristo libera definitivamente l’amore verso di Lui, amore costretto a lottare contro la prigione dell’esistenza per testimoniare la sua vita, e sciolto dalle catene solo quando il paradosso torna alla sua ricomposizione finale

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23 In effetti la paradossalità del morire consiste proprio nella sopravvivenza di quanto esterno al morire per sé. Dice Martin Spaeth: “Die Welt ‘überlebt’ den Menschen, so dass ein Versagensgefühl aufkommt, also das äußerst missliche Empfinden, ihm werde durch den Tod
24. Tale questione è stata ripresa (cfr. supra par. 19) da Fernando Inciarte che non ha mancato dal sottolineare come nell’aspetto metafisico dell’anima si rivelì palesemente l’orizzonte del divenire la stessa anima concetto-guida nell’analisi esistenziale dell’uomo e della sua storia. Ma allora dov’è finita e sin dove arriva quella storia della libertà di fronte alle scelte possibili così largamente propagandata dall’esistenzialismo e anche precedentemente dall’illuminismo? Dove è finita la tolleranza illuministica?

Non c’è mai stata libertà o tolleranza: costringere l’essere a una non-coincidenza con la realtà, per portarlo solo a un’incidenza con la stessa realtà, significa obbligarlo alle scelte; proclamare la tolleranza perseguendo gli oppositori, non può che assumere altra valenza semantica se non quella di essere intolleranti. La libertà possibile è quella che sorge dall’essere come perdonò, e tanto più sarà libertà quanto più infamia attornierà quell’uomo ridotto al pubblico ludibrio o al pubblico saccheggio. Il resto sarà liberazione giuridico-politica, cioè restaurazione.

25. Nella morte, peraltro, è la fede che realizza la vita come un evento della grazia, perché se la fede muove il ritorno a Dio, quotidianamente, di certo non si può neppure dubitare come, a sua volta, sia la grazia di Dio ad imprimerla alla vita dell’uomo la necessità della fede di fronte al mistero della sua vita. Proprio Gesù, cioè la rivelazione di Dio nel Tempo del mondo, soffre il mistero della necessità della salvezza del mondo attraverso quanto si oppone al potere politico, al dominio “semplice” del tiranno che saccheggia e umilia, infine attraverso quanto si oppone alla morte, cioè l’amore, quell’amore già narrato forte come la morte, ma che tuttavia necessita della morte per essere e per rivelarsi, perché è in quell’istante in cui la vita soffre tale necessità del mistero del suo proprio essere che la stessa vita finalmente risorge quale fulcro di pienezza della salvezza e diviene, la vita, evento nel mondo, contemporaneità assoluta nell’universo senza inizio e senza fine, esattamente perché colto in un solo impercettibile istante, in cui Dio ha sofferto il mistero della sua necessità di oltrepереasse l’apparente inaccessibile angoscia per vincerci a dispetto del pericolo della debolezza di essersi potuto rivelare politicamente, come capo per il dominio della storia e sul mondo.

Invece è nella salvezza del dolore che Gesù manifesta e dis-vela tutta la sua bellezza di essere Figlio di Dio, bellezza solo apparentemente e momentaneamente sconfitta dalla morte, bellezza però che risorge come amore di quella Vita che accade ancora nel Tempo perché memoria del mondo.

etwas vorenthalten, auf das er womöglich ein Anrechte habe”. In questo modo s’indirizza Martin Spaeth, Gewonnene Zeit-verlorenes Heil?, LIT, Berlin 2007, p. 142.


25 Ct, 8, 6-7.

26 Dice Javier Echevarría: “Non riusciremo mai a farci carico pienamente del male che noi uomini abbiamo commesso nel corso della storia. Gesù, che percepisce in tutta chiarezza quella mole di immondizia scagliata contro Dio, si sprofonda esterrefatto perché la sua perfezione di intelligenza e di amore lo porta a penetrare tutta la degradazione alla quale noi creature abbiamo
26. Se, allora, l’esistenza umana si racchiude in un inizio e in una fine, non consentendo a nessuno di sfuggire a tale dato ineluttabile in cui la temporalità si rivela nella morte, solo il sacrificio voluto pienamente e consapevolmente da Cristo, di Sé sulla sua Croce, strappa infine l’uomo all’inganno di osservare quello spirito del mondo sopraffare la vita stessa dell’uomo, pervasa invece perfettamente dallo Spirito di Dio. È perciò nell’ultimo Adamo, cioè Cristo, che lo spirito rinasce e ritorna per ricongiungere il vincolo d’amore tra semplice e complesso, tra il Creatore e l’uomo, uomo da Dio creato perché da Lui desiderato e amato, perciò voluto nel mondo, affinché vi fosse e vi sia custode della natura, all’interno della vita dell’universo sia nella sua dimensione spaziale che temporale.

27. Esiste, in effetti, una luce che pervade ogni osservazione della sfera dello Spazio che si allarga alternandosi però su quanto non ha limite, ma che permea, ciononostante, una dimensione finita: l’uomo, in grado di comprendere e valutare l’universo quale realtà presente, allo stesso modo del mondo afferrato e risolto (nella semantica di erfassen) nella sua illimitatezza, sebbene differenziabile nelle molteplicità del senso e nelle variabilità del Tempo e delle sue interpretazioni.

Ogni metamorfosi ha il suo tempo che non muta mai e che resta appeso a quella linea che s’intravede chiara e pulita all’orizzonte, linea che segna la separazione del mondo, spazio inespresso di una profonda tenebra di luce, luce che sgorga dalla muta volontà di questa terra nell’attimo stesso in cui il cielo pare unirsi a essa. Quella stessa luce, però, e anche su tali profili si concentra l’ultima parte del presente studio, percepisce qualcos’altro che aveva quasi ignorato, che aveva canzonato la sua attenzione eppure canonizzato la sua minuziosa osservazione, qualcosa di maggiore che non oppone all’illimitatezza l’indeterminato, che non colpisce la pluralità di osservazioni dello Spazio e del Tempo, cioè un’isometria che non possiede questi ultimi principi, ma che tuttaviva li consuma e li rigenera in una forma del mondo continuamente eterna: il Verbo.

28. Attraverso il battito della parola nella sua preghiera il Sufi afferra come l’invisibile sia all’interno dell’anima, come si muova e si riveli a tratti quale rappresentazione di un territorio inesplorato, voce di un inconscio imprevedibile. Si vorrebbe riposare il più lontano possibile da quanto si rappresenta attraverso la consistenza della voce umana; si vorrebbe riposare nel silenzio di un cielo invisibile, in cui il brivido dell’interiorità possa ancora dare la possibilità di sentire – nel senso più proprio di empfinden – questo viaggio verso il divenire, lì dove poter leggere infine l’ultima pagina dell’opera attesa, la propria via nel condiscoseso. Ma a tanta malvagità, che lo colpisce nell’anima e nel corpo con una sofferenza indescrivibile, risponde con quella pienezza di amore, così immensa da cancellare quella progressione di miserie: Uomo, i tuoi peccati ti sono rimessi (Lc 5, 20)”, così Javier Echevarria, Getsemani, Ed. Ares, Milano, 2008, pp. 219-220.

Tempo continuo che tratteggia la forma del mondo, mondo inseguito, lasciato e ripreso. E l’anima rimane immortale possibilità di salvezza, al di là del corpo che la contiene, perché essa è immagine dell’uomo di Dio, immagine nell’uomo di Dio. Ed è Dio come rivelazione della durata eterna della forma del mondo, che permette continuo il Tempo nel mondo, onticità assoluta e forma della coscienza dell’uomo.

29. Il Sufi riconosce che l’anima, affatto soggetta al ritorno (sanscrito: *samsara*) per la sua purificazione, dottrina anche accolta nel buddhismo zen che si rifece fortemente alla tradizione buddhistica indiana e tibetana, rimane immortale possibilità di salvezza, oltre il corpo che la contiene, poiché immagine dell’uomo di Dio, senza ovviare a essere *soprattutto* l’immagine nell’uomo di Dio; ecco perché ipotizzare un continuo reincarnarsi della propria esistenza in una successiva risulta completamente assurdo: la sola via esistente e possibile all’uomo per salvare la sua vita e la sua anima, tutto sé stesso, è in Dio, in Gesù quale perfetto Uomo, essendo la stessa vita sempre unica e irripetibile, e mai ripetuta sotto forme differenti o spoglie mortali diverse.

È Dio, peraltro, quale rivelazione della durata eterna della forma del mondo, che lascia continuo il tempo nel mondo, perché onticità imprescrutabile e interminabile dell’uomo in Dio essendo l’uomo creatura di Dio, *concreata* nella forma della coscienza.

30. Ciononostante se il traguardo paradossale, eppure inconfutabile, della vita fosse solo la sua morte, se obiettivo bizzarro del tempo fosse provenire da un passato invisibile, o solo fluidificato in appannati ricordi, per continuare verso un futuro ignoto e assolutamente inesistente, se non in immaginazioni umane che rendono la speranza volgare “magari”, allora Dio non può che rivelarsi pecuniamente in Gesù, quel Gesù che promette integralmente la sua Vita attraverso il suo stesso Amore, testimoniando la sua Vita come inconfutabile Verità, constatazione apparentemente contraddittoria e tuttavia irrinunciabile del tempo privo d’inizio e senza fine, perché tempo di sé stesso, di sé in quanto infinito e illimitato, eppure finito e periodicamente all’interno della vita di ogni uomo. Sulla Verità che non può essere confutata proprio perché in essa assente il dubbio o il tramonto, dice Dostojevski: “Se qualcuno mi dimostrasse che Cristo è fuori dalla verità e se fosse *effettivamente* vero che la verità non è in Cristo, ebbene io preferirei restare con Cristo piuttosto che con la verità”28.

**e. Ascesi spirituale e mistica universale: considerazioni di filosofia della religione tra al-Tawbah e al-Ma’rifah.**

31. Il *fanā*rivelato può essere descritto meglio, grazie anche a tali acquisizioni comparatistiche, come la fase in cui il Sufi si eleva in una mistica unione col divino, scomponendosi la comune distinzione antropologica fra sé e gli altri, ontologica fra umano e divino, psicologica fra riflessivo e antiriflessivo. Quando qualcuno opera nel *fanā’,* questi diventa dimora dellepeculiarità di Dio e

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fare ciò causa una purificazione delle caratteristiche umane, cioè una contrizione (al-Tawabah)\textsuperscript{29}.

Questo passaggio in cui si dissolvono e si estinguono i legami dell’ego e ci si unisce e si permane nell’Essenza Divina è chiamato \textit{fanā}.

\textit{Fanā} (estinzione) e \textit{Baqā} (sussistenza) sono due nozioni interconnesse in cui il \textit{fanā} precede il \textit{Baqā}. Dei due termini, il concetto maggiormente espresso nella letteratura Sufi è quello di \textit{fanā}. Infatti proprio nella condizione del \textit{tawhid}, intesa quale affermazione dell’Unicità di Dio, il mistico scorge ben delineato un al di là in cui si disgrega ogni parvenza di autocoscienza individuale, affinché egli stesso asceda ad uno stato estatico in modo da essere coinvolto per intero dalla non-esistenza, sussistendo in Dio soltanto e nella verità. Questa non-esistenza coincide con la dimensione che l’umanità conservava al principio dell’esistenza, alla presenza di Dio nell’unione primordiale precedente addirittura alla creazione, quando in Dio era attesa e principio, svolgimento e concepimento dell’essere.

32. Dice Rumi fornendo una buona analogia per questo concetto: “Lascia che il servo sia, rispetto a Dio, come una marionetta... lascia che ritorni, alla fine della sua vita, sino al punto di partenza”\textsuperscript{30}.

Junayd Baghdadi, tra i principali asceti e mistici sufi, è sempre stato relazionato, nella sua mistica ascesi, proprio al \textit{Fanā} quale dissolvimento di ogni sé temporale nel sé cosmico, lasciando ciò coincidere con il concetto di al-Tawabah, cioè di contrizione. La contrizione, il riconoscimento della propria umana limitatezza e della propria predisposizione ad una natura ferita, lascia condurre lo stesso Sufi a meditare perché la sua conoscenza interiore (al-Ma’rīfā)\textsuperscript{31} si riveli tra cessazione del proprio sé in Dio e contrizione rispetto alla propria condotta umana. Junayd in tale percorso, caratterizzato semplicemente da una ascetica e da una mistica che non possono restare avulse nell’osservazione del mondo, ma infine si integrano vicendevolmente, ci consente di afferrare meglio il

\textsuperscript{29} Cfr. \textit{Il Corano}, cit., Sura IV, vv. 17-18, p. 56, dove si dice: “Ma non si addice a Dio il perdono verso coloro che fanno il male finché, quando sopraggiunge a uno di loro la morte, dice: ‘Ecco ora mi pento!’; né verso coloro che muoiono negando: per questi abbiamo preparato castigo cocente”; Sura IX, vv. 5-6 sulla clemenza di Dio, p. 132; v. 27 sulla misericordia di Dio, p. 134; vv. 102-104, pp. 142; Sura XXV, vv. 70-71, p. 264; Sura LXVI, vv. 7-8, p. 433.

\textsuperscript{30} Jalal al-Dīn Rūmī, \textit{Mathnawi}, a cura di Gabriele Mandel Khan, cit.

concetto di fanā. Qui, il Fanā’ fu spiegato come l’oblio della consapevolezza di sé, la perdita del mio proprio perché ogni esistenza è Dio. Si riporta che Junayd abbia detto: “Dio annienta le mie costruzioni così come ha costruito me originariamente nella condizione del mio annientamento”32.

Junayd ci rivela pertanto come la transizione dall’esistenza alla non-esistenza o esistenza primordiale non corrisponde a un totale annientamento, dal momento che il Sufi non si riduce a un puro nulla: è piuttosto una purificazione dell’essenza del Sufi, portata agli stati supremi dell’essere e infine assorbita in Dio.

33. Il punto cruciale del passaggio è raggiunto quando il Sufi si libera del suo stesso essere, come un serpente quando muta la pelle, e oblitera la sua stessa coscienza di sé. Mutando l’ordinaria percezione di sé - quel sé identificabile da un nome di persona - il mistico raggiunge il vero sé, quello che è uno con Dio in maniera profonda e definitiva. Il Baqāʾ generalmente è considerato maggiormente perfetto rispetto al Fanā’.

Baqāʾ è infatti il ritorno al mondo come quest’è nella sua immutabilità e presenza che tuttavia muta in funzione della nostra stessa ermeneutica: il ritorno al mondo delinea al mistico la sua esperienza di inadeguatezza che lo porterà allo sforzo di conoscere il suo essere mediante una contrizione di sé stesso, e infine perfezionarsi. Quando nondimeno un mistico di ferma al Fanā’ senza alcun desiderio di tornare al mondo, la sua funzione non è ancora perfezionata dall’essere costantemente e contemporaneamente con Dio e col mondo, condizione che si percepisce ottenendo la condizione di al-Baqāʾ e quindi provocando una dimensione diversa in grado di trasmutare il corso della storia attivando la divina Verità religioso-morale. Solo quando il mistico perde l’identità con se stesso, sperimenta l’identità con Dio.

Ma cosa significa annientarsi pur rimanendo fisicamente vivo?

34. Coloro che sono entrati in questo stato affermano di non conoscere esistenza al di fuori di Allah e di essere in completa unità con Lui. Il Fanā’ è un concetto simile a quello di nirvana nel Buddhismo e nell’Induismo, o di moksha (detta anche vimoksha, mukhti, cioè liberazione, affrancamento, emancipazione, salvezza) nello stesso Induismo che mira all’annientamento del sé.

Il Fanāʾ può essere ottenuto perciò mediante un raccoglimento costante condotto a meditare esclusivamente gli attributi di Dio conducendoli a sé e con la rinuncia degli attributi umani. È una sorta di morte mentale, se per mentale s’intende l’attaccamento alla considerazione del reale. Chi percorre la Via ne fa liberamente esperienza; è il passaggio finale che porta alla sommità dell’estasi mistica ottenuta anche contemplando una contrizione della propria vita (al-Tawbah), solo mediata dalla conoscenza dell’interiorità propria quale visibile relazionato al mondo esterno (al-Ma’rifa). Liberati da ogni contingenza tranne quelle relative alla ricerca spirituale, l’obiettivo finale è la Verità. Si delineano

32 Citato in Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Scritti scelti, a cura di Laura Vecchia Vaglieri e Roberto Rubinacci, cit., p. 587.
pertantotre diversi gradi, differenziatidai maestri Sufi, di acquisizione della liberazione dall’attaccamento ai beni della terra: Fanā dell’azione, degli attributi e dell’essenza.

35. Il Fanā nelle sue manifestazioni, quindi, non agisce solo in maniera risolutiva nel rapporto con l’immanente; esso è proprio abbattimento di ogni contingenza, riuscita e senso spirituale sia questi acquisiti sotto una forma di azione, di attributo o di essenza; sia divenuti più precisamente un annientamento di qualsiasi condizione esistenziale che non sia configurabile in Dio, e Dio si prospetta supremo obiettivo perché in Lui solo si ottiene la piena consapevolezza della comprensione di ogni bene e di ogni bellezza, cioè la dimensione di perfezione mistica. Il Fanā in tal senso è concepito come uno stato interiore del Sufi, stato che richiede sforzo di concentrazione prolungato e richiamo al distacco, sostenuto per spezzare i propri legami e soddisfare le proprie domande, così attirando la verità, tramite azioni, virtù morali e tramite l’intero essere.

Questo implica una perfettaazione interiore: retta parola, retta giudizio, retto pensiero. A questo prezzo si ottiene uno stato spirituale interiore tale da diventare un puro e chiaro specchio in cui le luci della Verità si riflettono in tutto il loro splendore. La perfezione è raggiunta tramite regolari pratiche di concentrazione, attraverso tre gradi di sviluppo già richiamati: i) Fanā fi Shaykh (Fanā nel Maestro), estinzione nel piano astrale; ii) Fanā fi Rasūl (Fanā nel Profeta Muhammad), estinzione nel piano spirituale; iii) Fanā fi Allāh (Fanā in Dio), estinzione nell’astratto.

A seguito del passaggio attraverso questi tre gradi, si raggiunge il più alto stato di Baqā’ billāh (Baqā in Dio), estinzione nell’eterna coscienza.

36. Allo stesso modo, su tale prospettiva ermeneutica, essendo l’universo “vivente”, lo è nella misura in cui possiede un’anima, cioè il suo tempo, la sua durata, la misura del suo Spazio, tanto infinita quanto intuibile concretamente in Dio, che si rivela interiormente allo stesso Sufi come tempo e anima, misura e sospensione dell’intero universo.

È opportuno evidenziare come in questo “universo vivente” già nella filosofia di Plotino e poi in quella agostiniana fosse statopossibile cogliere la congiunzione tra cosmologia e ontologia, quasi a dover necessariamente ammettere entrambe frutto della molteplicità dell’essere e della conseguente variabilità del divenire, forma e fenomeno del moto del Tempo nel mondo e di quest’ultimo nello Spazio illimitato e indeterminabile, coniugazione tra l’eterno di Dio e l’in-finito dell’universo, perenne verso il “dopo”, unicità di quella e solo

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di quell’immagine: il volto di Dio, che è forma in Gesù, e diviene fenomeno esattamente quando Gesù compie la rivelazione di Dio, rivelandosi egli stesso Dio

**f. Conclusioni: il senso mistico dell’appartenenza a Dio mediante l’ascesi interiore, e la permanenza in Dio mediante la contemplazione della creazione nel creato.**

36. Cosa significa allora appartenere e permanere in Dio?

*Baqā’*, cioè permanenza, è un concettospecifico del Sufismo per descrivere un particolare stato della vita con Dio, che avviene mediante Dio, e che non si esplicherebbe se non in-Dio e per-Dio. È il punto più alto dei manazil mistici, proprio la somma delle estasi spirituali. La *Baqā’* si acquisisce attraverso distinti aspetti della vita spirituale, ognuno dei quali riferito a un particolare momento della fenomenologia del divino, intesa quale principio dell’esistenza e sua evoluzione qualitativa: *fede, conoscenza e grazia*.

Dal punto di vista delle azioni compiute, l’atto della continuità in Dio, secondo il Sufismo, è situato nell’unità dell’azione del Sufi con quella dell’azione divina, ricevendo da essa ordine, armonia e resistenza. Questo specifico grado della “*baqā’*” si ottiene passando attraverso la teofania divina come principio esistenziale e le luci della natura come fonte di conoscenza.

38. Bisogna ancora ribadire che nel campo della filosofia occidentale, quanto si è costituito in una riflessione sulla Creazione, successiva a Ockham, ma che proprio in quest’ultimo ritrovava la sua scaturigine, ha contribuito a vanificare e a confondere il concetto di creato con il Creatore, accomunando l’uno nell’altro sino a lasciarli scomparire in uno scombinato, disordinato panteismo che rifiuta Dio quale Creatore dell’uomo e del mondo, sottoponendolo a un’evascente sensazione emotiva e suggestiva, invece che ad una realtà fondata ontica nell'uomo e nella natura del mondo come dono proveniente direttamente da Dio. L'uomo scopre la sua presenza nel mondo come attimo creato che scioglie il *dubito ergo sum* cartesiano proprio nella stessa unicità ontica del mondo e nella molteplicità temporale dell’uomo: questa disarmonia, nei confronti del creato e della creazione, è un atto che non ha ciononostante indotto l’uomo stesso a configurare la sua azione come connaturato all’azione divina.

39. L’aspetto perciò della permanenza secondo cui qualità ed attributi vengono contemplati, porta il Sufi ad identificare le virtù umane al livello degli attributi divini, acquisitions la loro perfezione, dignità e resistenza: così facendo
il cuore dell'uomo raggiunge uno stato spirituale in cui è uno specchio puro e limpido in cui si riflettono le caratteristiche del supremo Creatore.

La Creazione, dunque, è elemento discreto nel tempo, attimo in cui sia il cominciamento che il mistero dell’inizio e della fine vengono donati all’uomo attraverso la stessa forma dell’uomo, perenne nell’atto di amore da parte di Dio per noi. A causa di ciò il tempo nella sua unicità è specifico nella Creazione, differente rispetto alla continuità della storia quando la trasformazione degli eventi, cioè il succedersi degli elementi della natura e del mondo, implica il susseguirsi di temporalità e temporalizzazioni. Così la forma continua del fenomeno del mondo e della sua specifica natura avviene proprio quando l’istante dell’incipit si estende indeterminabilmente nello spazio, pur permanendo nel presente del tempo.

40. Non è quindi il mondo a caratterizzare le trasformazioni della natura; piuttosto il tempo della Creazione, iniziale e finale nel suo mistero, determina la storia del mondo e della natura: il presente di Dio accade indeterminabile-per-il-mondo e interminabile-per-l’uomo, da Dio creati.La questione, in effetti, investì già nell’antichità quanto venne a essere individuato come problema del passaggio dal limite a quello della continuità, che qui s’inserisce appunto come sostanza di un concetto che attraversa e solca il tempo nel suo spazio, tra un limite di temporalità e la continuità ermeutica del senso nella temporalizzazione. Ci si ricollega a una delle dicotomie fondamentali della nostra esperienza: quella del continuo e del discreto.

I progressivi emendamenti temporali costituiscono una forma continua onticamente presente nel mondo del mondo. È come se il tempo attraverso ogni trasformazione, che in esso si configura e che caratterizza il mondo stesso, testimoniasse costantemente la memoria del mondo. Perciò è asseribile come ogni trasformazione sia limite da un lato e serie, dall’altro lato, kata-strofici, interpretabili cioè come legami storici recisi e rotture epistemiche del mondo. Da tali legami e da tali cesure appare la singolarità fenomenica del mondo, o meglio si profilano le sue stesse fenomeniche che fondano l’Universale del mondo quale Fenomeno, prospettato attraverso una Forma che ricompare continua, costante e perenne nella Creazione.

41. Il mondo, pertanto, è pensabile solo, quale concetto, nel Tempo della tradizione; in quest’ultima avvengono le possibili trasformazioni di senso, e la semantica di Fanāʾ si svolge e la si coglie nel momento in cui il mondo rivela un suo aspetto simbolico oggettivo, nel quale la permanenza si traduce in un’esperienza che trascende il mondo in quanto oggetto di conoscenza e di meditazione della rivelazione di Dio: Fanāʾ eBaqaʾ sono momenti esclusivi per il Sufi di interiorizzazione del creato e di acquisizione della creazione. Interpretare il senso è offrire un contributo di plausibilità alla storia della creazione e del mondo.

Nella determinazione del tempo il Sufi contempla l’evento quale vissuto mistico e sua continuità, ma ogni evento è in sé discreto: interrompe uno precedente. Mediante la percezione del creato e nella realtà dell’esperienza
mistica il Sufìe presente nella sua dimensione passata, in quanto sta determinando quella sua futura attraverso la trasformazione di sé nel mondo, per tutelarlo poiché momento continuo del processo creativo di Dio.

42. Nella permanenza ritrovata, allora, quale essenza del fondamento e del fine propri dell’uomo, si raggiunge l’altezza dell’Essenza divina nella sua Unità, Bellezza e Universalità. L’uomo è totalmente assorbito dalla Vita divina, perché èattraverso Dio che egli vede, attraverso Lui egli ascolta, attraverso Lui egli esprime le sue volontà, attraverso Lui egli contempla il mondo creato e la creazione. E questa è anche la forma perfetta della Baqā’ dei Sufi, la fase finale della ricerca dell’eroe.

Tale particolare stato è acquisito per effetto della teofania dell’Essenza sul piano esistenziale e per effetto della teofania della Luce a livello gnostico. In tal senso l’unità del creato è scoperta dal Sufì nella creazione voluta da Dio come progetto di originario amore: l’evento della Creazione è forma della realtà: in quell’evento emerge ciò-che-può-divenire, condizione potenziale di una trasformazione in atto. La Creazione è l’evento che consente mobile tutto quanto precedentemente immobile, proprio perché è l’accadere della possibilità. La possibilità si determina a posteriori rispetto alla probabilità che rimanga un mero percepire l’accadimento di un evento, come desiderio della volontà. In Dio piuttosto il desiderio è perfetto, perché si compone e si congiunge alla Sua Volontà diretta alla Creazione e consona al divenire del mondo proprio in Lui.

43. Il volontarismo medioevale, invero, aveva fatto dipendere il bene dalla volontà di Dio; già per il tomismo quando l’intelligenza riconosce che una cosa è bene, la trasforma in un oggetto di ambizione (cioè desiderio nel senso più proprio di Begierde ma non di Gier) per la volontà che la desidera, proprio perché Dio è “un’operazione intellettuale di efficacia infinita”, che conosce il bene completo e quanto la Sua Volontà ambisce (verlangen) è il bene totale. In queste ricerche molteplici del Bene, nella parte del tempo che caratterizza quella parte del mondo che il Sufì occupa, “vivono” a loro volta le differenze del suo esistere, cioè le pluralità e le variabilità delle forme della vita all’interno del mondo, intese come elementi discreti di questo mondo in grado di specificare singoli passaggi esistenziali, particolari istanti nell’ambito di un’età determinata. Forse proprio per questo il movimento parve allo stesso Aristotele comprovare l’eternità del tempo in relazione all’universo: l’osservazione del mondo secondo quanto il tempo ne determina la dimensione, non sarebbe altro che misura dello

spazio in cui questo movimento accade, divenendo tale osservazione a-posteriori
una descrizione dell’ordine in cui tutte quante le cose avvengono nel mondo, e
nel suo spazio, secondo il tempo del mondo: κόσμος infatti in greco ha come suo
primo significato quello di “ordine”.

44. Dio, pertanto, imprime movimento al mondo e rivela il mondo come
mantenimento ed estinzione del tempo in Dio stesso. Il tempo meccanicizza
razionalmente il divenire del mondo e Dio esiste come Sufinel Sufi, rivelandosi
ed essendosi rivelato nel tempo del mondo: il Sufi diviene eterno perché in Dio si
spegne il Sufi verso la molteplicità del tempo e la totalità del mondo; ma il
Sufi avviene nel mondo, la sua esperienza mistica è evento specifico, vicenda che,
inoltre, pone in essere un’incontrovertibile realtà mondana: quella
dell’imprescindibile suo identificarsi nell’essere eterno.

Si rileva così il profilo ontico della Creazione del mondo, perché ogni
trasformazione del mondo è possibile all’interno di un’unità mistica di
comprensione del senso del mondo: il tempo delinea il corso del mondo nel suo
sviluppo e raffigura suoi propri mutamenti in cui il Sufi ritrova cessazione e
mantenimento di sé in Dio, mediante però la sua esclusiva ed unica esperienza
mondana.

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**Notizie biografiche:**

A STUDY OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT ON GREEK CONSUMERS’ EVALUATION OF WINE

Cristin Cuflic,* ccuflic@gmail.com

Stela Cazacu** stela.cazacu@gmail.com

Abstract: The concerned study has the aim to investigate the Country of Origin (CoO) effect on Greek consumers’ evaluation of wine. Special attention was paid to the socio-psychological factors behind social identities: consumer ethnocentrism (CE) and animosity. 160 surveys were collected and analyzed through SPSS. The outcome of the research shows that Greek consumers are marginally ethnocentric. Additionally, it was observed that male respondents are more ethnocentric than females, and individuals that left Greece for at least one year also have a higher level of CE. This research can motivate companies, seeking to go internationally, to consider/reconsider the role of socio-psychological factors on the perception of a specific CoO, as well as their effect on foreign product acceptance.

Keywords: Animosity, Consumer Behavior, Country of Origin, Ethnocentrism, Greece, Wine.

Introduction to the Research

Given the opportunities provided by the globalization process, many companies seek to cross borders in search of new profitable markets. As nations are different in terms of economic, social and cultural determinants, if deciding to go internationally, it is crucial for companies to understand the impact of the abovementioned factors on the consumer behavior. Thus, a careful market analysis must be done before deciding to expand the business abroad. A weak market research might result into incorrect choice of a market, which usually imposes high costs to the firms.

This research has the aim to investigate the socio-psychological factors’ impact on Greek consumers’ evaluation of American, Chilean and Greek wines. The study will be linked to the national referent, and namely to the social identity’s effect on the Country of Origin (CoO). As determinants of social

* BSc Perrotis College/ Cardiff Metropolitan University, Greece, Thessaloniki.
** Lecturer & PhD. student, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Moldova State University, Chişinău.

identity, consumer ethnocentrism (CE) and animosity will be the main subtopics of the research.

In this context, the main goal of the study will be met by the means of answers to specific research questions. First of all, the researchers will analyze the respondents’ perception of quality of the three types of wine, in order to find out if this factor should be considered or not in the analysis of evaluators’ wine preferences. The assessment of the three types of wine will be done according to the principles of horizontal single-blind tasting and horizontal sighted tasting.

Furthermore, the level of ethnocentrism among Greek consumers will be evaluated. In addition to this, it will be examined if the evaluators feel animosity towards any of the abovementioned countries of origin. Finally, any noticed occurrence related to CE or animosity will be analyzed based on different demographical determinants.

Therefore, the outcome of the study can be considered useful in highlighting the importance of an appropriate foreign market research, and, namely, by determining the significance of the socio-psychological factors affecting the CoO perceptions. These findings would assist international companies in elaborating strategies on how to manage business affairs with respect to this issue.

**Literature Review**

**Greek Wine Culture and History**

Wine in Greece is closely related to the nation’s history, culture and religion. At the present moment, it is considered that Greece is the first country in Europe to deal with viticulture. “Evidence of the earliest European wine production has been discovered at archaeological sites in Greek Macedonia, dated 6,500 years ago”

Even though wine in Greece has been produced for around 6500 years, according to the numerous archeological discoveries, it became a part of the Hellenic culture only 2500 years later.

Some authors studying the expansion of viticulture consider that countries like Italy and France might have never become passionate of wine without the influence of Greeks. For example, Italians have been using Greek methods of vine cultivation for thousands of years. With reference to France, it is considered that wine has started to become popular only since 600 BC, when pioneering Greek explorers emigrated to Marseille. Nevertheless, Greek viticulture was not favored throughout the entire Greek history.

Until recently, the concerned sector has passed through numerous ups and downs to reach to the situation in which it is now. As it will be further described, the ancient Greek wine making, its culture and the nature of the country’s landscape still have an influence on the Modern Greek wine industry and market.

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3 The Greek Wine Federation (n.d.), *History of Greek Wines* [online].
5 The Association of Wine Producers of the Vineyards of Northern Greece (n.d.), *The Wine Experience* [online].
Trends in Wine Consumption

As regards features of the wine sector, the main wine producers and consumers around the world are the countries in the Mediterranean area, i.e. France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The factors behind are the tradition of wine making and its role in the Mediterranean diet. It is estimated that between 1986 and 2003, the population of the abovementioned countries has been consuming around 50% of the total intake of wine in the world, while the countries in the Central Europe have been consuming approximately 13% of it. The new wine consumers, such as the Chinese and the Scandinavians were consuming around 7% of the total volume of produced wine.

Nowadays, the wine consumption trends are radically changing. While the consumption in the Mediterranean countries decreases, in the Central Europe and in the new markets this indicator is considerably increasing. Trends are also changing in terms of quality of wine and its popularity. Because of the overproduction and over-commercialization of wine, the product becomes more and more popular, and the competition within the sector makes producers consider quality as one of the most important tools for success. Both trends in consumption and the positive change of wine quality seem to occur because of the impact of the globalization and people’s opportunity to experience new tastes of foreign cultures.

Greek Wine Industry and Market

Vis-à-vis the Greek wine industry, viticulture is one of the most vital sectors of the Greek agriculture. In 2000, around 7,000 hectares of land were occupied by vines. The average wine production in Greece was 459,355 tons per year for the period 1999-2008. According to the same source, Greek wine production was increasing from 412,699 tons in 1999 up to 509,366 in 2008 (see Figure 1). However, in 2011 there was recorded a significant decrease up to 420,203 tons. Unfortunately, there is no available data for 2009 and 2010; therefore, it cannot be estimated if, since 2008, the Greek wine production has decreased or if it suddenly dropped in 2011, because of specific factors, such as the natural conditions. However, the Greek wine industry generates a gross income of around 146 million Euros per year.

12 Ibidem.
Even though the wine industry plays a significant role for the Greek agriculture, if compared to other wine making countries, Greece does not perform very well. One of the largest problems of the Greek viticulture sector is related to the natural handicaps. The insular nature of Greece keeps farms very small, able to produce an average of 17 tones of wine per year; and, because of the mountainous landscape, new technology can be hardly applied; therefore most of the work is being done manually\textsuperscript{15,16}. Nevertheless, the abovementioned factors promote the preservation of Greek vine varieties and their terroir. As it was previously mentioned, the ancient Greek wine making tradition is still reflected in the present. Because of the unfavorable natural characteristics of Greece, as well as because the conventional practices are rarely applied, current wine making can still be considered traditional.

While the situation with the Greek wine production has started to improve both in terms of quantity and quality, the consumption has been declining. Especially during the last 15 years, the demand for wine in Greece has been sharply dropping. However, at present, the Greek wine market seems to be much more stable. At the moment, wine consumption represents 20\% of the total alcohol intake and the average wine consumption per capita is approximated to 30 liters per annum. Wine in Greece is being consumed by both genders and different age groups\textsuperscript{17}. On the ground of this information, it can be assumed that wine in Greece is generally consumed by all groups of people, mainly because it represents a significant element of the Mediterranean Diet, thus historical and natural factors are also related to the Greek wine consumption trends.

\textbf{Figure 1: Greek wine production for the period 1999-2008}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Greek_wine_production.png}
\caption{Greek wine production for the period 1999-2008 (tons per year)}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Source:} Adapted from Hellenic Statistical Authority\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{14} Hellenic Statistical Authority (2016), Portal, [online].
\textsuperscript{15} Freese, C.C., The Role of Wine Production in the Changing Structure of an Island Economy: A Case Study of Santorini Greece, University of Cincinnati, 2005.
\textsuperscript{16} Central Cooperation Union of Viticulture Products of Greece (2008), Greek Wine Industry [online].
\textsuperscript{17} United States Department of Agriculture (2013), EU-27 Wine Annual Report and Statistics [online].
Wine Trade in Greece

Further, a description of the wine trade in Greece is performed. Because many grape varieties cannot be cultivated in Greece, the country is both importing (even though domestic production can meet the demand of the market) and exporting wine. According to the data published by the European Commission (EC) Export Helpdesk\textsuperscript{18}, Greece has been importing around 19,674 tons of wine per year, mainly from the European Union member countries (see Table 1). The import indicators are stable, except the indicator for the year 2011, when, as previously mentioned, the production of wine in Greece considerably dropped. Because of this occurrence, the wine imports in 2011 increased compared to the previous year by around 100%. For the same period (2009–2013), the value of the Greek wine imports is estimated to be around 26,95mln Euros per year (Table 2). In terms of imports, Greece’s main EU partners are Italy, France and Spain, while the USA, Chile and Argentina are the main non EU partners. Due to some reasons, wine imports from the USA significantly decreased: from 90 tons in 2012 to 6 tons in 2013.

Table 1: Quantities of wine imports in Greece (2009-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Import Quantity (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>GREECE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Euro28</td>
<td>17,339.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Euro28</td>
<td>688.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18,027.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from EC\textsuperscript{19}

Table 2: Value of wine imports in Greece (2009-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Import Value (1000 EURO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>GREECE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Euro28</td>
<td>27,897.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Euro28</td>
<td>2,191.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30,088.667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from EC\textsuperscript{20}

With reference to Greek wine exports, the indicators are more stable in comparison with the imports. Between 2009 and 2013, Greece was exporting around 33,871 tons of wine per annum (Table 3), valued with an average of 61,72mln Euros per year (Table 4). The main non EU partners of Greece are

\textsuperscript{18} European Commission (2016), \textit{Statistics}, [online].

\textsuperscript{19} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibidem.
Australia, Canada and the USA, while most of the Greek wine is being exported to Germany, followed by France, Italy, Latvia and Belgium.

Table 3: Quantities of Greek wine exports (2009-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Export Quantity (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>GREECE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Intra-Euro28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extra-Euro28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>34 903.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from EC

Table 4: Export value of Greek wine (2009-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Export Value (1000 EURO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>GREECE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Intra-Euro28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extra-Euro28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>59 114.281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from EC

Generally, in terms of exports and imports, Greece is not a stable wine trader; however this is not unusual. As in the case of many other agricultural products, wine trade depends on many factors. One of the most important factors affecting trade’s volatility is the relation between the supply and demand, i.e. the volumes of domestic annual production versus demand. For example, because of specific natural disasters, such as droughts, the agricultural production might be negatively affected, therefore, imports might increase.

Country of Origin Effect

It is important also to discuss the Country of Origin effect (CoO), since this concept is the main part of this research’s title. Along with the globalization process and the opportunities it provides for the international trade, a lot of attention has been paid to the factors that might affect the performance of companies willing to go internationally. One of these factors is the CoO, which has become the topic of an increasing number of academic papers. Even

21 Ibidem.
22 Ibidem
though the CoO effect is very popular in the marketing related academia, there is no any generally agreed definition for it. Together with its increasing popularity, the controversy around the concerned topic is increasing as well. Several scientists are making efforts to demonstrate that because of the decline of origin labels in World Trade Organization (WTO) laws, the CoO effect is losing its relevance. However, the majority of publications are proving the opposite; in most of the cases, the CoO affects the performance of products in foreign markets.

The controversy around the CoO effect is not only related to its present relevance, but also to the set of elements studied under the concerned framework. The contradictory outcomes of such studies are mainly caused due to different combinations of products, samples and countries where the researches were conducted. Some authors consider CoO as a general perception of a country, while it can communicate even a stereotyped image of a country, as previously mentioned, there are many other factors to be taken into account.

It is suggested that, while studying the CoO effect, besides the overall perception of a country, the determinants, such as the level of economic development of both countries involved in the trade activity, should be

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analyzed\textsuperscript{36}. Following this argument, it is considered that by studying the level of economic development of the importing country, it can be found out how buyers would react to a specific price of a product, while taking into account prices of domestic products and of other competitors. On the other hand, the level of economy of the country of origin would characterize product attributes, such as the quality. Thus, it is considered that consumers hold less positive views of products from less developed countries\textsuperscript{37}.

Another determinant to be paid attention is the product category. As mentioned by the same authors, according to the product category, customers usually react differently towards the CoO.

Some other factors to be considered are the consumer characteristics, including product familiarity, reputation of the channel, market factors and the extrinsic product variables, such as the brand name\textsuperscript{38,39}.

All the above mentioned factors with potential influence over the consumer perceptions of a product can be classified according to three types of components of attitude: cognition, affection and conation. Cognition refers to the consumers’ knowledge about the product, affection is related to the attitude towards the country of origin and conation refers to the individual buying behaviour itself\textsuperscript{40}. Considering the specifics of this study, the following analysis will be done in accordance with the consumers’ affection, and namely their socio-psychological characteristics.

\textit{Socio-Psychological Factors Affecting Perceptions of the CoO}

The significance of the socio-psychological characteristics of the target market is represented by its effect upon the consumer behaviour\textsuperscript{41}; therefore, it can be assumed that such variables are strongly connected with customer perceptions on product evaluation. Following this assumption, the impact of the CoO will be further studied in the context of the social identity theory.

\textit{Social Identity Theory}

In this context, “psychology defines identity as a cognitive construct of the self – fundamentally relational and self-referential, that answer the question who


Taking this into account, as well as the self-categorization theory, it is considered that individuals have the ability to influence others’ behaviour; therefore the focus on these individuals provides the opportunity to examine the behaviour of the whole group, and vice versa. This is explained by stating that “individuals strive for a positive social identity derived from the social group they belong to.” Considering that intergroup comparison displays the status of the in-group, and because in-group members strive to express distinctiveness, individuals are often trying to highlight their esteem towards other members of the in-group. Finally, social identity is defined as the “extent to which a given culture recognizes and identifies with a set of focal elements that set it apart from other cultures.”

While relating to the CoO effect, citizenship is one of the main determinants of the social identity theory; and the nationalistic behavior of an individual can be considered as an in-group identification criterion. While the world’s economy is losing its borders, specific symbolic boundaries are becoming more visible and prominent. From this reason, nationalism goes along with the globalization, and consumer nationalism just cannot be ignored when studying the CoO effect.

Consumer nationalism is being expressed in several ways; some of them are patriotism and chauvinism. Relating to the CoO effect, if within a nation there is a high level of patriotism, it is logical to assume that imported goods (while ignoring non-tariff barriers) have high probability of failure in the host market. The reasons of such a possible occurrence are mainly related to the consumers’ feeling of national pride, resulting into domestic country bias, which stands for the support of the local economy by purchasing locally made goods. On the other hand, chauvinism has the same impact; the only difference is that chauvinists are being characterized as people with feelings of national superiority. Nevertheless, through cultural consumption, individuals of both

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groups of national consumers might have negative effects on the market performance of made abroad products\textsuperscript{50}.

\textit{Ethnocentrism}

Also related to the consumer nationalism and similar to patriotism is the ethnocentrism. The general concept of ethnocentrism was first introduced by Sumner in 1906, standing for the universal tendency of individuals to view their own group as “the centre of the universe, to interpret other social units from the perspective of their own group, and to reject persons who are culturally dissimilar while blindly accepting those who are culturally like themselves”\textsuperscript{51}. However, the term consumer ethnocentrism (CE) was first introduced in 1987 by Shimp and Sharma, with the aim to apply the general concept of ethnocentrism to the economic context\textsuperscript{52,53}. The CE is defined as customers’ belief to reject all foreign made products irrespective of price or quality considerations due to nationalistic reasons\textsuperscript{54}. Simply, it represents the overestimation of domestic products versus the underestimation of the imported ones\textsuperscript{55}. Additionally, old consumers and people with low educational level are usually more ethnocentric than the individuals of other groups\textsuperscript{56}.

CE can manifest itself in two forms: as an informal government policy favouring domestic firms or as a general societal tendency\textsuperscript{57}. Even though ethnocentric consumers are keen to choose domestic products in order to support the economy of their country, it is considered that cultural similarity might moderate the effect of CE on product judgement and the desire to buy it. A product coming from a culturally similar country has higher probability of acceptance in the host market\textsuperscript{58}. Finally, it is predicted that because of the increasing nationalism and because of the propaganda towards the preservation


\textsuperscript{54} Ibidem.


of the cultural and ethnic identity, the CE is going to become a potent force in the
global business environment59.

Animosity
Along with ethnocentrism, animosity is another socio-psychological factor
that can radically affect the evaluation of products from a foreign country. As in
the case of CE, animosity is reflected in a large number of international
marketing studies60,61. It is mentioned that consumer animosity is being
considered as an antecedent of CE, and if animosity reinforces ethnocentrism,
then the concerned topic should be carefully studied as a factor with potential
impact on the consumer evaluation of imported products62. Also, animosity is
defined as the remnants of antipathy towards a specific country/nation63.

Usually, the sense of animosity emerges when two parts have been or are
involved in a political, economical or military dispute64, 65. Because of such
conflicts, consumers of the host market are usually having a negative attitude
towards the exporting country’s products66. In the presence of consumer
animosity, product judgment and namely the comparison of prices or quality are
mostly avoided67, 68. It is considered that unlike CE, consumer animosity might
have a worse impact on the performance of products of different CoO. This
assumption is explained by the behavior of ethnocentric consumers versus the
behavior of people with a sense of animosity. As it was previously mentioned,
even if being aware of the product attributes, ethnocentric consumers prefer
domestic products in order to avoid harm towards the local economy. On the
other hand consumers with the sense of animosity do not even want to consider
the concerned attributes69.

60 Diamantopoulos, A. & Riefler, P. (2011), ‘Using formative measures in international
marketing models: a cautionary tale using consumer animosity as an example,’ Advances in
61 Jimenez, N.H. & San Martin, S. (2010), ‘The role of country-of-origin, ethnocentrism and
animosity in promoting consumer trust. The moderating role of familiarity,’ International Business
marketing models: a cautionary tale using consumer animosity as an example,’ Advances in
64 Ibidem.
animosity model from a new perspective,’ Journal of Consumer Marketing, vol.29, no.5, pp.319–
332.
marketing models: a cautionary tale using consumer animosity as an example,’ Advances in
animosity model from a new perspective,’ Journal of Consumer Marketing, vol.29, no.5, pp.319–
332.
69 Ibidem.
Short Presentation of Research Aims and Objectives

Based on the presented above secondary data, as well as on the analysis of the primary data, there will be made an effort to investigate the relation between the socio-psychological factors, more specifically CE and animosity, in order to finally conclude how the social identity influences the perception of a specific CoO. For this purpose, the research goal is split into small objectives:

1. Evaluation of wine attributes, such as colour, taste, aroma, aftertaste;
2. Identification of potential gender differences as regards the evaluation of wine attributes;
3. Comparison of wine preferences between the blind tasting and sighted tasting;
4. Identification of differences in ethnocentrism as regards gender and years lived outside Greece.

The findings will be also analyzed and interpreted in accordance to specific demographical variables. The outcome of the concerned research and its content’s connection with previous studies will facilitate further investigation on Greek market researches.

Methodology

By fulfilling the four objectives presented previously, this research study seeks to investigate the impact of CoO on the Greek consumers’ evaluation of Chilean, American and Greek wines. The assessment of the three types of wine was done according to the principles of horizontal single-blind tasting and horizontal sighted tasting.

Horizontal tasting stands for the evaluation of wine of the same vintage or/and grape variety or/and from the same region\(^ {70} \). In the case of this research, all types of wine were Cabernet Sauvignon, of the same age and price on the market.

Single-blind tasting stands for the wine evaluation by an assessor informed about at least one property of the wine\(^ {71} \). In this case, all the evaluators were told that the wine is Cabernet Sauvignon, however nobody knew about the country of origin.

Finally, the sighted or the so called non-blind tasting represents the wine evaluation when the assessors know all the information about the wine\(^ {72} \); in our scenario, evaluators were informed about the grape variety and CoO.

Thus, in order to achieve the four objectives of this research study, the respondents were asked to answer to a 10-question self-completion survey, which includes four demographic related questions, one closed format question and five closed-ended rating scale questions (see Appendix 1). The sample of respondents consists of 160 individuals. 91 respondents assisted to the blind


\(^{71}\) Cohen, J. (n.d.), ‘Wine Tasting, Blind and Otherwise: Blindness as a Perceptual Limitation,’ [online].

\(^{72}\) Ibidem.
tasting and 69 to the sighted tasting. The respondents were all Greeks from Thessaloniki, of different age and gender, with a relatively high education level.

Results, Analysis and Discussion

Demographic Profile of the respondents

During the first stage of data collection, 91 persons participated in the single-blind tasting, out of which 50.5% (n=46) were females and 49.5% (n=45) were males. The majority of the respondents (40.7%; n=37) belonged to the age group of 20 to 29 years old (see Table 5).

Table 5: Age Group Distribution of Results from the Single-Blind Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20 years old</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years old</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years old</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years old</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years old</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60 years old</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As regards the education level, during the single blind-tasting, 64.8% (n=59) of the respondents stated that they have obtained a bachelor degree, and 28.6% (n=26) have finished their master or doctoral studies (see Table 6).

Also, the respondents were asked to answer if they have or have not lived outside Greece for at least one year. As it will be further explained, this question is relevant to the concerned study. Thus, out of the population that have participated in the single-blind tasting, 37.4% (n=34) have lived abroad for at least 12 months, and 62.6% (n=57) have not left Greece for more than a year.

Table 6: Educational Level Distribution of Results from the Single-Blind Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional School</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters/PHD</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, during the sighted tasting, 52.2% (n=36) out of the 69 respondents were males and 47.8% (n=33) were females. In terms of age groups, when comparing with the blind tasting, during the sighted tasting, the respondents were more uniformly assigned (see Table 7). Thus, it can be observed that the participants of the sighted tasting can be considered older than the blind-tasting. While during the blind tasting almost 50% of the respondents were aged below 30, in the other case only 34.8% of them were belonging to this age group.

Table 7: Age Group Distribution of Results from the Sighted Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20 years old</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years old</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years old</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years old</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years old</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60 years old</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same was noticed during the blind tasting – the majority of respondents (69.6%; n=48) from the sighted evaluation have finished their bachelor studies, while only 15.9% (n=11) have obtained a higher degree (see Table 8).

Table 8: Educational Level Distribution of Results from the Sighted Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional School</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters/PHD</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it could be expected, because of an older population, almost 45% of the participants of the sighted tasting have lived outside Greece for more than a year.

Objective 1: Evaluation of wine attributes

No wine stands out as different from the rest

As it was mentioned in the methodology section of the study, the questionnaire contains five closed-ended rating scale questions. In a scale from 1 to 10, via these questions, the respondents were asked to rank the colour, aroma,
taste, aftertaste and the overall grade of their preferred wine. Through calculating the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, which is a measure of a linear correlation, it was found out that in both single-blind and sighted tastings, all the above mentioned variables are correlated to the overall evaluation of wines (see Table 9 and 10). This means that even though people identify a specific wine as preferable to others, the evaluation of the product attributes of that wine is not qualitatively higher than that of the others. In short, no wine stands out as really different from the rest.

Table 9: Pearson Correlation of Wines’ Attributes (Single-Blind Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall Grade</th>
<th>Colour Ranking</th>
<th>Aroma Ranking</th>
<th>Taste Ranking</th>
<th>Aftertaste Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.450**</td>
<td>.642**</td>
<td>.687**</td>
<td>.617**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Single-Blind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasting)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 10: Pearson Correlation of Wines’ Attributes (Sighted Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall Grade</th>
<th>Colour Ranking</th>
<th>Aroma Ranking</th>
<th>Taste Ranking</th>
<th>Aftertaste Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.437**</td>
<td>.599**</td>
<td>.634**</td>
<td>.669**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sighted Tasting)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Via the calculation of Kendall’s tau coefficient, which is a measure of rank correlations, there was confirmed once more the correlation between measured variables and overall evaluation of wines and, additionally, it was found out that during the single blind tasting the taste and aroma were the most significant parameters, while during the sighted tasting the aftertaste and taste were the most important (see Table 11 and 12).

Table 11: Kendall Rank Correlation of Wines’ Attributes (Single-Blind Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kendall's tau_b</th>
<th>Overall Grade</th>
<th>Colour Ranking</th>
<th>Aroma Ranking</th>
<th>Taste Ranking</th>
<th>Aftertaste Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>.494**</td>
<td>.540**</td>
<td>.470**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Objective 2: Identification of potential gender differences as regards the evaluation of wine attributes

Females are “Super-Tasters”

While conducting a hypothesis test of the relation between wines’ attributes evaluation and gender categories, it was found out that females rank several parameters differently than males (see Figure 2). The concerned parameters are colour and aroma. In comparison with males, female respondents gave statistically significant higher scores to both of these variables (see Figure 3 and 4).
The latter finding can be explained by the “super-taster” characteristics often found in the female respondents. “Super-tasters” are considered the people with a very sensitive approach to tasting, and as stated, “Women are more likely to be tasters than men”[73].

Thus, even though during both tastings, the evaluated parameters are correlated to the overall grade, it can be observed that specific wine variables are being paid more attention according to the type of the tasting. It is interesting that, in both cases, the same types of wines were evaluated, therefore the concerned occurrence cannot be objectively explained. In addition to this, specific variables have been evaluated differently across the gender categories; hence, such an occurrence might also be related to the CoO effect, as products’ intrinsic characteristics are a factor affecting the consumers’ intentions to consider the CoO[74, 75]. Thus, the discussion on the concerned assumption is going to be presented later on.

Objective 3: Comparison of wine preferences between the blind tasting and sighted tasting

“All wines are equally good, but I like the Greek one”

As presented in Table 13, during the horizontal single-blind tasting, according to the first question of the survey, 40.7% (n=37) of the participants of the sensory analysis preferred the Chilean wine over the American and the Greek one. 38.5% (n=35) of the sample have chosen the American wine as the best, while only 20.9% (n=19) of respondents preferred the Greek Cabernet

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Sauvignon. Taking into account that in the concerned research, horizontal single-blind tasting stands for evaluation of wine of the same vintage, grape variety and price\textsuperscript{76}, as well as considering that respondents were not informed about the country of origin, it can be stated that the Chilean and the American wines outperform the Greek one.

Table 13: \textit{Distribution of results for \textquotedblleft Preferred Wine\textquotedblright} (Horizontal Single-Blind Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As regards the sighted tasting, while being informed about all the attributes of the three wines (including the CoO), the respondents have still preferred the Chilean wine (36.2%; \(n=25\)), however, the second placed wine was the Greek one (34.8%; \(n=24\)) with a minimum breakaway from the Chilean (see Table 14). The sighted tasting disfavoured the American wine, which has obtained 29.0% (\(n=20\)) of the votes.

Table 14: \textit{Distribution of results for \textquotedblleft Preferred Wine\textquotedblright} (Horizontal Sighted Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the data presented in Table 15, in which the Tables 13 and 14 are summarized, the Chilean and the American wines were disfavoured during the sighted tasting in relation to the single-blind tasting. As it can be observed in Table 15, evaluators’ preference towards the American wine has decreased by 9.5%, while the preference of the Chilean Cabernet Sauvignon has dropped by 4.5%. On the other hand, the Greek wine has the only positive result. During the sighted tasting the Greek wine was preferred by 13.9% more than during the blind tasting.

Table 15: The Difference of Results (Preferred Wine) between the Single-Blind Tasting and the Sighted Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COO</th>
<th>Results for “Preferred wine” from Horizontal Single-Blind Tasting (%)</th>
<th>Results for “Preferred Wine” from Horizontal Sighted Tasting (%)</th>
<th>Percentage Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>+13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to explain the difference in wine preferences between the blind and the sighted tastings, the next analysis to be done is to compare the means of the wines’ overall grade. Along with this analysis, via t-tests, after selecting cases according to the responses on the “preferred wine”, there will also be evaluated the statistical significance of the difference in mean scores.

As it can be observed in Table 16, along with the American wine’s decrease in preference, the mean score of the overall grade has been also decreased (from 7.31 to 6.85). However, this occurrence and mainly the results on the difference of mean scores between the two types of tastings cannot be considered statistically significant (see Table 17).

Table 16: American Wine’s “Overall Grade” Mean Score Comparison between Single-Blind Tasting and Sighted Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tasting</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Blind</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>1.471</td>
<td>.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sighted</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>1.424</td>
<td>.319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: American Wine – Mean Score Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Grade</th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not assumed</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>.257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to the Greek wine, the mean score of the overall grade received in the sighted tasting (7.38) is higher than the one received during the blind tasting (7.21) (see Table 18). Therefore, along with the increase in preference (see Table 15), the overall grade increased as well. However, same as in the previous case, the results are not statistically significant (see Table 19).
Unlike the abovementioned cases, an interesting occurrence can be observed in the case of the Chilean wine. Even though the mean score of the overall grade has increased from 7.35 in blind tasting to 7.76 during the sighted tasting (see Table 20), the percentage as a preferred wine has decreased (see Table 15). As in the previous cases, the results cannot be considered statistically significant (see Table 21).

The above indicate that even though knowledge of the CoO clearly influences evaluators’ wine preferences, this influence does not go far enough to impact statements on the quality of the wine. This argument is supported by the

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**Table 18:** Greek Wine’s “Overall Grade” Mean Score Comparison between Single-Blind Tasting and Sighted Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tasting</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>1.512</td>
<td>.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>1.765</td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 19:** Greek Wine – Mean Score Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 20:** Chilean Wine’s “Overall Grade” Mean Score Comparison between Single-Blind Tasting and Sighted Tasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tasting</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasting</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>1.300</td>
<td>.260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 21:** Chilean Wine – Mean Score Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Grade</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
results of non-parametric tests (see Figure 5) that show that the respondents’ wine preference is not accompanied by an exposure of superior quality.

Thus, considering that a negative CoO effect might emerge because of a low economic development level of the CoO77, with consumers having a less positive view of products from less developed countries78, in the concerned case, the outperformance of the Greek wine over the Chilean and mainly the American wine, cannot be justified by the abovementioned statement. At least the U.S.A. does not have a low level of economic development; therefore its disfavour during the sighted tasting is not caused by this factor. Considering that none of the evaluated wines were having high brand equity, the difference between the results from the two types of tasting cannot be reasoned by the difference in extrinsic product variables79,80. Taking into account the above analysis on the overall grade of wines and its implications on respondents’ evaluation, it can be stated that the difference in preference between the two tastings is not affected by intrinsic product variables either. On the grounds that the less important a product category is, the more attention is paid to the CoO81, as well as considering that CE and animosity imply domestic products overestimation versus the underestimation of the imported ones82, it can be tentatively stated that such results can be justified by the presence of nationalistic reasons and namely ethnocentrism. Similar results are obtained by a study, where the authors state that Greek consumers are marginally ethnocentric83.

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79 Ibidem.
Moreover, as it can be observed from the results of the single-blind tasting (see Table 13), even though the Chilean wine was the most preferred, it does not considerably outperform the American wine. However, after the sighted tasting (see Table 14), the American Cabernet Sauvignon was disfavoured more than the Chilean one. Considering that cultural similarity between the importing and the country of origin might reduce the consumer ethnocentrism\textsuperscript{84}, when taking into account that Greek and Chilean cultures are pretty different, it cannot be stated that the Chilean wine was less disfavoured because of cultural similarity. Thus, it can be assumed that the significant disfavour of the American wine in the sighted tasting, is not only caused by the CE, but there is also involved the consumers’ sense of animosity towards the U.S.A. According to the Huffington Post, Greece is among the top 10 countries in the world that hate the U.S.A. the most\textsuperscript{85}. In the concerned article, it is stated that the reason of this occurrence is mainly the Greek economic crisis and that, because of it, fewer Greeks are accepting American leadership. However, from several sources which unfortunately cannot be considered reliable, it was observed that many Greeks dislike Americans because of their impact on the Greece’s relations with Turkey: the U.S.A. would provoke Turkish occupation of Cyprus, so both Greece and Turkey would have conflicts, while the U.S.A. would become their munitions supplier. If this information could be considered veridical, then it would be easy to state that American’s wine disfavour was mainly caused by the Greeks’ animosity towards Americans, however as the truthfulness of the information cannot be determined, the concerned theme could be an interesting topic of further investigation.


\textsuperscript{85} The Huffington Post (2013), \textit{10 Countries That Hate America Most: 24/7 Wall St.}, [online].
Objective 4: Identification of differences in ethnocentrism as regards gender and years lived outside Greece

Greek men are more ethnocentric than Greek women

When it comes to the relation between wine preference and gender distribution, it can be observed that except different evaluation of specific wine parameters, males and females do also share opinions on the preferred wine. As it can be observed in Table 22, during the blind tasting, out of the whole population that preferred the American wine, 54.3% are females and 45.7% males. In the case of the Greek Cabernet Sauvignon, out of the 19 people that liked this wine the most, 63.2% were females and 36.8% were males. Finally in the case of the Chilean wine, 59.5 of the population that preferred this wine are males and 40.5% females. Thus, probably because of the difference in tastes, males have liked the Chilean wine more than females, while the Greek wine was preferred mostly by females.

Table 22: Gender Distribution for the Preferred Wine (Single-Blind Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CoO of the Preferred Wine</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A. Count</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece Count</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile Count</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast with the blind tasting, during the sighted tasting, males and females preferred the same wines differently. As it can be observed in Table 23, fewer males liked the American wine (only 35.0%); however, the Greek wine has obtained more sympathy than in the blind tasting (54.2%). When it comes to the Chilean wine, as in the previous case, fewer women (36.0%) than men (64%) prefer it. As during the sighted tasting, respondents were informed about the CoO, the theory about “super-tasters” cannot be applied in the interpretation of the concerned results. It is important to mention that in both Table 22 and 23, the ranking of wines is not displayed, it is just compared which gender liked or not a specific wine in comparison to the opposite sex. Thus, the next step of the analysis is to compare the variation of wine preferences by using cross tabulations between this indicator and gender.
As displayed in Table 24, during the single-blind tasting, out of 49.5% (n=45) male respondents, the majority (24.2%, n=22) have preferred the Chilean wine, while only 7.7% (n=7) have chosen the Greek wine as the best. The American wine was ranked second (17.6%, n=16) by the male population. On the other hand, out of 50.5% (n=56) females, 20.9% (n =19) have ranked the American wine first. 16.5% (n=15) of females preferred the Chilean wine, while as in the case of males, the Greek wine was ranked third with only 13.2% (n=12) female votes.
sighted tasting (see Table 25), the score of the Greek wine has increased in votes from both males (18.8%, n=13) and females (15.9%, n=11). While females preferred the American wine the most (18.8, n=13), the score still has decreased in comparison to the blind tasting. Same happened in the case of males, which gave to the American wine only 7 votes (10.1%). When it comes to the Chilean Cabernet Sauvignon, even though generally it was the best ranked wine, during the sighted tasting it was less preferred by both males (23.2%, n=16) and females (13.0%, n=9). The difference between scores for “preferred wine” is displayed in Table 26.

Table 25: Preferred Wine * Gender Cross-tabulation (Sighted Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Wine</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26: Preferred Wine * Gender Cross-tabulation Difference between the two Tastings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CoO of the Preferred Wine</th>
<th>Preferred Wine * Gender Cross-tabulation Results (Single-Blind Tasting)</th>
<th>Preferred Wine * Gender Cross-tabulation Results (Sighted Tasting)</th>
<th>Preferred Wine * Gender Cross-tabulation Difference between Single-Blind and Sighted Tastings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, from Table 26 it can be observed that during the sighted tasting, both the American and the Chilean wines were less preferred by males as well as by females. On the other hand, the Greek wine has received a higher score from both genders. Thus, out of 13.8% increase of preference of the Greek wine (see Table 15), 11.2% are achieved due to the votes given by males, and 2.7% by females (see Table 25). In the case of the American wine, males disfavored this wine by 7.5% and females by 2.0%. Finally, the Chilean wine was less preferred by men by 1.0%, while the female respondents have disfavored it by 3.5%.
As it was previously mentioned, the only reason for the change of preference between the two types of tasting is due to the presence of ethnocentrism and animosity. Accordingly, considering the difference between scores given by males and females, it can be observed that men are more ethnocentric than women, as they contributed much more to the increase in preference of the Greek wine. In addition to this, as males disfavored the American wine more than women, it can also be stated that they possess a higher level of animosity towards the U.S.A. On the other hand, in the case of the Chilean wine, the indicators of the difference of wine preferences between males and females do not considerably vary.

“A Greek that has lived abroad is more Greek”

The difference in switching opinions in relation to the preferred wine according to the type of tasting is not present only across gender categories. Another finding of this study shows that people that have lived outside Greece for at least 12 months also have an impact on the results related to wine preference. Therefore, further it will be presented the cross tabulations between preferred wine and distribution of respondents that lived or not abroad, in order to finally compare the difference of respondents’ wine preference between the two types of tasting. Thus, Tables 27 and 28 show the percentage of respondents that have lived abroad for more than a year, and which wine these people preferred the most. However, the attention will be paid to the Table 29, which summarizes and displays the difference between indicators shown in Tables 27 and 28.

Table 27: Life Abroad * Preferred Wine Cross-tabulation (Single-Blind Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Have you lived abroad for at least one year?”</th>
<th>Preferred Wine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes Count</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Count</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28: Life Abroad * Preferred Wine Cross-tabulation (Sighted Tasting)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Have you lived abroad for at least one year?”</th>
<th>Preferred Wine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes Count</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, as it can be observed from Table 29, the most eye-catching finding is that during the sighted tasting, respondents that lived abroad for more than a year have preferred the Greek wine more than the people that have not left Greece for more than 12 months. Therefore, out of the 13.8% increase in preference of the Greek wine, 11.1% is due to the votes given by Greeks that have been abroad for more than a year, and only 2.7% of the increase, is owed to the votes brought by respondents that have not left the country for a longer period.

Such an occurrence can be explained by the relational identity theory, which says that a person becomes an identity only when leaving the in-group. In simple words, a Greek becomes more Greek in a foreign country. Thus, considering the concerned theory, it can be assumed that, respondents’ that have lived outside Greece experience is reflected on the increase of ethnocentrism, in this case, resulting into positive evaluation of domestic made products.

### Table 29: Difference of “Life Abroad * Preferred Wine Cross-tabulation” Indicators between Single-Blind and Sighted Tastings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Have you lived abroad for at least one year?”</th>
<th>Preferred Wine</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Chilean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
<td>+11.1%</td>
<td>+0.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-5.7%</td>
<td>+2.7%</td>
<td>-4.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-9.5%</td>
<td>+13.8%</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conclusions and Recommendations

This study had the aim to analyze the CoO effect and, namely, the impact of socio-psychological factors on the Greek consumers’ evaluation of American, Chilean and Greek wines. The analysis has been performed with special attention to the social identity theory and its components: ethnocentrism and animosity. In order to reach to the analysis of CE and animosity, the researchers had to make sure that no other factors affecting CoO perceptions disorder respondents’ wine evaluation. Thus, the wines put under evaluation were of the same vintage, same grape variety, and same price in the market. Such type of evaluation is called horizontal tasting. Further, it was decided to divide the evaluation process in two phases: single-blind tasting and sighted tasting. As the single-blind tasting implies wine evaluation with limited respondents’ knowledge about the wines...

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86 Gladney, DC (n.d.), *Relational Identity and Ethnic Conflict Resolution in Inner Asia*.
offered (respondents knew only about the grape variety of the wine), the researchers have managed to obtain objective opinions on evaluators’ wine preferences and perceived quality. By conducting the sighted tasting however (with respondents being informed about the CoO), the researchers have succeeded to include the national referent as a factor affecting perceptions of the CoO. Therefore, the difference of results between the two types of tasting would only be related to the socio-psychological characteristics of the sample.

Since the research had the purpose to obtain generalizable findings (that would characterize the behavior of a wide population), the chosen methodological approach was the quantitative one. Consequently, the primary data was collected by means of surveys, containing questions related to the demographic profile of respondents, wine characteristics evaluation and wine preference. The sample of the study was represented by 160 respondents. The collected data was further ordered and analyzed through SPSS.

Thus, the analysis started with the consideration of wine attributes, such as color, taste, aftertaste and aroma. With the use of correlation tests, it was found out that during both single-blind and sighted tastings, even though respondents had particular preferences towards a type of wine, the evaluation of its attributes is not qualitatively higher than that of others. This means that no wine is considerably different from the rest.

Moreover, via testing the distribution of wine attributes across gender categories, it was found out that males and females evaluate wine differently, more specifically, it was observed that women gave higher scores to color and aroma than men. “Women are more likely to be tasters than men”\(^{87}\), therefore it is considered that the difference in wine attributes evaluation is mainly caused by “super-taster” characteristics often found within the female population.

The next phase in the analysis was to compare the difference in respondents’ wine preference between the two types of tasting. Therefore, it was found out that during the sighted tasting, the preference in Greek wine has considerably increased, while the Chilean and the American wines were disfavored. As it was previously mentioned, all factors affecting CoO perceptions were eliminated from the evaluation; therefore, while knowing the CoO, CE is the only reason behind the preference of the Greek wine. Thus, as also proved by another study\(^{88}\), the Greek population can be considered marginally ethnocentric. In addition to this, it should be also mentioned that during the sighted tasting, the American wine was more disliked than the Chilean one, therefore it can be tentatively concluded that Greek population possess a sense of animosity towards the U.S.A. However, because there is lack of evidence, a future research could be made based on the concerned assumption.

Another finding related to CE is that, at least in this case, males are more ethnocentric than females. This was calculated by means of gender and wine preference cross-tabulations. In addition to this, it was also observed that people

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that have lived outside Greece for at least 12 months are more ethnocentric than the others. Such an occurrence is being explained by the relational identity theory, which says that an individual becomes an identity only when leaving the in-group. Therefore it is assumed that people that have been abroad for long are more Greek, thus more ethnocentric.

Nevertheless, the presence of several limitations questions the veracity of the findings. The most significant limitation of the study is the disuse of any CE measurement model or formula. In addition to this, the chosen methodological approach did not allow the explanation of occurrences, it only facilitated their detection. Thus, based on this set of limitations, it is suggested that the conclusions of this research should be considered tentative.

Finally, if considering the aforementioned findings veridical, it can be suggested that international marketers should pay a lot of attention to the socio-psychological factors. Even though a foreign market could seem very attractive and, even if a product to be exported is expected to outperform other competitors, if socio-psychological determinants are wrongly analyzed, then a potential international venture may turn into a costly failure. Thus, while considering price of competitors’ products, their quality attributes and the economical level of the market in general, marketers should also have in mind elements such as social identity, cultural characteristics, and religion of the country to expand in.

**APPENDIX 1. Survey Questionnaire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Which sample of wine do you prefer the most?</td>
<td>□ 1 □ 2 □ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a scale from 1 to 10 (10 the best), please rate:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the colour of the wine you preferred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the aroma of the wine you preferred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. the taste of the wine you preferred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. the aftertaste of the wine you preferred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. the overall grade of the preferred wine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What is your gender?</td>
<td>□ Male □ Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In which age group do you belong?</td>
<td>□ Under 20 □ 20-29 □ 30-39 □ 40-49 □ 50-59 □ Over 60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9. What is your level of education?
☐ High School
☐ Professional School
☐ Bachelor
☐ Masters/PhD

10. Have you lived or worked outside Greece for at least one year?
☐ Yes  ☐ No

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WOMEN’S ROLES AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AS THEY APPEAR IN CLASSICAL JAPANESE TEXTS

Iulia Waniek*

iawaniek@hotmail.com

Abstract: Anthropologist and sociologist René Girard, once dubbed by his colleague Michel Serres, "the new Darwin of the human sciences", used literature to substantiate his theories on such topics as the causes of conflict and violence, or on the role of imitation in human behaviour. He held the belief that literary texts contain a literal truth about human behaviour, and in his work I found a confirmation of my own belief that literature can contribute to the discovery of a continuing human truth.

The sources for our knowledge about women’s education and gender consciousness in Japan’s early history are, besides the first law codes and early histories, the diaries and other literary works created by women beginning with the tenth century AD. Laws give us some principles but literary works add details which help us understand the real situation, sometimes very different from, or even opposed to the legal provisions. My essay will highlight some details from literary works of the classical Japanese tradition (from the 10-th to the 18-th century) which show how women felt and thought about themselves and their relations with men.

I will show how women of high rank had a relatively high position prior to the influence of Confucianism and how both social classes and genders were divided behaviour-wise and even spatially in the Imperial palace, by using the data provided by various literary texts.

Keywords: gender divisions, marriage customs, travel and pilgrimage, Kagerō Nikki, Makura no Sōshi.

Women seem to have had a relatively high status in ancient Japan, prior to the influence of Chinese civilization. At least women belonging to the ruling class, as is shown by the descriptions of Queen Pimiko of the Kingdom of Wa (a kingdom in the Western part of Japan), which are found in the Chinese Chronicles of the 3rd century AD. Pimiko is shown as both a political and religious ruler1. The Chronicles also state that when Pimiko’s female descendant,

* Assoc. Professor at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest.
1 As the Chinese histories document, "early visitors from the Chinese mainland noted the rigid social distinctions, including different sorts of tattoos and other body markings, that separated the warrior elite from the mass of the people. They also remarked on the strong position women enjoyed in early Japanese culture, in marked contrast to their clear subordination in China. Early Japanese households appear to have been matriarchal, that is, dominated by childbearing women. Women also played key roles as shamans – who were central to Japanese religious ceremonies and worship - as leaders of some of the clans, and later as empresses". Also, "The
Iyo, became queen she was greeted with much support from the people. From the first Japanese chronicles it appears that women had an important role in politics, as consorts of sovereigns in the Asuka (538-710) through Nara (710-794) periods. Reading the early Japanese histories such as Nihonshoki we see many instances of empresses who acceded to the throne after their husbands’ deaths, or who had ruled together with the emperor. The Taihō code of laws (701), which is the first Japanese written law, and which represented the movement for the adoption of Chinese administrative and ethical principles – i.e. Confucianism – was to limit women’s participation in the official life of the court. However, the two hundred years between the rule of Empress Suiko (ruled 592-628) until the death of Empress Shōtoku (718-770, reigned 749-758 as Empress Kōken, and from 765 till death as Empress Shōtoku), men and women participated almost equally in the governing of the country and ruled for almost equally long periods of time, and such gender equality is difficult to find in other ancient societies.

The majority of Japanese historians considered the rule of empresses in the above mentioned period as intermediary stages, in moments of confusion over the succession of an emperor, or when the crown prince was still a child, and that they did not have effective power. However, recent research suggests that they had the same power as the emperors, even if their accession to the throne had a provisional character. At the end of the 8th century women sovereigns disappeared almost totally – after the reign of Emperor Kammu (ruled 781-806) women are excluded both from ruling the country and from the imperial administration. Empresses will continue to wield influence through other channels – as mothers of emperors. The period from the 9th to the 11th century is called the royal court state (ōchō kokka) and is dominated by the rule of regents, over child emperors, while the 7th and 8th centuries could be called the era of women rulers, according to recent research which reevaluated the role of women rulers in this period. “For example, the Consort of Emperor Temmu (673-686) is believed to have fought alongside her husband during the Jinshin War of 671-672, when they battled Temmu’s nephew for the throne. After the death of their son, Prince Kusakabe (662-689), she became Empress Jito (645-702, ruled 690-

importance of women in early Japanese culture is also indicated by their legends regarding the creation of the world. In these tales the sun goddess, Amaterasu, played a central role, and her worship became the central element in the Shinto religion developed by the island peoples. (see http://heritageofjapan.wordpress.com/)

3 As such the Taihō Code is no longer extant. It was revised in 718 in the Yōrō era and this revision came down to us only in an edition from 833, which contains commentaries from 718 and 833 and is improperly referred to as Taihō Code (cf. G.B. Sansom, ‘Early Japanese Law and Administration’, in The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Second Series vol. IX, Tokyo, Kyobunkan, 1932 p. 69)
5 we refer to Inoue Mitsuasa’s theory of provisional female sovereignty (jotei chikai setsu), which is based on a gender bias that women could not have political authority, cf. Heian Japan: Centers and Peripheries, p. 16
6 Ibid.
697), until her grandson, Prince Karu, who would rule as Emperor Mommu (r. 697-707) reached adulthood.”

During her reign Empress Jitō promulgated two codes of law and moved the capital to Fujiwara, thus setting the foundation of the bureaucratic state that was to emerge with the adoption of the ritsuryō system of the Chinese T'ang Dynasty. “Moreover, recent scholarship indicates that Empress Jitō not only ascended the throne without the customary selection process headed by the nobles, but also removed competitors, such as Temmu’s sons by other consorts, and forcefully took control by herself.” Her political achievements were recognized, and moreover, her role as patron of poetry – of Japan’s greatest poet, Hitomaro (according to some critics at least) is not to be overlooked.

As political conditions changed during the 8th century and the emperors lost some of their power in favor of the grand nobles, some women continued to become strong sovereigns, such as Empress Genmei (r. 707-715), who took the throne after her son, Emperor Monmu died at the age of 25, somewhat in the same fashion as Empress Jitō had done earlier. Empress Kōken (r. 749-758) was also considered to be “a forceful sovereign groomed to rule, ascended the throne without having ruled alongside a male emperor as principal consort.” Women continued to ascend to the throne in the 8th century, as imperial mothers of the emperors, ōkisaki in Japanese, a position from which they could influence the succession.

However, even women outside the imperial family participated in politics – in the administration of the imperial office – during the 7th century. They were called miyabito, and were officials serving as “channels of communication between the court council and the emperor and empress”. They were organized in 12 bureaus, and continued to serve as the emperor’s liaison to the bureaucracy even during the 8th century. The Taihō Code had established the ministries (shō, 省), bureaus (ryō, 寮) and offices (tsukasa, 司) in the administration, according to the Chinese model. It also set a hierarchy based on court ranks, which not only established the social hierarchy, but also were the basis for the administrative hierarchy. There were 4 ranks for imperial princes only (called hon, 品, and an imperial prince who did not bear such a rank was called muhonshinnō, 無品親王) and 30 ranks for nobles and common people, styled as follows:

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7 Ibid, p. 17
8 the Japanese adopted the Chinese administrative and legal system of the T'ang dynasty, which had been revised by the Chinese Emperor in 618, and enlarged in 651 and 713, and consisted of four types of laws: ryō, “an administrative code dealing with the functions of departments of state and the duties of officials”, ritsu, “a penal code composed of prohibitions and punishments”, kyaku, “detailed legislation supplementing ritsu”, and shiki, “detailed procedure for the enforcement of ryō” (cf. G.B. Sansom, cited works)
9 Heian Japan: Centers and Peripheries, p. 17
10 Ibid., p. 18
11 Ibid.
12 Sansom, cited works, p. 103. Sansom notes that the first Chinese accounts about Japan also stress the importance of hierarchy among the early inhabitants of Japan, the warrior class being separated from the common people by special tattoos and other body markings and receiving great respect from them.

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Senior First Rank, shōichi-i, 正一位
Junior First Rank, jōichi-i, 従一位
Senior Second Rank, shōni-i, 正二位
Junior Second Rank, jōni-i, 従二位,
and so on.

There was a clear gap between the third and fourth rank, as the first three ranks were highly prized and awarded to very few persons, and also between the fifth rank and those below. Actually, the persons belonging to the fifth rank and upward were the aristocrats who made the golden world of elegance depicted in the famous Heian diaries, romances, such as Makura no Sōshi (The Pillow Book) of Sei Shōnagon, Genji Monogatari, Izumi Shikibu Nikki or Kagerō Nikki.

Moreover, the Taihō Code stipulated a close relation between the court rank (i, 位) and the office (kan, 官) that a person could occupy in the imperial administration. Persons of high rank were appointed to important offices based on their rank and not on their merit, and if, at a certain moment, there was a need to promote a man to a higher office, he had to be promoted to a higher rank first. As an administration where promotion was not based on merit, the Taihō system did not last long and at the middle of the Heian period many of these offices were collapsed. However, a feature that lasted until the modern period was the fact that appointments to the highest ranks and offices (fifth rank upward) were made only by the emperor (choku 勅), while lower ones could be made by the emperor at the suggestion of a minister, or a minister solely. What is of interest for us about this system is the fact that practically it divided persons into classes who had access to certain apartments of the imperial palace and classes who had not. The imperial palace was the center of political activity, the only place where important things happened, and this aspect is very apparent in the works of Heian women writers, for whom access to the court life of the palace was the main life goal.

So, considering the spatial division between classes and gender, we could say that there were about 100 people styled denjōbito, 殿上人, belonging to the fifth rank and upward, who had the right to work in the inner palace, as opposed to the jige (地下) or shimobito (下人), who did not enjoy this privilege. As we have mentioned before, towards the end of the 8th century, the importance of the empresses decreased, as well as the administrative responsibilities of the female officials. After the demise of Empress Kōken, the imperial consort’s authority was confined to the inner palace (the empresses had their own offices outside the inner palace until then), where she had her quarters, with her ladies of the fifth rank and above. This residence was called the Rear Palace, gogiū (後宮) - and was served by a Bureau of the Rear Quarters, gogūshiki (後宮職) staffed by many women officials. According to the Taihō Code, the gogiū was reserved for the imperial consorts (kisaki), ladies of the third rank and upward, called fujin (夫人) and ladies of the fifth rank and upward, called hin/hime (嬪), who were served by a host of attendants, organized into 12 offices, or tsukasa. Of these most important was the naishi no tsukasa (内侍司), employing around 100
These attendants were provided by the clans, or by the families of local governors, if they had sufficient breeding and good looks, as we can infer from literary works such as Sarashina Nikki, Kagerō Nikki and others. In time certain offices came to be held in a hereditary manner by certain families, such as the office of naishi no kami, held by Fujiwara ladies.

The women officials who served both the emperor and the empress, participated in many ceremonies and banquets at court, together with men, until the shift in power and attitude which occurred toward the end of the 8th century, and brought about a lessening of women’s position, under Chinese influence. For example, in the ceremony of promotion to new ranks, at New Year (jōi no girei), described so vividly by Sei Shōnagon14, the men and women who were to be promoted were gathered in rows at court, in the same hall. After 813 the ceremony was split over two days, with men receiving their promotions on the seventh of January and the women on the eighth. Moreover, during the women’s ceremony the lineup of the ladies to be promoted was eliminated, which reduced much of its charm. As Sei Shōnagon is writing about this ceremony at the end of the 10th century, describing only the part where many people are coming to bring presents in gratitude for the ranks received, we can imagine how much things had changed.

Similarly, the empress used to participate beside the emperor in the audience for New Year’s greetings, on the first morning of the year, until the time of Emperor Saga (reigned 809-823), whose wife Tachibana no Kachiko had to retire to her quarters and another ceremony was organized for her on the second day of the year, after the Chinese fashion15.

A possible explanation for the decline of the responsibilities held by women officials (naishi) in the administration, in the service of the emperor, is an incident which opposed former Emperor Heizei and acting Emperor Saga in 810. Emperor Heizei had abdicated in 809, only three years after acceding to the throne, while very ill and feeling guilty and fearing the spell of a revengeful spirit, much to the displeasure of his lover, the head of the communications bureau (naishi no kami), Fujiwara no Kusuko. Heizei retired to Heijō-kyō (Nara) while his brother became Emperor Saga. When Emperor Saga wanted to change the inspection system created by Heizei, the latter set up a competing court in Nara. As the retired emperors could then involve themselves in politics in the same way as the ruling one, and as his lover the naishi no kami could control the imperial orders issued towards the Council of State, Heizei could send orders directly to the Council. After this situation had lasted a few months Emperor Saga established the kurōdo dokoro, a new bureau where he appointed male secretaries to replace the female naishi. The conflict escalated as Heizei tried to move the capital back to Nara and then rally an army against Saga. Realizing he had no chance of victory, Heizei returned to Nara, became a monk and died in

13 G. B. Sansom, cited works, p. 109
14 “On the eighth day there is great excitement in the Palace as people hurry to express their gratitude, and the clatter of carriages is louder than ever – all very fascinating.” In The Pillow Book of Sei Shōnagon, tr. Ivan Morris, Penguin Books, 1967, p. 22
15 Heian Japan: Centers and Peripheries, p. 22
From then on female officials came to serve the emperors only in minor matters and “the responsibilities at court ... were now divided: the political authority rested with men, while the private, including the sexual, rested with women.”

Emperor made a series of reforms inspired by the Chinese model, laying a heavy accent on virtue (toku, 徳). The Emperor’s wife was still highly considered but, according to the Chinese idea that each gender has its separate role, women’s being to rule over household affairs and men’s to work in society. The Empress who became a mother would continue to have an important role, for example choosing the wives of future emperors. Thus Empress Akiko (988–1074), daughter of the Regent Michinaga, for whom Murasaki Shikibu probably started to write Genji Monogatari, had a longer career at court as Retired Empress (with the name Jōtōmon’in), in which quality she chose the wives and successors of three emperors.

All through the 9th century women of the imperial family exerted power as mothers of child emperors or even as mothers of retired emperors, controlling the selection of consorts for their sons, or even the designation of a new crown prince, and the title they received now was kokumo (国母), or “mother of the nation”. A journal of the noble Fujiwara no Morosuke, the Kyūreki, describes the complicated negotiations that took place in 950 for appointing a crown prince and the important role that kokumo, the mother of the retired Emperor Suzaku, had played. At the turn of the 10th century, when Sei Shōnagon and Murasaki Shikibu were ladies in waiting to the two consorts of Emperor Ichijō (980-1011, r. 986-1011) writing the greatest works of classical Japanese literature, The Pillow Book and The Tale of Genji, in the period of the greatest flowering of Heian culture, the rivalries between courtiers and the influence of kokumo were at their peak. Ichijō’s mother, Senshi, saw her niece from her much older brother, Michitaka, married to her son, as Empress Teishi, but also plotted to have Shōshi, her other niece from her younger brother, Michinaga, married to Ichijō at age 11 (in 999), thus creating a precedent for an emperor to have two empresses. Shōshi (988-1074), in turn, will have a long career at court, as mother of two emperors and grandmother of another two, ruling and influencing politics, later known by her Buddhist names as Jōtōmon’in or Nyoin (or Dainyoin, 大女院).

The studies in Heian Japan: Centers and Peripheries were seminal in demolishing some myths like the one that women lost their power in Heian politics (“From Female Sovereign to Mother of the Nation: Women and Government in the Heian Period”, by Fukutō Sanae with Takeshi Watanabe), or that at the center of Heian literature are the works of women writers (“The Way of the Literati: Chinese Learning and Literary Practice in Mid-Heian Japan” by Ivo Smits) and that women wrote only in pure Japanese because they were deterred from the knowledge of Chinese - Edward Kamens shows in “Terrains of Text in Mid-Heian Court Culture” that women like Sei Shōngon (966? – after

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16 Ibid.
1017) participated in the various settings in which kambun, writing in Chinese, was produced and used.

As far as marriage and sexual practices of Heian Japan are concerned, although polygamy and the “promiscuous' irogonomi - a ’connoisseur of love’”\(^{17}\) - were the norm and even an ideal, some texts demonstrate that monogamy was also a part of the ideal man, as April Sprague shows in the above cited article. She uses chapters 22, 23 and 123 from Ise Monogatari\(^{18}\), which all contain poems that brought back the husband to a woman (poems that “kept her man”, as Joshua Mostow aptly put it\(^{19}\)) to illustrate the way in which a man who wanted to take (or already had taken) another wife returns to monogamy impressed by his wife’s feelings for him, expressed in verse.

“A boy and a girl...once used to play together beside a well. [...] The boy had set his heart on marrying the girl, and she too was determined that she would be his wife, and refused to agree when her father tried to betroth her to someone else. ... [Eventually] their wishes came true and they became man and wife.

Some years later the wife’s father died, leaving her without support, and the husband, tired of living with her in poverty, took to visiting a woman in the district of Takayasu in Kawachi Province. The wife saw him off with so little apparent resentment that he began to suspect her of having a lover. One day, pretending to set out for Kawachi, he hid in the shrubbery and watched her. After making up her face with meticulous care, she recited this poem, staring into space: ‘Shall you be crossing / Tatsutayama / Quite alone by night?'

His heart swelled with love for her, and his visits to Kawachi ceased.”

(Section 23, Tales of Ise)

Heian marriages, whether polygamous or monogamous, were mostly uxorilocal, which meant that the husband lived in his wife’s house (the house she inherited from her father, who materially supported his son in law) or at most duolocal, with the husband living apart but visiting the wife at her home\(^{20}\). From this we can conclude that Heian women remained secluded in their paternal home and aimed to attract the men into their own private space. As the episode in Ise monogatari shows us, if their parental support ceased, the husband could leave in search for a better life and the wife could remain alone and frustrated. Kagerō Nikki, the diary of a secondary wife of the powerful politician Fujiwara no Kaneie, shows exactly this situation: the woman received her husband’s visits, at first quite frequent, and took care of his clothes. As his visits get more infrequent with the years, she becomes despondent and frustrated, but she has no way of influencing him. Her only way of protest is to leave the house and go

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\(^{17}\) April Sprague, “Writing the irogonomi: Sexual politics, Heian-style”, New Voices, Volume 5, p. 64

\(^{18}\) Ise monogatari is the oldest example of the poetic tale genre and one of the major works of literature of the Heian period. It consists of 209 poems organized into 125 narrative sections. Sometimes its characters are identified by name, but for the most part they are referred to as simply otoko ‘man’ or onna ‘woman’. According to certain interpretations, the nameless men of the various tales are said to be one and the same person, the famous poet Ariwara no Narihira (825–880). cf. Sprague, cited works.

\(^{19}\) ibidem

\(^{20}\) McCullough, Japanese Marriage Institutions in the Heian Era, pp. 127-127 and 134
for pilgrimages and seclusion at mountain temples near the capital. The climax of the whole diary seems to be in the heroine’s retirement at Hannyaji temple in Narutaki, in the Second Book. Although her husband urges her to come home and even comes for her twice, she manages to stay there for a month, contemplating the possibility to become a nun. When the angry husband comes to take her home, her reaction is to hide behind a screen, the very object which helps to maintain gender division and inequality.

And then came the usual shouting and I knew that the Prince had arrived. This time there was no hesitation. He marched straight in. I pulled up a screen to hide behind, but it was no use.

“Terrible”, he exclaimed, as he watched me burning incense and fingerling my beads, the sutras spread before me.

“Worse even than I had expected. You really do seem to have run to an extreme.”

The Prince, as the author styles her husband, even has negative comments to make about his wife’s devotion to Buddhism: it becomes excessive and uncalled for, if her duties as a wife are consequently neglected.

One of the responsibilities of women was to make clothes for their husbands, even if the relations between them became strained and the husbands’ visits scarce. The mention of clothes sent for laundry and sewing all through the 

Kagerō Nikki shows how important was this function of a wife. For example, in 972, after almost twenty years of marital crises, the author records:

Because of my ill-defined position, I was less occupied than most with the rituals that covered the first half of the month [January].

On the Fourteenth the Prince sent an outer robe for me to do over. Since he specified when it was to be finished, I thought I might proceed at my leisure. A messenger came the next morning to hurry me ...

And again, after a quarrel:

He continued to pretend that nothing was amiss and sent laundry and sewing for me to take care of, but I sent it back undone. For more than twenty days I heard nothing from him. ....

Around the middle of the Second Month there was a widely circulated rumour that he had spent ten days running with his newest lady friend. Higan Week came and I prepared to go into a retreat – it seemed at least a fair alternative to this constant brooding and weeping.

Equally interesting appears from the text the author’s position as a wife placed in a duolocal marriage, who never gets to even see her husband’s main residence: “The Prince, still in retreat, was building a new place. ... One evening

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22 op. cit., p. 121
23 ibidem, p. 95
when I was in particular distress, he called and sent in a lotus pod from the new building. ... I lay there thinking of this new place, how tasteful and well appointed it must be, and how he had indicated that he would take me to see it when it was finished. I did not know whether I would live or die, however, and I did not know how far his promise was to be trusted.”

However, a good consequence of the fact that marriages were uxorilocal and wives stayed in their parents’ home for at least the early part of their marriage is the fact that thus they would not be ill treated by their in-laws, as it happened in later times.

Who could see women - is another interesting question. It seems that under the influence of Buddhism, strict physical limitations were imposed on women: they were not to be seen by men and sometimes even by other women (Lebra: 1976, 14). In the *Pillow Book* Sei Shonagon discusses the differences between women at the imperial court and those who stay at home: the women at court walked about and saw people of all ranks face to face, without hiding behind screens as women who lived at home had to do. Sei Shonagon also notes that because of this, some men thought that women at court were “frivolous and wicked”:

> When I make myself imagine what it is to be one of those women who live at home, faithfully serving their husbands – women who have not a single exciting prospect in life yet who believe they are perfectly happy – I am filled with scorn. ...
>
> I cannot bear men who believe that women serving in the Palace are bound to be frivolous and wicked. Yet I suppose their prejudice is understandable. After all, women at Court do not spend their time hiding modestly behind fans and screens, but walk about, looking openly at people they chance to meet. Yes, they see everyone face to face, not only ladies in waiting like themselves, but even Their Imperial Majesties (whose august names I hardly dare mention), High Court Nobles, senior courtiers and other gentlemen of high rank. In the presence of such exalted personages the women in the Palace are all equally brazen, whether they be the maids of ladies-in-waiting, or the relations of Court ladies who have come to visit them, or housekeepers ...

A consequence of the secluded character of women was that they could not travel and see different places. However, as women had the right to inherit their husbands’ estates, widows sometimes enjoyed an unexpected freedom to travel: such was Abutsu ni, the widow of an important poet, who traveled five hundred kilometers in fourteen days in 1279 in order to plead a case to the Court of justice in Kamakura to uphold her poetic legacy (Laffin: 2007, 71).

Older women or nuns could enjoy greater freedom, as the diary of a famous poet from the thirteenth century shows. The poet, Fujiwara Teika, was fond of

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24 cited works, p. 73-74
26 accessed in https://www.jstor.org/, March 26 2017
composing linked verse with a group of friends, in his later years (1220-1230). In an entry from 1226 in his *Diary of the Clear Moon (Meigetsuki)* he tells how he enjoyed composing and linking verse from noon until sundown with his nephew, another nobleman, a zen monk and the Nun. This nun appears frequently in his diary, although she is never given a name (Atkins: 2010, 238-9).

Travel and pilgrimages were a way in which cultured individuals could enjoy solitude, invite adventure and display their erudition in travel diaries filled with poems. In the 17-th and 18-th centuries, in a climate of peace, common women started to travel and were also very active in a process of raising their status by education, composing poetry, or even by writing travel diaries infused with a poetry that “connected them with a tradition shaped by female courtiers and by extension provided them the possibility of re-imagining their place in society.” (Nenzi: 2008, 109).

One of the most beautiful affirmations of gender consciousness that we can find in classical literature is in the anonymous travel diary of 1767 called *Azumaji no Nikki* (“Diary of the Eastern Road”). In the town of Kamakura a man from her travel party compared the monumental statue of Buddha with other similar statues he had seen in the country. The authoress remarks: “I envy him for having visited so many special places, but for a woman this is impossible.” (Nenzi: 2008). It is, as René Girard had observed – literature shows us how the human heart pushes us forward in the world, moved by envy, by the desire to be like the others, yet finally gaining awareness of our position.

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GRIEF AND DISPLACEMENT IN MAVIS GALLANT'S SHORT STORIES

Cristina Nicolaescu*

cristina@erciyes.edu.tr

Abstract: This paper proposes a closer look at the importance of short-stories as a representative genre for Canadian literature, which is also its main purpose. I will exemplify with Mavis Gallant’s short fiction by analyzing the themes and innovative narrative techniques in The Pegnitz Junction and From the Fifteenth District, in order to demonstrate how individual memory is braided with cultural consciousness and history, as a social narrative within varied forms of discourse. Among the short-story writers from Frank O'Connor to Nadine Gordimer and Alice Munro, Gallant’s greatest contribution to the twentieth-century short fiction may be considered to be in the first place her use of the genre to investigate how contemporary historical and philosophical issues can be best tackled in order to reveal and understand human experience with the eye of an observer. At the same time Gallant’s writing is unwavering in its great capacity of accuracy and refinement, never failing to impress with gripping stories of the exile, displacement and elusive self. As a result of such intricate and complex problematic, the approach is accordingly multiple, in response to the cultural issues identifiable in the selected texts.

Keywords: narrative, discourse, Canadian literature, short story, Gallant.

The short story as a genre coalesced in Canada just a little more than a century ago. Since then it has acquired a privileged status in Canada. The beginnings were marked by Isabella Valancy Crawford, Susan Frances Harrison, Ernest Thompson Seton at the end of the 19th century. It was as late as the 20th century with Morley Callaghan’s modernist writing that the Canadian short stories ascended to a new stage around the ‘20s and continued the development in the ‘60s with major writers and their internationally acclaimed collections. After the ’60s up to present, a period usually called in literary histories as “Canadian Renaissance”, the genre has gone through a process of diversification and refinement, so that this form of writing has gained prominence and a special place in the contemporary world literature. All writers in this form have brought their contribution so that national short fiction has become representative and significant. As Reingard M. Nischik calls it in the Introduction to his book “The Canadian Short Story: Interpretations”: “The short story is today generally

* Associate Professor, PhD., Erciyes University, Faculty of Letters, Department of English Language and Literature – Kayseri, Turkey.
considered to be a particularly vital genre, if not the flagship genre of Canadian literature.”

Most Canadian writers have started by publishing their short stories in magazines and then in collections and anthologies, so that the short stories have multiple publications with the effect of an increased popularity among their readership. This is also the case of Mavis Gallant, who almost exclusively published her short stories in the New Yorker. Her recognition of the essential homelessness of the human spirit in the modern world gives her work an appeal on both sides of the Atlantic. A Canadian by birth, Gallant continued to assert her Canadian identity even when living in France. Her experience often serves as material for her fiction: the sense of abandonment as a child, departure from native Canada (Montreal), and subsequent life as expatriate in Paris, events that contributed to the recurrent themes of her short stories, connected to the role of memory and imagination in shaping reality and history or the impact of past on the present. Often she portrayed English, American or Canadian expatriates living unsatisfactorily on the Continent, but also Europeans (particularly Germans), “exiled” after World War II in their homeland. There are physical and psychological effects of the war’s aftermath but also geographic and cultural displacements, temporal, spatial and conceptual dislocations. Generally characters are incompatible with one another and the split subjects can be read as an allegory of the Canadian sense of self. Personal alienation against the background of social upheaval in post-war Europe has an intensifying pressure on the individual and family in the rapidly changing world. The Pegnitz Junction (1973) and From the Fifteenth District (1979), writings from the ’70s: have a focus on collective memory and guilt. Loneliness, deracination, expatriatism, psychological loss, disorientation and dissatisfaction are the conditions of alienation that make up the abiding theme.

In title novella of the volume The Pegnitz Junction, we find what was true for the aliens in The Other Paris is also true for a disparate group of travelers on a train trip through Germany. There is a lack of close human contact between individuals, since guilt over the past seemed to be a dominant cause of anxiety in the consciousness of modern man. A young woman Christine, twenty-one, rides the train with her boyfriend Herbert, divorced thirty-one year old, and his son little Bert in postwar Europe. Onboard, she encounters all types of people, each burdened by the weight of what he or she has experienced. A wife must come to terms with her husband’s mistakes and find reconciliation in herself as she meets the refugee he had an affair with. A soldier must reintegrate himself into civilian life, no matter how difficult it is. An unlikely friendship between an actress and a police commissioner begins to form. between Paris and home which was an unnamed "small bombed baroque German city". (Christine “considered this voyage a major part of her emancipation”

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1 Nischik, Reingard M., The Canadian Short Story: Interpretations, USA: Camden House, 2007, p.1
3 Ibidem p.4-5
disenchanted with Herbert and his son, and is still unresolved when she gets home as to whether she will marry Herbert, or her other boyfriend, a theology student. This indeterminacy creates a distance amplified by the intensely personal disjunction in the life of total strangers, who appear in the story at different points in the train trip, never interact in the plot, yet thematically, all suffer from a related kind of stress. Their stories are juxtaposed, italicized, or overlapped one on another. They are not connected by the usual conventions of plot and character, rather the only thing that they have in common is that at some point in the train trip, Christine meets each one and then the narrative point of view shifts immediately, sometimes even in mid-sentence, from Christine's consciousness to the stranger's, and relates his story of personal trauma. The fact that the individuals involved are completely unknown to each other, and never make each other's acquaintance — rather, the story shifts from one point of view to another — increases the feeling of loss of continuity and of personal identity and human contact, and also universalizes the problem of human loneliness. Disillusionment, dissatisfaction and tragedy are what characterize each of the stories. The train trip is Gallant's way of using the voyage as a quest motif into the world of human guilt and memory. In the same way that Christine is in a period of transition from youth to adulthood, these stories of each fellow traveler also deal with transitions through times of crises. No destination is ever arrived at in the same way, so that Christine is never sure when the Pegnitz Junction has been reached. What matters is the gradual unfolding of human experience, particularly human unhappiness. The train trip and the exhausting stops at poor, crowded stations are the uniting links in the changing pattern of human relationships. Isolation emerges as the "unifying" link between juxtaposed incongruities and memories. While deracination suggests itself as the dominant theme, the story's technique of juxtaposing different, unrelated states of memory and consciousness in individuals, who have in common only the train trip and their intense personal alienation, emerges as the element of abiding interest. In this allegorical journey, love is absent. Travel is the symbolic expression of transience and absence of committed human contact, and of detached, disinherit, emotionally rootless human displacement. She simply extracts episodes from a strange character's life, usually because it contains something connected with war, loss, death, guilt or a more generalized incident involving alienation, and juxtaposes it with similar incidents to create a story in which several characters search for close human contact and fail. Similarly, when the train makes one of a number of unscheduled stops, Gallant gives literary significance to the event by relating an event of unexpected deracination in the past and memory of a man standing on the station platform. Hatch regards Gallant's story as her attempt to understand and confront the dangers of Fascism. When the leader of a group mentioned The Adolf-time\(^4\), and Christine observes the motionless, fearful, sad silence which descends on those people. Repeatedly, attempts at personal human camaraderie result in failure and guilty memories among the disparate figures in The Pegnitz

\(^4\) Ibidem 70

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Junction. The point of view in this novella is surveying the critical response to other narrators of Gallant’s stories and by positing an archetypal voice that highlights the centrality of voice in short fiction. As Mavis Gallant said: “Voice is everything. If I don’t hear the voice, I can’t write the story. One has to find the exact tone, and it has to hold from beginning to end if it is to be true”\(^5\). The readers need to decipher the “junction” of the history and fiction, of the past and present posited by the text, structurally encoded in the novella. There is a movement to revelation, fundamental to elegy.

With elegant simplicity Gallant employs interior monologue and flashbacks. By exploring the relationship between the past and the ability of the mind not only to remember but to record or represent history, the writer embeds an aesthetic of elegy. The digressions, narrative gaps, non-linear story sequences work against chronology and install their own temporality of fragmented discourse. As Paul Ricoeur asks, “is not repetition itself a kind of resurrection of the dead?”\(^6\)

In an earlier collection entitled From the Fifteenth District, in an act of mourning explores the moral climate in postwar Western civilization with parodic, conventional modes. Whether in Canadian or European cities, the characters – survivors of the war – are often exiled not only from their homes but also from their memories, identities and their values. Normally, the former form of exile leads to a sense of loss and dislocation, while the latter (that sometimes goes unnoticed by the characters themselves) produces certain ethical deficiencies detected by the narrating consciousness. In the act of telling, the authorial voice simultaneously portrays and laments the resultant exile from morality. The writer explores different modes of mourning or reactions to loss and grief, using an ironic distance between the narrator and characters (to place the reader in the position of judgment). Conventionally, tropes of remembrance allow a figurative resurrection of the past. Elegy combines morality and mourning, wartime suffering providing a kind of social critique often functioning as subtext. Such forms of literary consolation (including *propopopoeia*) are subverted by the use of the ghost as trope. As Benjamin writes: “Ghosts, like the profoundly significant allegories, are manifestations from the realm of mourning”\(^7\).

Ghosts are figurations of signs, representations of grief, linking the realms of the living and the dead. Freud’s statement that the uncanny is experienced most “in relation do death and dead bodies, to the return of the dead, and to the spirits and ghosts”\(^8\). This gets the reader rethink conventional representations of death and the past, to make the past disruptive of our comfortable forgetting. The most self-conscious use of the ghost trope in this collection arises in the title story,

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\(^5\) *Interview with Geoff Hancock*. “Mavis Gallant.” Canadian Writers at Work: Interviews with Geoff Hancock Toronto: Oxford UP, 1987, p.79


brief one in comparison to others, but significant since it serves as organizing principle for the collection. Gallant parodies the conventional tendency to use prosopopoeia as a trope of consolation. The spectral figures demand that the end of their lives be narrated from their perspective. They give the endings to their own biographies, undermining the stories told by the living and at the same time proving them inadequate interpretations of the past. The three ghosts in the parodic *From the Fifteenth District*: Major Emery Travella, Mrs. Ibrahim and Mrs. Essling are explicit and fantastic reversals of the prosopopoeic trope; haunted by those who survive them, they reject the versions of their deaths as constructed by the living. Mrs. Ibrahim is haunted by two people “without respite”, the Major, a “man of feeling” “wishes the congregation to leave him in peace”9. Mrs. Essling “complains of being haunted by her husband, Prof. Augustus Essling, the philosopher and historian”10, and she is burdened with his insistence that she was an angel; all angels “are stupid” she thinks.

According to Walter Benjamin’s philosophy, angels are inhuman observers of the human world, capable of passing judgment without the power to effect change. Keefer uses Benjamin’s “Angel of History” as a phrase to title a chapter of *Reading Mavis Gallant*. For Gallant, the figure of the angel suggests is one that measures the “pile of debris” produced by the “storm of progress” that is history, because – caught in the storm, the angel’s face is forcibly “turned towards the past”11. Keefer cites Benjamin’s description of the angel of history, in the relevant passage from *Illuminations*. Clearly, Mrs. Essling is no angel, but she is dead, like her future. Confrontations with ghosts, with the past is one important aspect of Gallant’s modernist fiction-elegy12. We can associate epiphanies with aesthetic moments of truthfulness. As Besner writes: “Gallant’s fiction demands that we recognize how significance plays over her stories in flashes and sparks, and that we develop the imaginative agility to respond to these moments of light”13.

Paul de Man writes that “allegories are always ethical; ethics (or one should say, ethnicity) is a discursive mode among others”14. The quest for truth in Gallant’s ethical allegories of mourning (focused on the events and effects of the Second World War) goes beyond the personal confirmation of self or the public affirmation of life. Its about the human potential for inhuman behavior and the necessity of remembering ethically, so that the extremes of sentimentality and irresponsible forgetting (both of which allow evasion of responsibility) for the past are condemned. But self is usually called a shape-shifter since it is fluid, not set in stone. If Descartes equated existence with thinking *je pense, donc je suis* “I am thinking, therefore I exist”, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer identified the self

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9 Gallant, Mavis, *From the Fifteenth District*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1979, p.163
10 Ibidem p.167
with the will: to exist is to want. Self evolves over time and if we think of the Over-hero concept in Nietzsche (Übermensch), the one that overcomes the illusion of the self, characters’ behavior in Gallant’s stories reveal themselves as unable to clarify what they want. This indecisiveness and elusiveness of their selves determine the narrative structure which is devoid of closure, on the contrary there is openness to further changes and increased mobility. Then, the encounter between two cultures plays a significant role in shaping self, so that it becomes undetermined, illusionary, mobile, and difficult to comprehend. This kind of self corresponds to the alienation theme, with the effects of moral, cultural and physical displacement of individuals from their homes and families.

To conclude, I may say that writing memory leads to a fictional truth with the reader participating in the interpretation of the disjointed text. The historical subtext critiqued by the allegorical narrative is created with allusions to history. The allegory of mourning for the social and moral disintegration during and after the war functions on levels of fiction and fact, a historiographic memory-fiction. The indeterminacy of the stories, which reminds us of Alice Munro’s narrative technique, sends a message that the “demand of moral meaning” should be an ongoing demand, while the significance of the drama of the past must not be closed or forgotten. The post-war social attitudes depicted get their responses from the individuals and of course, their responsibilities. Gallant’s stories highlight the displacement in the context of history, in mixed modes, polyphonic narration, literary parody and extended metaphors.

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“A STINKE IN THE CHAPELL”: READING SACRED SPACES IN THE MIDDLE ENGLISH SIR AMADACE AND THE ERLE OF TOLONUS

Hülya Tafli Düüzgün
htaflı@erciyes.edu.tr

Abstract: Though medieval romances are often adversely criticized for their depiction of sacred spaces, nevertheless, these spaces may be viewed as going beyond merely places for prayer and meditation. The Middle English Sir Amadace and Erle of Tolous seem to carry their audience through such sacred spaces. These romances seem to enter into a dialogue with the complex dynamics of desire and devotion which are mapped onto the space of the church. In this context, this paper will focus on the renewal of understanding the sacred space in medieval narratives. The literary landscape (i.e. monasteries, convents, shrines and chapels) may not utterly constitute a secular equivalent to the canonically inspired order. Hence, the major concern of this paper is to explore how some medieval romances seem to be a product of the complex process of inhabiting and representing a space which is itself far from simple.

Keywords: Middle Ages, Medieval England, Romance, Sacred Space, Sir Amadace and The Erle of Tolous

Thomas Nashe condemns medieval romances as “fantsically dreames of those exiled Abbie-lubbers”, and he notes that their composition has been inherent with a concept of space determined by a fanatical and erroneous consciousness: “In that generation there raigned and alwaies remained such singular simplicitie that all posterities should be enjoyned by dutie to fill and furnish their temples, nay, Townes and streetes, with the shrines of the saintes”.

The literary landscape is as full of monasteries, convents, shrines and chapels as the everyday landscape of towns and streets, used by devotional practices and consequently rendered ‘simple' in significance.

Modern approaches to romance have, on the contrary, have tended to see romance, as fiction distancing itself from the everyday and creating alternative, literary spaces. Jeff Rider asserts that ‘medieval romances are the laboratories of

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PhD., Department of English Language and Literature, Faculty of Arts, University of Erciyes. This article is the revised and expanded version of the paper presented at the International Medieval Congress, 06-09 July 2015, organized by University of Leeds, Leeds, U.K.


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fears and longings (full of) monstrous, elegant and fantasised elaborations’.² Looking at how the sacred spaces that Nashe sees as ‘simple’ or distanced from everyday life, this article will suggest another way reading the sacred spaces in medieval romances and explore some instances where these two views of romance space collide. In other words, this paper will explore the possibilities of what sacred spaces can be made to signify in terms of medieval romances. Sir Amadace and The Erle of Tolous seem to carry their audience through sacred spaces and enter into a dialogue with the complex dynamics of desire and devotion which are mapped onto the space of the church.³ The space of the church, unlike the fairy land of Sir Orfeo or the battleground of The Sege of Melayne, is the one, of which the vast majority of the medieval population would have had actual experience.⁴ When a romance portrays the precincts of a church, a chapel, a convent, or a cathedral, does it stop to utter a prayer, or does it, like Cassodorien in Richard Coeur de Lyon, gather up its children and defy the laws of nature and piety by flying out through the roof?⁵

In order to understand the ways in which romances and their characters move through sacred spaces, it is necessary to briefly consider the function of space in medieval church. Eamon Duffy suggests that the medieval church is a complex space, and the interior of the medieval church is far from being constructed around a simple hierarchy between the secular and sacred space.⁶ John Blair notes a that growing number of screens, altars, chantries and corrals work to produce “an interconnecting network of sacred zones based around a multitude of altars and images, some privately owned, others the property of guilds in which many parishioners were sharers” within the church.⁷

The uses to which the sacred space is put within romance reflect the tensions between these socially and spiritually different discourses, or representations, which takes place within and seeks to control the significance of the actual space of the church. Recognising the pleasure inherent in the imaginative transgression of boundaries and ingress into enclosed spaces, these texts are the product of a society which used these spaces to interact with each


³ *Sir Amadace* survives in two manuscripts: MS Advocates 19.3.1., National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh and MS Taylor 9, Princeton University Library, Princeton. The edition from MS Advocates 19.3.1 will be used in this article: Edward E. Foster (ed.), *Amis and Amiloun, Robert of Cisyle, and Sir Amadace*, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2007. *Erle of Tolouse* is extant in four manuscripts: MS Ashmole 45 and 61, Oxford University Bodleian Library, Oxford; MS Ff. 2.38, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge; and MS 91, Cathedral Library, Lincoln. The edition from MS Ff.2.38 will be used in this article: A. Laskaya and E. Salisbury (eds.) ‘Erle of Tolous’ in *The Middle English Breton Lays*, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1995.


other as well as with God. By mapping some of these concepts of space onto a single instance of a romance space, the “chapell dur” of *Sir Amadace*, it is possible to begin to explore the complex ways in which sacred space is used within romance.8 This chapel, lit mysteriously from within, exists at the centre of a series of concentric spaces which are delineated and penetrated in succession as each character progresses towards the centre. The linear progression of the narrative turns inwards as the knave, the squire and finally Sir Amadace. They test themselves against the boundaries imposed by their social standing, their status within the hierarchy of the narrative and, most pressingly, their ability to endure the stench of the corpse within which lies “stingcand opon his bere” (*SA*, l.117). Each progression not only involves an act of movement towards this centre which is halted by these barriers, but also an act of looking, an interpretative act, which likewise reaches towards the centre. Similarly to the physical act of movement, these interpretive acts are constrained by boundaries which are progressively transgressed by successive incursions.

These incursions are the means by which audience follows the concentric sequence of the romance and learns the significance of the chapel. The knave can see what lies within the chapel through the “glasse”, and turns to Amadace to relate “a bere, and canduls toe; / there sittus a woman, and no moe” (*SA*, ll. 88-89). His statement is anticipated by the narrative voice’s description of what he sees, and as such does not carry the reader far beyond it into the sphere of significance: “so see he stoned a bere /candils there were brennyng toe, a woman sittying and no moe” (*SA*, ll. 79-80). The squire, “as he loket in ate the walle” can hear what the woman says, but not discourse with her. He repeats the same detail, but also relates words spoken by the woman from within the chapel (*SA*, ll.11-120). Finally Amadace enters into the chapel. At its heart he does not discover a religious revelation, but a mirror image of himself which prompts a moment of self-knowledge and realisation:

Unnethe he myghte forgoe to wepe,
For his dedus him sore forthoghte;
Sayd, ‘yondur mont hat lise yondur chapell withinne,
He myghte full wele be of my kynne,
For ryghte so have I wounde’ (*SA*, ll. 205-10)

The chapel, despite its fictional status, is not a borderless place. It possesses a logic of ingress, a sort of literary habitus confirmed by the parallels between the situation of the dead body inside and Amadace himself. However, by permitting the successive imaginative movements of the audience across boundaries by which the space is structured, it highlights the way in which structured spaces and are inherently narrative, any act of marking out boundaries being “in sum, nothing other than meta-stories”.9 The revulsion experienced by the characters

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upon encountering the smell of the corpse belies the pleasurable experiences of the reader as they cross the boundaries it signifies.

Sir Amadace, on the other hand, by positioning a figure of its central character at the heart of the spatial narrative of the chapel renders its subject or “absolute” meaning parallel to that of the literary narrative. In doing so, it legitimizes the pleasure inherent in crossing the boundaries by which it is structured and the desire to discover what lies at the centre. The imaginative incursion of the reader into the space created by literature had long been associated with pleasure and leisure, particularly by the aristocratic elite. Literary space is even reconstructed as physical space by an audience seeking to recapture its pleasurable effects. J.A. Ashbee proposes that the term gloriette as a particularly lavish suite of rooms in castles of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, originated in a late twelfth century Chanson de Geste, Prise d’Orange, which is largely set in an exotic castle called ‘Gloriete’.\(^\text{10}\) A. Hagopian van Buren suggests that the famous pleasure garden at Hesdin in northern France was a direct result of the “literary imagination of its patron”, Robert II of Artois and was based in part on The Romance of the Rose.\(^\text{11}\)

Another romance which passes through a sacred space, Erle of Tolous, explores the complex interrelation between the sacred and literary uses or representations of that space. In its opening stanza it opens up two distinct spaces:

Jhesu Cryste yn Tryntyte  
Oonly god and persons thre,  
Graunt us wele to spede,  
And gyf us grace so to do  
That w emay come thy blys unto  
On rode as thou can blede!  
Leve lordys, y schall you telle  
Of a tale, some tyme befelle  
Farre in unknowthe lede:  
How a lady had grete myschefe,  
And how she covyred of hur grefe,  
Y pray yow take hede! (ll.1-12)

Separated by the semantic caesura falling between lines 5 and 6, these sentiments are united by their promise of ingress into another space, the appropriate “absolute” space for the discourse which they represent; the “blys” of heaven or the “unknowthe lede” where the story is set. The romance promises its readers a sight of both spaces by representing itself as both a prayer and an escapist. What it delivers is, however, the caesura itself, the junction between the two, the opening of one space to another for the pleasurable act of observing.


The setting of the first encounter between Earl Bernard and Dame Beulybon is in the “orryal” outside her chapel, just before the Mass. Both come attired appropriately, him to worship “in armtes array” (ET, l. 317) and her to be worshipped, like a devotional image “in golde and ryche perré” (ET, l. 327). Thus the oriel becomes an alternative chapel, where the dynamics of devotion are replicated. The chapel itself, however, is a distinct space, with a boundary that Beulybon crosses but Bernard cannot. His gaze can, however, presumably passing through a parclose screen of someking, and finds its object intensely attractive and imaginatively compelling:

The Erle stode on that oder syde;
Hys eyen fro hur myghte he not hyde,
So lovely she was of chere!
He sedye “Lorde God, full of myght,
Leve y were so worthy a knight,
That y myght be hur fere,
And that sche no husbonde hadde (ET, ll. 361-67)

As Beulybon attends the Mass, Barnard imaginatively witnesses a different sort of transformation, one which emphasises desire over devotion. In a way which is reminiscent of the self-reflexive play on the “absolute” meaning of the chapel in Sir Amadace, this transformation, imaginatively witnessed by means of a crossing boundaries in a devotional context, provides the romance with the driving force of its narrative.

The use of sanctified space in such a way that it encourages a re-reading of its component units in order to signify a relationship between protagonist and audience rather than worshipper and worshipped, is, perhaps, one of the features which distinguish romance from devotional writing. Stephen Nichols notes that omens, miracles and signs occuring within “sacred precincts” are assured a “context of divine authority”.12 In The Erle of Tolous, however, as the audience watches Beulybon, Beulybon watches the Mass, this “coincidence of image” is replaced by a series of shifting perspectives mediated by different boundaries, legitimising alternative readings of the signs of his devotion.

Critics of The Erle of Tolous have predominantly interpreted it as a reassertion of conventional moralities. Carol Meale sees the romance as promoting an “ideal of virtuous womanhood”.13 Robert Reilley likewise stresses the conservative nature of Beulybon’s piety.14 Arlyn Diamond notes the fact that Beulybon and Bernard only meet in spaces bounded by an idea of sanctity, but

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Cogito – REVISTĂ DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICĂ PLURIDISCIPLINARĂ 141
sees this as a figure of the control and suspension of desire.\textsuperscript{15} However, the lines which she quotes to lend weight to her statement that their love is “not rejected, but appropriated to serve conventional morality” can be read as part of this alternative romance discourse of desire, pleasure and imaginative ingress. There is a subtle play of meaning in the lines “of all the syghtys that ever he sye /rasyd never none his heart so hye” (\textit{ET}, ll. 331-333) which hints that, conversely, conventional morality is not rejected, but appropriated to serve love. They are reminiscent of Lancelot’s genuflection before Guinnevere’s bed in Chrétien de Troyes’ \textit{Le Chevalier de la Charette}: si l’aore et se li ancline, /car an nul cors Saint ne croit tant”.\textsuperscript{16} “[Lancelot bowed low and adored her, for no holy relic did he place such faith”].\textsuperscript{17} The same ambiguous resonances are apparent in the descriptions of Beulybon. She is, for example, “the fairest oon that evry bare lyfe /save Mary mekyll of might” (\textit{ET}, ll.38-39)

By exploring the possibilities of what sacred spaces can be made to signify in terms of a literary narrative, those romances carry their audience through these spaces. These romances enter into a dialogue with the complex dynamics of desire, devotion which were mapped onto the space of the church. The episodes in \textit{Sir Amadace} and \textit{The Earl of Tolous} discussed above use the potential of the imaginative gaze to establish spaces which are distinctly literary in function, but which illustrate an awareness of the sacred spaces constructed within the medieval church. Probing the boundaries, both physical and conceptual, which delineate these spaces, they explore the very nature of the desires, fantasies and representative acts which create them. Recognising the pleasure which is to be gained from this negotiation of boundaries, these romances do not necessarily represent what Crane sees medieval romances as “denial and resistance” of the sacred.\textsuperscript{18} Nor do the utterly constitute “ a secular equivalent to that divine order”.\textsuperscript{19} They are a product of the complex process of representing a space which was itself far from ‘simple’.

\textbf{REFERENCES}


THE IDENTITY CRISIS IN BETWEEN MASTERY AND SUBALTERNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF SYMBOLS IN WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS FROM POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE

ÖZLEM SAYAR

ozlemsayar@erciyes.edu.tr

Abstract: “This research analyzes the symbols in “Waiting For The Barbarians” by J. M. Coetzee from postcolonial perspective. In literature, there are several works on the process of colonizing and on the outcome of this process for both the colonizer and the colonized people. Likewise, “Waiting For The Barbarians”, which was written in 1980, can be considered as a remarkable work in the context of postcolonial studies. It has significant points and details on the effects of colonization on the colonized societies and lands. Especially, the symbols that Coetzee employs critically represent the core points about colonization and exploitation. However, what makes this novel special in this respect is the linearity of events and the symbols’ parallelism with that linearity. The main point is that the protagonist experiences the transition from mastery to the subaltern during colonization and the symbols masterfully symbolize this transformation, the psychology of the character and the attitude of the colonizers towards the native society.”

Keywords: Postcolonial, colonizer, colonized, barbarians, master, subaltern.

Introduction

Postcolonial literature deals mostly with the literature of the people who can be regarded as colonized or subalterns, and the works that are considered as postcolonial generally mention how the colonizer colonizes the weaker one, and how the colonized society is get exploited or alienated to its own culture and values in time. Indeed, postcolonial studies are often applied to criticize the passivity, simplicity and naivety of the silent, meek and open-to-colonization societies. On the other hand, these studies have an important role in criticizing and opposing against the people or communities who regard themselves superior and stronger, which create a reason for them to exploit the weaker. J. M. Coetzee writes a masterpiece as an example for this issue, which is named as Waiting For The Barbarians. Throughout the novel, he employs lots of symbols that symbolize the process of colonization and they go hand in hand with the changes on the mindset of the main character, who is a magistrate. The symbols reveal the fact that the magistrate has a superior position in the beginning, then he
becomes a subaltern after resisting against the Empire, and his journey ends up in nothingness, because he loses both his identity and self-respect in the end.

First of all, symbols in literature are the words or signs which are applied to give some clues about the hidden or intended meaning of a phrase. Symbols also demand reader to apply at his imagination and interpretation, that is why each reader can get different meaning from the same word. On this issue, William York Tindall (1955) states that:

The literary symbol, an analogy for something unstated, consists of an articulation of verbal elements that, going beyond reference and the limits of discourse, embodies and offers a complex of feeling and thought. Not necessarily an image, this analogical embodiment may also be a rhythm, a juxtaposition, an action, a proposition, a structure, or a poem. One half of this peculiar analogy embodies the other, and the symbol what it symbolizes.1

“Tindall shows the fact that symbol is a way of implying something beyond the seen one, and it is about the ‘unstated’ but intended. What’s more, he also says that symbol can be used either consciously or unconsciously by the author to hide or reveal something (p. 16)”. (Sayar 6) In his book, Coetzee masterfully makes use of symbols, which makes reader think and comment about the relationship between the colonizers and the colonized, and the effects of the brutality as a side-effect of colonization.

SYMBOLS: REPRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF COLONIZATION AND THE TRANSITION FROM MASTERY TO THE SUBALTERN

In her article, Can the Subaltern Speak?, Gayatri C. Spivak declares that there are two types of people: masters and subaltern.2 The masters are mostly the Western people; while the subaltern are the Eastern ones. Because of the oppression that is put by the masters on the weaker people, the subaltern cannot have a voice to speak since he is not allowed by the powerful. However, Spivak claims that the subaltern can speak and can be heard if he wants and struggles for this. In this novel, the reader sees how the magistrate tries to speak; nevertheless, he is silenced by the masters, and in the end, he cannot even stay in between, he gets lost in the crisis of identity.

To begin with, the dark-colored eyeglasses that Colonel wears are the first notable symbols that give clue about the society that Colonel and the magistrate belong to. The discs are dark as if they are hiding something, maybe preventing Colonel’s eyes from giving away the real intend of him or the colonizers. More importantly, it may represent the colonizers’ world and its window behind which

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they see the rest of the world: A black world of them, which is full of the dark desires; desires to exploit, to kill, to rape or to steal.

Moreover, when Colonel wears them, people unknown to him assume that he is blind. Even this assumption is also quite symbolic because the colonizers in the novel like Colonel seem blind to the beauties in life, even in a town of natives. They are blind to peace, happiness, justice and purity. Worse, they are blind to the harm and damage that they do to other innocent ones, which is an outcome of their colonial enterprise. However, towards the end of the novel, Colonel appears again but without these dark eyeglasses because he has seen the other sides of colonization. The soldier with him says that “We frozed in the mountains! We starved in the desert! Why did no one tell us it would be like that!” (196). He declares that no one from Empire explained the danger waiting for them, and they sent them to the center of wilderness, namely to death in a sense. After returning from this voyage, Colonel is seen without his dark glasses, which can be interpreted as he has experienced the cruel side of the world beyond the window.

In addition to the eyeglasses, the carriage that carries Colonel is also black, which clearly symbolizes the threat that Colonel carries with him. Black is mostly interpreted as the sign of death, evil, corruption and misery, which are quite appropriate for the situation of Colonel. He is like a black angel of death, who came to this town in the shape of a colonizer to take the lives of local people. Colonel uses his carriage to travel around and to hunt people whom he regards as barbarians. And, in the place he brought these people, death waits for them. Whereas this town had been a peaceful place before Colonel and soldiers came, he changed its atmosphere with his dark eyeglasses and black carriage. These items show the real face of Empire to the magistrate because before all these happenings, he was just a keeper of peace and security in these lands. Now, he becomes aware of the reality and the dirt on the colonizers’ hands.

Though he is also a member of the colonizer part of the society, the magistrate has tried to maintain peace with the natives for years before Colonel comes. He is aware of the danger Colonel has brought. However, no matter how much effort the magistrate makes to be polite to the local people, he still shows the traces of the colonizer inside him. For example, after the death of a native prisoner, he makes up a story and writes about it in a persuasive manner because he thinks he should hide the secrets of his Empire. Nonetheless, it can be said that he is in dilemma in the beginning because he does not want Colonel to harm the innocent native people such as aborigins, and he never wanted to be left between a colonizer and a colonized. At this point, he accepts that he is a colonizer in dilemma who can manage the peace there (12).

The dream that magistrate has in the beginning of the novel is also remarkable in this context. After Colonel arrives, the first dream comes, too. It will be a recurring dream in the next chapters and it is like a prophecy about future, the doom of the Empire on these lands. In the dream, the magistrate sees that he is passing from a gate and entering into a garden. In that garden, there are children who are building a snow-castle with a red flag on the top. As he gets closer to them, they get away from him. Only a girl in the middle sits in front of
the castle, but she does not show her face to the magistrate. No matter how much he tries to see who she is, he cannot and he wakes up in the end. It can be interpreted as follows: Before Colonel and his soldiers come, the magistrate has had a good relationship with the natives. However, when they arrive, they damage this relationship and the cold atmosphere of death comes to these lands. The snow-castle represents that the natives are no longer as tolerant to the Empire’s authority as before. Moreover, like the children in the dream, they get away from the Empire’s man because Colonel and his men start to execute them. The girl that does not show her face can be interpreted as the fact that the native society denies the magistrate as a member of their community. Especially the period that the magistrate has this dream is quite symbolic because it implies that the damage and the disaster have been brought by Colonel to those lands. And what is worse, as Colonel maintains his job there, the dreams get bitter and bitter. In the end, it comes true that most of the people are gone in addition to Colonel and his soldiers when the damage has been done, and the magistrate stays alone with a few people there.

Furthermore, the ruins near the walls of the town also remind the magistrate that he does not belong to here, but he is a stranger as Colonel or as any other colonizer is. However, the magistrate is quite interested in these relics and he tries to reveal them. This act can be considered as a sign of being torn in between two choices: the locals and the Empire. As he digs the ruins, he gets aware of the fact that these lands belong to the natives. Maybe, he is trying to set a connection with the old and ancient societies when he lies on earth and tries to hear some sounds that are said to be from the ghosts of the ancient inhabitants. However, in the end, he is happy because no one from the Empire has seen him while doing this. This part is a good example of his inner conflict. On the one hand, he knows he is a stranger and he tries to be friend and close to the natives; on the other hand, he refrains from the colonizers because his attitude towards the relics and natives is against Empire’s understanding.

Meanwhile, the natives imprisoned by Colonel stay in yard and magistrate grows impatient towards them day by day. Though he does not support Colonel, he does not act against him, too. He is passive and indifferent to the situations going around because he does not want to be involved in this though his guilty conscious fights against his passive mind. The baby which cries most of the time is dead in the end; magistrate realizes its death because it is not crying and disturbing him anymore. While the baby is crying, magistrate runs into his room and he tries not to see or hear anything from outside. The death of this baby and the relief caused by the lack of crying are the symbols for the passivity and ignorance of magistrate towards the poor and helpless people in the yard.

The room is another important symbol for reader to understand the psychology of magistrate. He sees the room as a place to escape from the reality and violence outside, and this room makes him blind and deaf to the deeds of Colonel for a while. On the other hand, it nourishes the passivity of magistrate, too. “I sit in my rooms with the windows shut, in the stifling warmth of a windless evening, trying to read, straining my ears to hear or not to hear sounds of violence. Finally at midnight the interrogations cease, there is no more
banging of doors or tramping of feet, the yard is silent in the moonlight, and I am at liberty to sleep” (31). Sleep is also a way of escape for him. Whenever an important event in his life such as the sexual intercourse with the native girl is about to happen, he falls asleep and misses it. So, sleep can be taken as a representative of both escape and obscure for him.

What Spivak means by the master and the subaltern are the powerful and the weak. In the first parts of the book, magistrate stands as a master to the ones weaker than him. For example, he brings a little fox to his room and tries to keep it inside, though he does not care its ease so much. However, the native girl thinks it belongs to outdoors (48). It can be interpreted as the difference between the perspectives of a master and a subaltern. Because the magistrate is an Empire-man, he is used to dominating and controlling, that is why he tries to keep the animal inside and control. Additionally, he is a civilized man which means domestic, so he considers the inner side as safer than the outside regardless of where the fox belongs to. However, differently from him, the girl stands as a subaltern in this context like the fox. She defends that one should go back to the place s/he belongs to. On the other hand, she has lived in nature as the fox does, therefore they cannot be imprisoned in a closed place. So, both the girl and the fox must be returned back to their habitats in the end.

Meanwhile, magistrate starts to experience the change in his mindset and tries to overcome his inner conflict. He wants to deny his colonizer side and he desires to get purified. He thinks more about the natives and the relationship between the colonizers and the townspeople. He declares some of his wishes for a better and peaceful environment for the natives:

Shall I tell you what I sometimes wish? I wish that these barbarians would rise up and teach us a lesson, so that we would learn to respect them. We think of the country here as ours, part of our Empire our outpost, our settlement, our – market centre. But these people, these barbarians don’t think of it like that at all. We have been here more than a hundred years, we have reclaimed land from the desert and built irrigation works and planted fields and built solid homes and put a wall around our town, but they still think of us as visitors, transients. There are old folk alive among them who remember their parents telling them about this oasis as it once was: a well-shaded place by the side of the lake with plenty of grazing even in winter. That is how they still talk about it, perhaps how they still see it, as though not one spadeful of earth had been turned or one brick laid on top of another. They do not doubt that one of these days we will pack our carts and depart to wherever it was we came from, that our buildings will become homes for mice and lizards, that their beasts will graze on these rich fields we have planted. You smile? Shall I tell you something? Every year the lake-water grows a little more salty. There is a simple explanation never mind what it – is. The barbarians know this fact. At this very moment they are saying to themselves, 'Be patient, one of these days their crops will start
withering from the salt, they will not be able to feed themselves, they will have to go.' That is what they are thinking. That they will outlast us."³

This speech is the turning point from mastery to the subaltern for him. From now on, he is a subaltern for the young officers because he is like a native and an enemy who is unsound and unheard anymore. This speech reminds a sentence from Jamaica Kincaid’s essay, *On Seeing England For the First Time*: “The space between the idea of something and its reality is always wide and deep and dark” (370). Though the natives see the Empire’s people as visitors, the reality is a bit different from their vision to some extent because the colonizers are gradually exploiting their lands. However, in the end the natives will be right in this sense. Nonetheless, this speech draws suspicion to magistrate and after he returns back from his voyage to natives’ lands, his post is taken from him and he getstreated as a subaltern.

Lapsley and Stey declares that Sigmund Freud writes about Id, Ego and Superego, and Freud claims that Id is a part of men’s psyche which should be hidden and repressed by the ego which is directly connected to the external life.⁴ Id represents man’s hidden and forbidden feelings and desires, which are mostly sexual ones. In Coetzee’s book, the native girl may symbolize the Id of the magistrate. She is like Id because she is hidden and unnoticed in society. Even the magistrate cannot remember the girl when she was a child brought with her father, which can be interpreted as that the girl was repressed by the innocence of childhood like a repressed Id. However, when she grows older, he notices her begging on the streets and he asks who this woman is, which shows she is not a child anymore and she emerges as a sexual object in his life, as a sign of the fact that magistrate’s Id is starting to emerge. On the other hand, if Id is taken as a sexual side of a man, the girl is a perfect symbol of it. The reader observes that the magistrate is impotent and he has problems with his sexual desires, which means he is not a proper man and he cannot control both his desires and Id. The sexual side of the magistrate is somehow improper. In addition, the girl is also disabled; she is blind and she cannot walk properly. Therefore, both the magistrate’s Id and the girl are cripple. On the other hand, the sexual urge of him, Id, emerges at night, so does the girl. Additionally, keeping Id under control is not always easy. The girl is also hard to resist for the magistrate, therefore he uses some humiliating words for her. For example, he calls her animal while mentioning about the fox. And, after he leaves her in the mountains, he tries to forget her and he comments on her deficiencies such as blindness and disabled foot. Clearly, he is in a fight with both his Id and the girl.

What is more, as inferred from Freud’s approach, the Id is hidden somewhere inside and it is subdued by the ego thanks to ego’s external relationships. The reader can see that under the control of civilization, though


they are in magistrate's room, the girl and the magistrate cannot make love most probably because of the psychological pressure on him. Till the end, he even cannot notice that she is a beautiful woman indeed. However, when they are in natives’ lands while taking the girl back to her people, they feel free and they do it. The borders of the Empire cannot restrict them there, and there are not so many civilized people around, which means that the social oppression is not felt anymore and the Id can get free and perform. Nevertheless, when it comes to return to the civilization, the magistrate has to repress his Id, which means the girl will not come back to him. After he turns back to Empire, he starts to forget the girl and oppresses his Id. In the end, he also knows that the girl will not turn back to the enslaved world of the Empire.

Returning back to Empire’s limits, he becomes a subaltern as he loses his job, and he is put in jail. The room that he used to stay before again plays an important role as a symbol in this part because it symbolizes the one in power. After coming back from the natives’ lands, he sees his room is occupied by a young officer, whose name is Mandel, and it shows that the one who possesses the room possesses the power, too. The design in it has been changed which can be interpreted as the magistrate does not have a word in this room anymore. He loses his mastery and becomes a lower class person, who is weak and old-fashioned, but free: “my alliance with the guardians of the Empire is over, I have set myself in opposition, the bond is broken, I am a free man” (106). He is a free man, but he does not possess the room and he does not have his power now; moreover, he is against the authority of the Empire, which shows that he experienced a change in his mindset.

Being put in a cell, he hears noise from outside and learns that the new cells for the newcomers are being built. He says “time for the black flower of civilization to bloom” (107). Here, again the black flower is applied as a symbol and it refers to the death that Empire’s civilization brings to the society. The cell also stands for the rapid change in his ideas, as he gradually becomes an outsider who gets away from Empire’s ideology. He starts to reveal some facts about the Empire such as corruption: “They will use the law against me as far as it serves them, then they will turn to other methods. That is the Bureau's way. To people who do not operate under statute, legal process is simply one instrument among many” (113). He explains how the Empire-men use their power to manipulate law and justice, and he displays a direct opposition towards them. Moreover, he gets happy when he learns that there are no new prisoners, which shows his alienation from the Empire and his alliance with the natives.

In addition, the key that he steals to escape from the cell is a very significant symbol because it could have changed his path. He uses it and runs away indeed; however, the outside world without his power and his job frightens him and he turns back to his cell, which shows he accepts to be the slave of the Empire as a passive subaltern. Nevertheless, later, he wants a trial, as an important symbol of his desire to speak, to have a voice as a subaltern. Unfortunately, the trial is never fulfilled and he cannot be heard.

The smock of a woman that the magistrate is forced to wear is another turning point for him because Mandel makes him wear it and humiliates him in
front of the society. Now, his soul and his honor are damaged, which will not be able to recover again. From now on, he feels that he is no longer a subaltern, but he is a beast. He calls himself a beast because he is not locked in a cell anymore, he is free to leave anytime he wants and he is as helpless as a dog because of the wounds all over his hands and shoulders and because he cannot leave the Empire’s area in fear of hunger. He could manage being neither a master nor a subaltern. He also realizes that there is not a situation which is in-between (170). He is aware of what the Empire did to him; still surprisingly, though he condemns, he still uses “we” while mentioning about the empire, which shows he could not get free totally. After spending days by begging, he decides to be fat again. The fatness came by his post in Empire once upon a time, and once Mandel has asked if he wants Empire to make him fat again. Now, while living like a dog, he cannot stand the hunger and again he wants the food that Empire supplies, which is a sign of his weakness and helplessness.

Meanwhile, there are fishermen around the lake and the soldiers often destroy their houses. The hope and the determination they have can be employed as a symbol for the future of these lands, too. Soon, the Empire’s soldiers will leave and the life will be quiet and calm again. Then, hope and determination will work for the rest of the people who remain. After the soldiers leave, the magistrate again finds a job and he tries to make a living here with a few people who were left behind.

**Conclusion**

Consequently, the symbols tell much about the linearity of the novel, they make reader get involved in the story because the reader tries to see the hidden meaning beyond the symbols. As the symbols also show, the reader sees that the magistrate experiences both mastery and subalternity; however, in the end, he cannot stay in between, he gets lost in this path “like a man who lost his way long ago but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere” (207). Till the end, he mentions the Empire-men as “we”, though he is opposed to their ideology. On the other hand, he cannot see himself as a local citizen because they do not accept him. Therefore, he is in a place worse than being in-between: he is lost in the chaos of identity.

**REFERENCES**


OVERCOMING THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSLATING FIXED PHRASES FROM TURKISH TO ENGLISH AND VICE-VERSAA

Melih Karakuzu,*

mkarakuzu@erciyes.edu.tr

Cristina Nicolaescu*

cristina@erciyes.edu.tr

Abstract: Our paper dwells on the difficulties of translating fixed phrases, such as idioms, expressions and proverbs from Turkish to English and vice-versa, focusing on their cultural understanding by the interpreters as well as linguistic major differences. The translation errors in/from these languages may be humorous or confusing due to their literal/non-literal uses or misinterpretations and distortions of meaning. Starting from the basic idea that words depend on the context, we propose some ways of overcoming those difficulties, based on our translating and teaching practice. First of all, cultural information carried by fixed phrases should prevail in this case, on the condition that the multiple equivalents possible provided by various translators will not create a further confusion due to false synonymy or incomprehensible polysemy. Another major point of our analysis is indeterminacy or untranslatability.

Keywords: language, difficulties, idioms, language, translation.

1. Introduction to the Topic
This paper starts from the premise that for the languages spoken in the West and the East there is a stark difference in approaching translation theory and practice. On this account we situate English and Turkish to theoretical extremes so that the challenge of transferring meaning is more evident. Comparative linguistics provides the basis for differentiating particularities of grammar structures, which opens the “floodgates” to further discussions on translatability limits of fixed phrases according to long established factors such as: socio-linguistic, stylistic and cultural considerations, along with some specific metalinguistic ones. Our analysis is informed by both theoretical works and the shared experience of translators’ good practice, to which we add our own findings from classroom research.

Translation theories are primarily based on the use of two basic concepts: equivalence and function. Equivalence may be understood as “accuracy,” “adequacy,” “correctness,” “correspondence”; it is a variable notion of how the translation is connected to the foreign text. Function may be understood as the capacity of a translated text to release various effects, starting with the
communication of information and getting a response that is comparable to the one produced by the foreign text, in its own culture. Considering cultural specificity, collocations and idiomatic expressions of the source and target languages diverge from each other in most cases. In relation to meaning, idioms and fixed expressions are defined by the linguistic Mona Baker as follows:

*Idioms and fixed expressions are at the extreme end of the scale from collocations in one or both of these areas: flexibility of patterning and transparency of meaning. They are frozen patterns of languages which allow little or no variation in form and, in the case of idioms, often carry meanings which cannot be deduced from their individual components*¹ and that translators cannot do any of the following with an idiom: a) Change the order of the words in it; b) Delete a word from it; c) Add a word to it; d) Replace a word with another; and finally e) Change its grammatical structure².

Idioms are defined in *Collins English Dictionary*³ as “an expression such as a simile, in which words do not have their literal meaning, but are categorized as multi-word expressions that act in the text as units”. *Longman Idioms Dictionary*⁴ defines them as “a sequence of words which has a different meaning as a group from the meaning it would have if you understand each word separately”. Certainly, idioms should not be broken up into their elements because they are sometimes referred to as a fixed expression. The first difficulty that translators come across is recognizing that they are dealing with an idiomatic expression. For instance, “to dance to a different tune” (a change of opinion) "The more difficult an expression is to understand and the less sense it makes in a given context, the more likely a translator will recognize it as an idiom" and then “rendering the various aspects of meaning that an idiom or a fixed expression conveys into the target language”⁵. On this account, idiomaticity can be dealt with in two steps: first, interpreting the expression, secondly, translating it, particularly that the literal meaning does not correspond with the symbolic one, in its pragmatic function. In terms of collocation pattern, this is also valid for easy expressions such as to take an exam in English. In Turkish we say: *sinava girmek*, where the verb is literally translated as “to enter” and exam, and using the verb to take will not make sense, being a mistake. Another confusing instance may be ordering in a restaurant: *alabilirmisiniz?*, which literally means: “Can you take?”, which is the exact opposite of the English give or bring. Idioms are more difficult to translate since most of them include culturally-bound items, which needs finding a common reference in the source and target language. This research tries to investigate and identify firstly some existing obstacles in the process of translating interlingual idiomatic pairs, and then to suggest some tested theoretical strategies to overcome such difficulties.

² Ibidem, p.64.
Taking into account Mona Baker’s classification of difficulties as well as strategies and related categories, our study analyses them and applies them practically with examples for some English and the equivalent Turkish expressions. Findings indicate that there are a number of essential factors which should be considered when translating idiomatic expressions. The major ones include socio-linguistic elements, cultural aspects, linguistic and stylistic considerations as well as some specific metalingual factors. Baker’s model of translating idioms includes four main strategies: using an idiom of similar meaning and form, an idiom of similar meaning but with dissimilar form, translation by paraphrase, and translation by omission. From among them, it has been revealed that paraphrasing and using an idiom of similar meaning and form are the most and the least common strategies respectively. On the basis of the findings of this research, it is recommended that, in addition of having enough knowledge in terms of the theoretical translation issues and the translation strategies suggested by different scholars, a translator should have a good command of the target language (TL) idiomatic expressions, and in the case of translating novels, benefit from the required creativity to handle the challenging task of transferring the idiom into the TL. Idioms and fixed expressions are an inalienable part of each language found in large numbers in most of the languages. Since the meaning of these collocations cannot be understood from the superficial meanings of the single words constituting them, so there are some problems in both processes of understanding and translating them. The process of translating fixed expressions from one language into another requires good knowledge of both languages and their corresponding cultures. People speaking different languages may use completely different expressions to convey the same meaning, in such a way that while the natives speakers of a specific language get the meaning clearly, the same expressions may be vague, confusing or unintelligent to the speakers of the other language. This case stems in the fact that each language has got culture-specific elements that are sometimes completely different from the corresponding elements from the other language. Besides, there may be differences in vocabulary from the field of religion, geographical places, ideologies, and social issues that harden the understanding and transferring meaning of idiomatic pairs. However, the main difficulties in this case concern the way in which we get meaning of the idioms and fixed expressions of a specific language and the way in which we can reconstruct the sets of expressions into another language to render the same ideas as in the original communication. Our research aims to investigate how these difficulties in interpreting and translating idioms and fixed expressions from source language into the target language can be overcome. We have looked for solutions of “equivalence above word level”, following the classification of difficulties and strategies confirmed through practice. As the analytic philosopher Willard van Orman Quine argues, there are three indeterminacies of translation, with the conclusion that no unique interpretation of a word is possible and that there is

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more than one correct method of translating. With the fixed phrases, a source of indeterminacy in their translation come from the holophrastic nature of words and/or sub-sentential phrases along with the pragmatic issues associated with them. Quine argues that translation is ‘indeterminate’ and that meaning itself is not something objective; the assignment of particular meanings to expressions is irrefutably intuitive and interest-relative, not something that could be validated by the impersonal procedures of science. This argument was presented in *Word and Object*, under the name of ‘Ontological Relativity’ (and later called the ‘Indeterminacy of Reference’), where Quine states that each given input has a unique correlated item different from the input itself. Following the classification of difficulties we have chosen to comment on their application to some Turkish and the equivalent English pairs of proverbs and idioms. Practice shows that the choice of a suitable equivalent for a given context depends on linguistic and extralinguistic factors at the same time; that is why it is important for the translator to have a look into the possible collocations in the target language (TL). The meaning of these collocations cannot be understood from the meanings of each single word separately, otherwise they seem nonsense. Fixed expressions are close to similes in the sense that they do not have their literal meaning, but function as multi-word units, “a sequence of words which has a different meaning as a group from the meaning it would have if you understand each word separately”8. Baker argues that idioms even allow “no variation in form under normal circumstances” and that translators are not permitted to do the following with an idiom: change the words order, delete any of its words; add a word; replace a word with another or change its grammatical structure9.

2. Verbatim versus Free Translations

2.1 Getting the Meaning and Related Difficulties

Linguistics has categorized meaning in different ways, but basically, it may be explicit or implicit. Denotative and connotative meaning or equivalence requires identification in the translating work. The first difficulty a translator has is to realize that he/she encountered a fixed expression. The idiomatic expression can be misinterpreted if:

   a. the SL (Source Language) idiom has a very close counterpart in the TL (Target Language) which seems to be similar on the surface but has a different even opposed meaning
   b. when an idiomatic expression has no equivalent in the TL
   c. a fixed expression has a similar counterpart in the TL, but its context of use is different.
   d. a fixed expression is used in the SL text in both its literal and idiomatic sense

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e. The very convention of using idioms in written discourse, the contexts in which they can be used, and their frequency of use may be different in the source and target languages.

Translating fixed phrases (Turkish – English, English – Turkish): idioms, expressions and proverbs sometimes causes difficulties that stem from the cultural background as well as from linguistic dissimilarities. These are presented below:

a. **Difficulties generated by a different cultural understanding or linguistics dissimilarities**, literal vs. non-literal uses, resulting in:
   - Misinterpretations (humorous or not)
   - distortions of meaning

b. **Difficulties generated by the relation to the context of communication**
   - False synonymy
   - Incomprehensible polysemy (the holophrastic nature of words/sub-sentential phrases/sentences)
   - The indeterminacy of translation (according to Willard van Orman Quine)

The conclusion is that there is no unique interpretation of a foreign communication. The question that arises is how natural it sounds and accurate as well. Actually idiomaticity ensures naturalness and readability to translations, either in fixed or semi-fixed expressions. Reaching this level of knowledge and ability to use them will render a stronger authenticity-like impression, in the sense that the target text will be sensed as less 'foreign' and, as far as possible, close to the original. But naturalness and readability are also affected by other linguistic features. In order to compare connotative to denotative meaning, we provide a few examples for their suggestiveness in this matter.

### 2.2. Examples and Comments

**Examples from Turkish into English**

**Word level**

köftehor (a way of addressing) meaning rogue, rascal

estağfurullah: a response to a compliment

Above word level:

Mart Kapidan baktırır, kazma kürek yaktırır: March comes in like a lion and goes out like a lamb (an example of paronomasia)

*Dört gözle beklemek* looking forward to

*Etekleri zil çalmak* to be overjoyed about something

*Ne ekersen onu biçersin* what you reap is what you sow

*Dört elle sarılmak* – to go into something wholeheartedly

*Başkasına ğehlen keden kendine etmiş olur.* Also similarly: *Rüzgar eken firtına biçer.*

Literal translation: He who does evil to another, has done it to himself.

Meaning: Sow the wind, reap the storm.

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Namaz da gözü olmayan ezanda kulağı olmaz.
Literal translation: Who has no intention to pray has no ears for the call to prayer.
Meaning: One's perceptions depend on her/his intentions.

Minareyi yaptırmayan yerden bitmiş sanır.\(^\text{11}\)
Literal translation: He who did not help building the minaret, thinks that it just grew out from the ground.
Meaning: The one who has never involved in performing a task cannot be aware of how some jobs are done.

Akılları pazaraç karmışlar, herkes kendi akını beğenmiş.
Literal translation: They put up minds for sale on the market, everyone liked his own mind.
Meaning: To stick to one's own opinion.

**Examples from English into Turkish**

Non-equivalence: Cream tea requires paraphrasing\(^\text{12}\)
To be full of beans – *hayat dolu olmak*
To let the grass grow under one’s feet – *zamanı boşa harcamak*
Couch potato – *tembel, miskin; hiç bir iş yapmayıp sürekli televizyon izleyen tip* (paraphrasing)
Confessor – *günah çıkartan papaz* (paraphrasing)\(^\text{13}\)

A linguistic sign is needed to introduce an unfamiliar word/expression – pointing does not give exact information. According to Willard V.O. Quine, what is really involved in the process of translation is the difficulty or indeterminacy of [semantic] correlation.

### 2.3. Types of Translations

Three types of translation are differently labelled by the linguist Roman Jakobson, as follows:

a. Intralingual translation or rewording - an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.

b. Interlingual translation or translation proper - an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.

c. Intersemiotic translation or transmutation - an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems\(^\text{14}\).

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Certainly, from among these, the transfer of meaning from a culture to another one is the main concern in this case.

In the following sample of Turkish national humour embodied in the character called NasreddinHoca15, famous for his wisdom and resourcefulness, we are presenting an example of intersemiotic translation that leads to funny effects based on misinterpretation, in terms of familiarity with certain notions pertaining to one’s culture:


Translated text below:

A foreigner, wise man, has come to Akşehir and he said the wanted to meet the wisest man of the town. People called Nasreddin Hodja... Foreigner drew a circle on the ground with a stick in his hand. Hodja grabbed the stick and divided the circle into two halves in the middle. Then the man drew a vertical line and divided the circle into four quarters. Hodja signed as if he owned three quarters and left one to the man. The foreigner shook his both hands with all fingers signing downward. Hodja did just opposite, upward. When the competition is over the foreigner explained: “Hodja is very clever! I showed the world is round, Hodja meant there is equator axis in the middle. I divided the circle into four, he said three-fourth of the world is composed of waters, and one-fourth is of land. I asked “How does the rain fall?” He replied “waters vaporize and rise to the sky and turn into clouds and then to rain” The people asked Hodja to explain. He said “the man is greedy! He wished to have a tray of Baklava. I responded “you cannot finish by yourself, half of it is mine”. He asked “what if we split into four?” I said “I eat three quarters”. He offered to spread grinded pistachio, nuts etc. I said “it goes well with, but it requires to be fried on a flame fire, not ashy fire.” He’s gone away beaten”.

Technically, a tendency to literal translation is assured anyway, since it is the most obvious in most cases. Refining stimulus meanings may give a first clue of possible interpretations and then the selection of method enters the stage. As

Quine puts it: “We may alternatively wonder at the inscrutability of the native mind and wonder at how very much like us the native is and merely muf the translation, putting our reading modes into the native’s speech” 17. Actually translating is a matter of bridging cultures in an intelligible way, by ensuring correspondence of meanings at the highest level possible. The lack of an acceptable equivalent raises further challenges that can be coped with in the ways described below, in the next chapter. Therefore, the principles of correspondence guide any type of translation. Since two languages are not identical, either in the meanings given to corresponding symbols or in the ways in which such symbols are arranged in phrases and sentences, it stands to reason that there can be no absolute correspondence between languages18.

3. Strategies of Solving Non-Equivalences

3.1 Similarities and Dissimilarities

There are similarities and dissimilarities in the use of idiomatic pairs that a translation should be aware of when selecting the most suitable equivalent or paraphrase. As enumerated below, expressions in the two languages may be of different types, taking into consideration both meaning and form:

- Formally and semantically similar
- Formally similar, semantically different
- Semantically similar, formally different
- Grammatically different
- Lexically different
- English-specific
- Turkish-specific

The main strategies of solving non-equivalences of interlingual idiomatic pairs are paraphrasing, use of metaphor into sense, and omission of the redundant paraphrase or explanatory footnotes. The possible solutions suggested by Baker are:

a. using an idiom of similar meaning and form: step by step (EN); adimadim (TR)
b. Using an idiom of similar meaning but dissimilar form: between two stools you fall to the ground (EN); ikicamiarasindakalnisbeynamazuadonmek (TR)
c. Translation by paraphrase: to learn by fits and starts (EN); duzensizbir tempo ile/gelisiguezogrenmek (TR)
d. Translation by omission.19

3.2 Differences in Translations

It is a well-known fact that there is no unique translation of a text, the challenge is to choose the best option for both meaning and form. Reading

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19 A word that cannot be paraphrased or because of grammatical redundancy. (Baker, M. p. 71-78); the examples are ours.
various versions of the same text may be rewarding in the sense of providing comparative models to follow or to avoid. Experience will accumulate gradually with every new text and further revisions. If applied to translations Finding the most suitable solution to a translation difficulty created by idiomatic expressions will be a search for cultural meaning in the first place. For the translations from Turkish into English we can notice a high frequency of the paraphrasing mode as the most convenient to cover such a large range of cultural differences. As to differences in translations, traditionally, we have tended to think in terms of free translations as contrasted with close or literal ones. Actually, there are many more grades of translating than these extremes imply, each of them adjusted to the particular context the fit in and to external factors\textsuperscript{20}. Differences in translations can generally be accounted for by three basic factors in translating: (1) the nature of the message, (2) the purpose or purposes of the author and subsequently of the translator, and last but not least (3) the type of audience (in terms in specialization, age etc.). However, there are standards of good translations based on principles of accuracy and naturalness. From the provided examples with both literal and meaningful translations it is obvious that idiomaticity deserves more attention, since most expressions may be misleading and betray inexperience, lack of training or careless work.

4. Conclusion
Throughout the paper it has been shown that there are difficulties in translating idioms and fixed expressions, due to the four main considerations: 1) an expression has no equivalent in the TL; it has a similar counterpart but a different meaning; it may be used in both its literal and idiomatic sense at the same time; and finally the contexts in which it can be used are different. Analyses indicated that when these difficulties are encountered there is no predefined way to cope with idioms, but any particular case will have a suitable option of strategy. The importance of cultural and sociolinguistic factors has been revealed by using some frequent examples showing that the more different two cultures and languages are, the more difficult the translation process is. Another key point of our analysis was to look into the connotative meanings of fixed expressions and the solutions how to reconstruct their similar counterparts in the TL. The study of literary translation and translation theory relies on a complex methodology, quite often revised and renewed, according to the demands of the translations market, for a better accomplishment in verbatim, free translations or back-translations. Translation activities are highly practical, and therefore it is normally performed at the proficiency level, after students’ acquiring advanced abilities in working on complex texts. By taking into account the basic principles presented throughout the paper and constant revisions of the work performed, quality may be increased and this will eventually stir motivation for new challenges. Guiding translation capabilities of future translators is nowadays a huge task, considering the diversity of techniques and also various requirements, on the purpose of strengthening training skills.

suitable equivalent for a given context depends on linguistic and extra-linguistic factors at the same time; that is why it is important for the translator to have a look into the possible collocations in the target language. By doing this, difficulties presented at the beginning may be overcome.

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