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WHO IS THE NATIVE? REFLECTIONS FROM FANON, CÉSAIRE, AND BRATHWAITE

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Abstract: The advent of globalisation has, somewhat paradoxically, spawned regionalism and parochialism in many parts of the world. This tendency towards regionalisation and provincialism has been particularly pronounced in the context of culture and ethnological-cum-intellectual movements and traditions. But, more specifically, in terms of the theme of this paper, it can be seen that this intellectually driven anti-globalisation thrust has been principally directed towards attempts to forge native systems of thought and ideas. Globalisation is seen as a hegemonic attempt to suppress other percepts and precepts and subsume all other perspectives into one vast, boundless mass: that is, a homogenisation and effacement of difference that would ultimately culminate in the intellectual and cultural annihilation of 'the other'. Accordingly, the nativist intellectuals have been motivated to reclaim their cultural and intellectual traditions from the ravages of the imperialism wrought in by globalisation. But, who and what constitute the native? To give a concrete setting to the discussion, the question is examined in the context of the attempts by Caribbean thinkers to construct nativist narratives of culture and intellect.

Keywords: Brathwait, Césaire, Fanon, Globalisation, Identity Politics, Literature and Identity, Native Identity, Nativism.

Whence came the nativist narratives of culture and intellect? In 'The Politics of Recognition', Charles Taylor points to the consensus that 'since 1492 Europeans have projected an image of indigenous and colonized people as somehow inferior, "uncivilized," and through the force of conquest have often been able to impose this image on the conquered. The figure of Caliban has been held to epitomize this crushing portrait of contempt for New World aboriginals.' (Taylor, 1997: 226) Correspondingly, Edward Said suggests that it was, in fact, in response to this *colonial* 'encounter' of dehumanisation on one side and attempts at self-assertion and identity on the other side that 'the *nativist* phenomenon' emerged and flourished. (Said, 1993: 275)

However, despite the passage of several decades since the success of anti-colonial movements across the world, nativism is once again on the rise with a new vigour and fervour, but this time apparently in response to the process of globalisation. One thus wonders whether in eliciting such a reaction globalisation is projecting the same image of the 'indigenous and colonized people' that the

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European conquerors were projecting. That is: is globalisation after all only an extension of the same colonial mindset? In Stuart Hall's view, globalisation 'is not a new phenomenon' and its history dates back to 'the era of European exploration, conquest and the formation of the capitalist market.' (Hall, 1999: 9) Anthony Giddens, in contrast, locates the origin of globalisation in the somewhat later epoch of *modernity* and argues that, although modernity is 'inherently globalising', the emergence of globalisation is a relatively new phenomenon. (Giddens, 1990: 63)

Now, whether globalisation is a relatively new phenomenon or not, what seems relatively new is its *postcolonial* effect: that is, the advent of globalisation has, somewhat paradoxically, spawned regionalism and parochialism in many parts of the world. This tendency towards regionalisation and provincialism has been particularly pronounced in the context of culture and ethnological-*cum*-intellectual movements and traditions. For instance, in the words of a Mexican intellectual, on the 'productive' side of globalisation in Latin America, one needs to observe the emergence of 'new issues … such as new cultural features and new subjects' as 'the new forms of resistance' (Angulo Parra, 2006: 81). But, more specifically, in terms of the theme of this paper, it can be seen that this intellectually driven anti-globalisation thrust has been directed towards attempts to forge *native* systems of thought and ideas to withstand the process of globalisation that is taken to be intent on suppressing authentic culture and subsuming everything into one vast, boundless mass. The underlying thought here is that globalisation is shepherding us towards a homogenisation and effacement of difference that would ultimately lead to the cultural annihilation of *the other*: that is, the end of cultures and traditions. From this perspective, the unspoken end of globalisation is the unveiling of 'the end of history' – to use Alexandre Kojève's apposite phrase. (Kojève, 1969)

Predictably, Caribbean intellectuals have been similarly, if not more than others, affected by these debates and issues, for, as Maryse Condé observes, the third world countries, 'especially the Caribbean countries, seem to be the most concerned with this future since they lack political and economic power. They make headlines only when there is a hurricane, an earthquake, or other catastrophe' (Condé, 1998: 1). Globalisation has brought into forced contact technologically advanced countries and communities with less developed nations, and it should not, therefore, be surprising to see the erosion of local cultures and traditions of thought in such a confrontational encounter: a confrontation that has been dramatised as a 'new universal alienation of mentality' that 'touches all aspects of human life' (Sidekum, 2006: 119). The situation is further accentuated for the intellectuals in the Caribbean by the history of the region that was brutally forged through the unconscionable act of slavery: a process that was accompanied by the cultural decimation and alienation of the slaves, whereby, as Gordon Lewis observes, the European colonisation was capable of creating a *cultural tabula rasa* upon which it could rewrite Caribbean culture (Lewis, 1968: 69; 1983 and Benn 1987). The new 'natives' of the Caribbean have already seen what it is to be forced into servile

imitation of the creeds and codes of 'Eurocentrism'[1], and it seems as if globalisation is only a contemporary incarnation of that cultural assimilation, obviously with less crudity but more insidiousness.

Patently, this is one type of material and historical interpretation of globalisation that does not leave much room for a less cynical and more benign view of globalisation as an attempt to reach out beyond national and linguistic borders and barriers. Nonetheless, this is a point of view that does chime with a significant number of third world intellectuals in general and Caribbean thinkers in particular, and it is amid this rush of resistance to stem the growth of globalisation that one should see some of the attempts to construct national and regional edifices of thoughts and ideas. And, like its colonial counterpart, this new nativist movement is often manifested in terms of a *cultural* search for Caribbean *identity*: a self-conception that is articulated against the backdrop of what has come to be labelled as *politics of difference.* In Edouard Glissant's *literal* rendition, this politics of difference is transformed into the *poetics of relation*: '*We are not prompted solely by the defining of our identities but by their relation to everything possible as well – the mutual mutations generated by this interplay of relations.*' (Glissant, 1997: 89) But, it should be apparent that there is already a question, if not an intractable problem, over what exactly 'nativism' amounts to in 'native' narratives of culture and identity as attested by Glissant's reference to the '*mutual mutations*' that both the natives and non-natives undergo by the '*interplay of relations*' in the construction or definition of identities. Thus, the rest of the essay is chartered around the serious contestations over the connotation of nativism in the works of a number of prominent Caribbean intellectuals.

In Aimé Césaire's *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land*, we cross path with a Caribbean wayfarer on the eve of his *homecoming* that:

> At the end of daybreak, the wind of long ago – of betrayed trusts, of uncertain evasive duty and that other dawn in Europe – arises ...
> To go away. My heart was pounding with emphatic generosities. To go away ... I would arrive sleek and young in this land of mine and I would say to this land whose loam is part of my flesh: 'I have wandered for a long time and I am coming back to the deserted hideousness of your sores.' (11 & 13)

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[1] The use of quotation marks is intended to indicate that there is yet to be a clear and cogent conception of 'Eurocentrism' that could usefully serve an explanatory role. For example, in Rajani Kannepalli Kanth's recent work, 'Eurocentrism' is characterized as '*none other than the constellar paradigm of Euro-capitalism, in its rich contusion of allied, conjunctural elements made up of capitalism, patriarchy* (i.e., *misogyny) misanthropy, racism, colonialism, anthropocentrism, and recharged Christian ideology – or modernism, in a word*' (Kanth, 2005: 91). As can be seen, the explication is more of an angry man's hit list than an attempt to identify a consistent explanatory strand in the concept of 'Eurocentrism'. More damagingly, it trades one problematic concept with a host of equally difficult and intractable terms. However, among the few exceptions, Samir Amin's *Eurocentrism* (1989) is a serious and sober attempt to furnish a consistent theoretical orientation for the epithet. Yet, even Amin's approach is as much 'Eurocentric' as the 'Eurocentrism' he inveighs against.

Yet, the returning *native* son, Césaire tell us, refuses to pass off his 'puffiness for authentic glory', and admits:

> No, we've never been Amazons of the king of Dahomey, nor princes of Ghana with eight hundred camels, nor wise men in Timbuktu under Askia the Great, nor the architects of Djenné, nor Madhis, nor warriors. We don't feel under our armpit the itch of those who in the old days carried a lance. And since I have sworn to have nothing out of our history (I who love nothing better than a sheep grazing his own afternoon shadow), I may as well confess that we were at all time pretty mediocre dishwashers, shoeblacks without ambition, at best conscientious sorcerers and the only unquestionable record that we broke was that of endurance under the chicote ... (27-8)[2]

What is remarkable about this passage of return to reconstruct Caribbean thought is Césaire's unequivocal admission of *rupture in memory* and *disruption of history* in the Caribbean. Unlike comparable African or Asian 'nostalgic' orientation of 'nativist' intellectuals in search of their decimated and neglected *pre*-colonial cultures and countries, Césaire is too sober to seek a 'native' land or past beyond his own *colonial* Caribbean island marooned in a sea of *historical* and *cultural dissociations*. Césaire's 'anti-nostalgic' intellectual attitude was apparently not lost on André Breton who, after meeting Césaire in 1941, writes in his preface to the first book-form publication of *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land* thus: Césaire's *return* is the homecoming of a 'returning poet' to his 'native land' 'as enriched as he may have been by all the teachings of the white world and thereby at that moment all the more torn.' (Césaire, 2001: xvi)

Nonetheless, when Césaire *returns* to the shores of his island – 'And we are standing now, my country and I' – he does not so much propagate a parochial *nativistic* stance but a position of universal humanistic hue,

> ... it is not true that the work of man is done
> that we have no business on earth
> that we parasite the world
> that it is enough for us to heel the world whereas the work of man has only begun
> and man still must overcome all the interdictions wedged in the recesses of his fervor
> and no race has a monopoly on beauty, on intelligence, on strength
> and there is room for *everyone* at the convocation of conquest ... (Césaire, 2001: 44; my emphasis)

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[2] Glossary of Terms: Amazons refer to female warriors in the ancient African kingdom of Dahomey. Ghana is the medieval West African empire after which the modern nation is named. Timbuktu was an outstanding educational center in the Middle Ages. Askia the Great was ruler of Songhai – a 15th century Malian empire. Djenné, in present-day Mali, was a university and trade center in the Middle Ages. Madhis are Muslim leaders of a holy war. Chicote was a Portuguese knotted leather slave whip.

On the other hand, in Kamau Brathwaite's lecture 'The African Presence in Caribbean Literature' delivered in 1970 at the Cave Hill campus of the University of the West Indies in Barbados, we come across a Caribbean sojourner in search of his *roots* complaining about 'a persistent, established theory which contends that the Middle Passage destroyed the culture of these people, that it was such a catastrophic, definitive experience that none of those transported during the period from 1540 to 1840 escaped trauma' (Brathwaite, 1993: 191). The theory, specifically attributed by Brathwaite to the Jamaican sociologist Orlando Patterson, proposes 'that the slave had no philosophy, no military organization, no social life, no family structure, no arts, no sense of personal or civic responsibility' (Brathwaite, 1993: 192). Patterson himself summarises his sociological analysis of slavery in Jamaica following its capture by the British in 1655 and wiping the island's 'historical slate … completely clean' thus:

> Jamaica developed into what it would remain for the rest of the period of slavery: a monstrous distortion of human society. It was not just the physical cruelty of the system that made it so perverse, for in this the society was hardly unique. What marks it out is the astonishing neglect and distortion of almost every one of the basic prerequisites of normal human living. This was a society in which clergymen were the 'most finished debauchees' in the land; in which the institution of marriage was officially condemned among both masters and slaves; in which the family was unthinkable to the vast majority of the population and promiscuity the norm; in which education was seen as an absolute waste of time and teachers shunned like the plague; in which the legal system was quite deliberately a travesty of anything that could be called justice; and in which all forms of refinements, of art, of folkways, were either absent or in a state of total disintegration. (Patterson, 1969: 9)

Therefore, Patterson concludes, in Jamaican slave society there was 'no collectively held system of values, no religion, no educational system to reinforce the laws' (Patterson, 1969: 70), and the real life situation of the slave 'was one in which there was a complete breakdown of all major institutions – the family, marriage, religion, organized morality' (178).

Brathwaite berates this 'anti-African' attitude towards Caribbean culture and argues that 'African culture not only crossed the Atlantic, it crossed, survived, and creatively adapted itself to its new environment.' (Brathwaite, 1993: 192) The argument is basically premised on his claim that African culture was transmitted to and survived in the Caribbean through *religious traditions* as African culture is fundamentally *in-formed* by religion; it is in fact, according to Brathwaite, within the religious web of beliefs and behaviour that the entire culture resides. And, in response to Patterson's analytical division of intellectual labour in society, Brathwaite paradoxically continues in a Hegelian 'totalising' conception of culture – predicated on Hegel's European self-affirmation in opposition to and belittlement of 'others', including the 'African-other' – that,

In traditional Africa, there is no specialization of disciplines, no dissociations of sensibilities. In other words, starting from this particular religious focus, there is no separation between religion and philosophy, religion and society, religion and art. Religion is the form or kernel or core of the culture. (Brathwaite, 1993: 194)

Yet, Brathwaite is prepared to concede that African continuities cannot be 'easily traced' in the contemporary Caribbean (Brathwaite, 1993: 204), and in order to engage in a 'truly *native* enterprise and expression' (Brathwaite, 1993: 208; my emphasis) and 'to rebridge the gap with the *spiritual* heartland' (Brathwaite, 1993: 212; my emphasis) there has to be 'a recognition of the African presence in our society not as a static quality, but as root living, creative, and still part of the main' (Brathwaite, 1993: 255). Furthermore, as an integral constituent of this 'native' reconstruction of the Caribbean cultural self, Brathwaite posits the development of 'nation language'. This is a concept first mooted in his earlier 1970 article 'The African Presence in Caribbean Literature' characterised as 'intransigent English', which later becomes the central character of his 1979 'History of the Voice' as 'the process of using English in a different way from the 'norm'' and 'the language that is influenced very strongly by the African model' (Brathwaite, 1993: 259 & 265). In this respect, it is interesting to contrast Brathwaite's nostalgic *return* to Africa with C.L.R. James' response to the question whether as a Caribbean intellectual he should be *returning* to his native Africa:

How am I to return to non-European roots? If it means that Caribbean writers today should be aware that there are emphases in their writing that we owe to non-European, non-Shakespearean roots, and the past in music that is not Beethoven, that I agree. But I don't like them posed there in the way they have been posed *either-or*. I don't think so. I think *both* of them. And fundamentally we are a people whose literacy and aesthetic past is rooted in Western European civilisation. (James, 1984: 7)

Notwithstanding Brathwaite's *idealisation of culture* along the lines of *scientific idealisation* where laws are postulated or phenomena are explained under *ideal limiting conditions* ignoring the facts that such conditions are *rarely* if ever realised and that *social reality* is even far more messier and intractable than *physical reality*, Brathwaite's reconstructive account of culture has to contend with a number of serious challenges. First, from a general perspective, Brathwaite's 'totalising' conception of culture is facing an internal inconsistency. The conception of culture that Brathwaite advocates is very much predicated on the idea of the *organicity of the social*. But, the idea of organicity of the social owes much of its theoretical genesis to Hegel for whom society was a homogeneous whole where each part was *pars totalis*.[3] In the Hegelian social

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[3] For a textual account of Hegel's notion of the organicity of the social or *Sittlichkeit*, see, for example, Taylor (1975).

fabric, each pattern is equally qualified to express the internal essence of the whole and each compartment is capable of manifesting the self-presence of the entirety in its own distinctive manner at any given historical moment. In the Caribbean context, Brathwaite, for example, betrays no compunction in intimating this 'European' intellectual inheritance in his analysis of African culture that 'this entire culture is an *organic whole*' (Brathwaite, 1993: 194; my emphasis). But, Hegel's conception was rooted in his philosophy of history: a philosophy of history that even to this day remains the most highfalutin statement of European self-confirmation in opposition to other 'races'. In other words, the very philosophy of history that underscores the organicity of the social has churned out the most elaborate rationalisation of European ethnocentrism to the detriment of other cultures including Brathwaite's. The irony here is that Brathwaite 'anti-Eurocentric or nativist' reconstruction of the Caribbean culture is sustained on the very doctrinal nourishments that nurture Hegelian cultural exclusivism of Europe. In fact, in contrast to Brathwaite, Glissant is acutely aware of the affect of the historicist's fantastical formulation and conception for the Caribbean. By drawing attention to the Hegelian historicist construction of 'History' into ahistory, prehistory, and History as essentially discriminatory in its attitudes towards non-European cultures, Glissant remarks:

> History is a highly functional fantasy of the West, originating at precisely the time when it alone 'made' the history of the World. If Hegel relegated African peoples to the ahistorical, Amerindian peoples to the prehistorical, in order to reserve History for European peoples exclusively, it appears that it is not because these African or American peoples 'have entered History' that we can conclude today that such a hierarchical conception of 'the march of History' is no longer relevant. ... It is this hierarchical process that we deny in our emergent historical consciousness, in its ruptures, its sudden emergence, its resistance to exploration. (Glissant, 1989: 64)

The second general stumbling block that Brathwaite's nativist reconstruction faces in its path is, what Paulin Hountondji calls, the *myth of unanimism*. (Hountondji, 1996) It is ideally assumed that cultures are homogeneous entities as if each one speaks with a unanimous voice. But they lack homogeneity, and none speaks with unanimity. The myth often arises from the projection of one's own ideas and values onto a culture or tradition. The problem is more pressing in the Caribbean context owing to its chequered history of amalgamation. The assumed unanimity or homogeneity is more imaginary than real. Caribbean culture, Hall poignantly points out, is 'irretrievably 'impure'' as it 'is essentially driven by a diasporic aesthetic' (Hall, 1999: 8).

The third problem that Brathwaite faces, though from a narrower and specific perspective on the religious beliefs and behaviour in the Caribbean, is that even if one overlooks the highly controversial if not profoundly problematic statement of Brathwaite that religion is the core of African culture, Patterson points out that in the light of the available sociological facts 'it must be noted that

the clearly defined categories of supernatural practices which one finds in Africa were not to be found in Jamaica, where elements of ancestor worship, of the various divinities and of the cult of the dead, were all incoherently combined in the supernatural beliefs of the slaves' (Patterson, 1969: 185). By marshalling detailed historical evidence, *contra* Brathwaite's 'nostalgic' religious return to the 'native' Africa, Patterson concludes: 'No other area of the cultural life of the African slaves brought over to Jamaica was more shattered than their religious institutions' (Patterson, 1969: 198).

Moreover, Brathwaite's 'native enterprise and expression' (Brathwaite, 1993: 208) of African ancestry in the Caribbean culture is caught in an unstable state of diametrically divergent declarations and denouncements. In his 'Caribbean Critics', Brathwaite caustically castigates critics who *locate* 'West Indian writers, despite their local concerns, and despite the presence in their work of 'other' elements' in the *space* 'of the English/European tradition' (Brathwaite, 1993: 112). He contrasts this 'Eurocentric or non-nativist view of the matter' with his 'anti-Eurocentric or nativist' perspective that the

> West Indian voice is a complex of imposed 'establishment' tongues (Standard English, French, Dutch, etc.) and the mainly submerged patterns of the 'folk' – the peasants and illiterates who carry within themselves a transformed but still very real and essentially non-European tradition of Africa, Asia and the Amerindians. (Brathwaite, 1993: 115)

Yet, despite the presence of these interacting different traditions in the Caribbean, Brathwaite goes on to suggest that the West Indian culture is making its 'way out of a broadly *ex-African* base' (Brathwaite, 1993: 115; my emphasis) and denounces 'a multiracial howl' in the Caribbean that is intent on making Africa 'diluted, even submerged, and certainly safely out of the way' (Brathwaite, 1993: 199-200). Now, if, as he emphasises, there will be no 'one West Indian voice', 'because there *is* no 'one West Indian voice'' (Brathwaite, 1993: 115), it is somewhat baffling when Brathwaite begrudges a 'creole' conception of Caribbean that he disparages as a 'multiracial howl' and then denigrates as a 'cultural wreck ... not totally European, nor is it purely African' (Brathwaite, 1993: 200). The sudden spectre of seeking and searching for 'purity' – whether European or African – becomes, to say the least, problematic. For, as Paul Gilroy observes, whatever the merits or demerits of cultural syncretism and fusion are, 'we must be prepared to give up the *illusion* that cultural and ethnic purity has ever existed, let alone provided a foundation for civil society' (Gilroy, 2000: 251; my emphasis); otherwise, as he poetically puts it, we end up in 'the dismal dance of absolutism' (218).

But, what is more paradoxical is how Brathwaite *situates* himself and other Caribbean writers in relation to the 'European' tradition. To give a specific example, it may be recalled that Brathwaite envisages the emergence of a 'nation language' as a crucial component of a 'native' African *re-ordering* of *one-self*. Yet, unhesitatingly, he reminds his audience that the idea itself is not anchored in the Caribbean – or Africa for that matter – but has a European antecedence:

The forerunner of all this was, of course, Dante Alighieri who, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, argued, in *De vulgari eloquentia* (1304) for the recognition of the (his own) Tuscan vernacular as the nation language to replace Latin as the most natural, complete, and accessible means of verbal expression. (Brathwaite, 1993: 267)

In this respect, Brathwaite sees not only his own work embedded in the European canvas of conceptual configurations, but also the *corpus* of the cardinal Caribbean literati. Thus, he remarks,

The mainstream poets who were moving from standard English to nation language were influenced basically, I think (again the models are important), by T.S. Eliot. What T.S. Eliot did for Caribbean poetry and Caribbean literature was to introduce the notion of the speaking voice, the conversational tone. That is what really attracted us to Eliot. And you can see how the Caribbean poets ... have been influenced by him ... (Brathwaite, 1993: 286-7)

Finally, to give another example of the contestation over the notion of *nativism*, it would be instructive to trace the intellectual itinerary of Brathwaite's 'native' on the travel map of Frantz Fanon's 'native intellectual' – thus closing the circle of our conversation with another Martinican wanderer. Fanon's 'On National Culture', in his *The Wretched of the Earth*, is concerned with the *dialectical reorganisation* of *pre-* and *post-*colonial *selves* – as opposed to the singular *self* – and the role that native intellectuals can play in this transformational toil. According to Fanon, the native intellectual passes through the three phases of 'unqualified assimilation', 'remember what he was', and, lastly, 'the fighting phase' when 'a national literature' is forged (Fanon, 1963: 222-3). Yet, even at the third stage of struggle, Fanon warns that the native intellectual has a number of serious susceptibilities. For one thing, at the moment of cultural creation, the native intellectual:

... fails to realize that he is utilizing techniques and language which are borrowed from the stranger in the country. He contents himself with stamping these instruments with a hallmark which he wishes to be national, but which is strangely reminiscent of exoticism. (Fanon, 1963: 223)

In fact, Fanon contends, the native intellectual often behaves 'like a foreigner' and that his culture is 'no more than a stock of particularisms' (Fanon, 1963: 223). Moreover, Fanon observes that the native intellectual has the tendency to fetishise culture or the self by having the 'desire to attach oneself to tradition or bring abandoned traditions to life' (Fanon, 1963: 224): that is, to embrace 'the castoffs of thought, its shells and corpses, a knowledge which has been stabilized once and for all' (225). Yet,

... the form of thought and what it feeds on, together with modern techniques of information, language, and dress have dialectically reorganized the people's intelligences and that the constant principles which acted as safeguards during the colonial period are now undergoing extremely radical changes.' (Fanon, 1963: 225)

And, at the end, Fanon condemns his native intellectual for failing to understand that a 'national culture is not a folklore, nor an abstract populism that believes it can discover the people's true nature' (Fanon, 1963: 233).

Now, Brathwaite's 'native' seems to straddle the second and third stages of Fanon's native intellectual's progress, *viz.*, remembering and fighting. Yet, in contrast to Fanon's native intellectual, he is self-conscious of his indebtedness to, at least, Dante and Eliot: that is, in Fanon's words, aware of borrowing 'from the stranger in the country'; but, like Fanon's native intellectual, he 'fails to realize' how incongruous this borrowing is with his desire for a 'purely African' culture. Again, like Fanon's native intellectual, Brathwaite's 'native' has the desire to attach himself 'to tradition or bring abandoned traditions to life' when he attempts to reframe Caribbean culture in terms of the traditional African culture where 'there is no specialization of disciplines, no dissociations of sensibilities. In other words, starting from this particular religious focus, there is no separation between religion and philosophy, religion and society, religion and art. Religion is the form or kernel or core of the culture.' And, at last, contrary to Fanon's express injunction against reading a national culture as a folklore, Brathwaite's 'native' attempts to reconstruct Caribbean culture in terms of 'the mainly submerged patterns of the 'folk' – the peasants and illiterates who carry within themselves a transformed but still very real and essentially non-European tradition of Africa, Asia and the Amerindians.' Thus, contrary to Fanon's forewarning, Brathwaite's 'native' seeks to discover the real and essential nature of non-Europeans and thereby commits the *fallacy of cultural essentialism*. This is the mistake that each culture comprises a diachronic core of immutable, definitive and exclusive doctrines that could be prised out through a process of careful considerations. In fact, some critics of 'Eurocentrism' contend that this very conception of culture is one of the most fundamental pillars of a 'Eurocentric' view that 'assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different peoples' (Amin, 1989: vii). But, cultural essentialism is, at best, a non-verifiable hypothesis arrived through an over-interpretation of facts or, at worst, as Fanon emphasises a mythological fantasy.

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KINDNESS-THE TELEOLOGICAL CREED OF HUMAN CONDITION

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"It seems to me, sometimes, that we are not real people. We're a kind of blueprint, a trial for the humanity that ought to have been or that will be, maybe, one day. He who made us thought of another humanity and put even in our hearts the nostalgia for other forms of life, better than the existing ones. It's good to keep in mind that we are only the way to something else"[1].

Constantin Noica, *Mathesis or the Simple Joys*

Abstract: Kindness - perhaps the most important human quality - has not given rise to philosophical research like the other virtues; there is not an ethic of kindness as there is an ethic of duty; it is not a grand concept because it is grandeur itself. What is goodness, in fact? An ethic or a cognitive virtue? Does it play any role in science or in metaphysics? Kindness today is increasingly taken for naivety, weakness, idealism, lack of pragmatism. If we refer to the great behaviors in the history of humanity such as Socrates or Jesus who, knowing the maximum suffering caused by human injustice, gave the spiritual dimension of kindness identified with justice or love, it is difficult to appreciate whether human nature is in moral progress or in a deep crisis. Addressing such an issue stems from the need to raise the awareness for the synergistic role of human kindness in our lives, in creation, from the simplest activities to science and philosophy. Kindness implies rationality, intelligence, self-control, altruism, dedication, spirit of sacrifice, heroism, forgiveness, boundless love. It is a condition of happiness, the very human being's reason to exist.

Keywords: kindness, common sense, good will, happiness, beauty of the soul, God.

The idea of the text arose from the consciousness of today's degradation of human nature, in an increasingly unstable and conflict-torn world, sometimes

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irreconcilable ones, dominated by an exacerbation of the evil, devoid of rationality and genuine faith. It is all a sham, we are witnessing an undesirable mixure of truth and falsehood, of values and non-values; our knowledge has become confused; the unclear differentiation between good and evil, between essential and non-essential grows us apart from a certain understanding of the meaning of life, thus wasting our time in this world. Our article is an invitation to self-knowledge, imperatively necessary, because the cause of man's moral strength diminuation is to be found in his authentic incapacity of self-awareness, of reassessment and self-control. The source of kindness is in ourselves, we need just the desire to get to it and to keep it sheer.

The paradoxes of kindness

Writing about kindness nowadays, in a world that seems to be "the best of all possible worlds"[2] is an attempt which seems meaningless at first glance and, yet, so necessary because there is no better time to write about what we are increasingly deprived of. A lot of people think that we can never do anything except out of some sort of self-interest. We always act ultimately for our own sake, they say – for material gain, for prestige, to gain power over others, to avoid suffering some kind of pain. While we may like to think differently, to think we are capable of acting unselfishly or out of a disinterested sense of justice, we are really egoists. That is human nature[3]. We live in a state of "ontological insecurity"[4]: we communicate face to face increasingly less, we suffer from a damaging solipsism, we think of ourselves as kind while in reality we tear each other down, we delude ourselves saying that we are virtuous while in reality we are individualistic and selfish, greedy, and full of envy and rancor, "blinded" by vanity; kindness is considered, nowadays, as a prerogative of the weak man, lacking in pragmatism, naive and idealistic and, more often than not, unfortunately, it is even perceived as a proof of stupidity. Thus, the kind man runs the risk of not being able to adapt to a reality of hobbsean type illustrated by the famous phrase: "belum omnium contra omnes"[5]; the misunderstanding of kindness inevitably leads to eluding it. We draw the attention, in support of these ideas, to a text that we consider enlightening for the analyzed problem: "In vain do we possess it all: intelligence, culture, wit, super-culture, docorates, super-doctorates if we are *vilain, wicked, rude and vulgar, fool and stupid*, if we are not worth a damn, then all these - intelligence and erudition and super-doctorates go down the drain, just like all the international congresses we take part in and all scholarships that we win by means of severe competitions. **Nothing can replace and provide for a bit of kindness, a bit of goodwill, tolerance and understanding. The kindness of the soul** is not

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[2] Leibniz, *Essays on Theodicity. On the Kindness of God, the freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, First Book*, translated by Diana Morărașu and Ingrid Ilinca, Polirom, Iași, 1997, p.93.
[3] Tony Skillen, Kindness in the Cold, has an attack of altruism in Philosophy Now, 1991. Tony Skillen is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent.
[4] C. Noica, *Becoming within Being. Trial on traditional philosophy. Treaty of Ontology*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p.291.
[5] Th. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Paris, Sirey, 1971, Romanian transl. Leviathan, XIII, The Scientific Printing House, Bucharest, 1957.

a subtle and refined virtue, it is a **basic attribute of the human being** and also an **attribute of culture**".[6] Those who are "rude", "wicked" regardless of the knowledge they possess, their academic position or intellectual level, are not to be excused if they possess an inner malice. Kindness is not only a *"mere obsolete and sentimental virtue"*. Without kindness, Steinhardt had called the intellectuals "**information memorizers**". The mere reproduction of knowledge at intellectual level does not do much, it is only an attitude of pride and it is finally deprived of any quality. In a profoundly individualistic and moral polluted world as the one we live in today, kindness is repudiated and derided, although we need it. **What justifies the current human moral behavior? Why is it so hard to be kind?! What is really kindness? How to express it?! What is the faculty of the soul meant to lead us to kindness?**

Kindness encompasses a range of acts and habits that can be most easily described as thoughtful manners and heartfelt courtesy. Such etiquette not only applies to our relationships with other people but also to things, animals, plants and the Earth. Kindness may be simple like saying "please," "thank you," "excuse me," or "I'm sorry."It may be offering a helping hand, patiently waiting your turn, returning a phone call or favor, or even cheerfully responding with a smile. Kindness is also characterized by being generous with your time, money, resources and a willingness to help. "Kindness," as the Greek philosopher Sophocles said, "gives birth to kindness." It is, as American writer Mark Twain notes, "The language which the deaf can hear and the blind can see."

The present condition of the world seems to contradict the notion that the virtue of kindness offers people a sanctuary for peace, safety, comfort and hope. Over two-dozen major armed conflicts consistently take place in the world; over 1.5 billion people live on less than one dollar a day; 2.5 billion people have no access to basic sanitation or clean water; 1 billion people (over half of them women) are illiterate; thousands of acres of forest are logged each day, and dozens of species become endangered or eliminated. Earth's climate is changing: there are increased natural disasters, global warming and desertification. In spite of our planet's vulnerability, humans have long had an ethic of kindness.[7] We do not talk about a systematical ethic of kindness, but rather about reflections we find in in the writings of Lao Tzu, who considered it one of the three great treasures of human conduct, or Confucius who taught kindness to be the path of civic responsibility, familial obligations, and courtesy. Buddha taught that kindness/generosity is a primary quality of an awakened mind and Jesus Christ preached the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."[8]

However, in the history of Western philosophy there are ephemeral attempts to deal with this subject, being probably taken for granted as an easy

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[6] N. Steinhardt, *On the Kindness of the Soul* in *The Danger of Confession* Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, p. 41.

[7] C. Forrest McDowell, *The Virtue of Kindness*, on

www.onesanctuary.com/peace/peacevirtues/ virtueofkindness.pd, Excerpted from forthcoming book, Peace of Heart, Peace of Mind, 2007.

[8] (Bible, Luke 6:31)

topic whose understanding does not raise insurmountable difficulties.Yet, how can one explain the fact that very few people make a creed, a profession of faith out of kindness? Is it that kindness is associated with suffering, because the best people in the cultural history of mankind like Socrates, Jesus, Confucius, Buddha[9], as well as the great geniuses, saints have suffered because of their love, of their kindness? Does man reject kindness in order to not suffer or due to the fact that in a competitive world individualism is associated with personal interests and well-being?!

The philosopher Mary Midgley[10] says somewhere that the history of ethical reflection clearly demonstrates how much of our thinking is shaped by what our sages *omit* to mention. Ethical philosophers like to talk about duties and rights, they like to talk about utility and consequence, they like to talk about virtue and vice, good and evil, responsibility and obligation. These are big and impressive sounding things. But the amount of ink spent writing about kindness is, as far as I can see, rather slight. That is not to say that philosophers have *entirely* ignored the subject, of course. Aristotle, for example, tackles the subject in his Rhetoric, where he writes that "Kindness – under the influence of which a man is said to "be kind" – may be defined as helpfulness towards some one in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped" – perhaps a rather more minimal definition than I myself might favour. However, it would be possible to scour the indexes of a substantial library shelf full of books on ethics, and not come across the word "kindness" mentioned even once. And yet, when it comes to our everyday lives, kindness is something that we seem to care about a great deal. Indeed, for many of us, I suspect, kindness is a more fundamental aspect of ethical reflection than the ideas of duty, rights, consequence and so on. Still, we meet in the specialized literature a relatively recent work, in fact a singular work dedicated to kindness, which demonstrates the actuality of researching this theme. Thus, our analysis could not omit *Kindness and the Good Society: Connections of the by* William S. Hamrick[11] which "is steeped in the language and concerns of Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Ricoeur, Levinas, Dufrenne, and Werner Marx, but is by no means confined to an exposition—or even an integration—of the theories of others. Instead, the author offers, first, an original phenomenological description of the phenomenon of kindness, supported not only by examples drawn from his own experience and from current social events, but by examples drawn from the arts, notably literature. Next, he complements the descriptive move with a hermeneutics of suspicion designed to reveal how hidden interpretive frameworks covertly shape the ways in which we experience and recognize kindness. Yet he does not merely invoke such suspicion in order to "destabilize" descriptions, undermining their findings by revealing their limits; rather, he

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[9] K. Jaspers, *Crucial People from the History of Mankind: Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus,* Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996.

[10] Mary Midgley, *Kindness and Philosophy*, article online, thinkBuddha.org:WillBuckingham@DMU, 2008.

[11] William S. Hamrick, *Kindness and the Good Society: Connections of the Heart*, SUNY Press Publishing House, 2002, pag. 253.

assigns the hermeneutic move a positive role, employing it in service of a critique of the social world itself. The result is an original thesis of "critical kindness" as a practical wisdom. Here kindness does indeed function as a regulative ideal. However, it must be constantly tempered with critical questioning, along with a vigilant readiness to rethink social institutions and cultural assumptions. In this way, a life of kindness does not naively accept or reinstate a ready-made world of anesthetized sensitivities, but helps to make community possible by actively creating it, just as an artist creates a work of art—an activity guided by, but irreducible to, inherited rules and frameworks. According to Hamrick, then, kindness itself can thus be understood as a kind of "performance art" requiring the utmost situational sensitivity—a discerning "poetics of the will," guided by the principle of informed respect and sustained by a commitment "to bring goodness into being within what well-founded suspicion reveals as the limits of one's situations". William S. Hamrick's contribution reveals the complexity of the topic approached, prompting us to support the idea that kindness is beneficial both individually and at the community level. It is not is a grand concept although it is greatness itself. It is a moral law to which we can all accede through a certain comprehension of our own reason; it is the chance to prove that man is a rational animal and not a being dominated by emotions: *hatred, selfishness, jealousy, pettiness, envy, etc.*

Even if there are not systematic studies on kindness, all the moral philosophy from Confucius, Socrates, Kant up to the contemporary ethicists implicitly or explicitly emphasizes that kindness is a cardinal value also involving the other fundamental values of the human condition, being a prerequisite of happiness.

Therefore we argue that **kindness is both a concept and a state of mind**. **Kindness is a corollary of all virtues: wisdom, honesty, selflessness, honesty, courage, intelligence, generosity, modesty, temperance, work, diligence, solidarity, freedom and justice, conduct of a good will guided by reason.**

From good sense to good will

Good sense is not only a phrase used to describe what is considered to be widely accepted by most people, but a philosophical idea that has preoccupied ancient or medieval philosophers (Aristotle and Avicenna), who considered that common sense is the way by which the individual becomes aware of the optimal reality. An ancient philosophical term, reintroduced in the 17th century along with the spread of Cartesianism, common sense has acquired a wide variety of meanings from the first definition **of Descartes - "the power of judging well and distinguishing truth from falsehood, which is precisely what is called common sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men".[12]** Good sense is not only a phrase used to describe what is considered to be widely accepted by most people, but a philosophical idea that has preoccupied ancient

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or medieval philosophers (Aristotle and Avicenna), who considered that common sense is the way by which the individual becomes aware of the optimal reality. An ancient philosophical term, reintroduced in the 17th century along with the spread of Cartesianism, common sense has acquired a wide variety of meanings from the first definition **of Descartes - "the power of judging well and distinguishing truth from falsehood, which is precisely what is called common sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men". Or, if all people are equally capable of thinking well ("good sense is the most orderly thing in the world"), they do not think equally well. For this innate faculty does not take place spontaneously in a good way, we must learn to practice it with the method. For it is not enough to have a refined spirit, it is important to use it well.[13] More often than not, good sense is confused with common sense,[14] the latter involving the idea of a faculty common to all men, that developed inside us during successive, empirical accumulations, of primary truths, which have come to be reduced to the average of a society's values. Good sense is not to be taken for granted, it is not an attribute of the being. Good sense goes further, it is a synthesis of aspirations that implies a whole philosophy of life which combines knowledge with ethical dimension, demanding and promoting an accumulation of moral virtues such as wisdom, honesty, fairness, compassion etc. Good sense always amends intelligence nonsense and infatuation, vanity, egotism, self-sufficiency, intolerance.**

There is a *paradox of good sense*, which Al. Paleologu defined thus: "Good sense is not, as people think, a primary form of intelligence, an inferior succedaneum thereof. There is (and how often) intelligence without good sense, but there is not good sense without intelligence. More often than not, good sense is taken for common sense; it is true that they go along the path together a good part of the way, starting from basic findings. But common sense quickly falls in apories or platitudes, while good sense continues its way attaining sensational discoveries ...". A philosophical and ethical concept of classical culture, good sense sticks together with reason, with which it has already been assimilated. It is therefore normal for good sense not to be considered a norm of conduct in epochs of profound transformations, when the old order is destroyed, but without having established the neww one. Reason is thus devoid of any ethical content, being assimilated with mechanistic thinking, which assumes a good organization of the intellect, but bring excessive specialization, narrowing horizons, being opposite to the intuitive-creative thinking. Leaving aside the moral value of good sense, the interest in this concept in Romanian culture has a practical justification. Unfortunately, this ideal is not part of the domestic ethos, having being received later, along with the French influence, assimilated only superficially, hardly penetrating into the depths of the Romanian society. We often speak about the traditional good sense, of the common human respect

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[13] Ibidem, p. 114.
[14] Elena Buzatu, *On Good Sense*, www.universulromanesc.com; Prof. at "Butte College" Faculty. Oroville / California / USA

towards customs and traditions, the evaluation criteria being reduced only to highlighting the qualities, without mentioning the flaws. But if good sense is understood as a specific and more complex philosophical concept, as presented above, then things are a little different. However, the above mentioned considerations speak about the necessity of assuming the good sense, primarily by the elite as the specter of their ethical and professional failure triggers the confusion of values and, implicitly, of the the assessment criteria in all areas of a country's social life. The ideal is worth being appropriated wholeheartedly, especially since the cultural foundations of good sense point us to the origins of the modern European civilization."[15] Good sense makes possible the almost miraculous understanding among people belonging to different cultural groups and apparently so fa. We have a "common kernel" as Plato said and, more than that, our common note is that "we are all dwellers of this world"[16], we just have to learn to live our own uniqueness. People are like fortresses. Plato sets forth this explicit parallelism in the Republic [17] where the Greek philosopher made an analogy between the social hierarchy and various parts of the individual soul. Justice brings individual inner harmony and social harmony for the public order. All people are subject to the same universal laws of Logos. All people are countrymen as long as there is a single life and a single order of things for everybody. From this perspective, the man endowed with good sense does not do anyting by mere chance; every action has a purpose circumscribed to a universal one, in other words, the man endowed with good sense is the one who *is on the right path, he does what he has to do, he does his duty in relation to himself and with others, thus participating in the universal order*. Thus the man who has good sense is free. The freedom to live *as if* there was no order is not granted to anyone[18] *appreciates Andrei Pleşu in his "small treaty" of morale. Good sense is a prerequisite of knowledge but, in my opinion, sometimes it means more than literacy, it is a divine gift just like wisdom; it can be identified with a balanced, rational conduct, without excesses, characterized by prudence and measure.* Our world does not abound in good sense, shame, humility; people rather behave with *guts, rudeness, shamelessness. Philosophers like Kant*, who believed in the progress of humanity, at a time when others claimed that only the individual can progress, but not the entire mankind, *would disarm when confronted with such a reality*. Kant put forward the following argument: *If we have the duty to work together for the greatest good of humanity, he said, we must have the faith that our efforts are not in vain. Thus, as a corollary of our duty, we must accept the belief in the perfectibility of the genre. And, indeed, it would be meaningless to feel bound by a duty unless we believe in the effectiveness of accomplishing it, even remotely*.[19] If human reason had not evolved during the centuries which

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[15] Al. Paleologu, *Good Sense as Paradox,* https: //books,google.ro, books?isbn=9734620568

[16] M. Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism in* the *Originof the Art Work*, The Universe Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, p.148.

[17] Platon, *The Republic*, in *Works* 5th vol., The Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publsihing House, Bucharest, 1986, p.81-411.

[18] A. Plesu, *Minima Moralia*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p.47.

[19] Giorgio DelVecchio, *Lessons of Legal Philosophy*, Europa Nova Publishing House, 1995, p.116-117.

followed Kant, his reflections could still be assigned to the transcendental idealism of his thinking. Indeed, man has evolved intellectually, but *the ultimate purpose of reason is to establish a good will in itself*[20], in Kantian language, we could say that a theoretical, pure reason is fulfilled through a practical reason, which is good will. The Kantinian argument is - *good will, not happiness is the only intrinsic good. From what can be thought anywhere in the world, and even beyond it, there is nothing that can be considered good without restriction, except for* **a good will**. Intelligence, wit, judgment power or no matter how the talents of the spirit may be called, or courage, determination, perseverance in making decisions, as traits of the temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but they may also become extremely bad and harmful when the will, which must use these gifts of nature and whose specific constitution is therefore called character, is not good. The same is true regarding the fate's conducive gifts (Glucksgaben). **Power, wealth, honours, health itself** and the whole welfare and contentment for the situation in which we find ourselves, known as happiness, give rise to boldness and, through it, more often than not to vanity, where there is not a good will to correct their influence on the soul and, along with it, to regulate the whole principle of action and to adjust it universally according to its scope (allgemein-zweckmassing mache); needless to mention that an impartial rational spectator can never be satisfied seeing the continuous prosperity of a being who bears none of the ornaments of pure and good will, so it seems that good will is a prerequisite for the very dignity of being happy.[21].

We appreciate the good will in the Kantian meaning as being a developed form of good sense fulfilled through knowledge, education and self-education. *The morally significant documents which make proof of unconditioned human goodness are out of duty, which means the obligation to perform our actions in accordance with the moral law. They stem from an independent will, unconditioned sentimentally, which gives itselfs laws, is self-determining. Of course, in the world we live moral perfection cannot be conceivable, because we have interests, inclinations, temptations, cravings hard to stave off; but doing one's your duty towards oneself and towards the others is a form of perfection.* **To be good, to love, to work for the others' happiness and for one's own improvement are actions stemming from duty with a high moral content.** *If we were able to obey the moral law or the categorical Kantinian imperative, then we would all be saints; I would no longer need law, state, as all our actions would be moral. In reality, our world is dominated by what might be called antropical entropy, where the one who does his duty is out of tune, being marginalized or even humiliated. It is hard to talk about the Kantian moral in a world where the individualis are deprived of an interior will, lacking authentic landmarks and being unable of*

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[20] Imm. Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals,* Humanitas Publihing House, Bucharest, 2006, p.31.
[21] Ibidem, p.29.

self-knowledge.[22] Man keeps being an open being. We love and hate, we are selfless and selfish, good or bad, without being able, more often than not, to explain and control our own behavior, and much less the collective behaviors. And as time passes and we become more aware of ourselves we realize the unfathomable depths and the darkness of the human soul.[23]

Kindness is the beauty of the soul

Kindness is a character trait which is a prerogative of education and self-education; we do not share the idea that some people are born good and others bad; man is ambivalent, he is a combination of good and evil, entropy-negentropy, subjective-objective, rational-irrational, sacred-profane. The way in which we manage to harmonize these antinomies in our person is also reflected in our spiritual physiognomy, in our way of being, in other words, in our our character. "Being a man of character is that feature of the will which determines the subject to make a convenant against certain practical principles, which he sets once and for all by his reason. It does not matter here what nature makes out of man, but what he makes out of himself"[24]. The fact that virtue can be acquired (it's not innate), can be inferred from its notion, without having to relate to anthropological knowledge from experience. As human moral faculty would not be virtue, unless it triumphed through the power of principle in fighting the strong contrary inclinations. It is the product of pure practical reason, as the latter, being aware of its superiority, due to its freedom, gains ground predominantly over the inclinations.[25] Moral theories which, like those of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, give a central place to the virtues, tend to assume that as traits of character the virtues are mutually compatible so that it is possible for one and the same person to possess them all. This assumption—let us call it the compatibility thesis—does not deny the existence of painful moral dilemmas: it allows that the virtues may conflict in particular situations when considerations associated with different virtues favour incompatible courses of action, but holds that these conflicts occur only at the level of individual actions. Thus while it may not always be possible to do both what would be just and what would be kind or to act both loyally and honestly, it is possible to be both a kind and a just person and to have both the virtue of loyalty and the virtue of honesty[26]. 'Virtue and Character' A.D.M. Walker claims that kindness and justice are incompatible in certain important ways and that a person can be kind or just without possessing the other virtue. Walker argues that virtues must lead to 'effective and intelligent action' and that a virtue ceases to exist if 'it leads to violation of the minimal

    [22] Gabriela Pohoață, *Confucius and Kant or the Ethics of Duty, Cogito. Multidisciplinary Research Journal"*, vol. II no. 1/ March, 2010, "Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University, Pro Universitaria Publihing House, Bucharest, 2010, p.50-57.
    [23] Nicolae Sacaliș-Calata, *Philosophy aand Pedagogy of Culture. From Homer to Plato and Zamolxis,* Pro Universitaria Publihing House, Bucharest, 2012, p.20.
    [24] Imm. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, apud. N. Bagdasar, Virgil Bogdan, C. Narly, Philosophical Antology, Foreign Philosophers, Casa Școalelor Publihing House, 1943, p.457.
    [25] Idem, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ibidem. p. 457.
    [26] A.D.M. Walker, *Virtue and Character – Research Gate*. Available from:
    http://www.researchgate.net/publication/231933987

requirements of any other virtue'. On this view kindness and justice function independently to produce effective action. Kindness requires a direct caring for the individual in particular circumstances, while justice involves a commitment to impartiality that abstracts from an individual's situation. Walker argues that, as long as the minimal requirements of other virtues are met, one can be kind without weighing considerations of justice. He cites with approval kind behaviour which human beings learn as young children. Such behaviour may be a deeply engrained personality trait, and the individual passing through different situations in life may have no need to consider questions of justice. 'He will merely need to be able to recognize and respond to certain types of considerations as overriding the values promoted by kindness'he trait of modesty has received significant philosophical attention in recent years[27]. This is due, in part, to Julia Driver's claim that modesty is able to act as a counter-example to intellectualist accounts of the nature of virtue. 'Modesty as kindness' states that the trait of modesty ought to be considered as intimately connected with the more fundamental virtue of kindness. I set out the account, explain its benefits and defend it against possible objections. I then ask whether or not the intense focus on the trait of modesty has actually furthered our understanding of the nature of virtue more generally, and suggest that alternative approaches ought to be considered[28]. Julia Driver argues that modesty essentially involves ignorance (underestimation) of one's self-worth. Intuitively, modesty is a virtue. So this would count against traditional accounts of virtue (as involving moral perception or an internal orientation towards the good), and in favour of <u>her instrumental account</u>. But there are reasons to doubt whether modesty essentially involves ignorance after all.[29] We could equate modesty with human kindness and man's moral personality. Given this dual dimnesion, modesty is a moral value of personality that belongs to one's attitude towards the others and towards oneself by virtue of which man assesses himself properly, to the actual value of his work and conduct, without ascribing to himself any further merit or right, without ignoring the will and needs of others. Here, there is the intrinsic link between modesty and kindness, which can lead to the understanding that no man should be underestimated, because each man, as Socrates said, "was born with the wisdom of man". It is necessary in this context of our analysis to recall that for the ancient Greeks the educational ideal was *kalokatheia*: a handsome (*kalos*) and good (*agathos*) man. For Plato, human nature is not accomplished by the unleashing of force and passions, but by a life lived rationally according to Justice and Good that can lead to happiness. People who live only according to the unbridled desires of their body are not only ignorant and bad, but, equally, unhappy. **The happy life is the life of the soul which has become acquainted with good, beauty and kindness, every faculty of the soul fulfilling their role in a hierarchical structure that ensures the**

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[27] Daniel Putman, *The Compatibility of Justice and Kindness,* Philosophy 65(254):516-517(1990).

[28] Alan T. Wilson, *Modesty as Kindness*, Ratio 28(2), 2014.

[29] Julia Driver, *Are there virtues of Ignorance*, http://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/09/are-there-virtues-of-ignorance.html

supremacy of reason. Conversely, the soul domination by passions leads to dissatisfaction, to the incessant repetition of desires impossible to appease and therefore to unhappiness. Although most people do not want this unhappiness because nobody wants "his own evil", the tragedy is that they refuse their spiritual liberation, the therapy through the philosophy of soul, a therapy that could heal his ills and sufferings. Man realizes his essence of a "rational animal not in a life of pleasure in which his passions triumph, but in an activity of the soul consistent with virtue.[30]. In his eudemic Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtuous people – the "**good man**" (*agathos*), who acts virtuously in order to acquire naturally good things, such as wealth and dignity, and the "**noble and good man**" (*kaloskagathos*), who accomplishes the virtuous actions for their own sake, because they are noble. Being moral towards other people stems from and helps increase the personal value or have a good character. Having a good character means acquiring virtues. *Being virtuous means behaving properly. For example, shame, inclinations for pity or compassion, in contrast with insolence, selfishness, cruelty and malice are positive character traits or virtues that provide a rule of altruistic behavior, guided by justice and charity. Such a behavior leads to the moral good of a true solidarity with others, with all living beings.[31]* When there is a moral action, mercy is always its generating feeling. Moral life means solidarity, and it is based on the feeling of pity. "A boundless compassion that unites us to all the living things, here it is the strongest and safest guarantor of morality.[32] The previous arguments converge on the idea that human goodness is a synergistic attitude emanating from inside the harmony in which all faculties of the soul endowed with qualities take part - **it is the beauty of the soul that depends on free, rational will which can be educated and cultured.**

Kindness is the condition of happiness

The happiness we can achieve always remains at the level of the human and of the uncertain world he lives in. If gods are self-sufficient, man is dependent on external things. Virtue itself is not possible under some circumstances which are beyond man's mastery. Happiness involves a maximum independence from the material constraints that the individual is unable to obtainby himself. People are, essentially, social beings, so that the good emotions, wishes and actions of a person will also include a good attitude and behavior towards the others. To be moral towards the other people stems from and helps increase the personal value or have a good character.

Goodness of character is neither natural nor unnatural for man. Man has from the very beginning a willingness for it, but it must be developed through

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[30] Aristotel, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, p.28.

[31] Vladimir Soloviov, *Justification of Goodness*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, p.137.

[32] Ah. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representaion* , apud. Ion Petrovici *Ethics of Renonciation* in *Schopenhauer, Historical and Philosophical Monography,* Eurosong & Book, 1997, p.125.

practice. The thing that is accomplished must be the right thing that needs to be done under certain circumstances and this should be carried out starting from a good motivation. **Aristotle wants man to have a permanent spiritual and moral self-improvement will. Man must want to highlight all that is best in him. This is the noble sense in which Aristotelian happiness can be truly accessible to any man.[33]** The man of spiritual grandeur is the one whoc, assessing himself as worthy of great things, is truly worthy of them. The greatness of the soul manifests itself in big things. The man of spiritual grandeur represents the fair conduct in relation to whatis appropriate for him. Individual welfare also promotes the welfare of the community, because individuals always live in and are partially defined by the societiesthey live in. The more virtuous its members, the better the community. **Kindness is another name of the definition Aristotle gave man: social being.[34] Without kindness we cannot cohabitate but in conditions of terror, justifying the bitter and well-known statement: "others, here is hell." There is an elementary altruism expressed through kindness, which is an axiom of public life.**

We do not have in mind here the apparent kindness - emanation of a doubtful character or false generosity hiding some mean personal interests. In fact, here we refer rather to the resentful man, envious, cunning or simply evil, the vilain man who has not yet reached the level of "social contract"[35] whose "happiness" is fueled by the pleasure of doing harm, thereby trying to conceal certain frustrations and complexes that tear his inner being. When such a man does charitable deeds he acts in a Nietzschian style showing off his greatness and by no means his grandeur of mind. *Genuine kindnes emerges only from a genuinely honest character and our appreciation envisages the nobility of soul, the untainted conscience of a pure soul. Such kindness cannot be converted into anything bad, even in extreme situations of maximum suffering because it springs from self-determining good will*, from free will. We want to illustrate this bringing into discussion the Socratic case. What is true and good, and what is false and infamous is not allowed to be hidden in a tragic vision. A reconcilliation with the death sentence of Socrates is possible only through Socrates himself. He died without bitterness and without accusing anyone: "I am not at all angry with those who voted against me or those who accused me" - this was his last word. Socrates was convinced that for the honest man there is no evil, and that gods will not leave his cause at the mercy of chance. Either ways, **for the good man there is no harm in life or in death.** Our argumentation would be incomplete if we did not bring to attention, even ephemerously, Jesus' behavior who on the cross, in a state of maximum suffering, had the moral strength to say: **Lord forgive them for they know not what they do!**

We naturally ask ourselves the question: How can genuine kindness generate happiness?

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[33] Aristotle, *cited works, 30.*
[34] Aristotle, *Politics,* IRI Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, p.37.
[35] J.J. Rousseau, *Du contract social, GF Flamarion, presentation, notes, bibliographie et chronologie par Bruno Biernardi,* GF Flamarion, Paris, 2001.

The evil man is never happy because his soul cannot enjoy inner peace even in the midst of his riches. Therefore, happiness on earth consists in our own work onto ourselves and on our peers to make us all better. The evil man is never happy because his soul cannot enjoy inner peace even in the midst of his riches. Therefore, happiness on earth consists in our own work onto ourselves and on our peers to make us all better. Before Kant, the representatives of the eudaemonistic-emipiriste concepts had asserted that the purpose of life was the promotion of personal well-being (happiness) in a general prosperity, without specifying where the first ends and where the second begins, and the rationalist representatives of the concepts who had supported perfection as the purpose of life lay emphasis on personal perfection, without considering its social aspect. Kant reconciles the theses of this opposite points of views, reducing them to their true value, by stating the following moral command "Set as goal of your actions your own perfection and foreign happiness."[36] Your own perfection and not the others' perfection, for others, if they do not possess it, cannot be inoculated with a good conscience, as it the personal work of each of us. Foreign happiness and not personal happiness because we tend instinctively to personal happiness and we do not need anyone's instigation and competition. Kant admits that people tend to happiness by virtue of their nature of finite and rational beings, the pursuit of happiness thus being a necessary endeavor of their nature. But perfection, which is the same as holiness, is not destined for any rational human beings here on earth. It can be approached only through progress, which, because it cannot achieve its purpose in this world, must be admitted to extend itself in the other world, by the continuance of our personality in that world, that is we must admit the immortality of the soul, not as a certainty, for the immortality of the soul is not subject to knowledge that can be demonstrated theoretically, but as a "comforting" hope.[37] Thus, only by postulating the immortality of the soul through hope that we will continue to exist as a moral personality after death, morality becomes reality. For our moral conscience, virtue on this superior moral stage is not only *worthy of happiness*, but makes even part of it, opening prospects for the sovereign Good, a notion that has always played an important role in ancient ethics, for the Epicureans, and which we continuously approach, but we will not never reach, comforting ourselves just with the hope that we will still manage.

But since we are not sure that the sovereign Good could be accomplished even in an eternal life, for it is beyond human powers to achieve it, we must admit a moral world order, where the change in nature is subject to a superior order, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to unity between the sensible world and the intelligible one , to unify, as Kant also stated "the empire of nature with the empire of mores" and to achieve a perfect agreement between virtue (morality) and happiness or, as the Greeks said, the moral Good. But such unification is conceivable only by postulating the existence of a moral omnipotent and absolute

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[36] Imm. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, IRI Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p.21.
[37] Ibidem, p.22.

being, of God. And thus the faith in God's existence is, in Kant's view, according to the faith in the sovereign Good.

Human kindness and divine kindness

There is in each of us a "pit of selfishness", there is much duplicity, false altruism, apparent generosity, but there is, indisputably, kindness. If it weren't for the virtue, then there would not be anything good in this world, the human creation could not be explained. In every age, in all societies, there have been people capable of love, dedication, selfless kindness, people who sacrificed themselves, who sometimes made even the supreme sacrifice on behalf of certain values, beliefs, ideals. "For this reason, I would venture to say that even in this life the good things outperform by far the evil ones, our comforts outweigh our inconveniences and that Mr. Descartes was right to write (vol. I, letter 9) that *the natural reason teaches us, in this life, that we experience more good things than bad ones*"[38]. These are arguments we rely on when we argue that **teleological kindness is the creed of the human condition.** By means of kindness stemming from love, from good conscience, we can connect to a noumenal world where we feel free and happy. We cannot fail to remind in our analysis maybe the most beautiful ideas that have ever been written about divine kindmess. "Love is that affection that makes us enjoy the perfections of what we love, and nothing is perfect and more charming than God**. In order to love Him it is enough to think of his perfections and this not hard work, as we find these ideas inside ourselves. Perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses a boundless ocean from which we received only mere drops – there is inside us some power, knowledge, kindness but all of these, as a whole, are inside God. Order, proportion, harmony delight us, painting and music prove it. God is sheer order, He always keeps the fair proportions, produces universal harmony – the entire beauty is an outpouring of His rays ...**[39]

Good nature, appropriate education, meeting with pious and virtuous persons can greatly contribute to put souls in this beautiful posture .... we need to combine light and ardor, it it is necessary that *intellectual perfections lead to improving those of the will*. We always learn at school that as truth is the object of truth, goodness is the object of the will and as the intellect can never assert than what is shown under the desguise/appearance of truth, the will never like but what seems good to it. The will contains a natural determination for good in general. There is in us enough willpower, only that we are unaware of it. We are the masters of our homes, in the sense that we have free will, but not like God who is the Master of the world. The kindness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite and it would not be infinite if we could conceive a greater kindnes than His. But when we say that only kindness led God to create this universe, we must add that KINDNESS led Him antecedently to create and produce any possible goodness, but WISDOM is the one that made the selection and was the reason why he chose the greatest goodness *consistently* and, finally, it was POWER that

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[38] Leibniz, *cited works,* p.228.
[39] Ibidem, p.27.

gave him the means of carrying out the great plan which he made up. As God is good, goodness itself created the man good and righteous, but also changeable, being able to by his free will. It is precisely this duplicity of man to be both sensitive and intelligible that makes him capable of morality. Besides, morale starts with this **choice - each will decide what he will be**. Thus, we understand so that we can achieve good will but not in the nick of time or through a simple act of will. We have yet to remark that troubles and sorrows that accompany the victory over the passions turns into pleasure for some, due to the satisfaction thay find in the intense feeling of the force of their spirit and of the divine grace. This happy state can be reached, and this is one of the principal means the soul can use to strengthen its dominion.[40]

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[40] Ibidem, p.266.

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BIASED RATIONALITY AND THE SYSTEMATIC THINKING ERRORS

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Abstract: The problem of rationality as a faculty every human being should possess and the apparent irrationality of individuals manifested in numerous cognitive biases have been subjects of concern for specialists in different fields of study, such as philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, economic science, etc. Various authors have tried to offer different definitions of rationality and understand all the biases or judgement errors the human mind is systematically prone to. Individuals are equipped with a biased rationality, which does not mean or imply that they are unwise or injudicious. On the contrary, this biased rationality helps human beings make rapid, effortless, automatic, usually correct and beneficial decisions in vital situations, when they are confronted with a series of internal and external constraints. Although this biased rationality may not pass the test of logic, it seems to be good enough for humans' evolutionary goals.

Keywords: rationality, cognitive biases, systematic errors, heuristics, error management theory, artifacts.

Preliminary considerations

Numerous experts in cognitive psychology and human thinking begin their books with the alleged Aristotle's assertion that man is a "rational animal", although such an allegation is hard to find in his writings, not to mention that he, sometimes, seems to contradict it[1]. It is, however, true that Aristotle makes a clear distinction between "lower animals", which "cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts"[2] and man, who has "the power of thinking, i.e. mind"[3], thus being able to use his "rational soul" to control his body (instincts, passions, desires, appetites, etc.). Therefore the man "is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule;

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[1] M. Boyle, "Essentially rational animals", pp. 395-428, in G. Abel, J. Conant (Eds.), *Rethinking epistemology*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012, available online at: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8641838.

[2] Aristotle, *Politics*, Book One, Part V. Translated by Benjamin Jowett, available online at: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html.

[3] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, Book II, Part 3. Translated by J. A. Smith, available online at: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.html.

for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful"[4].

In the field of economic sciences, the mainstream view is that the individual is a perfectly rational agent, who makes decisions for "allocating scarce resources to satisfy unlimited needs, with the final purpose of maximizing utility"[5]. Based on this view, both economists and marketing specialist assume that "high rationality" is the norm, while in reality people's choices are, at best, the result of a "flawed rather than perfect rationality"[6].

Aristotle's optimism regarding the rationality of man has, nevertheless, been severely questioned in the last decades. For instance, even since 1950, Bertrand Russell, starting from the idea of man as a rational animal, stated that "[t]hroughout a long life, I have looked diligently for evidence in favor of this statement, but so far I have not had the good fortune to come across it, though I have searched in many countries spread over three continents"[7]. Similarly, the economists' vision of the utilitarian, perfectly rational *hommo oeconomicus* - as a model capable of explaining not only individual's economic choices, but also every choice and behaviour - has been under a long and severe scrutiny[8].

More recently, numerous studies in cognitive psychology or neuroscience show us that the traditional understanding of and analysis on the nature of rationality is far from being accurate, with people obviously acting against their personal interests (as viewed from "outside", by specialists), or being unaware of their motivations for action (or, at least, unaware of the ultimate causes of their actions), or putting their non-material gratification above their material gains, or making emotional choices instead of rational ones, or holding erroneous, even absurd ideas and opinions instead of correct and informed ones, etc. Such apparently irrational manifestations are not the "appanage" of only uneducated people, as "every brain within every body is infested with preconceived notions and patterns of thought that lead it astray without the brain knowing it"[9].

Even more troubling, individuals themselves are oblivious of such foibles or weaknesses, being unable to notice them even when they lead to disastrous results. Being "designed by nature" to apply to self-deceptions in order to maintain a good impression about themselves and be "always right", individuals do not know or admit that their minds are prone to cognitive biases, heuristics, artifacts or logical fallacies that, in certain conditions, will determine them to

[4] Aristotle, *Politics*, loc.cit.

[5] S. Balan, "Substantivism, Culturalism and Formalism in Economic Anthropology", in *Cogito Review*, Vol. IV, no. 2/June, 2012, pp. 27-38.

[6] J. O'Shaughnessy, N.J. O'Shaughnessy, *The Undermining of Beliefs in the Autonomy and Rationality of Consumers*, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. xi.

[7] B. Russell, *Unpopular Essays*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1950, p. 69.

[8] S. Balan, *The Economic Man - Rational Agent and Cultural Human Being*, in L.C. Boşca, L.O. Vreja (Eds.), *Philosophy and Economics. Contemporary Themes and Realities*, Bucharest: ASE Publishing House, 2015, pp. 54-80.

[9] D. McRaney, *You Are Not So Smart*, New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2011, p. 11.

make irrational or erroneous decisions (as they too often seem, at least from "outside").

Individuals' decisions, both economic and non-economic, as well as their behaviours or interpersonal relations are funnelled not by pure rationality, but by biases related to a wide variety of factors, such as gender, race, nationality, economic or social condition, etc. The situational factors of an interaction (such as familiarity or design) also influence people's behaviours, as does the emotions, which in popular psychology are seen as entirely opposed to rationality. In fact, the "power of nonconscious, emotional factors is so well recognized" that, in the last decades, huge machineries in the political or economic field have been designed and employed by specialists in order to influence people's attitudes[10]. Uncontrolled emotions or judgment errors rooted in emotion are considered a source of irrational human behaviour, yet as studies suggest, the lack of or "reduction in emotion may constitute an equally important source of irrational behaviour"[11].

Types of Rationality

Although there is no consensus among specialists regarding the scope or content of rationality, several classifications or definitions have been issued over time. In the field of cognitive psychology (according to which people's actions are determined by mental processes such as beliefs and desires) two types of rationality[12] aim at bringing clarifications when discussing about human beings:

- *Instrumental rationality* (or practical rationality) - seen rather as "expected utility" - is a refinement of the old economists' view of rationality, meaning that human beings manifest their rationality when they optimize their goal fulfilment, behaving such as to acquire exactly what they want given the available resources (physical and mental);

- *Epistemic rationality* (theoretical rationality or evidential rationality in philosophical terms) - refers to the cognitions of an individual, concerning the relation between beliefs and reality or the structure of the world.

While different, these two types of rationality are related, given the fact that any goal achievement requires actions that are based on beliefs, which have to be adjusted to reality. In a sharper phrasing, "[e]pistemic rationality is about what is true, and instrumental rationality is about what to do. For our beliefs to be rational they must correspond to the way the world is - they must be true. For our actions to be rational, they must be the best means toward our goals - they must be the best things to do"[13].

Ronald de Sousa, expert in philosophy of mind and philosophy of emotions, makes the same distinction between the two types of rationality, although in

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[10] A. Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind. Constructing the Conscious Brain*, New York: Pantheon Books, 2010, p. 209.
[11] A. Damasio, *Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, New York: Avon Books, 1994, pp. 52-53.
[12] K.E. Stanovich, *Decision Making and Rationality in the Modern World*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 1-2.
[13] *Ibidem*, p. 2.

slightly different terms, indirectly suggesting that practical or instrumental rationality might be more important than the epistemic rationality, naming it "strategic"[14]:

- The *strategic rationality*, studied by decision and game theory experts, pertains to action and, implicitly, to desired ends and available means, being relative to the individual's choices and desires;

- The *epistemic rationality*, studied by logic and epistemology experts, concerns the beliefs, being relative to the individual's goal of attaining truth and avoiding untruth.

Two different types of rationality are also the subject study of psychologist Jonathan Evans and philosopher David Over in their book *Rationality and Reasoning*[15]. According to them, without pretending to offer an exhaustive classification, human rationality can be personal/subjective or impersonal/normative, each with a different approach:

- The *personal rationality* "asks what our individual goals are, and whether we are reasoning or acting in a way that is usually reliable for achieving these"[16];

- The *impersonal rationality* "asks whether we are following the principles of logic and other normative theories in our reasoning or decision making"[17].

Accordingly, individuals possess impersonal rationality if they have beliefs or do actions that are appropriate according to logic or a normative system. Nevertheless, individuals are also rational if their beliefs and actions will guide them to achieve their desired goals.

For a further clarification, Evans and Over introduce the terms "rationality$_1$" for personal rationality and "rationality$_2$" for impersonal rationality. Rationality$_1$ refers to "[t]hinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in a way that is generally reliable and efficient for achieving one's goals", while rationality$_2$ refers to "[t]hinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting when one has a reason for what one does sanctioned by a normative theory"[18].

It is rationality$_2$ that was philosophers' object of reference for many centuries, and this type of rationality is still considered the standard in relations to which people's mental processes or actions seem to be irrational. It was not until the last decades that rationality$_1$ became the concern of researchers in different fields of study (such as cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, behavioural economics, even evolutionary philosophy, etc.), with the aim of explaining people's beliefs, actions or behaviours. While impersonal normative systems (the foundation of the impersonal rationality) are effective in achieving ordinary goals and in bringing clarity in decision-making processes, they "make no reference to individual goals [and] are laid down by abstract thinkers who themselves have goals in mind. Thus logic as a formal system can be seen as a way of specifying inference forms that will preserve truth from arbitrary

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[14] R. de Sousa, *Why Think? Evolution and the Rational Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 121.

[15] J.St. B.T. Evans, D.E. Over, *Rationality and Reasoning*, Hove (UK): Psychology Press, 1996.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 7.

[17] *Ibidem*.

[18] *Ibidem*. p. 8.

assumptions. But the goals of ordinary people may be such that they have little use for inferences from a restricted set of premises thought of as, in effect, certainly true"[19]. Nevertheless, the personal rationality may be subject to "systematic errors" known as biases[20], which recur in specific circumstances and undermine people's decisions and actions.

Cognitive biases

The Wikipedia's list of cognitive biases includes no less 94 decision-making, belief, and behavioural biases (which affect people's belief formation, economic decisions or behaviour in general), 26 social biases (or attribution biases, involved in justifying people's actions) and 48 memory errors and biases (which influence/alter people's memory)[21]. This impressive number of cognitive biases is a clear indication if not of people's flaws of judgment, at least of researchers' interest in finding people's deviations from normative rationality.

Cognitive biases are defined as inferences or beliefs for which the evidence is insufficient or absent from a logical point of view[22] or as "predicable patterns of thought and behaviour" that determine individuals to "make poor choices, bad judgments, and wacky insights that are often totally incorrect"[23].

Cognitive biases can take many forms and are usually the result of three main factors, as shown in the table below.

Table 1 - Classification of Cognitive Biases		
Type of Bias	**Determining Factors**	**Examples**
Heuristics	- result from the design of the mind (evolutionary or information processing constraints); - some heuristics are learned, while others are innate.	- Stereotypes - Fundamental attribution error - One-reason decision strategies - The representativeness bias
Error management biases	- result from the fact that, for certain situations, natural selection favoured biases toward the less costly errors.	- Physically protective biases - Social biases in interpersonal perception - Self-judgment biases (positive illusions, illusion of control of events)
Artifacts	- result from an inconsistency between the task and the mental	- Evolutionarily invalid problem formats (probabilities versus frequencies);

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[19] *Ibidem*, p. 43.

[20] D. Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, p. 2.

[21] Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases.

[22] M.G. Haselton, D. Nettle, P.W. Andrews, "The Evolution of Cognitive Bias", pp. 724-746, in David M. Buss (Ed.), *The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology*, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005, p. 725.

[23] D. McRaney, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

	mechanism involved to solve it (the mind has to solve problems for which it was not designed or which are not familiar).	- Evolutionarily invalid problem content (abstract logic rules versus familiar problems)

Source: Adapted from M. G. Haselton, D. Nettle, P. W. Andrews, "The Evolution of Cognitive Bias", pp. 724-746, in David M. Buss (Ed.), *The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology*, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005, p. 726 and D. McRaney, *You Are Not So Smart*, New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2011, pp. 13-14.

Heuristics

Generally speaking, an heuristic is a method or technique based on experience and used for problem solving, which will lead to a satisfactory solution given the current situation, yet not necessarily an optimal one.

In psychology, an heuristic implies the use of mental shortcuts or rules of thumb for solving common problems that work well in most circumstances, yet they do not comply with objective normative systems and are "prone to breakdown in systematic ways"[24]. According to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, two most influential psychologists in the field of finding and explaining biases people are predisposed to, "judgment under uncertainty is often based on a limited number of simplifying heuristics rather than more formal and extensive algorithmic processing", and although such heuristics are usually fast, appropriate and accurate, they can lead to systematic error[25].

Such cognitive heuristics are either learned through experience or evolved (emerging without any prior rich experiences and being evolutionarily ancient[26]) and often they are "the best tool available for a particular inferential job"[27]. The occurrence of different cognitive shortcuts, leading to judgment bias, will be influenced by various factors, such as: lack of information or information processing constraints, given the fact that the human mind is limited in its computation capacity; "economic" consideration, as such heuristics would provide simple, rapid, automatic, unconscious solutions, with a low cost in terms of energy or time; lack of „responsibility perspective" and a higher motivation for accuracy, especially when the task at hand is not essential from an evolutionary point of view, etc.

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[24] M. G. Haselton *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 727.

[25] T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, D. Kahneman (Eds.), *Heuristics and Biases. The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. xv.

[26] L.R. Santos, V. Lakshminarayanan, "Innate Constraints on Judgment and Decision-Making? Insights from Children and Nonhuman Primates", pp. 293-310, in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, S. Stich (Eds.), *The Innate Mind: Volume 3: Foundations and the Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 295.

[27] P.M. Todd, A. Heuvelink, "Shaping Social Environments with Simple Recognition Heuristics", pp. 165-180, in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, S. Stich (Eds.), *The Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 166.

Error Management Biases

Certain types of biases arise when less costly errors are favoured over unbiased yet costly ones. Although on a short run such biases lead to an increase in error rates, on the long run the net costs of potential errors in solving adaptive problems are decreased, thus presenting a clear benefit in evolutionary terms.

The Error Management Theory (EMT) applies the principles of signal detection theory[28] to judgment processes, assuming that any cognitive mechanism employed by any living being in order to assess situations and take actions would be a trade-off between accuracy and speed (the faster the evaluation/the perception of the alarm signal/the detection of the stimulus, the less accurate the mechanism). The main idea of EMT is that any cognitive mechanism is predisposed to two types of error[29], each with the same logic, yet with a very different set of consequences:

- *false positive* or *type I errors* - refer to the situation where an inexistent stimulus is perceived or detected, thus leading to the adoption of a false belief;

- *false negative* or *type II errors* - refer to the situation where a real stimulus is not perceived or detected, thus leading to the failure of adopting a belief that is true.

Based on the evolution's main objectives (the survival and reproduction of an organism), "EMT predicts that an optimal decision rule will minimize not the crude rate of error, but the net effect of error on fitness"[30], as it is better, in evolutionary terms, to make low-cost though frequent errors rather than high-cost, yet infrequent ones, as shown in the table below.

Table 2 - The Error Management Theory			
		True state of nature	
		A stimulus does exist	**A stimulus does not exist**
Inference	Detecting the stimulus	Correct inference	***False positive (Type I) error*** – detecting the stimulus that does not exist Potential consequences: mental illness (paranoia, phobia, anxiety disorders)
	Not detecting the stimulus	***False negative (Type II) error*** – not detecting the stimulus that does exist	Correct inference

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[28] D.M. Green, J.A. Swets, *Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics*, Los Altos: Peninsula Publishing, 1998.

[29] M.G. Haselton *et al.*, *loc.cit.*, p. 730.

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 731.

		Potential consequences = loss of critical opportunities, even potential death	

Artifacts

An artifact is an undesired alteration of analysed data resulted from the use of an unsuitable technique and/or technology. In the case of this kind of error, the human cognitive mechanism (the mind) fails to solve certain problems because it is inappropriately designed for this task.

A first category of artifacts relates to problems whose format is unfamiliar. For instance, laypersons and experts alike seem to fall short on logic when a problem to be solved is presented in terms of probabilities, although the same problem will be easily solved when framed in terms of frequencies. The main assumption for explaining these judgment errors is that human beings are familiar to frequencies, experienced during the evolutionary time as series of events, and not with probabilities or percentages[31], which are a rather new "invention" in their evolution.

A second category of artifacts relates to problems whose content is "evolutionarily invalid" (such as the famous "Wason selection problem"), requiring the use of abstract logic rules. The main idea in explaining such errors is that the human mind was evolutionarily designed to deal with adaptive problems, and not with abstract ones. Human beings would effortlessly and successfully use their evolved information-processing and problem-solving mechanisms for problems that are recurrent over evolutionary history, yet they would be unable (without education and practice) to use the same mechanisms when the application of normative standards is involved[32].

All the three kinds of systematic errors show that human rationality is not perfect but, at best, biased. As numerous experiments and studies illustrate, the "biased rationality" has its source in the evolved design of the mind (the "machinery of cognition") rather than in other internal or external factors that could "corrupt" the thinking process (such as emotions or lack of education)[33]. Nevertheless, this biased rationality is not synonymous to either arationality or irrationality.

Biased Rationality

Given all the systematic errors the human mind is prone to, it could be asserted that individuals are equipped with a biased rationality, which does not mean or imply that they are unwise or injudicious. On the contrary, human beings habitually solve complex tasks with an efficiency and performance yet

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[31] G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, "How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats", *Psychological Review*, 1995, Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 684-704, p. 686.

[32] M.G. Haselton *et al.*, *loc.cit.*, p. 741.

[33] D. Kahneman, *cited works*, p. 10.

unequalled by any artificial system. In accordance with the core ideas of evolutionary psychology, the rationality is biased for a reason. The human mind evolved during evolutionary time to solve vital, recurrent adaptive problems, and not abstract or unfamiliar ones (such as the problems involving the principles of formal logic or some problems encountered in today's modern conditions), making use of a rationality that would favour the adaption of an individual to the environment. The apparent irrationality of humans is, therefore, rather a mismatch between the design of the mind, evolved during the ancestral environment, and the novel, intricate, constantly changing conditions of the current environment.

In evolutionary terms, any cognitive mechanism would prove rationality if, in a problem solving task, would identify the best method to achieve a specific goal, with the available resources, in a given, specific context. Hence, a content independent method (as are the rules of formal logic) for solving any kind of problems is unconceivable, as "[w]hat matters in the eyes of selection is not truth, validity, or logical consistency, but simply what works in the currency of reproductive success"[34].

Assuming that the human cognitive mechanisms evolved to solve adaptive problems pertaining to survival and reproduction, the biased rationality is rather a design quality than a design fault. In terms of evolutionary psychologists Lance Workman and Will Reader, "[t]he visual system did not evolve to show us how the world actually is; it evolved to provide us with a useful representation that supports action. Likewise, memory is not designed to represent a veridical representation of the past but rather stores information that supports us in our day-to-day lives. And the processes of reasoning and decision making were not designed to enable us to answer text-book questions, they were designed to make rapid decisions that allowed us to flee from predators, attract a mate or detect cheaters"[35].

This biased rationality helps human beings make rapid, effortless, automatic, usually correct and beneficial decisions in essential situations, when they are confronted with a series of constraints, both internal (lack of information and limited computation capacity, finite material or non-material resources such as time or energy, deficient cognitive capacities such as attention or memory) and external (uncertainty, unpredictability and complexity of the world)[36].

Evaluated with the principles and rules of the normative systems, people's judgements are too often deviating from the standards of logic. At the same time, though, they might be good enough for survival and reproduction.

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[34] D.M. Buss, *Evolutionary Psychology. The New Science of the Mind*, Third Edition, Boston: Pearson, 2008, p. 390.

[35] L. Workman, W. Reader, *Evolutionary Psychology. An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 246.

[36] P.M. Todd, G. Gigerenzer, „Mechanisms of ecological rationality: heuristics and environments that make us smart", pp. 197-210, in R.I.M. Dunbar, L. Barrett (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 197-199.

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A SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (II)

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Abstract: This paper focuses on the analyses of the concept/expression of Louis Wirth's urbanism as a way of life. Wirth characterizes modern city through three essential dimensions: number, density and heterogeneity. But Wirth is criticized because he tends to understand the city from a uniform perspective, or there are many ways to live in a city. The process of urbanization is a key dimension of the socio-philosophical perspective on the human communities. Another relatively recent socio-philosophical approach of the urban refers to the emergence of the so-called post-modern city. Its essential feature is decentralization and it is predominantly oriented to consumption, but also to highlighting of a cultural identity.

Keywords: Urbanism as a way of life, urban family, centralized city, decentralized city, global city, post - modern city.

I. Urbanism as a way of life

The American sociologist Louis Wirth, one of the most important members of the Chicago School of Sociology, in his work *Urbanism as a way of life* published in 1938, offered a definition of urbanism, which have become classic. In a social sense, a city can be defined as a permanent settlement of large size, with a high population density, which is made up of heterogeneous persons from a social point of view[1]. Wirth characterizes modern city, specifically of the twentieth century, through three essential dimensions:
- A very large number of people.
- A very high population density.
- Heterogeneity of the population, manifested through social diversity.

This tripartite model proposed by Wirth – great size, high density, and heterogeneity – has a large number of consequences. Within the city, kinship, which was dominant in rural area, has a more diminished weight, the traditional neighbourhood relations are removed and the social solidarity that exists in rural communities has gradually disappears. A major consequence of great size – sometimes excessive – and of urban population density is the appearance of the division and specialization of labour, specifically of urban phenomena. The people fulfil completely different roles, which leads to the emergence of a new

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[1] Apud. Harrison, B.C., *Power and Society: An Introduction to the Social Sciences* (12th ed.). Wadsworth, Cebgage Learning, 2011.

type of relations, of impersonal character. The cooperation is replaced by competition.

The primary social relations are being replaced by secondary, which have in the same time a fragmented nature. The notion of primary group refers to those groups of family or based on friendship, where relations between members are immediate, such as face-to-face type. In the other acceptation, the secondary group has in view wide associations of people, in which relationships are impersonal, distant/reserved/cold, as in organizations/institutions.

The people inside the city are not known on each other as was the case of the rural areas, where the individual is perceived by the others as a whole, and he performs a multitude of social and economic functions, being accessible to the others in a variety of ways. Thus, in rural areas, an individual is presented to the others both as a practitioner of agricultural activities, and also as a member of a family, as a neighbour etc., generally as a person who is linked to the others through profound personal experiences of life. On the contrary, within the urban population this bond is broken, an individual is perceived by others exclusively through a unique personality characteristic, which most often is directly related with the type of job performed by it.

On the other hand, the typical urban family[2] differs essentially from the rural family. It can be noticed a trend of atomization in urban universe. The urban lifestyle has resulted in decreasing the number of the family members; peoples get married at an age much higher than in the villages, and the number of single persons is steadily growing,. The phenomenon of isolation is infinitely more pronounced in urban areas than in the rural. The urban society is characterized therefore by a low level of social integration, the urban residents being directly involved only in their current activities and occupations – both public and private. Due to this limited involvement and integration, we can say that urban life is unstable, and the social order can collapse in crisis situations. It is a recurrent phenomenon in urban areas that individuals exhibit suicide inclinations, or to feel gripped by psychological depression or to become victims of political manipulations.

And yet, despite these difficulties and changes that sets in motion, Wirth did not hesitate to consider the city as "a centre of freedom and tolerance", which is the basis of the progress, of scientific discoveries, of science and rationality; in conclusion, "the metropolitan civilization is no doubt the best form of civilization that human beings have ever conceived"[3].

Synthesising, we can affirm that for Louis Wirth the fundamental differences between the two types of human life – rural and urban – are[4]:

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[2] Anastasiu, I., *The Social Functions Of The Family,* in Euromentor Journal Studies About Education, Volume III, No. 2/June 2012.

[3] Wirth, L., *Community life and social policy*. Selected Papers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956.

[4] Adapted from Fulcher, J., & Scott, J., *Sociology* (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press, U.K., 2007.

Rural	Urban
Primary Group	Secondary Association
Integral Personality	Segmental Relationships
Personal Relationships	Impersonal Relationships
Social Integration	Weak Integration: Isolation and Disorder
Unspecialized Activities	The Division of Labour

II. Herbert J. Gans and the five ways of urban life

The analysis of urban environment undertaken by Louis Wirth has been criticized by another American sociologist Herbert J. Gans, who claims that Wirth has focused exclusively on the interior of the city as a social entity, ignoring however the urban population which in its majority lives in relatively stable communities, being protected from the noxious aspects of urban way of life. On the other hand, Wirth is criticized because he tends to understand the city from a uniform perspective, or there are many ways to live in a city.

The city integrates its people in various forms, which implies – argues Gans – that there are five essential ways of urban life:

1. Cosmopolites – this category includes plastic artists, writers, musicians, students etc, in other words, it refers to the intellectual, artistic or educational kind of urban life. Educational establishments or artistic institutions are regarded, in this sense, as the genuine centre of the city, all the others having secondary importance.

These persons are integrated very well in their subculture, and they are not particularly wishing to be assimilated in dominant culture. The relationships established between members of these urban groups does not fall under the impersonal field, but are based on partnership, on creating and joining to this specific subculture. Many of those who belong to these groups are not married nor have children.

Those less wealthy of them can move to the suburbs to raise their children, but continue to live the same cosmopolitan life. As I said, the wishes of those who share this way of life is not heading in any form towards integrating into society at large, to which show an obvious detachment, but, on the contrary, what they intend is a semi-isolation and focusing attention on the universe represented by the cultural world.

2. The unmarried and childless people are predisposed to live relatively mobile. They generally live in crowded areas of the city, areas with high density and do not seen to be interested in what offer to them their strict neighbourhood. Their social bonds with their environment are relatively small, they does not seek to globally integrate, nor suffering from isolation. Those who wish to start a family live in downtown areas a specified period, after which they settle in the suburbs, especially in the moment of the appearance of the child/children.

3. Ethnic villagers give utmost importance/significance to kinship relations, or family and community traditions to which they belong. They continue to preserve a way of life located outside of the strict control of the society. While the first two categories of individuals have voluntary chose their way of life, on basis

for the emergence of those groups stand external necessities, the most frequent causes being the poverty or the imperatives imposed by tradition.

4. The deprived – this concept envisages the physically or psychologically disabled people, those with emotional disorders, the poor, those who come from broken families – psycho sociological studies have shown that children who come from broken families manifest a predisposition to mental disorders – , peoples that have experienced racial discrimination etc. In this case, due to external conditions in which they live and which oblige them to dwell in the cheapest and most modest homes, there is a strong feeling of isolation.

5. The trapped – this expression has in view the elderly people or those whose pension/income are very low; these people have lost their social relations with the environment in which they lived before. The neighbourhood in which they lived a good part of their lives has undergone major changes, being invaded by immigrants or foreigners, and all persons known by them have moved to other areas or died. In their turn, people in this category suffer from the feeling of isolation.

Summarizing, only the last two categories of people are characterized by the feeling of isolation and not the entire urban population. There is no single urban way of life, but a real urban diversity. The differences between the rural and the urban way of life are not essential, despite Tönnies's and Wirth's analyses; the place is not important, but rather membership in a certain social class as well as quality of life of various individuals and groups. Communities and cities are not separated by an immeasurable abyss that cannot be overcome, but some specific community ways of life are preserved relatively unaltered in urban life.

Another major criticism brought against Wirth's work is that his analysis of urbanism is limited to the American cities, whose observation he extends it to the whole world. It is a hasty/excessive/abusive generalization, and although the urban life is undeniably characterized by anonymity and impersonally, yet it cannot be reduced to these. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that the urban world is composed of superficiality, loneliness, and a high degree of uncertainty. And yet, one of the essential characteristics of the city is the diversity, the assurance of internal and external freedom that cannot be ignored or denied, as well as the spirit of tolerance and conciliatory. The possibility of choosing is another defining feature of the city, its inhabitants having permanently numerous alternatives available.

III. Urbanization, de–urbanization, global and post-modern city

The process of urbanization, a wider phenomenon, intimately connected with the history of humanity, is a key dimension of the socio-philosophical perspective on the human communities. It involves two fundamental meanings; on the one hand, it refers to the appearance and development of cities in general, especially on the upside of their size during the time, an obviously fact since antiquity.

On the other hand, this process has a permanent open character, involving major changes at the population level, which relates more specifically to the tendency of people to migrate from rural to urban. And this tendency of

relocation is happening in a natural way, without being imposed by someone. An essential reason for which the urbanism is an integral part of the global world is that it can generate increasing of economic opportunities, of person's mobility, of educational opportunities etc. and development in general[5].

At the level of big cities there are two main trends: first, the centralized city, defined in socio-philosophical literature as an urban entity with a centralized structure, which involves central organization of public administration and of the main services. This kind of city presupposes the existence of a unique centre of management/administrative/decision making around which gravitate everything. The idea of planning plays a very important role in this type of city. It is based on the existence of differences/specializations between the various areas of the city. The suburbs are integral part of this kind of city, being directly related to the centre through the centralized network of transport; thus are preserved the differentiations between the various places within the city.

The decentralized city doesn't presume the existence of a centre forever fixed, but on the contrary it is based on several centres and dissimilar activities disparate in all areas of the city. The specialization of every part of the city is much less obvious than in other urban type, but we can't assert that is definitely missing. We cannot talk about strictly differentiated areas; there is no single industrial area, a unique shopping centre, but of lesser and multiple industrial areas, as well as many places for business, trade and leisure. Apparently paradoxical, the focus here is on the suburbs and this because of good reasons; these areas are conducive to the emergence of new stores/outlets, to construction of schools and hospitals, to the organization of leisure activities places. Also, the phrase "edge city", highly dependent on decentralized cities, highlights the fact that here are working many of the city people, and with the growth of suburbs, the city has transformed into an urban network which connects the various centres of the city. The most suitable example in order to illustrate decentralized city is without doubt Los Angeles, which fits very precisely in this description.

The massive trend of urbanization has seen however a major setback in the second half of the twentieth century. The population of major cities, especially in the United States and Western Europe, showed an important tendency to move from them to smaller towns, less crowded, and even to rural areas. This phenomenon, opposite to urbanization, is called de-urbanization, and some authors called it counter-urbanization, precisely in order to emphasize the rejection reaction that some people manifest in relation to the process of accelerated urbanization. Hence, de-urbanization produces a decline, both at the level of urban labour force, as well as in terms of people's desire or need to live in urban areas.

Another phenomenon specific to the end of the twentieth century and to the beginning of the twenty-first century is global city. The Sociologist Saskia Sassen in his work[6] – *The global city: New York, London, Tokyo* – introduces this new

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[5] Harrison, B.C., *Power and Society: An Introduction to the Social Sciences* (12th ed.). Wadsworth, Cebgage Learning, 2011.

[6] Sassen, S., *The global city: New York, London, Tokyo.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A., 2001.

concept that refers to a new type of city, which is linked by an infinite network of the whole human universe, the social and economic decisions/strategies which are adopted here having a direct impact on the global problems. The global city is a consequence of the disappearance of classical industrial societies, which led to the dispersal of economic production/activities to all over the world, and to the emergence of the need to coordinate and control this phenomenon by a small number of – global – cities. These cities are regarded as cities of command and that is because within them the main companies/multinational corporations and the large financial institutions have established their headquarters. It should be also observed that the global economic processes which characterize the global city can be essentially differentiated by those of the specific country or region where the city is situated. For example, the author notes, there have been times in recent history when the industrial cities in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan have been in decline, but global cities from these countries were having a period of economic and social prosperity.

The global city is therefore a centre of leadership; he is closely linked to financial institutions which operate within of it the main management activities. Herein are located the most important companies in the sector of insurance, legal, communications, marketing, public relations etc. In addition, the global city is a centre for innovation, where new technologies are tested and implemented, which aimed the developing and improving the services provided to the inhabitants of these cities. There are also some negative aspects; the benefits of globalization do not serve all people equally; there is a huge discrepancy between how managers are being paid – with very high wages – and how are paid the other social categories, who have modest or low wages. On the other hand, globalization led to the elimination of certain traditional occupations. Finally, the global city is oriented exclusively towards globalization and shows a real lack of sensitivity in relation to the poverty existing in the various regions of the world.

Another relatively recent socio-philosophical approach of the urban refers to the emergence of the so-called post-modern city. Its essential feature is decentralization; the production activity has moved to the periphery of the city where on the former lands that were destined for agriculture, arose, within a very short time, factories or offices of various economic/commercial companies. The central areas of the city are devoted to the entertainment sector, people spending their leisure time through participation in cultural/social/sport etc. activities. This city is predominantly oriented to consumption, but also to highlighting of a cultural identity.

The post-modern city has produced a significant upheaval by moving from production to consumption, that is to say it transfer the emphasis on shopping centres, which became defining for the city. Increasingly more, the focus is on diversity, and the product image or brand is a decisive factor in consumer preferences. The style of post-modern architecture is strongly opposed to classical or modern aesthetics, which consists in realizing structure with universal character, between two buildings there were a very high degree of similarity. The architectural modernism was searching before anything the

efficiency/effectiveness; post-modernism is oriented in a different direction by proposing a combination style, dominated by the construction of façades which sometimes have nothing in common with the buildings to which they are attached; not infrequently it can be seen the absence of a personal style, which is replaced by a seemingly random mixture of styles, some of which being borrowed from the past. In other words, the originality is not to create a new style, but an art of combining elements that seem to have no connections between them.

The table below[7] synthesizes the main differences between modern and post-modern city

The modern city	The post-modern city
- Centralized	- Decentralized
- Production	- Consumption
- Industrial economy	- Symbolic economy
- Objective reality	- Virtual reality
- Faceless architecture	- Façades
- Collective consumption	- Private consumption
- Public life	- Private life
- Integration	- Fragmentation

A dominant feature of post-modern city is the very high degree of standardization; the trend is that the big chains of stores or fast-food restaurants to sell the same products in every city; in this regard, some analysts have argued that we can speak of a phenomenon of cloning of urban centres, so that each of them eventually loses its specificity. Therefore, the historical/geographical/cultural/social characteristics of the cities become secondary to the increasing standardization of urban spaces.

The more pronounced fragmentation of social life that takes place in contemporary cities push stronger to isolation and induces to the people the feeling of social abandon. In addition, ethnic diversity is growing and also the social inequalities are more prominent. The public life restrict its scope and scale and tends to be reduce to the entertainment activities; people go together to music concerts, or sport competitions etc. and these are the only times in which still manifest a sense of communion, music or sport being one of the few areas of interests that manages to gather together the people and emphasize the principal function of human being, namely the social function.

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THE IMPACT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY ON EASTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLES

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Abstract: The North Atlantic Alliance was the solution that western states found to the problem of communist expansion in Europe. During the Cold War, one of the Alliance's tasks was to evaluate the military capabilities and the political intentions of the nations that were part of the Warsaw Treaty. Today, although the situation has altered and the Warsaw Treaty does not exist in effect any more, Russia continues to represent a threat that could affect eastern-western relations. For over a year, the conflict in Ukraine has made it necessary for the Alliance to protect its eastern border. Russia's pressure and Ukraine's destabilization increase the importance of the area. Though many consider that the Cold War is a past issue, the Alliance must look for solutions to secure Europe.

Keywords: the North Atlantic Alliance, secure, the eastern border, Russia, Ukraine.

It is sometimes difficult for a new generation to understand the state of mind of the previous one. The world evolves, political issues change shape. Obviously, the reactions to the unknown problems cannot be the same as to ones that have been proven.

In 1941 it was globally hoped that the alliance with the USSR, which made possible the victory in the Second World War could be maintained and that the United Nations, in turn, could handle peacekeeping. This well-founded theoretical point soon proved far from reality. The USSR's refusal to participate in Europe's economic recovery proposed by general Marshall in 1947 and the *coup d'état* in Prague in 1948 destroyed any remaining illusions. In 1949, the great Western leaders, regardless of political convictions, understood that they had to join forces in order to prevent communism from spreading in Europe. This was the belief that led to the birth of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The main goal of the authors of the Atlantic Treaty was attained. Communism did not progress further in Europe after 1959. No member country of the Atlantic Alliance suffered the fate of those that between 1945 and 1948 fell under the communist influence despite the will of the majority of their people.

Ever since the beginning of the Alliance, global evolution has called for adaptations in its mechanisms and activities. Adapting the Alliance and its role

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in the evolution of various situations is a permanent process, and the current events are a new stage.[1]

Since 1949, NATO has had to continuously adapt to the transformations that have taken place and to find solutions to unprecedented problems. The organization itself was an answer to a situation that threatened to become critical considering that, as a result of the agreements between the allies at Yalta, Stalin could impose his political regime in the states which that Red Army entered. Austria and Greece were saved, Europe on the whole no. Classic war was replaced by the Cold War. Europe was divided into areas in accordance with the interests of the two political and military entities: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

East and West turned into theaters of operations: "NATO demarcated a theater of military operations in south-eastern Europe, on its southern flank, made up of the territories pertaining to Italy and the Balkan Peninsula, central and eastern Mediterranean and Asian Turkey. The Warsaw Treaty defined its theater of military operations to the south west, which included south-eastern Europe and was made up of all of communist Moscow's satellite states in Eastern Europe."[2]

From 1949 till the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty states paid close attention to the events that took place in the communist area, changes which were generally dictates by USSR's foreign policy. NATO evaluations involved evaluations of the military capabilities and political intentions of the Warsaw Treaty nations and attempts to assess the possibility of changes in threats occurring in the future, in light of Soviet political objectives concerning NATO and the implications of such changes for NATO's defense policy.[3]

The members of the Alliance wanted to prevent the spread of communism and to maintain peace. As a solution, Buhling, for example, suggests maintaining the military power and cohesion in the years to come also showing that this military stance could lead to the achievement of the Alliance's political objectives especially finding a peaceful solution in Europe and a lasting easing of the tensions in the relations between east and west. He also considers that, "establishing peaceful relations cannot be based on fear; an objective of our military power should be to create the state of confidence in which an agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies becomes possible. This is valid especially with respect to an arrangement in Europe which should be guaranteed by the combined military power of NATO allies."[4]

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[1] NATO Archives, *Document issued by Brosio Manilo, NATO Secretary General to the permanent representatives,* Brussels, Belgium, 18th October 1967, in http://archives.nato.int/, accessed on 14th August 2014.

[2] Grosaru Florian-Eduard, *South-East Europe. The Regional European Security Complex in which Frozen Conflicts Perpetuate*, Military Technical and Editorial Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, p. 47.

[3] NATO Archives, *Document issued by James N. May*, Deputy Secretary of the US delegation to the North-Atlantic Council, Paris, France, 15th May 1967, in http://archives.nato.int/, accessed on 14th August 2014.

[4] NATO Archives, *W. Buhling's proposals regarding the Narth-Atlantic Alliance's mission,* 12th May 1967, USA, in http://archives.nato.int/, accessed on 24th August 2014.

During the Cold War, western states could do almost nothing for east-European peoples. USSR would not allow interference in its domestic issues because, as events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia proved, this was dangerous.

In 1989, a radical change in the political regime took place, by shifting from communism to democracy. Strong internal struggles have made the 90s unsettled, dominated by armed conflicts (Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova), by diplomatic misunderstandings regarding the consolidation of democracy (Albania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania). "A true mosaic of weak, corrupt, almost collapsed states, with various identities, asperities and unequal development paces situated in the middle of a triangle that is more and more crystallized around the Russian, European and Islamic civilizations."[5]

The common denominator for former communist states was the desire to join NATO and the EU opting for the western development pattern to the detriment of the oriental, Russian one. Most of these states became NATO and EU members, while a part of them, such as the Republic of Moldova or Ukraine are aspiring to this status. The wishes of eastern European peoples is in contradiction with Moscow's wishes, as it is concerned with EU and NATO expansion.

NATO expansion is rightly viewed as a diminishing of Russia's influence, since, not even at present, it has been fully understood that it is the option of peoples who have experience with the communist regime. President Yeltsin, in December 1994, showed that the problem of the expansion creates the risk of Europe "sinking into a cold peace."[6]

In this period, the threats no longer had the desired effect but this did not mean that Eastern Europe was at peace, because this is a contact zone between areas with different geopolitical, cultural, religious and economic characteristics, which have made the geopolitical reality in South-Eastern Europe become a more and more sensitive topic. International and regional strategic actors have tried to solve the problem according to their own interests which, more often than not, were divergent, reason for which the area was turned into the scene of geopolitical disputes fueled especially by the Russian Federation, the USA and the EU.

NATO's and EU's expansion indicates an increase in the strategic value of Eastern Europe. The focalization of the Russian Federation's, US's, NATO's and EU's geopolitical interest in the area has led to an increase in security threats against some states such as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. [7]

As it has already been noticed, the threats have come from Russia, whose greatest concern is the North-Atlantic Alliance, not the EU. Collaboration with the EU seems easier for Russia because the EU has emphasized its civilian nature and has pleaded for peace and prosperity in global politics, neglecting its own power policy and appearing to be military vulnerable. The EU's low interest is

[5] Grosaru Florian-Eduard, *cited works.*, p. 53.
[6] „Rossiiskaya Gazeta", CDPSP, vol. XL.VI, no. 49, 7th December 1994, p. 8.
[7] Grosaru Florian-Eduard*, cited works.*, pp. 52-58.

explainable, however, by the fact that Europe's security is ensured by the USA and NATO.

The relation with NATO has fluctuated. In 1991, Russia was considering tightening the collaboration. In a letter to the Allies, dated 21st December 1991, Yeltsin surprisingly stated that, "Today we wonder whether Russia joining NATO could be a political long-term goal." However, in 1994, Russia's policy towards NATO became more prudent once NATO started promoting the Partnership for Peace - PfP.[8]

The difference was made by the fact that in 1991, Russia's cooperation was considered by Moscow a concession made to NATO and, as a result, it expected a corresponding reward from the Alliance for this behavior, while in 1994 the Russians started to believe that "the Partnership only provided diplomatic coverage for a process of expansion from which Russia was excluded".[9]

When former communist countries joined NATO and the EU and these organizations' borders came closer and closer to Russia, Moscow's uneasiness grew and Ukraine's propensity for the western world determined the outbreak of an open conflict between Russia, the North Atlantic Organization and the EU.

Ukraine declared its independence in 1991 to the dissatisfaction of many Russian politicians as well as of ordinary citizens who consider the Ukrainian state politically and economically belongs to Russia's orbit. Kiev refused to accept this status as the Euro-Atlantic view is of a strong, independent Ukrainian state as an integral part of a united, free and peaceful Europe.[10]

Governmental decisions were hard to make because "the conflicts between political Ukrainian forces resulted in an incoherent foreign policy, seen as being less important than the internal political competition."[11] The hesitations of the political actors were not unfounded: signing the Association treaty with the EU in 2012 set into motion Russian hostilities. In 2013-2014, despite American and EU interventions, domestic instability increased. Putin did not heed western warnings and annexed Crimea.

The Republic of Moldova is itself threatened by Russia but the pressure does not seem to be as strong at present. It benefits from the support of the European community and NATO in general and of Romania in particular.

26 years after the demise of communism, eastern states that were forced to adopt this system after 1945 are trying to help Ukraine rid itself of pro-Russian forces. The advantage they have is the "NATO umbrella" and the EU.

The North Atlantic Alliance has always manifested an interest in re-establishing peace in Ukraine. In the Munich Security Conference on 6-8 February 2015, NATO representatives, the general secretary Jens Stoltenberg and the German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen emphasized the danger

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[8] Simion Oana, *Ex-Soviet Space Geopolitics, between Russian Hegemony and Euro-Atlantic Structures,* Political Science Institute and International Relations Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, pp. 169-170.

[9] C.C Menges, *Russia and NATO*, George Washington University, February 1997, www.tinyuri.com

[10] Simion Oana, *op.cit.*, p. 225.

[11] S. Woehrel, *Ukraine: Current Issues and US Policy*, Congressional Research Service, 2012, p. 6, apud Simion Oana, *op.cit.,* p 230.

posed by "Crimea's annexation by Russia and by the military conflict in eastern Ukraine which has generated the greatest political security crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The USA has been requesting for some time harsher sanctions against Russia and is even discussing sending weapons to Ukraine. Germany, however, opposes this and insists on continuing diplomatic efforts."[12]

Analyzing NATO's role in the contemporary world, Jens Stoltenberg reminded us that when NATO was founded it was a firm guardian of international order, and, if at present, this mission is contested everything must be done to defend it. To this end, three fundamental aspects must be taken into account: maintaining a strong NATO; building stability relations with neighbors; reconfiguring relations with Russia.

As an immediate measure, an increase in NATO's Rapid Response Force has been decided, at the ministers' of defense reunion. It will reach 30,000 soldiers, with a ground brigade of about 5,000 troops, with air, naval and special forces support ready to deploy in less than 48 hours. Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom will jointly act with the USA. Moreover, command and control units will be immediately instituted in six allied eastern countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. These units make it easier to deploy NATO Rapid Response Forces. They will support the collective defense project [13]

On the other hand, the EU has become greatly involved in this issue to the surprise of some analysts who started from the premise that "the EU has often shown a low degree of cohesion and solidarity among its members with respect to foreign and security policy, an example being the divergences among member states during the American-British military intervention in Iraq."[14]

The escalation of the situation in eastern Ukraine has called for a diplomatic mission. The role of mediators between Kiev and Moscow has been undertaken by Germany and France, represented by chancellor Merkel and president Hollande. The two leaders have had a tough mission, finalized at present with an agreement signed at Minsk, according to which, starting with February 2015, a ceasefire will be enforced.

It is hard to believe that Putin will quietly stand by and witness the expansion of EU and NATO borders. These last few days, Russian officials have threatened the states that get involved in supporting Ukraine, including Romania. Within NATO and the EU as well, the view on the possible means to solve the conflict is not unitary, as the USA wishes to send military equipment and weapons in Ukraine, and many western states do not agree. However, a positive trend can be noticed with respect to the rights of the peoples in Eastern

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[12] Dani Rockhoff, *The Security Conference in Munich and the Challanges of a World like "a Madhouse"*, in „HotNews.ro", Friday, 6th February 2015, 15:51 Actuality
http://www.hotnews.ro/news-international-19305319-conferinta-securitate-munchen-provocarile-unei-lumi-casa-nebuni.htm, accessed on 14th February 2015.
[13] *Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference*, 6th February 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117320.htm.
[14] Cioculescu Şerban Filip, *Terra incognita? Landmarks for Mapping the Chaos in Contemporany Relations,* Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 59.

Europe, because, as they are supported by NATO they manage to oppose the power policy of the USSR even if only partially.

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ANTICOMMUNISM, DISSIDENCE AND RESISTANCE IN FOUR POPULAR DEMOCRACIES: ROMANIA, POLAND, HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA[1]

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Abstract: The anticommunist opposition did not manifest in a legal environment because, after seizing power, the Stalinist regimes dismantled any form of contestation and any critical group. Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin's policy, as appearing in the above mentioned secret report, triggered an extensive debate both inside the parties and overall in societies, but especially among the intellectuals. Once the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe is signed in Helsinki in 1975, the criticism towards the communist policy gets a new form. The forms of opposition, dissidence and resistance differed not only from one state to another but also within the very societies in which they appeared. Their evolution during the last communist decades and their categorisation represented a specific debate for the post communist societies of the four states we analysed.

Keywords: anticommunism, dissidence, resistance, resistance through culture, opposition.

By the end of the Second World War the establishment of communism across a large part of Europe gave birth to a series of various forms of contesting movements of the new power emerged from the Soviet Union. The anticommunist resistance, armed but only partially organised, had been specific to a number of countries, but meeting its largest number of adherents in the mountain region of Romania, where it gathered groups consisting of monarchists, former legionary members, persons opposing the collectivisation of agriculture or people who joined out of various reasons. Any form of contesting the new political power had been annihilated by use of tough repression. Thus, only after the death of Stalin, that is, after 1953 and especially after 1956, we can talk about a new type of anticommunist manifestation. On one side, the death of Stalin, the father of the absolute dictatorship, seemed to bring an end to his political regime too. On the other hand, the new political course of his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, as it had been declared in the *Secret Report* presented during the 20th Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in February 1956, determined in most of Soviet Union's satellite states a certain liberalisation and the change of the old Stalinist government.

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The anticommunist opposition did not manifest in a legal environment because, after seizing power, the Stalinist regimes dismantled any form of contestation and any critical group. Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin's policy, as appearing in the above mentioned secret report, triggered an extensive debate both inside the parties and overall in societies, but especially among the intellectuals. Thus, two segments emerged inside the communist parties, disputing power and legitimacy: the conservatives, adepts of Stalinism and supporters of the respective regimes since the moment of their establishment, and the revisionists, who pleaded for opening, for the modification of the party's policy and for a new analysis of the past mistakes. The new type of anticommunist movement is built around this second segment of the communist parties. This ample debate was more obvious first in Poland and Hungary and subsequently in Czechoslovakia. In Bucharest, the debate is nearly non-existent and any attempt to align to Khrushchev's ideas is quickly terminated by Gheorghiu-Dej, who interpreted it as a direct threat to his leadership. The revisionism was "the critique of the Stalinist system practiced by its heirs", because it "rejected the totalitarian doctrine and practice, appealing to Marxist language and to the communist system of values", while allowing the existence, inside the party, of a "germ of the reformative movement", "the germ of the democratic opposition"[2]. This internal conflict will become characteristic for most of the communist parties, and it will meet moments of sharpening, so being the case of 1968 Czechoslovakia, continuing after 1985, when the old revisionists and the new reformers received a direct support from Moscow. The anti-Stalinist revisionism was more obvious in Poland and Hungary, but due to the existing connections between the countries placed under the USSR tutelage, it echoed in the rest of these countries, emphasising the profound differences between the Stalinist systems and the false unanimity among the above mentioned countries. Initially, the social support of these revisionist groups changed from work groups into protests. There had been two reasons for this change: first, the population was encouraged to criticise different aspects of the policy of the communist party; second, a part of more or less important party members publicly assumed a position expressing their own disappointment in front of the differences between the ideals of the communist movements and the Stalinist practices exposed in 1956.

In Poland, in 1956, the critical discourse towards the regime and revisionism was advanced, Khrushchev's discourse from February of the same year aggravating the state of facts and accelerating the dissolution of the regime. The Poznan protests in June 1956 had been bloodily repressed by the Soviet troops as a declaration of Moscow's undiminished power. However, the Poznan example did not work, as proven by the following uprisings in Hungary. The situation inside the party did not change, although the protests had been repressed. De-Stalinisation lead "eventually to brutal repression, but the havoc it caused inside the block was so important that the Soviet system could never be the same as

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[2] Adam Michnik, *Confessions of a Converted Dissident*, Polirom, Iași, 2009, pp. 52-60.

before"[3]. The de-Stalinisation dictated from Moscow by Khrushchev and Malenkov shook the Stalinist regimes from the satellite countries; these regimes will attempt to obey the party directives while remaining in power, which shall eventually prove to be almost impossible for those countries where more and more popular uprisings appeared[4].

Each reference to their own Stalinist past and the perspective on future is given by the way in which the popular mentality had been shaped by the repression but also by the general communist practices and the composition of the party. In this respect, for the Polish people, the debate is sustained by the intelligentsia supported by students and others, thus emerging currents that support the revisionist movements and also uprisings without an obvious anticommunist aspect. In 1956, the differences between the Polish and the Hungarian cases appear from the violent repression and the lower, respectively higher interference of Moscow in the development of the events, while the Czechoslovakian and Romanian cases resemble through the conservatism and the protection instituted by party leaders against de-Stalinisation and any potential transformation. The rehabilitation of former party members imprisoned or even murdered following Stalinist directives is specific to Poland and Hungary, who bring back to power Wladislaw Gomulka and, respectively, Imre Nagy, credited by Marxist intelligentsia who had reconsidered the regime and pleaded for its reformation.

In October 1956 Imre Nagy was readmitted in the party, without holding any office. But, at the end of the same month, the revolution gained momentum, asking for Gerö's resignation and Nagy's appointment as prime-minister; the moment when the party leader orders to open fire against the protesters is politically fatal for him. The autumn of 1956 brings a change, as under the pressure of several population segments actively involved in the uprising and with Nagy's help in supporting the reformation requests, Hungary becomes a country with democratic accents, with a growing independence towards Moscow and with opinions more and more radically opposed to those of the party. Nagy's government was "a more democratic one-party socialism"[5], which led to the violent repression of the revolution and to Nagy's own death.

The Hungarian revolution proved impossible a mix between capitalism and socialism, but also that the system can be attacked and contested, even if briefly successful, when a number of social segments united. As a result of the elimination of all contesters and critics from inside or outside the party, who had been arrested, marginalised or forced to leave their respective countries, Poland and Hungary become normalised after 1956, while the Romanian and Czechoslovakian administrations rush to ensure Moscow of their loyalty. By the end of the 1950s and especially during the 1960s the critical discourse against

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[3] Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Trends of Marxism. The Fall, 3rd vol.*, Curtea veche, Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 356.

[4] Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Reinvention of Politics. Eastern Europa from Stalin to Havel,* Polirom, Iaşi, 1997, pp. 50-100.

[5] Stephen Kotkin, Jan T. Gross, *Non-civilian Society. Year 1989: the implosion of the communist structures*, Curtea veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 48.

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communism was still existing especially through the intellectuals who do not leave their country, which will become obvious in the movements of support for the Prague Spring. Under Alexander Dubcek's leadership, the Action Programme transformed Prague in the most Occidental capital behind the Iron Curtain. With a 12 years delay compared to Warsaw and Budapest, the conflict between the conservatives and the revisionists takes place in a modified form in Prague, while Dubcek's appointment as general secretary of the party in January 1968 sets the start of a late change which could adopt some aspects of the Polish and Hungarian models. Four months later, the adoption of the Action Programme of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party determined a growing support from the population which expected fundamental changes, thus their requests becoming more radical than the ones in Dubcek's own programme. Although the program of Dubcek's reformists was less radical than the Hungarian autumn in 1956, Brezhnev proved himself to be even tougher than Khrushchev, one of the reason being the same in both cases, namely the fear of a potential dissemination of these ideas within the rest of the states from the block. As a result, the forced resignation of Dubcek and his team and his replacement with Gustav Husak, after the Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia, triggered the purging and lead to a series of arrests, to tens of thousands of immigrations (especially in 1956) especially of the intellectuals that supported the reformist team, but also to resignations from the party or to marginalisation, following the now known model applied in Hungary after the 1956 uprising.

In spite of the different aspects discerned according to the party's actions against the society, 1968 is the year when the segregation between government, the smaller, challenging social segment and the major social segment cohabiting with the political regime becomes obvious. The facets of the cohabitation are similar. In Hungary the end of the repressions following the autumn of 1956 leads to the establishment of a so-called "goulash communism", while in Czechoslovakia, the purges began in the summer of 1968, right after the invasion, are finalised in a situation of normality. In Poland, after all citizens opposing the regime in one way or another were either arrested or forced to choose between exile and a certain benevolence towards the said regime, from 1968 the government offers the welfare in exchange for a "silent" way of living, with short breaks and uprisings of the population, especially those of the workers, until the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the anticommunism, seen as a form of challenge, did not disappear but was diminished and dissipated, while the hopes that revisionism is possible and the party can be reformed met their ends in the same year. As the ideas of the reformist-revisionist segments are impossible to apply, mainly because the Muscovite leader, Leonid Brezhnev, wouldn't allow it, as it is clearly shown by invading Prague, the ideas and the critique against the party coagulates, emphasising the failure of a leadership model which cannot be modified or improved. By the beginning of the 1970s, while the communist regime proved its inefficiency in all states, "as the elites lost the feeling of their historical predestination, giving signs of nervousness, it became possible for the long silenced civil society to reorganise itself and launch the battle for rebuilding

the public sphere"[6]. The Polish case differs from the "goulash communism" and from normalisation by the continuous discontent of an anti-Sovietic and also Catholic society that could not be convinced by communists' barter, that is, silence for welfare.

The 1970 and 1976 protests in Poland had no effects on the situation outside this space, the more so since the Czechoslovakian normalisation begun in 1969 and the welfare guaranteed by the Hungarian communists together with the population's discouragement guaranteed a minimum of the critic accents against the communists.

In what concerns the Romanian case, after the loyalty display towards Moscow during the Hungarian revolution and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Romanian territories in 1958, there is no change in leadership, the same Stalinist leader stays in office and isolates any revisionist tendencies. By 1960, and starting with 1962, the distance towards Moscow and the emergence of a certain liberalisation become more obvious as the regime changed, reaching its peak with the denunciation of the invasion of Prague by the Warsaw Pact troops in august 1968. This last gesture will bring Romania a trust fund from the Western countries that will last for more than 10 years. Still, the real liberalisation is gradually diminished after the so-called Theses of July 1971, affecting mainly the intelligentsia. The leadership in Bucharest is not more permissive towards direct critique than their fellow comrades from Budapest, Warsaw or Prague.

Once the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe is signed in Helsinki in 1975, the criticism towards the communist policy gets a new form, establishing its legal base on the third segment of the Act, on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the International Human Rights Conventions and on the Constitutions of the states. Thus anticommunism takes the forms of dissidence and opposition, outlined in peaceful movements pleading for the observance of the human and citizen rights. The most visible critics of the 1956 or 1968 regime, namely intellectuals, former party members or various persons, form groups which avoid demanding a change of the regime, making instead a critical analysis of its activity on a legal base. The work of these dissidents and opponents (as they were called by Western media) had become known through a variety of documents addressed either to the state authorities or to Western correspondents, and also through a specific support from the citizens whose rights were infringed.

By the end of the 1970s and all along the 1980s we can talk about the dissidence and the opposition in the Eastern world, terms comprising different persons and especially intellectuals, helping them achieve inside the society a position protected both by Occident and the authorities. The notion of "dissident" applied initially to those who were opposing from inside the party, while those opposing from outside the communist structures were "opponents". But, as the opposition intensified and became more and more known in the Western world and persecuted by the authorities, the definitions and the

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[6] V. Tismăneanu, *Reinvention of Politics. Eastern Europa from Stalin to Havel*, p. 115.

categories change, so that the majority of the critical voices got to be known as "dissidence", while the concept of "opposition" remained applicable mostly to democratic countries where the government is criticised by political parties and and opposition groups.

During the 1980s the term "dissident" is used mostly in the Western analysis of miscellaneous forms of opposition or challenging, although this term is not considered proper nor is it agreed by those it defined. Vaclav Havel, the best known dissident of the 1970s and 1980s Czechoslovakia, thought dissidence is "a natural manifestation and an inevitable consequence of the present historical phase of the political system"[7].

The notion of "opposition" has completely different connotations than the one met in democratic states, as it included, especially from the Western point of view, groups from inside the party confronting groups holding the power, but also everything that opposes, everything that can be a threat to the regime, therefore, "any attempt to fight for living in truth"[8]. The dissident, as defined by Occident towards the socialist countries, is the person who "publicly manifests their nonconformist attitudes and their critical opinions"[9], earning a degree of respect in their own country and a certain protection from the Occident, protection which won't save them from being marginalised by the authorities but saves them from any form of radical persecution. What displeases Havel in this definition is that "the term "dissident" necessarily implies it is a special occupation: as if, along with different ways of earning a living, there is a special one; as if the dissident is not simply a physicist, a sociologist, a worker or a poet acting the way they feel they have to act, as if it's someone who simply decided to become a professional dissatisfied". Dissidence is "originally and above everything else an existential attitude which, besides all, is not an exclusive property of those who -accidentally meeting all those random conditions mentioned above- earned the title of dissident"[10].

For Paul Goma, a former communist party member from 1968 until exclusion, thought to be the first dissident in Romania and the initiator of a solidarity movement with the Czechoslovakian group "Charter 77", the term dissident does not apply, he defining himself as an opponent.

The difference between the acts of dissidence, opposition and resistance is applicable not only inside the states but also inside groups, from individuals' point of view. Vladimir Bukowski pleads for the term of resistance in favour of the term dissidence, although in the Anglo-Saxon world resistance is associated with armed actions[11]. This difference is also applicable to Romanian opposition, which prefers the term dissidence to that of resistance, the last one being considered adequate to the phenomenon of the armed resistance from the

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[7] Vaclav Havel, *The power of powerless (written in* October 1978) and included in volume *Living in truth,* Universe Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, p. 52.
[8] Ibidem, p. 86.
[9] Ibidem, p. 88.
[10] Ibidem, p. 90.
[11] Jean Chiama, Jean-Francois Soulet, *Histoire de la dissidence. Oppositions et revoltes en URSS et dans les democraties populaires de la mort de Staline a nos jours*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1982, p. 10.

mountains that took place from the end of 1940s until the 1950s, with the mention that the intellectuals added a nuanced formula specific to themselves and the Romanian area, that is, resistance through culture. Until the end of the communist regimes, the discussion concerning resistance, opposition and dissidence took place exclusively in the democratic states. This debate became official in the countries in which these phenomena actually took place only during post communism, thus discussing the issues of placing a certain person or activity in one form of anticommunism or another.

The modalities in which groups formed and dissidents manifested differs from one state to the other. Their success was determined both by the relationship between those involved in such manifestations and by the state's ways of surveillance and repression. In Poland, at the half of 1976, in response to the arrests and sentencing following the 1970 and 1976 workers' protests, appeared the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) followed by the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (ROPCIO) and, in 1979, the so-called fly-wheel university. In the same time, in Prague, in the autumn of 1976, a group of intellectuals around Vaclav Havel set the foundation of the "Charter 77", which became official through the document published in the beginning of 1977. Later, following the KOR model, the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS) was born. The difference between KOR and "Charter 77" is that the Polish organisation built structures through which it offered support (even financial support) to the workers and to any citizens whose rights had been infringed and to their respective families. "Charter 77" was born from the beginning with the purpose of a long term and continuous activity, materialised in various forms of manifestation, not just memoirs or documents, which will eventually bring it closer to KOR. What defines these dissident groups is that they don't offer an alternate plan to that of the government and they do not contest the administration, but they build their actions according to legal provisions and the international treaties. Nevertheless, the initiators of "Charter 77" are arrested and imprisoned.

The difference between the "Charter 77" movement and Paul Goma's adhesion group consists not only in a numeric aspect but also in the group's very capacity of cohesion and existence. The activity of "Charter 77" is not suppressed by the arrests of Havel, Kohout and the other leaders. The samizdat and the underground actions conducted through a continuous activity of those involved in it ensured the survival of the group, just like the Polish and the Hungarian dissidence, which acted in a similar way even without being organised as a group. In Paul Goma's case, except that adhesion through signing his letters is numerically more restrained, a part of the subscribers used the movement to ease the process of obtaining a passport and a final departure to Occident. The non-violent character and the way it pleaded for a regime that observes the human rights, without contesting or opposing the above mentioned regime, is what unites the dissidence in these countries. Still the regimes saw in the dissidents enemies endangering the public order, so that, until the end of the 1980s they remained "besieged minorities, harassed by the secret police, denigrated by the corrupted official media, isolated from the large communities

and deprived of any form of institutional communication with their supporters, thus having to invent strategies for a gradual change exactly because they knew too well the terrorist potential of the system"[12].

While in Poland, starting from 1980, KOR and ROPCIO together with other dissident groups paved the way for a pact between the newly appeared free union and the power, in Czechoslovakia the Chartists stayed a minority, yet not an insignificant one, and the Hungarian dissidence acted the same ways like those in the similar countries, by disseminating forbidden literature or a parallel press in the form of the samizdat and organising various meetings.

In Romania, during the spring of 1977, the Goma movement grows but fails to offer a lasting impact. According to a Securitate note, several hundreds people signed the letter or tried to contact the writer. More precisely, after writing the open letter in support of the Czechoslovakian intellectuals, 430 people tried to contact Goma directly or by phone, most of them having already applied for permission to leave the country. Out of 430, 240 people managed to get in touch with him. 184 of the people who tried to contact Goma were issued the permission to leave the country while a number of 76 persons were still under supervision, having previously applied for permission to leave the country[13]. By the end of the first half of 1977 the Goma movement was annihilated, a part of its subscribers obtained their passports and the visas, the Securitate made sustained efforts to isolate any possible adherents and also to force some of them to leave the country. Lacking a larger adhesion, the movement diluted. The summer of the same year witnessed the brutal repression of an ample strike of the miners in Lupeni; the lack of public solidarity withe the protesters determined Goma to leave the country, thus concluding this chapter, while the writer remained not only the first Romanian dissident but also one of the most powerful exiled supporters of the Romanian dissidence, activity that will keep him in the eye of the communist Securitate.

Along the last communist decades, in the states we analysed, dissidence and opposition took various forms of manifestation, so that at the end of the 1980s, first in Poland, then in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, they managed to find ways of collaboration and coagulation. There had been numerous forms of protest, some of them difficult to include in a defined type of anticommunism. However, defining the dissidents as a relatively small group is maleficent. First, such idea could turn into an argument in favour of the regime for whom the dissidents where the discontented minority trying to draw attention while the majority is contently living a normal life. Second, the regime could take advantage of the idea that the dissidents were a small group benefiting from a certain protection from the authorities, thus enabling the government to cultivate the image of the group's existence and popularity as a result of the benevolent attitude of the communists, a group living isolated and having nothing in common with the rest of the society. Such an image opposed the very characteristic of the dissidence as

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[12] V. Tismăneanu, *The Utopia Mess. The Marxist Ideology Crisis in Eastern Europe* Polirom, Iasi, 1997, pp. 136-138.
[13] The Romanian Intelligence Service, *The White Book of Security, Literary and Artistic Accounts (1969-1989)*, The Romanian Press, Bucharest, 1996, p. 130.

an action benefitting the majority of the population, i.e. those not participating in the leadership of the state, those searching for an honest way of life, even though the said way of life was sometimes opposed to the party's ideas. The public expression, written or in any other form, of such a group, be it large or less numerous, is, from the state's point of view, a threat. The state did not protect such groups, but it supervised them in an effort to anticipate the potential danger of their actions and the potential risk for them to become an alternative to the actual power[14].

Without questioning the power, the dissidence coagulated in groups of different characteristics. Such was the religious dissidence or resistance, which appeared first in Poland, where the Catholic Church supported the emerging groups and ended by becoming a mediator between the government and the society. Later, groups formed inside certain ethnic and religious minorities appeared in Czechoslovakia, but in this country the Catholics didn't have the same power as in Poland, since the Catholic Church chose to collaborate with the regime, and also in Romania, where such a group originated the revolution of 1989.

The dissidence, be it Polish, Hungarian or Czechoslovakian, is not fundamentally anticommunist, the groups being so heterogenous that they may include any form of critic against the party, from active party members to excluded party members, disappointed Marxists, nationalists, people in a continuous disagreement with the regime, intellectuals and workers. The differences of vision divided them, but what unified them even beyond the borders of their own respective countries is the disappointment towards the party policies and its relationship with the society and the struggle for civil rights and freedoms. The differences are visible in the reactions of these groups: on one side they draw protest letters, manifestos, petitions, on the other side they organised strikes and street protests. While the intellectual part of the dissidence drawn documents, the workers blackmailed the government through strikes, like those in Poland in the summer of 1980, or in Brasov in the autumn of 1987, to give just two examples. Such protests originated in the debasement of the economical and social situation, and the demands went extremely close to contesting the regime.

The legal protest, the dissidence manifested in miscellaneous forms and among different non-violent groups grows during the 1980s and especially after 1985, when the new leader in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev, signals new policies. In Romania the differences remain as visible during these years, as dissidence manifests individually, only rarely through documents subscribed by several persons and, therefore, totally different from the Polish and the Czechoslovakian cases. Romanian dissidence lacks alternate ways of communication, like the Hungarian case, where there are no dissident groups but the dissidents were active and the samizdat phenomenon is ample. In Hungary the support of the Catholic Church is open, but in Romania such support is almost inexistent. The Romanian dissidents are linked by the support coming from Occident, from the exiled Romanians and from the foreign radio stations which receive the

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[14] Vaclav Havel, *cited works*, pp. 91-92.

documents they drew and kept them connected with the outside world.

Cataloging the forms of dissidence and resistance is nuanced by the Romanian case in which a different form of rejecting the co-optation was the resistance through culture. The resistance through culture included those who did not publicly criticised the regime but they did not support it either. The resistants were tolerated by the regime, they were supervised by the Securitate, but they were not harassed. The resistants came mainly from humanist and artistic environments. They were those who refused compromise, choosing an "honest survival inside the profession"[15]. The rejection of the rules set for intellectuals as a result of the so-called Theses of July 1971 and some other party directives, the permanent negotiation with the censorship and the omnipresent supervision by the authorities transformed the intellectuals which refused to compromise with the power into persons isolated in their own circle. The resistance through culture, as the form in which a part of them chose, in post communism, to define their activity during the last communist decades, rose a series of controversies. Some of the people actively involved in the opposition against the party considered the syntagm inadequate, using sometimes Bukowski's explanation that resistance involves an armed form of contesting. The refusal may embrace various forms of manifestation, not only in the Romanian case, but dissidence, as it was assumed by those involved in it, meant an active form of critique against the regime, a "continuous fight for reforms, in favour of an evolution that will increase the civil liberties and will guarantee the observance of human rights"[16].

In the cases of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the continuous fight of the dissidence gave birth, after 1987, to certain structures which became the alternative to the actual power and the main negotiator at the round tables, ensuring a more peaceful transfer of power and transition to post communism. Romania's case stood out as the dissidents did not form such a group that could negotiate with a reformer segment from inside the party, segment which did not exist until Ceausescu couple escaped.

The forms of opposition, dissidence and resistance differed not only from one state to another but also within the very societies in which they appeared. Their evolution during the last communist decades and their categorisation represented a specific debate for the post communist societies of the four states we analysed. The term "dissidence" was, probably, the most studied one from the moment those included in such category had been able to discuss it officially. By comparison, the idea of (non armed) dissidence associated with various groups was considered to be less visible, coming second to the opposition to the regime. The Romanian discourse stood out among the four states by the concept of "resistance through culture", as proposed and supported by a part of the intellectuals who considered this syntagm is the best definition of their relationship with the ruling power.

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[15] Vladimir Tismăneanu (coord.), *The Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania. Final Report*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p. 718.
[16] Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, Polirom, Iaşi, 1997, p. 134.

Thus, the reference to the recent past of the post communist societies had been characterised by all these debates about the opposition towards the regime and the means for its categorisation.

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ONU TREATY CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT AND IMPACT ON THE BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract: The adjustments of the international system to the challenges of globalisation illustrates the reason for which it is necessary a new approach of security. This new approach must start from the control and supervision of international trade with conventional armament. In this respect, the ONU Treaty on international trade with conventional armament will contribute to the reduction of the risk that the international transfers of conventional weapons serve to committing the most serious crimes on the planet, mainly terrorism, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The ONU treaty on international trade of conventional armament will impose global standards advanced by the ruling of weapon trade and by the responsibility of the states involved, with a view to eradicate the illicit trade of conventional armaments, estimated on 70 billion USD annually. The observance of such standards by all the states of the world will provide security and stability, both on global, and regional level, by performing a forecast of the weapon trade.

Keywords: trade with armament; ONU; security; conventional weapons.

I. Introduction

The need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade of conventional weapons and to prevent the embezzling of it to illicit markets or unauthorised final uses and final users, including for committing terrorism acts, lead to the execution of ONU Treaty concerning the international commerce with conventional armament, which completes a aide diplomatic process, initiated in 2006, and which rules, for the first time, the weapon trade worldwide. Practically, the ONU Treaty on international trade of conventional armament is the first legal instrument which rules, worldwide, the international trade with conventional weapons, ammunitions and parts thereof, and the enforcement of this Treaty will consolidate the international legal frame and will reinforce the responsibility of states in the field of international trade with armament.

The Treaty is the result of a process of global collaboration between the member states of United Nations and civil society, represented by NGO and the academic environment, during which Romania played an active role, manifesting

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interest both on declarative political level, and by undertaking some positions of substance during the negotiations of the Treaty disposals.

The principle of the Treaty is that every country evaluate, before anything else, if he armament sold risks to be used in order to avoid an international embargo, committing "serious breaches" of human rights or embezzlement in the advantage of some terrorists or criminals. If the case, the transaction must not be authorised.

The field of the Treaty includes operations of export, import, intermediation, transit and transhipment with military products from the category of conventional weapons (tanks and war armoured vehicles, systems of artillery of high calibre, war aircrafts, helicopters of attack, war crafts, rockets and rocket launchers) widely determined in the ONU register of Conventional Weapons, as well as the category of small calibre weapons and light armaments.

The execution of ONU Treaty concerning the international trade with armament has signification related to the responsibility of the states that carry out operation of external trade with conventional armaments, of reduction of illicit trade in the field and performance of a proper level of transparency.

II. ONU treaty concerning the international trade with conventional armament

The global market of armament is permanently developing and many super powers, as well as other emergent, want a piece as big as possible of this special "cake". During the last century, since the first world wars, to the period of Cold War and subsequently to the development of the terrorism phenomenon, all states followed the guidelines of development of military industry and the procurement of armament, in general for dissuasive purposes. The efforts to rule the weapon transfers on global level were constantly on the international agenda since the beginning of 20th century. The first attempt in this respect was made by the League of Nations, in 1925, which issued a project related to the Convention of weapon trade, document which unfortunately has never been adopted. In contrast to the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, with a status very well defined by different international agreements and conventions, up to present, there was no such document meant to forbid or at least restrict the transfer of conventional weapons. In 2001, a group of laureates of Nobel prize for peace issued a sketch of a legal frame with a Convention for the international transfers of armament. This document was to rule such issue. Then, a campaign initiated by several NGOs tried to lobby near several ONU states in order to promote the issue among the countries with which they entertain closer relations. In this context of international pressures for the ruling of trade with conventional armament, France, Great Britain, Germany and Sweden required the adoption of an international treaty "solid, effective and restricting from a legal perspective" on the topic of conventional weapon trade.

Thus, in December 2006, the General Meeting of ONU adopted the resolution 61/89 entitled "Towards a treaty concerning the exchange of armament: determining the common international standards for import, export and transfer of conventional weapons". After several bureaucratic manoeuvres as

of the issue of this document, in 2008 a new resolution 63/240 was adopted, the same meeting decided to constitute a group of work made of experts in charge with analysing this issue. Barely in 2009, the General Meeting of ONU adopted another resolution 64/48 which decided on the organisation of the Conference for the Treaty concerning the international trade with conventional armament.

On 2 April 2013 it was adopted a resolution of the General Meeting of ONU, proposed by Costa Rica and co-sponsored by 107 states, among which all states of EU, USA, Israel etc., by which the Treaty is adopted and it is required to General Secretary of ONU, as repository of the treaty, to open it for execution on 3 June 2013.

The resolution that opens the way for the execution of the Treaty, as of 3 June 2013, was adopted with 154 votes for and three against (Syria, North Korea and Iran). And 23 countries abstained, including one of the main exporters (Russia and China) or buyers of such kind of armament (Egypt, India and Indonesia).

The General Secretary of ONU Ban Ki-moon considered that it is a "historical diplomatic success" that is going to impress „a new impulse effective for other efforts in the field of disarming".

The treaty sends a clear signal to the armament markets that supply the dictators and lords of the war.

Up to present, the treaty was signed by 118 countries and ratified by 31 of them. The treaty comes into force days after depositing the 50th instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

The first conference of the member states will be organised within maximum one year as of the date of enforcement of the Treaty concerning the international trade with conventional armament in force. According to the final clauses, this may be amended the earliest after six years as of the entry in force, with the support of three quarters of the member states.

We state that, in perspective, the Treaty on international trade with conventional armament will benefit of a specialised Secretariat, the costs of operation of it being negotiated and approved during the first Conference of the member states. The Conference of the member states will adopt, by agreement, its rules of procedure during the first session. The Conference of the member states will adopt its own financial norms concerning the operation of Secretariat and will manage the operation of every subsidiary body incorporated.

At the end of the ordinary session, the Conference will approve the adoption of a budget for the tax year in progress.

Conference of the member states: will analyse the enforcement of the disposals of the international Treaty on trade of conventional armament, including the evolutions appeared in the field of conventional weapons; will examine and adopt recommendations about the implementation and functioning of the Treaty mainly promoting its universality; examines the proposals of amendments to the Treaty; will examine the issues generated by the interpretation of the Treaty; will examine and decide the duties and the budget of the Secretariat; will examine the creation of any subsidiary necessary for the

improvement of the Treaty operation; will accomplish any other function in conformity to this treaty.

The extraordinary meetings of the Conference of the member states will be organised every time if it deemed necessary by the Conference of the member states, or on written demand of any member state, provided it is supported by minimum three thirds of the member states.

In the scope of this Treaty, the activities of international trade include export, import, transit, transhipment and brokerage and it is applied to conventional weapons from the following categories: war tanks; war armoured vehicles; systems of artillery of high calibre; war planes; helicopters of attack; war crafts; rockets and rocket launchers; weapons of small calibre and light armaments.

This Treaty is not applied to the international transport by any member state or on its behalf, of conventional weapons for own use, provided they remain in the property of such state.

The United States, the main supplier of armament, with a 30% market share, obtained the ammunition to be dealt with separately, by less exhaustive controls. The text of the treaty leaves however open the possibility that certain bilateral military aids are exempted from the application of the Treaty.

This Treaty has as object: the institution of the most strict common standards for the ruling or improvement of the regulation of international trade with conventional weapons; prevention and eradication of illicit trade with conventional weapons and prevention of embezzling it in order to contribute to the peace, security and international and regional stability, reduces human pain, promotes cooperation, transparency and responsible action of member states in international trade with conventional weapons, building thus between them.

As a subject matter, the treaty of international trade with conventional armament is a wide, robust and balance treaty, including a wide range of obligations and diligences of member states, including express interdictions for the transfers of conventional armament which may breach the international obligations stipulated by the treaties and conventions in the field of human rights and humanitarian law or which may be used in committing crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in all kinds of armed conflict.

The treaty includes a range of criteria for prior evaluation of the operations of transfer of military products, which we characterise as being more extended than that stipulated by the EU *acquis* and which is rigorously and systematically applied, by all EU states and other *like-minded* states (Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Norway etc.). Despite all these, we consider that the text of the Treaty does not create issues of incompatibility to the disposals of EU *acquis*, opinion supported as well by the representatives of the European Commission and SEAE, who participated to the diplomatic negotiations from New York.

According to the treaty, the member states must institute and keep updated a national system of control for the ruling of the export of ammunitions shot, launched or released on target by conventional weapons indicated above; it has to institute and maintain updated a national system of control for the ruling of the export of parts and components if the export is made under a form which

renders possible the assembly of conventional weapons before authorising the export of such parts and components; it has to implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner, considering the principles stipulated in the Treaty; it has to institute and to maintain updated a national system of control, including a national list of control, with a view to implement the disposals of the Treaty.

Every member state is encouraged to apply the disposals of the Treaty on a range as wide as possible of conventional weapons, and based on the national legislation, it will submit the national list of control to the Secretariat, which makes it available to the other member states. The member states are encouraged to public the national lists of control.

Every member state will take the necessary measures to implement the disposals of this treaty and will appoint the competent national authorities so as to have a national system of control transparent and efficient meant to rule the transfers of conventional weapons provided above, designating one or more national points of contact for the exchange of information on topics related to the implementation of the Treaty, notifying to the Secretariat the national points of contact.

No member state will authorise any transfer of conventional weapons or military products, if the transfer breaches the obligations it has generated by the measures adopted by the Council of Security of the Organisation of United Nations in conformity to art. 7 of the Charta of the Organisation of United Nations, in particular, embargos concerning the weapons.

However, no member state will authorise any transfer of conventional weapons if this breaches its relevant international obligations resulted from the international agreements to which it participates, in particular, those concerning the international transfer or illicit traffic of conventional weapons.

No member state will authorise any transfer of conventional weapons or military products if it knows, on the moment of authorisation, that the weapons or items could be used for committing a genocide, crimes against humanity, serious breaches of the Convention of Geneva dated 1949, attacks against civil people or goods protected as such, or other war crimes such as those defined in the international agreements to which it participates.

Every member state that participates to the transfer of conventional weapons will take measures to prevent any embezzlement and will try to prevent the embezzlement of the transfer of conventional weapons by its national system of control, evaluating the risk of embezzlement of export and considering measures to reduce the risk, as well as of building reliability or programs agreed or developed with other exporting or importing states. On need, other measures of prevention such as the examination of the parties participating to the export, the requirement of additional documents, certificates, insurances, forbidding export or other relevant measures which may be taken.

If a member states detects a diversion of conventional weapons during a transfer, it takes the necessary measures, allowed by its internal law and by observing the international law. Such measures may consist in alerting the member states potentially affected, the examination of the transports of

embezzled weapons and the taking of measures by opening an investigation and application of law. In order to improve the understanding and prevent the embezzlement of conventional weapons on the moment of transfer, the member states are encouraged to perform mutual exchanges of information by effective means of fight against embezzlement. Such information may include illicit activities such as corruption, routes of international traffic, illegal brokerage, illegal resources of supply, methods of hiding, usual places of delivery or destinations used by organised groups for delivery of embezzlements.

The member states are encouraged to report to other member states, through the Secretariat, the measures taken in the fight against the embezzlement of conventional weapons.

Every member state will submit annually to the Secretariat, until 31 May, a report for the previous calendar year concerning the authorised exports and imports or performed by conventional weapons. The reports will be made available to the Secretariat and will be shared by them to the member states. The report submitted to the Secretariat may include the same information which the member state submitted to other groups of work of the Organisation of United Nations, including to the Register of United Nations concerning the conventional weapons. The reports may exclude sensitive information from a commercial or national security perspective.

III. Impact on the Black Sea region

Besides the security problems in the Black Sea Region, which need to be solved for the states to be able to value the opportunities in the area, such as: transnational and crossborder threats, frozen conflicts and the absence of a culture of dialogue and regional cooperation, the Black Sea area is a gate of access for the resources of oil and gases carried from Central Asia and Caucasus to Europe. Thus, the security of energetic infrastructure in the region is essential for the energetic security of Europe.

Practically, the consolidation of security, stability and democracy in the Black Sea Region represents a priority for Romania. The scope is to contribute to anchoring the region in the euro-Atlantic community by stimulating the regional cooperation and attracting the support for such processes from the European and euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO.

Romania, with the allies and partners from the European and euro-Atlantic institutions, acts with a view to consolidate the regional cooperation.

As average manufacturer and exporter in the area, Romania has actively manifested the support for the legal regulation of international trade with weapons since the initiation of the process of agreeing the Treaty related to international trade of conventional armament. Our country has plenary supported the objective of adopting a treaty concerning the international trade with conventional armament since the international standards in the field have advanced, and the Romanian experience of two decades in the politics and practices of control of the exports of conventional armaments confers a substantial comparative advantage which must be valued as well during the immediate following period.

During this process, Romania manifested the interest to adopt the treaty concerning the international trade with conventional armament not only on declarative political level, supporting the EU initiatives and of other states to advance the process of negotiation, as well as by undertaking some of the positions of visibility both during the preparing process, and the final diplomatic conference.

Romania submitted the instrument of ratification of the Treaty during a ceremony organised at ONU seat from New York, on 2 April 2014, being those one of the states that directly contributes to the enforcement of this international legal instrument.

By the execution and ratification of the Treaty on international trade of conventional armament, Romania reiterated its attachment towards the values promoted by this multilateral agreement, among which we mention the observance of human rights and of international humanitarian law, as well as its commitment in combating the illegal trade of conventional weapons and the embezzlement of it by terrorist groups and „black market".

As a general issue, it may be considered that the disposals of the treaty on international trade of conventional armament are already included in the national standards and practice in the field of exports' control and the implementation thereof will not create new legal obligations for the Romanian companies holders of export licenses of military products.

As for the European Union, it has agreed with the conclusion, under the patronage of the United Nations, of the treaty concerning the international trade of conventional armament and stated that some of the disposals of the Treaty on international trade of conventional armament enter in the sphere of exclusive competence of the Union, since they are under the incidence of common commercial policy or affects the norms of internal market with respect to the transfer of conventional weapons and explosives. We state that, currently, all the 28 EU member states have already signed the Treaty on international trade of conventional armament.

In this context, within the European Union, a decision adopted by the European Union's Council was adopted with respect to the conclusion of the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons performed by the Member State, the issue of ratification being under the attention of the speciality commissions of the European Parliament. The legal formula identified in EU for the ratification of the agreement stipulates that "with respect to those aspects which fall under the exclusive competency cycle of the Union, the member states are authorised to ratify, in the benefit of the Union, the Treaty with respect to the international trade with conventional weapons".

Despite the notable diplomatic efforts, EU did not manage to impose a different clause with respect to the regional international organisations which would have allowed it to be a Party of this Treaty. Because of the open opposition towards China and the veiled opposition of other states which are significant for the global weapon trade, the EU managed only to introduce some distinct provisions, in the preamble of the Treaty, which refer to the role that the regional organisations might play in supporting the member states, upon request, for the

implementation of the Treaty, with respect to the international trade with conventional weapons. Practically, EU cannot conclude and ratify the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons because of the fact that only the states which, as subject to the international law, can become parties of this new international tool.

Taking into consideration that the Treaty aims at establishing the highest possible mutual international standards for the regulation of the international trade with conventional weapons, for the prevention and eradication of the illegal trade with conventional weapons in order to support the international and regional peace, the security and stability and the minimisation of human sufferance, we consider that the efficient implementation of the Treaty might significantly contribute to the consolidation of respect regarding the international human rights and the consolidation of human rights at global level, with a positive impact upon the Black Sea region.

IV. Conclusions

Initiated in 2006, this Treaty is the first international major text regarding the disarmament, after the adoption of the Treaty regarding the interdiction of nuclear tests in 1996.

The Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons explicitly stipulates the obligation to develop national systems for controlling the exports by the exporting states, the possibility to create systems for the control of imports by the importing states, as well as the obligation to regulate certain national lists of arms which fall under the control regime of transfers. It is also stipulated the obligation to create national registers with respect to the transfer operations, including the transit and transhipping operations, as well as the development and the annual development of national reports with respect to these operations stipulated by the treaty.

So, the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons will reduce the impact of using conventional weapons upon the civil population from the areas of conflict, 500,000 of civilians being annually killed in conflicts and will diminish the embargo regimes imposed by the Security Council of ONU upon the weapons' trade.

We consider that the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons will not prevent states from purchasing conventional weapons for the exercising of their lawful right for self-defence, in compliance with the provisions of article 51 of the Cart of the United Nations, or for the utilisation of weapons for the support of humanitarian actions and maintain peace.

The long term success of the regime of the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons depends on the participation of an increased number of countries, and especially of all major actors in the international trade with weapons.

It is regrettable that the Treaty does not introduce a commune and accurate definition of the conventional weapons, that envisages only a limited number of categories of weapons, which are mentioned above, and that it does not include a

list which would describe the actual types of weapons from each category. However, it is satisfactory the fact that in this category, small weapons, light weapons, ammunitions, the related component spare parts are included it would be desired that the Member States would understand each category in the broadest sense of their national regulations. It is also regrettable the fact that the trade with remote piloted air systems (drones) used for armed purposes are not subject to the Treaty; the Treaty does not include the technical assistance which comprises the repairing maintenance or the development of conventional weapons.

We mention that the member states must annually report with respect to the conventional weapons imports and exports and we believe that the relevant reports should be made available to the public, and the member states would undertake an agreement with respect to transparency and to disclose to the public the annual reports regarding he weapons transfer, without waiting for the global acceptance of this principle.

Form the posture of the average size producer and exporter in the region, Romania has actively provided support for the legal framework of the international trade with weapons even from the initiation of the process of the initiating the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons. Our country plenary supported the adoption of a Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons due to the fact that the national standards in this field are advanced, and the Romanian experience developed during the last two decades with the policies and control proceedings of the export with conventional weapons provides a substantial advantage, which will have to be valued in the following period.

During the development of this process, Romania manifested its interest in adopting the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons not only as a political declaration, supporting he EU initiatives and the initiatives of other to advance the negotiation process but also by means of assuming some of the positions with visibility both in the preparation process as well as in the final diplomatic conference.

Romania submitted the ratification tool of the Treaty during a ceremony which took place at the ONU headquarters in New York, on the 2nd of April 2014, being thus included within the states which directly contribute to the enforcement of this international regulatory tool.

Through the adoption and ratification of the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons, Romania reiterated its attachment towards the values promoted by this multilateral agreement, at which it is part of, and towards the observance of the human rights and of the international humanitarian right, as well as towards the commitment in the control of illegal commerce with conventional weapons and in their submission to terrorist groups and on the "black market".

Generally, it can be appreciated that the provisions of the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons have already been included in the national standards and practice with respect to the control of exports and

their implementation will not generate new legal liabilities for the Romanian companies which hold license for the export of military products.

Regarding the European Union, it has adopted the conclusion, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons and it received that some of the provisions of the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons fall under the exclusive competence of the Union, due to the fact that they are under the commune trade policy or they affect the norms of the internal market regarding the transfer of conventional weapons or explosives. We note that currently, all the 28 member states have already signed the Treaty regarding the international trade with conventional weapons.

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THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS

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Abstract: *According to Islamic thinkers, the reason for restructuring the economies according to Islamic principles is based on two assertions: the first one argues that the current system has disappointed and the second argues that the history of Islam beginnings proves the superiority of this system compared to others. In the view of thinkers mentioned, it's important to raise the following question: What did this system represent in the "golden age"? By today's standards, they argue, it can be said that the economy of the seventh century in the Arabian Peninsula was very primitive, producing few consumer goods, using simple technologies; it was devoid of the pollution affecting the major economies and was based on the oldest division of labor. The answer to many of the emerging problems from back then was given in the specific economic provisions found in Islamic writings (the Koran and the Sunna). Some of them were perceived as universally valid, while others were subject to change in order to meet new conditions.*

Keywords: *Islamic economics, Islamic financial system, riba, mudaraba, musharaka.*

Introduction

Islamic economics studies are part of a relatively recent field of interdisciplinary research developed in economics, a research field focused on the interface between economics and theology. Regardless of its internal systems, it is believed that the Islamic economy had to appear „as a whole" in order to legitimize its existence and viability. Its followers believe that the dominant systems of our time are responsible for injustice, inefficiency and moral shortcomings. In capitalism, the interest rate encourages rigor and exploitation; in socialism, the suppression of trade leads to tyranny and monstrous imbalance. The fundamental books of Islam prohibit the interest rate, but allow trade, therefore – it is argued by the ideologists of this economic system – a proper Islamic economy would have all the virtues of these two systems and none of their flaws. This assertion is supported by references to the canonical „Islamic Golden Age" period, between the years 622-661, which includes the last decade from the life of Prophet Mohammed, followed by leadership of the land by

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righteous caliphs. During this period, the Islamic code of economic behavior had massive recognition among the masses, maintaining a spirit of brotherly cooperation. Seeing as everyone was „subject to the same laws" and had the same obligations, injustices have been reduced to the maximum. The resources have been allocated in a very efficient way, allowing a rapid increase in living standards. Historical developments show, however, that after the so-called "golden age", the Muslim community's attachment to Islamic percepts fell, creating a pronounced downturn and prolonging the process of waning the global position (in the context of the Muslim world) of the Islamic economy.

Stages of historical development

Although the introduction of the concept of "Islamic economics" took place only in the twentieth century, it was initiated and developed, as shown above, long before. A large number of scholars have brought major contributions to the establishment and development of Islamic economics, examples of which are: Abu Yusuf (d.798), al-Mas'udi(d. 957), al-Mawardi(d. 1058), Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), al-Sarakhsi(d. 1090), al-Tusi(d. 1093), al-Ghazali(d. 1111), al-Dimashqi(d. 1175), Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), Ibn al-Ukhhuwwah (d. 1329), Ibn al-Qayyim(d.1350), al-Shatibi (d. 1388), Ibn Khaldun(d. 1406), al-Maqrizi (d. 1442), al- Dawwani (d. 1501) and Shah Waliyullah (d. 1762). These scribes were not specialized in economics (there was no strict compartmentalization of the sciences back then), but in a number or other related areas, being great intellectuals of their time and leaving behind a vast literature (much of it lost due to the vicissitudes of those times and Mongol invasions). Perhaps because of this, Islamic economics has developed as an inter-disciplinary subject, which shares the Islamic belief that lies in the Islamic teachings promoted by the Koran, lawyers, historians and social philosophers, politicians and moral thinkers.

In "Introduction to History", Ibn Khaldun examines[1] the relationships established between the roles of moral, psychological, political, economic, social, demographic and historical factors over a period of three generations, that is 120 years, from the rise to the fall of a dynasty. All the work of his predecessors seems to have been intensely fructified in this fundamental book. His analysis is not static and based only on economic variables, but rather dynamic, multidisciplinary and highly useful in the context of the Muslim civilization decline (1332-1406) and the need for reaffirmation of the Muslim identity. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun also contributes to the development of economic science by asserting certain economic principles.

Sadly, however, his contributions have not been sufficiently exploited later in order to continue the development of economics because, as he said himself, science only progresses if society progresses. This theory was supported by the history of Islam, because after a "golden age" in the middle of the eighteen century, development continued at a much less accelerated pace for more than two centuries. Thereafter, a brilliant mind stood out from time to time in a less than stimulating environment, and the economy was no exception to this state of

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[1] Khaldun, Ibn, *The Muqaddimah: an introduction to history*, 1969, Princeton University Press.

"numbness". No major contribution was made after Ibn Khaldun, except for a few isolated illuminists like al-Maqrizi (d. 1442), al-Dawwani (d. 1501) or Shah Waliyullah (d. 1762).

Thus, we can say that while conventional economics has become a stand-alone scientific discipline after 1890[2], after the publication of Alfred Marshall's fundamental paper "Principles of Economics", it kept evolving, but the Islamic economics stayed, mostly, part of the Islamic unitary philosophic and morality system until the end of World War II. The independence of the majority of the Muslim countries after the war and the need to develop their own economies in a way that is compatible with the Islamic vision, has led to the "manifestation" of Islamic economics. Islamic economics doesn't disregard the previous findings of conventional economic science, but introduces a new style of making business, encouraging individuals to put self-interest below society's interest.

Umer Chapra, one of the most influential writers of Islamic economics issues, sees capitalism as a provider of a life of plenty for few members of society, while bringing poverty for most. Social Darwinism is blamed and his view on capitalism is that it is unable to resolve the conflict between public and private interest. The priorities have become distorted due to material imperatives and spiritual needs are overlooked as society becomes increasingly influenced by utilitarian ethics, which are focused on obtaining short-term and morally narrow satisfaction, and will ultimately lead to frustration and the removal of the individual from the main goals of humanity. However, Chapra[3] seems to be realistic in terms of comparison between the Islamic countries and the West. He is aware that the practical applications of Islamic economics are far from superior from the Western capitalist system. He considers that Islamic economics is abused by many government systems from the Muslim world because, ever since pre-Islamic Arab tribes, the principle of free elections[4] and the rule of law was either ignored or manipulated by the autocratic and corrupt state administration. The religious elite of scholars at the top of the sectarian hierarchy, *ulama*, have failed to follow the teachings of their predecessors and became more preoccupied with "trivial matters" from everyday life than with applying Islamic principles in the contemporary economy. *Fiqh* stagnation, that is the stagnation of the Islamic jurisprudence, is identified as the main cause of the Muslim decline, but Chapra sees new hope looming with the *Ijtihad* rebirth, the reinterpretation of Islamic law constructed so as to guide believers in choosing the most appropriate moral path. This is, however, increasingly difficult in our world that is constantly moving and filled with temptations at every step, even for faithful Muslims.

Syed Naqvi is a capitalism critic as harsh as Umer Chapra, but he believes that Islamic economics must be rebuilt part to whole, rather than whole to part. His attention is directed more towards microeconomics rather than macroeconomics and he is more concerned about the decision-making behavior

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[2] After Mark Blaug, economic science became a standalone discipline in the 1890s.
[3] Chapra, Umer, 2000, *Is it necessary to have Islamic Economics?,* Journal of Socio-Economics, pp. 21-37.
[4] Called *shura* in the days of pre-Islamic tribes.

of every Muslim rather than searching in vain for a better society achieved through political means. Muslims can exert free will, *ikhtiyar*, when making decisions regarding doing business, but it should be a moral incentive for the believers who are responsible for their decisions, both before the concerned parties and God. If they feel closer to God, it does not mean that they are losing their responsibility, but that they are becoming less selfish and more driven to serve the general interest of society. Syed Naqvi is aware of the fact that the Western capitalist society is developing a kind of social responsibility and capitalists are rather altruistic than the brutal exploiters described by Marx, but in Islam social obligations are central.

According to Islamic thinkers, the reason for restructuring the economies according to Islamic principles is based on two assertions: the first one argues that the current system has disappointed and the second argues that the history of Islam beginnings proves the superiority of this system compared to others. In the view of thinkers mentioned, it's important to raise the following question: What did this system represent in the "golden age"? By today's standards, they argue, it can be said that the economy of the seventh century in the Arabian Peninsula was very primitive, producing few consumer goods, using simple technologies; it was devoid of the pollution affecting the major economies and was based on the oldest division of labor. The answer to many of the emerging problems from back then was given in the specific economic provisions found in Islamic writings (the Koran and the Sunna). Some of them were perceived as universally valid, while others were subject to change in order to meet new conditions.

Historical evidence questions some of the virtues attributed to The Golden Age, such as the original Islamic community being a parity paragon, whereas there were rather very frequent conflicts within the community, force played a very important role in governance and 3 out of the 4 very righteous caliphs would have perished at the hands of other fellow Muslims. Moreover, even this era had corrupt practices attributed to contemporary capitalism and socialism, such as nepotism or malpractice. During this period, the state reinforced the zakat collection and although a large proportion of the money raised from these proceedings have reached the more disadvantaged social groups, there is no strong evidence that this would have led to the reduction of social inequalities.

What spurred Mawdudi to lay the foundation of Islamic economics, with various other Islamic disciplines, was the desire to defend Islam "against various external influences from external policies and intellectual domination". He wanted to support the authority of Islam in areas where Muslims had come to rely on the guidance of Westerners, the Muslim community's confidence in its own abilities to successfully face the outside world, such as in the period before the rise of the West as a military and economic superpower. Therefore, for Mawdudi, Islamic economics was primarily a means to reestablish the superiority of Islam and secondly an instrument for radical economic change. Islamic economics intends to promote harmony and growth as much as justice and to intensify the Islamic political order. It would support the idea of pan-

Islamism where Muslims would enjoy the benefits of commercial trade between continents, without having to compromise their religious beliefs.

The defining characteristics of Islamic economics

Is the concept of business at odds with what Islam means and stands for or can they collaborate successfully both for the business in question and the Islamic economics?

Islam is often perceived as an impediment to successful business development as most Muslim countries are considered to be poorly developed (in addition to standard statistical data on the level of economic development, the literature also brings into question "anecdotal" arguments, such as the fact that the Muslim states only have 5 companies included in the Financial Times Top 500 index). Also, these countries are considered to be at high risk due to political unrest, religious extremism and the confusion that arises between the "conventional"[5] judicial code of most states and the Islamic jurisprudence. Could this be the reason why multinationals don't "flock" to invest in Muslim countries, but Islam wants to receive foreign business? And if so, how can it attract FDI in this context?

Besides the banking sector, another area where Islamic values have an increasing influence on multinationals is satellite television, especially in the Middle East[6] where the main channels are owned by Saudi Arabia, but most are located in Lebanon or in other member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council[7]. Even if, in theory, the state does not censor television channels, entertainment programs from channels Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBC), Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC), Arab Radio and Television (ART) and Orbit are specially designed for Muslim viewers and do not include the kind of content they would find offensive. However, LBC and MBC, despite the fact that their viewers were very pious, they took a great risk in broadcasting, including an Arabic version of the controversial Big Brother, which was subsequently withdrawn because of objections from viewers in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.

Many Muslims also hold investments outside the "Muslim world", but after the events of 2001 which strained the relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, investments of approximately $ 1.2 trillion in 2001 were reduced considerably. It is also worth mentioning that strong Muslim shareholders of some "western" companies have not tried to change their policy, to "Islamize" it (Prince Waleed, the richest member of the royal family in Saudi Arabia, did not try to change the policies of Citicorp or Ancor, where he holds a significant share). However, many foreign companies which want to lay the

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[5] It concerns the civil law system, adopted by most countries, and the joint one (UK, Canada, USA, Australia and the former British colonies).

[6] The Middle East defines a general area, so there are no precise boundaries. Most geographers consider that it includes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Jurdan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Yemen and the Palestinian territories (West Bank and the Gaza strip).

[7] Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

foundations of their business in Muslim countries want to follow the *shari'a* law (the companies that produce/sell pork, alcohol, that deal with the organization of gambling or focus too much toward debt are excluded).

In the past, opposition to foreign direct investment of multinational corporations in the Arab world was rather caused by a sense of nationalism than by religious objections against the penetration of Western business. The opposition was rather a product of the post-colonial world, when small enterprises were preferred in order to be able to contribute more effectively to solving the unemployment problem they were facing back then. Some of the followers of Islamic economics were also in favor of cooperative societies, organized locally instead of globally, because they considered that within multinational companies Muslims were removed from power and the decision-making process. However, they have accepted recently, with resignation, the limits of cooperative societies.

Some Muslim countries have adapted to globalization better than others. In this sense we could name Malaysia; it did not hesitate to lead an aggressive policy to attract foreign direct investment from Western corporations, which allowed it to overcome the almost total dependency of production and trade of palm oil and rubber and to develop their economy so that it falls into the category of modern, industrial nations, exporting high-tech goods. On the other hand, one can notice that, with regard to the Middle East, traditional monarchies have adapted best to globalization, while the so-called reformist governments of Arab republics have adopted a closed mentality and failed to attract foreign direct investment and modern technology.

Considerations on the Islamic financial system

While Islamic economics defines the principles of exchange, production, distribution and consumption of economic resources to ensure the balanced and proper functioning of the system, the Islamic financial system, which is based on the prohibition of *Riba* (the word "Riba" means interest, usury, excess or addition), dictates the principles of capital mobility, trade, funding, investment and payment methods.

Islamic finance is ultimately derived from Muslims' belief that God is the absolute creator: "Allah is the true owner of all that is on Earth and beyond, and man is nothing but a property manager of the goods He owns. As such, man is obliged to follow the directions of the one he serves."[8] And, as this property is given by God onto man, *shari'a* should monitor the way it is used. When a bank calls itself "subject to *shari'a* law", it means that it undertakes the implementation of Islamic principles to financial transactions, whether it operates within the Islamic world or outside it. In order to ensure that the bank complies with the principles, a *shari'a* internal oversight committee is established. There are international institutions working for the standardized implementation of *shari'a* and in some countries their existence is mandatory by

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[8] Maududi, Abul A'la, *The economic problem of man and its Islamic solution*, Lahore (Pakistan), Islamic Publications, 1941.

law. Under this regulatory framework, compliance with a set of principles and provisions is required, such as the following:

- One should not lie when a product is sold.
- Under any circumstances should anyone be deceived.
- The seller must not resort to advertising practices in relation to their products.
- The seller must not sell products that can have a negative impact on individuals and society as a whole.
- To comply with the law in all transactions carried out, both with friends, strangers or enemies.
- Gambling and other activities that involve risk and are purely speculative are prohibited.

The black market, cheating, concealing certain defects of the commodity that is intended to be sold and forgery are prohibited activities, as well. The sale of certain products such as alcohol and murdered animals is prohibited. Keeping large amounts of certain products in order to market them later and causing a decline in prices is also prohibited. Transactions with individuals forced by someone/something or under some constrained should not be carried out, and businesses should be done in an open economy.

However, beyond such restrictive provisions, there are two "directives" which have the greatest impact on the Islamic financial system, namely those concerning the prohibition of *riba* and *gharar*. *Riba* means "excessive" tax collection or, in other words, what is known as interest. Thus, the one who borrowed money cannot ask to receive an amount of money greater than the original amount. Prohibition of *riba* means that taxes on products that are too large should not be claimed. On the other hand, prohibition of *gharar* means that transactions should be conducted in a transparent and reliable manner, free of hidden or omitted parts (for example, the sale of wool with the omission that the wool is still on the sheep's body).

Coming back to the "issue" of interest, one must address the question "Why is interest avoided?" "Interest", writes an Islamic economist, "generates love for money and the desire to accumulate more wealth for their own well-being. It makes people selfish, miserable, narrow-minded and with hearts of stone." (ibid.) Another sin attributed to interest is that "it transfers wealth from the poor to the rich, increasing inequality in income distribution" (ibid.).

It is considered that in this case it is the duty of those who decide to know that it is necessary to give at least 2.5% to the needy who cannot provide for their basic needs on their own. This is called *zakat* and it is managed by the one who is responsible with the treasury in the community (a sort of Minister of Finance), and the amount of money raised is redistributed among community members who need and deserve help. It is estimated that this is the best form of insurance, which removes all the evil that can occur due to a lack of an arrangement for collective help and cooperation. There is no need for the bank accounts that were created due to fears for the future, no insurance policy, no fear of hunger or lack of a roof over one's head, because you can always call the social agent who will

help anyone in need. However, it is known that however much one may try to inoculate these principles, there will still be people who will want to invest their surplus wealth in order to gain even more. These people are strictly forbidden to borrow money with interest, whether they do so for an individual's personal interest or in order for them to open a business.

The purpose of the Islamic banking system is to prevent such operations that are deemed to generate inefficiency, immoral behavior and injustice. In theory, an Islamic bank only accepts two types of deposits: demand deposits, which are considered risk-free, but do not bring any additional benefit, and investment deposits (under the principle of sharing, the deposit which is not in sight is an investment, i.e. an investment that generates profit) which are set up with the risk of capital decrease, but provide a certain rate of profit. The loan operations of the Islamic bank are based on the principle of sharing (risk and profit) between creditor and debtor. In the absence of interest, when lending money to a company, the bank agrees to bear a certain loss of company activity in exchange for a certain rate of profit, where the company had favorable outcome.

However, while both theorists and practitioners of Islamic economics agree that interest is sinful, there is no agreement on what the concept of "interest free" lending constitutes. In this context, the occurrence of dilemmas is inevitable. For example, under inflation circumstances, must loans be indexed to the inflation rate in order to protect their purchasing power? Although some writers say that in these conditions, indexing is not only legitimate, but also a requirement of justice, a majority believes that indexing is un-Islamic.

How does the Islamic bank function in practice? Traditional banks (broadly) operate attracting deposits and lending money. Profits are generated by the difference between the interest (deposits are offered a lower interest rate, while loans are offered a higher one) and the bank's ability to adequately measure the risk each transaction implies. In this context, the Islamic bank is rather an asset manager than a financial intermediary and depositors become investors. Islamic banks operate on the principle of "profit and loss sharing": depositors agree to conclude a deal in which the profits gained are shared between the bank and the depositor (including a management fee to the bank). However, this system means that depositors' money are at risk as well if the business goes wrong, even if the bank remains solvent.

As the financial system develops, the tools implemented by Islamic banks under the principle of "profit and loss sharing", are becoming more complex and different. The best known tools are *mudaraba*, *murabaha şi musharaka*.

Mudaraba and *musharaka* were related to the financing techniques used by venture capital industries of today's advanced economies. Mudaraba is a contract by which the bank and the potential customer agree on the implementation of a project. In Mudaraba, one of the partners provides 100% of the capital (financer/rabb-ul mal), while the other one provides 100% of the work and management (worker partner/mudarib). Simply put, one partner provides all the capital, and the other one provides all the work. For a better understanding, we should translate the words from Arabic. Rabb-ul mal translates as "wealth lord"

or "master of the capital". The word *mudarib* comes from the verb "daraba", which has several meanings, including "multiply". So the mudarib is the one who, through his work, makes the money invested by the rabb-ul mal multiply, by the profit obtained. Losses are borne entirely by the financier (*rabb-ul mal*), while the mudarib wastes time and work, without receiving remuneration. *Musharaka* means "partnership" in Arabic. For customers, the advantages of musharaka are obvious, since if there is a profit, it is divided with the bank, which is also the case for losses. Namely, if the bank has contributed with 70% of the capital to create a project, and the client contributed with 30%, that means that if there are losses 70% of them are borne by the bank and 30% are borne by the client. If the client had taken a loan from a conventional bank for the same project, in case of losses, the client would have borne 100% of them and, moreover, they would have to give the borrowed money with interest back to the bank. The main difference between the two is the financial involvement of the contractor, in musharaka, the contractor will contribute with equity capital alongside the investors.

Three factors distinguish an investor who makes loans based on risk capital (a venture capitalist) from a conventional bank. First, while a bank bases its lending decisions on applicants' creditworthiness, the investor (venture capitalist) bases its decision mainly on the potential profitability of the projects proposed. Thus, an applicant without collateral, but with a promising economic project can fail to obtain the bank loan, but succeed in obtaining venture capital. Secondly, while the conventional bank earns interest from the loan, the investor receives a share of company profits. Third, the investor, unlike the bank, can also provide management and technical assistance through the so-called know-how. Thus, the investor's involvement in the business development shows the greater interest he takes in business profitability. A conventional bank does not care whether the business man will have profit or not, since he must pay the monthly interest, regardless of how well the business goes.

Murabaha is a contract in which an individual wants to purchase certain goods or services, but lacks the money to do so. He will negotiate his business and will contact the bank, which will pay for the customer purchases and then sell it at a later date. The price the two of them will negotiate will be higher than the original price of the product/service, and usually the difference between these two prices is equal in value to the interest charged by conventional banks. But between murabaha and interest there is an essential difference: the risk of theft, fire or destruction the bank is exposed to during the time the product is in its possession, which needs to be paid accordingly. In practice, however, the period of time while the bank is the owner of the goods is very short, so the risk is negligible. If the buyer will not repay the loan, then the bank will not be entitled to charge any penalty or resell the product back to the initial seller at a higher price.

This type of loan typical to the Islamic financial system had difficulty being integrated in the UK, problem that arose from the fact that Islam is the second most widespread religion from the UK, with about 4% of its citizens being

Muslims[9], difficulties arising from the existence of certain taxes specific to the sale-purchase process in the UK. For example, stamp tax (stamp duty) is paid by everyone who buys a home and, through murabaha, it has to be paid twice (because the bank both buys and sells the property). The double stamp duty on Islamic mortgages was abolished in April 2003.

The main disadvantage of the system of "profit and loss sharing" is that it is more exposed to losses than the interest system. For example, if an entrepreneur would have to choose between financing the business in one of the two ways, the outcome would be that entrepreneurs with below average success expectations would choose "profit and loss sharing" in order to minimize losses, and those with above average expectations would choose interest in order to maximize profit. Conventional banks would thus create a problem of "adverse selection" for Islamic banks, and it would result in the sharing of the risk rather than the profit with the entrepreneurs they decide to finance. Also, because of mutual distrust between bidders and recipients of the funds, interest, a mechanism which requires no monitoring, becomes preferable against the procedure of "profit and loss sharing".[10]

The last few decades of theory and practice development of Islamic banking[11] can be divided, roughly, into three periods: the first period, between 1950-1975, defined by theory development, the second period, between 1975-1990, defined by experimentation, and the last period, starting from the early 90s to present day, defined by recognition and implementation.

The year 1945 marked the end of World War II and Japan, due to defeat, was forced to withdraw its troops from Indonesian territory, therefore the latter declared its independence. The following decades have meant the end of European colonization in the Middle East, and when Algeria gained independence from France, most of the Muslim world was free from foreign occupation. Prior to declaring their independence, the colonizing countries were managing the economy and finance of the Muslim countries. However, the colonized countries believed they can manage themselves better, so that any form of organization would be compatible with Islamic values. Therefore, between 1940 and 1960, there was an attempt to produce a workable model of Islamic banking system through which collecting or paying interest on loans or deposits would be avoided. In practice, the models proved to be a failure at a business level, yet projecting a feasible banking system did not stop. This was subsequently tried through investigation and experimentation of other models to put Islamic beliefs into business practice.

In 1975 the first Islamic bank was founded, Islamic Development Bank (Dubai Islamic Bank), authorized by special laws which enabled it to operate in accordance with shari'a (Muslim religious law). By 1985, another 27 Islamic banks were founded, and today Islamic banks carry out operations in more than

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[9] Study by The Times in 2009.
[10] Timur Kuran, *Islamic economics and Islamic Subeconomy*, Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 9, Number 4 Fall 1995-Pages 155-173.
[11] Iqbal, Zamir şi Mirakhor, Abbas, *Progress and challenges of Islamic banking,* Thunderbird International Business Review, Volume 41, Issue 4-5, 1999, pages 381–405.

60 countries. The growth of financial institutions, instruments and transactions with no interest rose from $ 5 billion in 1985 to more than $ 150 billion today. Moreover, even non-Islamic banks have started to set up Islamic departments, in order to provide such banking services, in the UK and other countries outside the Islamic world today there are over 200 Islamic financial institutions. In Great Britain, the first Islamic bank, Albaraka Bank, has established a branch in London in the late 80s, becoming the first Islamic bank with banking license to operate in the UK. The branch was closed in 1993. The speculated reasons for the closure are diverse: internal problems, pressure from the central bank or the bank's inability to guarantee full deposit refund to depositors, which has led to the suspending of the banking license.

Conclusions

Islamic economics applies classical solutions to current problems, and where solutions are missing, they seek justifications in the holy books (Koran and Sharia'a law code) in order to favor some reforms. Therefore, at first glance, this economy is more of a nostalgic attempt to take refuge in the simplicity, harmony and prosperity of a traditional social order than a response to contemporary issues. Although it intends to restore parts of the way of leadership of the 8th century peninsula, in reality it has more capacity to adapt to economic reality than theory would show. This doctrine, which they call "fundamentalist" claims to be based on fundamental principles, but in practice these are more malleable than it seems. Moreover, this doctrine (together with others of the same type) imposes monopoly on knowledge and sound judgment, even if it shows responsiveness to external influences.

The Islamic doctrine is not secular, indifferent to values, materialistic, or social-Darwinistic. It attaches primary importance to moral values, the spirit of brotherhood, socio-economic justice and it does not rely solely on the state or market to accomplish its vision. Rather, it is based on the integration of values in society, institutions, market, families, society and the state in order to ensure the welfare of all its citizens. It places great emphasis on social change through individual or collective reform so that neither the state, nor the market perpetuates inequalities.

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ADDING A NEW DIMENSION TO ECONOMICS – HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN ECONOMICS

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Abstract: The article focuses on an increasing importance of economic history as a part of general methodology used by economists in their efforts to understand a more and more instable global economy. It shortly reviews both the evolution of economy and economic history as disciplines with their own identities and then looks at different theoretical approaches to methodological debate between supporters of cliometrics or „New Economic History" and advocates of more traditional schools of economy and, it also attempts to identify a few errors of neoclassical economics. The discussion starts from the idea that economists require, at least, a basic knowledge of economic history as it contributes to a better understanding of the context under which the contemporary economic transformations and events take place.

The economic history shows that models of the "one-size-fits-all" type almost never apply, while neoclassical economic models can be successfully applied in certain but not all institutional and technological contexts.

Keywords: economic history, cliometrics, economics, social sciences.

> *Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exept from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.*
> **John Maynard Keynes**

> *Practical economists, who believe themselves to be quite exept from any humanistic influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct historian.*
> **Jan de Vries**

In the 19th century, economy gained its credibility by associating with established sciences, such as physics and mathematics. The main idea of first modern economists was that if the application of Newton's mechanics had been so successfully used in the fields of physics and engineering, this could also be applied to economics. The theory developed by the neoclassical economists at the end of the 19th century known today as neoclassical economics has been up to now the foundation of "orthodox" economic theory and is the core element of the

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economic science taught to future economists and business world leaders in all big universities of the world. M.N. Browne and J.K. Quinn emphasized that: "*Perhaps unlike any other social science, economics does have an orthodoxy that is so dominant that few economists see themselves as even having a perspective or as being part of a school of thought*"[1], and D. Orrell sustained that the neoclassical economy as a set of ideas can be considered the most powerful theoretical school of modern history[2].

Neoclassical theory is based on explicit analogy /comparison with Newton's physics: therefore, in the same way as Newton believed that matter is built of countless particles interacting with each other bur still remain unchanged from other points of view, the neoclassical theory stated that economy is made up of unconnected individuals that interacted with each other by exchange of goods, services and money. The behaviour of these individuals can be foreseen and anticipated by using economic laws that are as omnipresent as laws that govern the universe. The laws of economy were similar to those of nature, being "eterna land immutable", the expression of their creative power and importance was underlined by Vilfredo Pareto in 1897 as follows: "*Eternal and immutable, they are the expression of the creative power; they represent what is, what must be, what otherwise could not be. Man can come to understand them: he is incapable of changing them. From the infinitely great down to the infinitely small, all things are subject to them. The sun and the planets follow the laws discovered by Newton and Laplace, just as the atoms in their combinations follow the laws of chemistry, as living creatures follow the laws of biology. It is only the imperfections of the human mind which multiply the divisions of the sciences, separating astronomy from physics or chemistry, the natural sciences from the social sciences. In essence, science is one. It is none other than truth*"[3]. In the view of economists, in order to calculate the moves of economy, the forces that drive it must be established. The neoclassical economists based their mechanistic model developed on the idea of usefulness, the concept that Jeremy Bentham defined by means of a "hedonistic calculation" as a sum of pleasures minus pain / effort. The problem is that different people give different use to objects. The neoclassical economists tried to solve this problem arguing that what counts is the average usefulness and thus the use of theory of utility could be used for identifying the economic laws that operate on neoclassical models. These laws, once established had to be considered as William St. Jevons underlined in *Theory of Political Economy*, "*as sure and demonstrative as that*

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[1] M.Neil Browne, J.Kevin Quinn, *The Lamentable Absence of Power in Mainstream Economics*, in John T. Harvey and Robert F. Garnett (eds.), *Future Directions for Heterodox Economics*, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2008, p.240-241.

[2] David Orrell, *Economyths. Ten Ways Economics Gets It Wrong*, Willey & Sons Canada Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, 2010, p.13.

[3] Vilfredo Pareto, *Cours d'economie politique*, 1896-1897, Manual of Political Economy (New English Translation), Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1971 p.122.

of kinematics or statics, nay, almost as self-evident as are the elements of Euclid, when the real meaning of the formulae is fully seized"[4].

The economy is a mathematical representation of human behaviour and as any mathematical model, it is based on a series of assumptions. But, in case of neoclassical economy these are so far from reality and the result is a caricatured and wrong representation of human behaviour, the neoclassical theory being closer to ideology than science. The reason why so many people are convinced that the assumptions of neoclassical theory are rational is because these are based on ideas from physics and engineering that have been a part of our scientific heritage for the past 2500 years, starting at least from the ancient Greeks. David Orrell emphasized that even though the assumptions seem rational and give the impression that they are "scientific", in reality these are as forged coins and the main mistaken conceptions are the following: "*the economy can be described by economic laws; the economy is made up of independent individuals; the economy is stable; economic risk can be easily managed using statistic; the economy is gender-neutral; the economy is fair; economic growth can continue forever; economic growth will make us happy; economic growth is always good*"[5].

These ideas are the foundation of "orthodox" economic theory and impact the process of decision-making at the national, corporate and societal levels. But, the real economy is the result of complex processes that reject reductionalism, it is not "rational" or "correct", while economic growth is not "automatically" desirable, whether we refer to individual wealth or planet wealth in general. Moreover, you do not need to be a mathematician to observe that models on which modern financial system is based are not in order and these not only fail to coherently explain how economy goes but also proved to be completely wrong. The failure of economists (with few exceptions) to predict the beginning global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the global economic downfall that followed it, is not an atypical case. Moreover, this time, not only models failed to predict the economic disaster, but these also helped and favoured its appearance. As in the case of previous economic crises, the causes of the crisis began in 2007-2008 have been and still are hugely debated and analysed, and the main reason is that the assumptions that are the foundation of today's mainstream economic theory are wrong. This means that not only the mathematical models are wrong but also the mental models that have been used for analysing economy are completely wrong[6].

The main problem of the contemporary capitalist economic system that pervades the financial risk calculation is not that it is hard to anticipate/foresee but that in spite of its immense creativity and productivity, it seems to be in a

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[4] William Stanley Jevons, *Theory of Political Economy*, 1871, 4th Edition, Edited by H.S. Jevons, Macmillan, London, 1911, in David Orrell, *Economyths. Ten Ways Economics Gets It Wrong*, Willey & Sons Canada Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario 2010, p.13.

[5] David Orrell, *Economyths. Ten Ways Economics Gets It Wrong*, Willey & Sons Canada Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, 2010, p.5.

[6] David Orrell, *Economyths. Ten Ways Economics Gets It Wrong*, Willey & Sons Canada Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, 2010, p.3.

poor state of health. The capitalist economy was, is and will be "incorrect", instable and difficult to sustain and the contemporary mainstream economic theory face difficulties in analysing and anticipating these problems. *The main problem of neoclassical economy is that it is based on static models that are used to understand a process that is mostly dynamic.* Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of the way the capitalist economy functions was carried out within a heated debate with the proponents of neoclassical economic theory and in this perspective, the main Schumpeter's statement, according to which "*Capitalist reality is first and last a process of change*"[7] proves to be true and also underlines that mainstream economic theory failed to understand that capitalism is mainly characterised by *change* and it cannot be analysed in statical terms. Moreover, Schumpeter harshly criticized the largely spread tendency among the economists to use a completely formal and unrealistic concept of competition, mainly because Schumpeter was convinced that there had never been and will never be a perfect competition and even if this will ever become reality, it will be harmful for the economy.

One of supposed successes – that in time proved to be questionable – of the neoclassical economy in the 1960s was the mathematical demonstration of the fact that capitalist economy still has a tendency to head towards a state of stability characterised by perfect equilibrium. This demonstration had been considered a mathematical proof of "the invisible hand" that maintains prices at their "natural" state of Adam Smith and had been the foundation of models of general economic equilibrium that are still used to simulate tendencies in economy. But, there are a few significant differences between economics and physics. Firstly, the particles described in physics are stable and invariable, in other words, a carbon atom from the Earth cannot be distinguished from one from the Sun having also the same the same gravitational pull. Therefore, the law of gravity applies on Earth and anywhere in the Universe and therefore it is such a strong tool in physics. On the other hand, people are not atoms: they are very different and, moreover, they change their opinions and behaviour in time.

Another major mistake of the perspective offered by the neoclassical theory on the functioning of economy is that similarly tot o theory of atoms in physics, it considers individuals to be the only and most important elements and, at the same time, it underestimates the role of society and history. This finding requires an analysis of the relationship between economy and economic history, in other words, the topic related to the use of historical analysis in economics. The study of the economy of past societies started at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, at a time when it became more and more evident that the economic system had entered into a process of irreversible transformation as a result of beginning of the process of industrialization that made the Western World leave the *Age of Agrarianism* and the *Malthusian Trap*. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that even though their works are not historical, the works of Adam Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus or Karl Marx abound in historical references. Nevertheless, it was only when economics became a deductive

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[7] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Routledge, London and New York, 2003, p.xvi.

science, able to universalise the particular starting from a culturally determined behaviour specific models, that it gained its own identity. This transition had finished by the end of the of the 19ᵗʰ century, being anticipated by the work of the German economist Friedrich List, who in the 1840s following the kameralist tradition questioned classical theories of British economists. List criticized the mainstream British classical theory for the way in which it generalised the conclusions drawn from observing the evolution of the first industrialized nation, confusing the mechanisms of its functioning with the laws of nature. List's view: "*Not considering historical facts, except so far as they respond to its particular tendencies it knows not or disfigures the lessons of history which are opposed to its system*"[8]. Therefore, List considered that Adam Smith had not taken into consideration the importance of a nation as an economic agent, while David Ricardo interpreted the rent as a price of natural fertility of land, a principle on which he based his entire theory of political economy. In reality though, in spite of their inclination towards over-generalization, British classics of economy initiated also the analysis of social aspects of economy, including here the Smith's principle of separation of the public and private areas and Ricardo's theory on conflict between social classes and groups.

In the last three decades of the 19th century, the analysis adopted by marginalism was that disembedded individuals live being animated by the desire to maximise their satisfaction and personal income. The most extreme version of this approach and that later became the standard neoclassical theory supposes that agents operating on the market know the rules of differential calculation and how to apply it to all goods and services and in decisions related to all existing production. Key economists that developed the marginalist neoclassical theory were William Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto. In his main work published in 1871 having the title *Theory of Political Economy*, Jevons made explicit analogies between the theory of utility and physics and, similarly to a physician who analyses abstract, purely theoretical matters and ignores the effects of the friction or turbulence type, he analysed just abstract markets where each individual takes decisions based on "*a pure regard to his own requirements or private interests*", under conditions where "*the intentions of exchanging are known to all*" and where there is "*perfectly free competition*" between market players. Jevons compared the mechanism of prices with the movement of a pendulum that at a certain moment reaches a state of ideal equilibrium between supply and demand. Leon Walras, another marginalist neoclassical scholar, is viewed as an economist who created the theory of economic equilibrium in one of the most influential works of standard neoclassical economic theory, *Elements of Pure Economics*. Contrary to Jevons, who considered only simple examples, Walras simulated the functioning mechanism of markets with multiple goods, where the price of a good could have indirect effects on prices of other goods. Walras came to the conclusion economy should be modelled and simulated as an interconnected whole and, consequently, developed a series of sets of equations within some models that simulated interactions between the sellers and buyers

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[8] Friedrich List, *National System of Political Economy*, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1856 (1841), p.65.

for as wide range of products. Walras' theories had a great influence that was reflected also by Schumpeter, who in 1954 believed that: "*Walras is in my opinion the greatest of all economists. His system of economic equilibrium, uniting, as it does, the quality of a revolutionary creativeness with the quality of classic syntesis, is the only work by an economist that will stand comparison with the achievements of theoretical physics*"[9]. In 1906, Vilfredo Pareto published *Manual of Political Economy*, in which he developed Walras' theory of equilibrium a complicated mathematical device and in which he introduced the idea of Pareto optimum, defined as a state in which any change that improves the wealth of an individual will lead to a reduction of wealth of another one. Thus, gradually, together with other neoclassical economists, Jevons, Walras and Pareto created a solid foundation for the impressive structures of modern classical theory of the 20th century. Marginalism spread in Great Briatin, Austria, Switzerland and the United states at the beginning of the 2th century, Franca and Italy were incidentally influenced by it, while Germany remained practically immune to marginalism up to the begging of the world War II.[10]

The so-called "debate on the method" (Methodenstreit) appeared in 1880 between, on the one hand, Gustav Schmoller, the leader of the German school of economics, in whose view, no economic theory could be formulated if it was not based on historical analysis of a society, and, on the other hand, Carl Menger, the leader of the Austrian School of Economics, who supported the possibility to know *a priori* the principles of behaviour of individuals. At the same time, the debate took place between William Cunningham and Alfred Marshall, but it was less intense as Marshall adopted just partially marginalism[11]. In his turn, Arnold Toynbee dedicated himself to the study of industrial revolution motivated by the desire to reject the standard generalizing statements of the kind that advocated for the universal benefits of free trade. Once entered into the pantheon of history, the study of economic past made huge progress after the end of the World War I, in spite of the difficult context after the World War I, marked by the Great Depression, the instability of the 1920s and 1930s and more and more complicated global economic relations led to getting awareness of the fact that the study of history becomes more and more necessary for understanding the present. As a result, the importance of studying economic history grew during this period, together with more evident separation of this field from economics.

In the mid-40s, Berlin ceased to be the intellectual center of the Western world and the historical and institutional model of economy that German scholars had exploited on a large scale started to lose its influence. At the same time, the theoretical system developed by John Maynard Keynesin the 1920s and 1930s by criticizing the neoclassical theory started to be questioned. Keynes 'intuition that disequilibrium is a rule in capitalist economies and the equilibrium is an exception, was destroyed by the neoclassics after the

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[9] Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, Routledge, London, 1954, p.827.

[10] F. Boldizzoni, *The Poverty of Clio. Resurecting Economic History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p.3.

[11] G.M. Hogson, *How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science*, Routledge, London, 2001, p.107.

publication in 1937 of a famous article by Hicks. Its consequence was that in the following two decades after abandoning their ambition to develop big theories based on empirical evidence, the historians of economy dedicated themselves to interpreting empirical evidence, this stage being described as a period of "history for its own sake" This change of direction left open a conflict between history of economy and the field from which it had separated quite recently, that of economics.[12] In the 1940s and 1950s, under the influence of synthesis between marginalism and keynesism carried out by Paul Samuelson, there took place a kind of division of labour between neoclassical economists focused on analysis of short-term phenomena and historians of economy that concentrated on developing heterodox concepts in their efforts to understand long-term economic-historical processes beyond the action area of neoclassical theory.[13]. The statement of the famous epistemologist, Karl Popper, is significant for the intellectual climate of the period, who said in 1960 that: "*Economics is the first of the social sciences to have had its Newtonian Revolution*", while in, 1976, Donald McCloskey, in a kind of declaration pronounced the victory of a New Economy, he supported in his main article "*Does the Past Have Useful Economics?*", that economic history must and could be applied to modern economy– the neoclassical theory to the benefit of history.[14].

Nowadays, as a result of developments in socio-human sciences, economic history has been undergoing a deep identity crisis, triggered by the development of a movement in the United States at the end of 50s, known under the name of "new economic history" or "cliometrics", a term introduced by Stanley Reiter to describe a kind of quantitative history that combines history and statistics. In the autumn of 1957, a group of American and Canadian historians met at Williamstown, Massachusetts, to discuss main tendencies in American history throughout the !9th century. At this meeting, some presentations adopted the analytical form and rigour specific to standard neoclassical economic presentations but almost absent in economic history. The result was that in 1957, *Journal of Economic History*, that included some outcomes of the initial discussions and an abstract of the conference written by Simon Kuznets, set for itself a goal to integrate standard economic theory and economic history. Later, at a conference hosted by Purdue University, the extremely controversial "Cliometric Revolution" was launched. This new approach to research in the field of economic history rejected the methodological style of "*measurement without theory*" that characterised "the Old Economic History". Cliometrics underlined the need for researchers of economic history to be precise and clear in terms of their key assumptions that should be tested, not only to avoid logical errors but to connect historical investigations to neoclassical economic theory and

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[12] F. Boldizzoni, *The Poverty of Clio. Resurecting Economic History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p.4.

[13] N. Lamoreaux, Economic History and the Cliometric Revolution, in A. Molho, G. Wood (eds.), Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998, p.69.

[14] Jan de Vries, *Economic History: What Does It Have to Teach Us*, 1999, p.1 (www.econ.yale.edu/alumni/reunion99/devries.htm).

quantitative analysis[15]. Starting with the 1960s, through a series of regular seminars and conferences of climetricians, the discipline gained solid background in the next few decades, especially in the United States and the main feature of cliometrics as it developed in the United States, has been the desire to connect economy with history of economy. In a larger context, the growing importance of cliometrics was based on a long tradition of economic history in a period when other fields of social sciences flourished due to development of computers and data bases in the 1960s. First cliometricians reinterpreted economic history through the lens of neoclassical economy and the result was that the cliometric revolution meant a simultaneous and radical transformation of economic history, a reinvention of the field that brought new methodologies that produced more relevant outcomes that increase the prestige of the new approach and guaranteed the access to more and more important resources.

At the beginning of the 1970s, cliometrics was already well-established to be accepted as a part a larger field of economy, in the context in which the distinction between classical and historical schools of economy having their roots in the 19th century had been more and more emphasized. In the 1970s, the new historical economy differed from the old school belonging to classical school of economy and not to the historical group. The new economic history became a form of applied neoclassical economy as underlined Greasley and Oxley: "*The heat of the early debates, the label of the new economy, and the controversies surrounding counterfactuals and applying neo-classical economics to re-evaluate long-standing historical questions sometimes disguises the wider foundations of cliometrics. In that wider setting several intellectual traditions shaped the emergence and the subsequent evolution of cliometrics*"[16]. Starting with the 1970s, a few important intellectual movements had been established that include quantitative economic history and, especially, the development of historical series of data regarding prices, salaries and income, the movement that has had a long tradition since the 19th century; the quantitative social sciences of the 1950s and 1960s that focused on empirical research and the use of census and statistical data on population, main macro or micro economic indicators, a method developed due to developments in the field of computer science that allowed larger amounts of statistical data; econometric testing that includes macroeconomic models related to economic cycles developed since the 1920s; cliometrics, a discipline in full development, its research and change of area of interest reflects the new developments in the field of economic theory and especially the return of theory of growth into the center of interest of standard economy, together with the development of endogenous growth models in the 1990 that allowed cliometricians to reduce their dependence on neoclassical models; also, the development of cliometrics has been highly influenced by the

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[15] B. Snowdown, *Review of Reflections on the Cliometrics Revolution*, p.1 in John S. Lyons, Louis P. Cain, Samuel H. Williamson, (eds.), *Conversations with Economic Historians*, Routledge, London, 2007 (www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/402005.article)

[16] D. Greasley, L. Oxley, *Economics and History. Surveys in Cliometrics*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2011, p.2.

new developments in terms of methods used by the discipline, most importantly in the analysis of non-stationary time series[17].

Cliometrics as it appeared in the 1960s, has been a part of a larger movement within social sciences and history towards quantification. Cliometricians started from the belief that their new methods will bring new, clearer answers to old historical debates and the same optimistical movement animated the other social sciences, there was a hope that their results should increase the ability to grow wealth through public policies. This desire is evident in the case of new economy of Keynes of the 1960s that reflected the increase of trust among practitioners, politicians and decision-makers towards usefulness of social sciences for the "real world". In the 1960s, the reconnecting of economic history and economy was the core of cliometrics that was mainly a form of social science based on methods and theories of economists[18]. In the 1980, cliometrics became more and more mature and eclectic. Even though the belief in the usefulness of precise measurement and exact conceptualization has remained unchanged, the empirical and theoretical models of cliometricians have become more and more econometrical and more focused on historical details. The reinterpretation of economic history by first cliometricians was based mainly on the application of economic logic in a neoclassical way in the interpretation of historical processes on the long run and it had a deep impact especially in terms of reviewing the economic history of the united States of America.

The new economic history was also "exported" from the United States of America to a large number of countries, the fact that made Donald McCloskey in 1987 state that it "conquered the West" and declare *Pax Cliometrica[19]*. McCloskey's argument in favour of the study of economic history had at its core the idea that: "*economics needs what historical economics has gotten from its association with history: seriousness about facts, an interest in the long run, and habits of scholarship that make for a cumulative science*"[20]. McCloskey brought to attention also a number of practical reasons why economists should read, write about and study economic history that could be summarised in the idea that the value of historical economy lies in providing a laboratory for economists who through testing and improving economic theories get in tune with findings of economic history.[21] At the end of his important article published in 1976, McCloskey concluded: "*An economist, least of all a cliometrician cannot argue that there are no substitutes for history in the production of important*

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[17] D. Greasley, L. Oxley, *Economics and History. Surveys in Cliometrics*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2011, p.2-3.

[18] D. Greasley, L. Oxley, *Economics and History. Surveys in Cliometrics*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2011, p.5.

[19] D.N. McCloskey, *Econometric History*, MacMillan, London, 1987, p.77.

[20] D.N. McCloskey, G.K. Hersch Jr., *A Bibliography of Historical Economics to 1980*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.10.

[21] D.N. McCloskey, *Does the Past Have Useful Economics?* In Journal of Economic Literature 14 (1976), p.439-55.

economics, no more than he can argue that there was no substitute for the railway in American economic growth"[22].

These statements disagree with the powerful statement of Schumpeter on the centrality of historical processes in economic analysis and, consequently, with the central role played by the economic history within economic and social sciences. For McCloskey, economic history was first an economy in the service of history and not history in the service of economy[23]. Schumpeter valued and found useful both history and pure theory, econometrics and great compilations of evidence, sociology and statistics, but underlined the importance of historical approach in the analysis of issues related to cyclic evolutionary processes, especially due to the fact that: *„Since what we are trying to understand is economic change in historic time, there is little exaggeration in saying that the ultimate goal is simply a reasoned history, not of crises only, nor of cycles or waves, but of the economic process in all its aspects and bearings to which theory merely supplies some tools and schemata, and statistics merely part of the material. Only detailed historic knowledge can definitively answer most of the questions of individual causation and mechanism; without it the study of time series must remain inconclusive, and theoretical analysis empty. Contemporaneous facts or even historic facts covering the last quarter or half of a century are perfectly inadequate. For no phenomenon of an essentially historic nature can be expected to reveal itself unless it is studied over a long interval. An intensive study of the process in the last quarter of the seventeenth and in the eighteenth century is hence a most urgent task, for a quantitative and carefully dated account of a period of 250 years may be called the minimum of existence of the student of business cycles. Of course, this is beingly realized. Histories of crises and detailed descriptions of individual crises have been written from the beginning of the nineteenth century. That literature is richer than appears at first sight because it includes all the descriptions of particular aspects, as well as those written from particular standpoints – notably, most of the attempts to analyze the working of the monetary mechanism and of speculation, with both of which the phenomenon of crises has been linked up from the first. But that is not what we mean. Since the development generated by the economic system is cyclical by nature, the task to be accomplished grows far beyond mere description of spectacular breakdowns, on the one hand, and of the behaviour of aggregative quantities, on the other, into the formidable one of describing in detail the industrial processes behind them. Historians of crises primarily talk about stock exchange events, banking, price level, failures, unemployment, total production, and so on – all of which are readily recognized as surface phenomena or as compounds which sum up underlying processes in such a way as to hide their real features. Hence, the value of that kind of historical work is not only impaired by the fact that much of it is not up to minimum requirements of scholarship, but also by the still more important fact that, except incidentally, it*

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[22] D.N. McCloskey, *Does the Past Have Useful Economics?* In Journal of Economic Literature 14 (1976), p.454.

[23] D.N. McCloskey, *Econometric History*, MacMillan, London, 1987, p.14.

did not touch upon the essential things at all...What we really need we are more likely to find in general economic histories: they brings us much nearer to the process which produces the waves we observe in our time series. But much more important are the innumerable monographs on individual industries...they indicate how an industry arises, how it is absorbed into the economic organism, how it affects that organism and how it is reacted upon, and what its cyclical behavior is"[24].

In the mid-1980s, the general perception was that economic history had lost its practical relevance and vitality, this reduction of its importance being attributed to the development of cliometrics. The critics asked themselves if economic history is nothing else but economy applied to set of historical data, this made useless the allocation of substantial intellectual effort by professional economists to the study of economic history. Moreover, some critics believed that revisionism of the pioneers of cliometrics led to an emipirialism of basic neoclassical economic theory. On the other hand, one of the first critics of the new economic history was Fritz Redlich who was convinced that the future belongs to both qualitative and quantitative, to economic and social history[25]. Another renown critic of new economic history was Carlo Cipolla, who in an essay on economic history method stated that: *"If the new economic historians" want to come to grips with historical reality in all its complexity they will have to abandon their esprit geometrique for the subtler if less elegant esprit de finesse. This may actually happen sooner than expected"*[26].

Normally, it is expected that economic history should contribute to development of knowledge and understanding of economic and social past and what differentiates historical studies conducted by using a coherent conceptual instrument from the ideologized ones is the ability to increase the degree of understanding the way of functioning of some societies in the past, more or less different from the present ones. On the other hand, as F. Boldizzoni underlined in *The Poverty of Clio. Resurrecting Economic History* (2011), nowadays the undeclared goal of cliometrics/new economic history is not that of contributing to a better knowledge and understanding of history, but: *"it is to create narratives of the past compatible with neoliberal economics, and often it is a highly ideological exercise to endorse specific worldviews, theories, and policy recommendations"*[27]. Until relatively recently, the European historians of economy tended to ignore this phenomenon and believed that beginning a new debate with advocates of new economic history is useless and a waste of time as in their vision cliometricians could not be viewed as professional historians. In addition, as long as cliometricians focused mainly on aspects of American economic history, they have not been considered a "threat". The situation

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[24] Joseph Schumpeter, *Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1939, p. 213-214.

[25] Fritz Redlich, *Potentialities and Pitfalls in Economic History*, 1968, p.85 in Andreano, 1970.

[26] Carlo Cipolla, *Between Two Cultures: An Introduction to Economic History*, Norton, New York, 1991, p.70.

[27] F. Boldizzoni, *The Poverty of Clio. Resurecting Economic History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p.5.

gradually started to change provided that in the last two decades a still small but aggressive group of European cliometricians educated in American universities became more and more influential as their studies and research occupy the most market of publication in the field, especially in English, the fact that contributed to increase of their visibility. Moreover, cliometricians use more and more sophisticated persuasive instruments of the academic field and the result is hat more and more historians from other fields not familiar with economy began to rely on cliometrics in order to develop an informed opinion on this matter. Cliometric studies became a kind of literary genre covering the history of the five continents since Antiquity to present times. But, these developments of cliometrics have produced a counter-reaction and insatisfaction among historians and "dissident" economists. For instance, in 2001, from a neo-Schumpeterian perspective, Chris Freeman and Francisco Louca made a call for "*remarrying economics and history as an alternative strategy to that of cliometrics*"[28].

New economic history /cliometrics managed to reintroduce the theory and instruments of economy to the study of economic history and the next stage shall be the reconnection of economic history with economy, what becomes more and more evident in a field until recently almost ignored of economic growth analysis or in that of economic crisis analysis that regained its importance after the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis. Theoretical models of economic growth include the analysis of human capital, geography and institutions, and analogies between the past and the present are based on the huge amount of data and long-term historical series. Contrary to cliometricians, who whether study economic history *for its own sake*, or try to provide historic-economic arguments compatible with modern neoliberal theories, the standard historians of economy of the "old school" can provide a set of data resulted from their studies that could be useful for developing economic theory that should reflect more accurately the mechanisms of economy. The usefulness of economic history for economists lays in the fact that economic history more specific data and better theories that could contribute to setting better economic policies. We should not forget the fact that, in their turn, some important members of the Department of Economy of the Chicago University, the birthplace of the most extreme version of neoclassical theory, headed by Milton Friedman, believed that economic history is a legitimate field of study within economy: "*I believe some knowledge of economic history is indispensable for a student of economics. It is only from a knowledge of the past that we can make judgements about the future. Only by studying economic history can we know what economic problems have arisen in the past, what kind of measures have been taken to deal with them and how these measures have worked out*"[29].

To understand modern global capitalism, we need a new paradigm, a new synthesis between economy and other social sciences and, especially, the

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[28] Chris Freeman, Francisco Louca, *As Time Goes By: From the Industrial Revolution to the Information Revolution*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p.39.

[29] Ross B. Emmett, *The Elgar Companion to the Chicago School of Economics*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010, p.117.

reintroduction of historical analysis into economic research and this due to the fact that as George Soros underlined: *"The currently prevailing paradigm, namely that financial markets tend towards equilibrium, is both false and misleading; our current troubles can be largely attributed to the fact that the international financial system has been developed on the basis of that paradigm"*[30]. The dominant modern paradigm has been contradicted by the entire financial history that has shown that during periods of boom and bursts, there are no exceptions, but rules in the evolution of capitalism. Starting from this finding, George Soros stated that need for a new paradigm not focused on financial markets but deals more with the analysis of the relationship between "thinking and reality" and supported that mistaken interpretations and conceptions play a key role in shaping the evolution of history. For Soros, there is fundamental difference between previous economic crises that tested and reconfirmed successfully the trend and the wrong conception on which dominant economic theories during the financial crisis of 2008 had been based, and which in his view had been a turning point from which both the trend and the wrong conception had become unsupported.[31]

The main idea of conceptual framework of Soros is that social events have a different structure compared to natural phenomena. In case of natural phenomena, there is a usual chain that links directly a set of facts to the next ones, while in the case of social developments, the course of events is more complicated as these involve the actions of participants and their conceptions and the interaction and interdependence between actions and conceptions or opinions about the respective actions influence the causal chain. In other words, there is a bidirectional connection between facts and predominant opinions at any given moment: on the one hand, participants try to understand the situation that includes both acts and opinions, and, on the other hand, they try to influence the situation (that in turn includes both acts and opinions) Interaction and interdependence between cognitive and manipulative functions that are inserted and influence the causal chain so as, in case of social events, the causal chain does not lead directly a set of acts to another as it reflects and influences the opinions of participants. If these opinions do not match the acts, they introduce an element of *uncertainty* into the course of events, the element that is absent in case of natural phenomena. This element of uncertainty affects both the acts and opinions of participants. In the view of Soros, natural phenomena are not necessarily determined by scientific rules that have a universal validity, and the social developments even less so.[32]. What Soros tries to show is the validity and importance of *reflexivity* in the analysis of social and economic problems and, especially in the context where the dominant paradigm based on the theory of economic equilibrium and its political derivate, the market

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[30] George Soros, *The New Paradigm for Financial Markets. The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.1.

[31] George Soros, *The New Paradigm for Financial Markets. The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.10.

[32] George Soros, *The New Paradigm for Financial Markets. The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.8.

fundamentalism not only proved unable to explain what happens to contemporary capitalism, and could become responsible as it contributed to global economic crisis. Before the start of the 2008 financial crisis, it had been difficult to develop a new paradigm that should match the neoclassical theory as it could not have delivered unequivocal predictions and that is why the economist did not even consider it. But, after the downfall of 2008 and global recession that followed it, revealed that the neoclassical paradigm based on the theory of equilibrium had been wrong failing to predict and explain what happened, so the path to new paradigm is more open[33].

The neoclassical economic paradigm proved to be based on a chimera and this is the main reason why the economic science needs a new paradigm that should leave behind the autistic neoclassical way of thinking. In this sense, the article entitled "*Economics Needs a Scientific Revolution*" published in the *Nature* magazine seems to show the fact that things started to change, as this includes a call to rethink the current economic paradigm: "*We need to break away from classical economics and develop completely different tools*"[34].

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[33] George Soros, *The New Paradigm for Financial Markets. The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means*, Public Affairs, New York, 2008, p.153

[34] J.P. Bouchard, *Economics Needs a Scientific Revolution*, in Nature (455), p.1181

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NOT A REAL TRANSLATION, BUT A 'REMAKE'.
NOTES ON THE ENGLISH VERSION OF INCREMENTORUM ET DECREMETORUM AULAE OTHMANNICAE ... LIBRI TRES

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Abstract: The present paper is aimed at testing Virgil Cândea's hypothesis concerning the fate of Dimitrie Cantemir's most famous work, The History of the Othman Empire, *first written in Latin and translated into English and hence into other vernaculars. A few years after he discovered the Latin original, Cândea stated that the English version was not a real translation, but "a sort of remake", holding the translator responsible for a great deal of the "harsh criticism" received by the book. My tools for testing this hypothesis are drawn from relevance theory, formulated by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson and adjusted to translation studies by Ernst-August Gutt. In section 1 I summarize the problem investigated, presenting the history of the text and Cândea's arguments. Section 2 is reserved to the definition of the main concepts used in the analysis. In section 3, Cândea's hypothesis is rejected and the analysis of a few examples illustrates how the quest for relevance drives translation techniques.*

Keywords: translation, Dimitrie Cantemir, relevance theory, processing effort, cognitive effects.

The present paper[1] investigates the relation between an 18th century Latin text and its English version, namely Dimitrie Cantemir's most famous work, *Incrementorum et decrementorum Aulae Othmannicae sive Aliothmannicae historiae, a prima gentis origine ad nostra usque tempora deductae, libri tres* (hence IDAO), and its English version *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire* (hence HGD), translated by N. Tindal. Virgil Cândea, one of the best experts in matters of old Romanian culture, denied the English text the status of a translation, considering it "just a sort of remake" (see below). The relation between the two texts is important because, as section 1 of this paper shows, the European audience was acquainted with Cantemir's work only by means of vernacular translations, all of them relying on Tindal's version. Thus, the reception of IDAO in European culture was filtered by Tindal's translation options.

In testing Cândea's hypothesis, I have chosen to apply relevance theory, formulated by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson and adapted to translation studies by Ernst-August Gutt. Relevance theory has redesigned the field of cognitive pragmatics and allows a unitary account of various phenomena connected with human communication. I have chosen this theoretic framework because it has a great explanatory power, greater than other translation theories[2].

In the first section, the complicated history of Cantemir's text is presented. Section 2 gives an overview of relevance theory, with special attention to the concepts needed for the analysis. In section 3, Cândea's arguments are analysed and his hypothesis is rejected; moreover, it discusses several examples using relevance-theoretic tools in order to show how the translator's decisions are relevance-oriented. Conclusions are summarized in section 4.

1. A complicated history

The problem under investigation arises partly from the complicated history of Cantemir's work. Written originally in Latin in 1716, IDAO was first translated into English by N. Tindal, a professional translator. HGD was published in London in 1734-1735. The English version was the source of several other translations: into French (1743), German (1745) and other vernaculars, including Romanian (1876-1878). The Latin manuscript was sold several times until it went missing. In 1984, Virgil Cândea found the manuscript at Houghton Library, at Harvard University.[3] The discovery came with immense surprise. Virgil Cândea noted great differences between the Latin original and the widespread English version:

> „A comparison between the Latin original – found almost by miracle – and Tindal's English versions clearly shows that Tindal and, besides him, all his followers published just a sort of 'remake' of Cantemir's work. [...] Anyway, this translation made Dimitrie Cantemir famous and appreciated for more than a century, but the 'liberties' that Tindal had taken from the Prince's text are to be held responsible for a great deal of the harsh criticism addressed to the work later on"[4] (translation mine).

The so-called 'liberties' are, in fact, a series of charges enumerated by Virgil Cândea. The most important of them are the following:

(a) Tindal changed the structure of the work entirely. IDAO was divided in three books in which Turkish history is narrated and three other books of so-

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[2] Gutt, Ernst-August, *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context,* Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. VIII.

[3] For more details on the history of the text, see Cândea, Virgil. The Original Manuscript of the *History of the Ottoman Empire* by Dimitrie Cantemir. In Cantemir, Dimitrie, *The Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire*, Bucharest, Roza Vânturilor Publishing House, 1999. pp. XVII-LVII.

[4] Cândea, Virgil, „Foreword of the Romanian Translation. In Cantimir, Dimitrie, *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman or Alothman Court, from the first origins of the nation, narrated until present times, in three books*, translated by Dan Sluşanschi, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing House, 2010, p. 6.

called annotations. These annotations were conceived as 'endnotes'. Their function is to explain the information of the main books. They rely mainly on Cantemir's personal experience at the Ottoman Court. Tindal placed the annotations inside the main text, turning the 'endnotes' into 'footnotes' and thus blurring the difference between 'serious' history and personal experience matters;

(b) Tindal omitted some fragments, tables and drawings. Sometimes, he summarized larger amounts of text in one or two sentences;

(c) Tindal omitted words and phrases in Turkish and Persian, written with Arabic characters. Turkish or Persian words and even fragments are rendered in both their original alphabet (at the time, Arabic alphabet) and in Latin-character transliteration, followed by their glossing. For larger fragments, Tindal usually keeps only the glossing, while for single words – that had to be used as such – he rendered them transliterated, omitting the Arabic writing.

All these charges will be discussed in detail in section 3.

2. Relevance theory

Relevance theory is a general theory of human cognition and, in particular, of human communication. At the core of this theory lies the notion of relevance, which determines the way we speak and the way we interpret utterances. A stimulus (that includes utterances) is relevant only if it combines with background information available in the hearer's mind to produce positive cognitive effects[5], that is, to produce a change in his cognitive environment: adding a new belief, strengthening old ones or revising old beliefs[6]. All things being equal, the greater the cognitive effects, the greater the relevance. However, all cognitive effects come with a cost – the effort of processing a stimulus. All things being equal, the higher the processing effort, the lower the relevance[7].

People have intuitions of relevance and the cost-benefits balance is unconsciously assessed by both speakers and hearers[8]. Out of the multitude of stimuli in the environment, hearers will pick only that stimulus that they consider relevant enough, i.e. capable of yielding positive cognitive effects at a low processing effort. Speakers will try to construct their utterances in such a way that the audience would find them relevant enough to be worth processing[9].

Since translation is a form of communication, it is governed by the principles of relevance. Among other forms of communication, translation has

[5] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, "Relevance Theory". In Ward, Laurence & Ward, Gregory, *The Handbook of Pragmatics*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 608.

[6] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition,* 2nd edition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 114.

[7] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, "Relevance Theory". In Ward, Laurence & Ward, Gregory, *The Handbook of Pragmatics*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 609.

[8] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition,* 2nd edition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 119; Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, "Relevance Theory". In Ward, Laurence & Ward, Gregory, *The Handbook of Pragmatics*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 610.

[9] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition,* 2nd edition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 156-157.

two defining characteristics: (a) a translated text T_2 stands for an original text T_1 and (b) the language of T_2 is different from the language of T_1. Translation can thus be defined as "interpretive use across language boundaries"[10]. An utterance is used interpretively when it is used with the aim of representing another utterance "in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms"[11]. Other instances of interpretive use include quotations and indirect speech. The resemblance of the two propositional forms is assessed with respect to the explicatures and the implicatures it could yield. Explicatures are analytical implications that can be derived from the propositional form alone. Implicatures are implications derived from the propositional form of the assumption being processed and other assumptions in the cognitive context of the audience. But a translation is read in a different context than the original text, therefore implicatures will be different. Resemblance is, therefore, a matter of degree[12].

Constraints of relevance are applied to both the contents and the means of expressing that content:

> "[I]f we ask in what respects the intended interpretation of the translation should resemble the original, the answer is: in respects that make it adequately relevant to the audience – that is, that offer adequate contextual effects; if we ask how the translation should be expressed, the answer is: it should be expressed in such a manner that it yields the intended interpretation without putting the audience to unnecessary processing effort."[13]

To conclude, the resemblance between a source text and its translation should be assessed by taking into account two factors: cognitive effects and processing effort.

3. Latin to English: a Change of Context

My claim is that all changes operated by Tindal are aimed at adjusting the text to the new context, in order to yield adequate positive cognitive effects at a low processing effort. In this view, the English version remains a translation. In order to support my claim, a definition of context in cognitive terms is presented in the following section.

3.1. Cognitive context

In relevance theory, context is understood as a psychological reality: no extralinguistic information (for instance, age or sex of the participants) matters

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[10] Gutt, Ernst-August, *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context,* Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. 100.

[11] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition,* 2nd edition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 229.

[12] Gutt, Ernst-August, "A Theoretical Account of Translation – without a Translation Theory". *Target: International Journal of Translation Studies*, II/2, pp. 135-164 (here from http://www.bible-researcher.com/gutt1.html, last accessed on 28.02.2015), 1990, section 5.

[13] Gutt, Ernst-August, *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context,* Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, pp. 101-102.

unless it is mentally represented. Context is "a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world"[14], namely that subset of assumptions that is most accessible at the moment when the communication takes place.

In the case of IDAO, the audience of both original and translated text are aware that they are reading a treatise on Ottoman history. Therefore, their cognitive context includes assumptions on Ottoman history and culture. These assumptions are more salient than other assumptions, and will be easily accessed when reading the text in order to yield contextual implications.

Dimitrie Cantemir's biography warrants the conclusion that he was familiar with Turkish culture and history, since he spent some 10 years at Istanbul[15]. His presumed audience included firstly the members of the Academy of Berlin, whose interest in Cantemir's treatise is documented[16]. The choice of a certain language for IDAO, namely Latin, gives further clues towards identifying his target audience: the *Respublica litterarum*, the intellectual community of the 18th century, people with a certain academic experience[17].

N. Tindal was a translator of historical works. His knowledge of Turkish affairs is obvious in many parts of HGD, where he dares to complete or even contradict Cantemir's statements. In several points of the treatise, the translator writes his own notes, where he argues for his personal views, quoting sources that support his claims (e.g. Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*). However, by translating this work into a vernacular, Tindal marks the shift from an academic audience to a non-academic one. The cognitive environment of such an audience could have contained a number of assumptions regarding Turkish history and culture, but their knowledge must have been less specialized.

3.2. Cândea's arguments

The translator's interventions, ironically called 'liberties' by Virgil Cândea, are aimed at increasing the relevance of the text, taking into account the cognitive context of the audience. Increasing the degree of relevance can be done by increasing cognitive effects, by decreasing processing effort or by both.

The strategy of increasing cognitive effects is adopted when the translator wants to prevent a failure in communication. His text might not produce adequate cognitive effects in several situations: (a) the new assumption provided by his text has no connection with the assumptions in the cognitive context of the audience; (b) the new assumption was already present in the cognitive context of the audience, and its strength is not modified; (c) the new assumption provided

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[14] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition,* 2nd edition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 15.

[15] Panaitescu, Petre P., *Dimitrie Cantemir: the Life and the Works*, Bucharest, The Romanian Academy's Publishing House, 1958, pp. 37-46.

[16] For more detailed information on the efforts made by the members of the Society of Sciences in Berlin to acquire Cantemir's manuscripts after the author's death, see Bahner, Werner, 1973, Cantemir and the Academy of Berlin. *The Twentieth Century*, 154-155, p. 95.

[17] Waquet, Françoise, *Latin or the Empire of a Sign: from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, translated by John Howe, London, Verso, p. 87; Burke, Peter, 2004, *Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 53.

by the text is in contradiction with other assumptions in the cognitive context of the audience and it is not strong enough to upset these assumptions[18]. All these shortcomings make the text irrelevant, since achieving positive cognitive effects is a necessary condition for relevance, and lead to a failure in communication.

Cândea's criticism targets some operations performed by the translator in order to prevent the situation described under (a): the lack of connection with the audience's cognitive context. The first 'charge' put forward by Cândea regards the rearrangement of the entire book by turning the endnotes into footnotes. According to Cândea, this operation blurred the distinction between information relying on written sources and information drawn from personal experience. This distinction is highly relevant for an academic, as Cantemir himself stated in one of his Romanian works. The assumption "the source of information is important" was present in the cognitive context of a scholar. For a non-academic readership, it would either be absent from their cognitive environment or as a weak assumption. On the other hand, turning the endnotes into footnotes allowed an easier information retrieval and so a decrease in processing effort.

The second objection refers to the omission of fragments, tables and drawings, which, according to Cândea, were meant to explain the text. I believe that the procedure was intended to decrease processing effort and increase cognitive effects, although in certain cases the translator's decision is questionable. I shall discuss the situation of the tables. In his treatise, Cantemir uses Muslim chronology to date the events. In the *Introduction*, he presents an original method of finding the correspondence between the Hegira (Muslim chronology) and the Christian calendar, by means of tables. To illustrate his method, Cantemir gives several examples of important events, discussing previous opinions on their date. The text is accompanied, in each case, by a table. Tindal omits the tables and sometimes he even summarizes the texts. In relevance-theoretic terms, the tables had the function of increasing the degree of certitude of the assumptions presented in the text by providing more arguments for the assumption presented. For an academic audience, the path towards a conclusion is just as important as the conclusion itself. For a non-academic reader, the source of an assumption is less important and the tables would only increase processing effort, with no worthy benefits. Actually, Tindal compensated this omission by calculating himself, for each date expressed by Cantemir in Muslim chronology, the corresponding date of the Christian era. The tables were thus useless.

Cândea's third major objection, concerning the omission of fragments and words in Turkish, Persian (especially when rendered in the Arabic alphabet) and sometimes in Greek can be explained by the same quest for relevance. The cognitive environment of the envisaged audience contained no knowledge of Arabic writing or of Oriental languages. Thus, keeping the fragments and words in Turkish and Persian in their original alphabet would have mean just useless processing effort.

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[18] Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition,* 2nd edition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 121.

The transformations of the text might seem radical. We're not used to see such changes of the macrostructure of a text in translation. But if we adopt a definition of translation such as the one proposed by Gutt (see section 2), the relation between IDAO and HGD may still remain under the scope of translation. The resemblance between the translated text and the original is a matter of degree, and translation is conceived in relevance theory as a continuum whose final point is total identity. In reality, total identity is rarely achieved, and the degree of resemblance might just as well vary inside the same text.

Cândea's criticism relies on certain expectations about a translation. This type of mismatch between the audience's expectations and the translator's decisions may be prevented through specific paratexts such as notes or introductions in which translators should spell out their principles[19]. The absence of such a paratext allows such undeserved critiques. In my opinion, Tindal actually helped Cantemir's text reach his audience better. He adjusted the text to its audience's cognitive environment and so he insured a better reception of the text. As I have shown elsewhere[20], the translator cannot be held responsible for the 'harsh criticism' addressed to the book. I believe that the few pitfalls that can indeed be found in the translation are fully compensated by the many relevance-oriented improvements made by Tindal.

3.3. *How does it work?*

In section 3.2., relevance theory was used to explain changes undergone by the macrostructure of the book in order to refute Cândea's criticism, but no examples from the texts were discussed. I the current section, I analyse some fragments from the texts to show how the quest for relevance drives translation techniques[21].

In (1a), Cantemir pleads for a certain spelling of the Latin adjective *Othmanus*:

(1a) "Arabice enim th illud per ث, quod Turcis vocatur *Tshei Arebi*, id est 's Arabum' notatur, qui character cum accurate τῷ θ Graecorum respondeat, literae, ut ita dicam, 'interdentali', lingua dentibus intercepta tenue et obtusum s protrudente, nullum est dubium, quin, uti Graece Ὀθμᾶν, ita Latine 'Othman' scribi debeat."[22]

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[19] Gutt, Ernst-August, *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context,* Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. 186.

[20] Vasileanu, Monica, Foreign words in the *History of the Ottoman Empire*, conference presentation at *The 14th International Conference of the Department of Linguistics: Current Issues in Linguistic Variation*, organized by the University of Bucharest, Faculty of Letters, Bucharest, 2014, Novermber 28-29.

[21] A more in-depth analysis in Vasileanu, Monica, "What was a relevant translation in the 18th century?" (unpublished), 2015.

[22] Cantemir, Dimitrie 2015 (in press), *Incrementorum et decrementorum Aulae Othmannicae sive Aliothmannicae historiae a prima gentis origine ad nostra usque tempora deductae libri tres* [*The Three Books of The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman or Alothman Court, from the first origins of the nation, narrated until present times, in three books*], edited by Dan Sluşanschi, with the contribution of Octavian Gordon, Florentina Nicolae, Monica Vasileanu, translated into Romanian by Ioana Costa, Bucureşti, Ed. Fundaţiei pentru Literatură şi

(1b) "For the Arabic th is noted by ﺙ, which is called by the Turks *Tshei Arebi*, that is 'Arabic s', a character which corresponds exactly to the θ of the Greeks, an interdental letter, to call it so, with the tongue slightly caught between the teeth, uttering a weak and blunt s.[23]

(1c) "For the Arabic Tse or (th) called by the Turks, *Tshei Arebi*, exactly answering to the Greek Theta [or the Sakon Ð] doubtless to be pronounced in Latin [or English] as in Greek Othman."[24]

A close comparison of (1a) and (1c) shows how relevance is increased by creating connections with the audience's cognitive environment and dismissing irrelevant information. Tindal omits the much-too-technical fragment "literae, ut ita dicam, 'interdentali', lingua dentibus intercepta tenue et obtusum s protrudente", which required some special knowledge on sound classification. It is quite likely that a great part of the audience had no such specialized knowledge; it then follows that the fragment would not connect with the cognitive environment of the audience and would not yield contextual implications. The omission is compensated by adding the information in another form, one that was connected with an English speaker's cognitive environment: the sound under discussion is associated with its Saxon correspondent. The text becomes relevant for its specific audience and the cognitive effects of the Latin original are recovered.

A second example shows how Tindal avoided inconsistency of the assumptions rendered by the text with the (presumed) cognitive context of the audience:

(2a) "Nihil post translatum ad Graecos Imperium accidit memoratu dignius, quam Constantinopoleos expugnatio, qua totus Christianismus altero, eoque praecipuo, oculo orbatus et in ultimum exitii periculum fuit adductus."[25]

(2b) "Nothing has happened more worthy of remembering, after the removal of the leadership to the Greeks, than the taking of the Constantinople, by which the whole Christendom was blinded by its second eye, the most significant one, and was pushed in deadly danger."

Artă [Bucharest, The Publishing House of the Foundation for Literature and Art], *Annotationes* I, I pp. 1-2 [Annotations, book I, chapter I, pp. 1-2]. Since the book is in press now, page numbers refer to the manuscript's page numbering.

[23] Translation mine. (1b) is a mere glossing, meant to allow a better understanding of the Latin structures. The same applies to (2b), (3b).

[24] Cantemir, Demetrius, 1734-1735, *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire*, translated into English from the author's own manuscript by N. Tindal, London, printed for James, John and Paul Knapton, pp. 1-2.

[25] Cantemir, Dimitrie 2015 (in press), *Incrementorum et decrementorum Aulae Othmannicae sive Aliothmannicae historiae a prima gentis origine ad nostra usque tempora deductae libri tres* [*The Three Books of The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman or Alothman Court, from the first origins of the nation, narrated until present times, in three books*], edited by Dan Sluşanschi, with the contribution of Octavian Gordon, Florentina Nicolae, Monica Vasileanu, translated into Romanian by Ioana Costa, Bucharest, The Publishing House of the Foundation for Literature and Art, *Praefatio* [Introduction], 6.

(2c) "Nothing certainly, since the removal of the Imperial Seat to Constantinople, has happen'd more memorable than the taking of that City by the Turks, whereby all Christendom was in danger."[26]

(2a) implicates the following assumptions:

(3a) Constantinople is the most important city of Christendom.
(3b) If Constantinople is conquered (by the Turks), the neighbouring countries are in great danger.
(3c) If Constantinople is conquered, the whole Christendom is in deadly danger.

However, it is highly likely that the cognitive context of the intended audience contained assumptions such as (3d)-(3j):

(3d) The most important city of Christendom is X (perhaps Rome, certainly not Constantinople).
(3e) If Constantinople is conquered, the neighbouring countries are in deadly danger.
(3f) England is far from Constantinople.
(3g) England is not a neighbouring country to Constantinople.
(3h) England is not in danger.
(3i) England is Christian.
(3j) It is not the whole Christendom that is in deadly danger.

Assumptions (3d)-(3j) are too strong to be upset by (3a)-(3c). The clash between the two sets of assumptions is solved by the translator by omitting those elements which entailed (3a)-(3c).

4. Conclusions

The present paper has tested and rejected Virgil Cândea's criticism of the English version of Dimitrie Cantemir's *History of the Ottoman Empire*. Although the text suffered radical changes, including a complete rearrangement of the material, HGD remains a translation of IDAO, if we resort to a definition of translation as the one formulated within relevance theory.

Such a definition allows a deeper understanding of translation practice. Relevance theory provides the tools for more fertile analyses. Instead of arguing about the status of a translation/non-translation, research should assess the degree of resemblance and the means of achieving relevance in different languages. This type of analysis might give some insights into the process of decision-making in translation, with applicability to both sinchronic and historical translation studies.

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[26] Cantemir, Demetrius, 1734-1735, *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire*, translated into English from the author's own manuscript by N. Tindal, London, printed for James, John and Paul Knapton, p. IV.

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METAL ADORNMENTS OF/ WITH BALKAN INFLUENCES, COMPONENTS OF WOMEN'S FOLK COSTUMES IN OLTENIA AND BANAT[1]

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Abstract: In this paper, we intend a presentation of women's head coverings, in terms of ethno-cultural representation processes, their presence in the Balkan area during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, by bringing to light the coexistence of different ethnic and religious minorities within the areas of our interest.

Using the new analysis, based mainly on visual-comparative research methods, we emphasize the interactions between the areas covered and the Oriental or Western areas, defining from a polycentric perspective, that is to say identifying accessories as hybrid objects, which result from trade, and contacts involving, at the same time, physical and behavioural practices.

Keywords: adornment, metal, Romanian, Balkan, folk costume.

The fact that self, identity and fashion are all interlinked – ties that are maintained throughout life[2] – requires an approach based on the natural course of life: child, teen, young unmarried woman, married woman – wife, widow and old woman – complemented by the social status and, above all, the historical period in which manifests itself, in order to create the socio-political context.

Moreover, we must take into account, in this approach, the individual lifestyle and identity change, not just as a result of life-steps taken or historical changes, but as part of an individual's life course. Thus, the development must be understood as a bio-socio-cultural variable, the product of a complex interaction of forces, in which the reflection of own conscience and deliberate action can play a role[3].

By diversity and because of different geographical, historical, political, economic and social circumstances in which they were created, ethnic costumes as a whole in the Balkans have preserved the characteristics of different cultures, determined, mainly, by the creativity and heritage of individuals and communities.

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[*] *Dimitrie Gusti* **National Village Museum.**

[2] Julia Twing, *Dress and the narration of life: Women's reflections on clothing and age*, in Sparkes. A.C. (ed) Auto/Biography Yearbook 2009, BSA Auto/Biography Study Group. Nottingham: Russell Press, 1 – 18, ISSN 2040-2996, p. 1.

[3] *Idem.*

1. Historical background

The great invasions, started with the Slavs in the late sixth century, and concluded with the Turks, in the fourteenth century, which led to important changes and the formation of medieval states, were self-imposed as significant historical, social and ethnic actions. However, the most important social phenomenon that has dominated this geographical area was represented by the ethnic migrations, imposed or voluntary, which over the centuries have created a real interpenetration of ethnic groups throughout the Balkans and beyond its borders. As maintained by Mr. Victor Papacostea, the Macedonian Empire and Hellenism, the Roman Empire and East-Roman culture, the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, are factors that have generated the "unity in diversity" Balkan specific[4].

To sum up in a few words the history of the Balkans, this includes a period of about 550 years, following the Byzantine period, dating from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth century, marked by intestine wars – in which we were forced to intervene[5] –, revolts, sometimes with mass character. All these conflicts occurred due to the feudal system, excessive taxes, etc., but also due to religious reasons, Christians against Muslims, Muslims against Muslims (autochthonous against Imperials). Only in 1830, two major revolts, generalized initially, led to the independence of Greece (the Greek War of Independence or Greek Revolution – 1821 to 1829)[6] and Serbia (the struggle for a national State), which lasted almost three decades, starting with the revolt in 1804 – 1813, continued with the one in 1815 – completed with the establishment of the Serbian Principality and completed in 1935, with the adoption of the Constitution). The year 1876 meant for Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia, the war against the Ottoman Empire and proclamation of Union. However, the Great Powers in the Treaty of Berlin (June – July 1878)[7], granted independence only to Serbia and Montenegro; Bosnia remained under the Austro-Hungarian authority until the Balkan Wars, 1912 – 1913[8], and the First World War. It should be recalled here that by that Treaty of Berlin, which came to correct the Treaty of the San Stefano (March 1878), is recognized *de jure* the independence of Romania, the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria was significantly reduced and the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia was constituted, headed by a Christian Governor appointed by the Sublime Porte.

Going back to what concerns us, in addition to discontent against status quo, the engine behind these revolts was nationalism, for the first time. The Serbo-Bulgarian War was defining (November 1885), concluded by the Treaty of Bucharest (March/February 1886), by which the European powers recognized the Unification of Bulgaria which took place in September 1885, when Bulgaria

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[4] Nicolae Tanaşoca, Ştefan Vâlcu, *Documents of Macedo-Romanian Revival. Collected and selected by...*, Bucharest, 2012, p. 5.

[5] The Romanian Academy, *The History of Romanians,* 7th Vol., Bucharest, 2001, p. 592; idem, Vol. IV, Bucharest, 2001, p. 280 - 283.

[6] The Romanian Academy, *The History of Romanians,* 7th Vol Tom I, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 10 – 11, 227 - 229.

[7] *Idem*, p. 798 – 801; 692 – 698.

[8] *Idem*, Tom II, Bucharest, 2003, p. 280 – 289.

and Eastern Rumelia, both semi-autonomous, proclaimed their unification. The latter is, actually, the reason triggering numerous disputes, in the period 1878 – 1912, between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, concerning the affiliation of Macedonia, which led, ultimately, to the Balkan Wars. In fact, these are the only real civil, extensive wars in the history of the Balkans. The First World War broke out following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, on 28 June 1914, but the assassination was not actually the cause of the war, but only the motive; in reality, Serbia was attacked by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on 28 July 1914 and the other Balkan countries would be involved much later, determined also by strong pressure from Western powers.

Banat[9] (a historical province today distribute between Romania, Serbia and Hungary), established as a unitary part as of the eleventh century – part of the Kingdom of Hungary, then from the sixteenth century – of the Ottoman Empire, and by the end of the eighteenth century – Archduchy of Austria, becoming later the Austrian Empire, after 1867 found in the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, after World War I, was divided – based on ethnic criteria - between the three national states whose ethnicities were inhabiting the area, former Yugoslavia (Vojvodina), Romania and Hungary[10].

Attempt for proclamation of the Banat Republic, on 31 October 1918, in Timisoara, which lasted until 21 February 1919[11], was an attempt to preserve the unity of the multiethnic and multi-confessional Banat, but failed because of promises made before the war by the Entente to Romania and territorial claims of Serbia.

As shown, Wallachia and Banat, at the crossroads of two centuries, are found in a wide process of release, redefinition, bonding, all taking place starting especially with 1859 and completed at the end of the First World War. It should be noted that in 1866, "the country's political and intellectual elite fully assimilated the idea … to re-design the country's political borders in accordance with the ethnic borders"[12].

2. A brief foray into the tradition of folk costume

Putting together all these political, social and ethnic events, from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a period marked by ethnic and national reaffirmation, the rediscovery of folk tradition, we conclude that it is perhaps the most flourishing phase for the traditional costumes from the Balkans, but is at the same time, unfortunately, the period showing the first signs of the beginning of their replacement with urban outfits.

The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the rural and urban life of the area of our interest raises a multitude of issues, including the nature of relations between the ethnic person and State, the status of

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[9] Banats = name given to all border counties led by a „ban", during the domination of the Kingdom of Hungary (1001 – 1541).
[10] The Romanian Academy, *The History of Romanians* 7th, Tom I, Bucharest 2003, p. 712 - 714.
[11] I. Munteanu, R. Munteanu, *Timişoara. Monograph*, 2002.
[12] Mihai Bărbulescu, Dennis Deletant, Keith Hitchins, Şerban Papacostea, Pompiliu Teodor, *The History of Romania*, Bucharest, 2002, p. 310.

interregional relations at the moment, cultural and economic interaction trends between individuals, nature, social and ethnic structure of rural or urban areas.

Thus, during that period, in the areas on which we focus, we encounter great ethnic variety: Romanians, Macedo-Romanians, Hebrews, Gypsy, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Turks, Albanians, Croats, Czechs, Saxons, Hungarians, Germans, etc.

In this interpenetration of ethnicities and beliefs (to mention only the major, defining ones – Christian – Orthodox and Catholic – or Muslim), each has brought both its spiritual baggage, folk costume and other traditional practices.

3. Head adornments

It is already known that because of all movements within the population, everything is subject to deep transformation and/or disappearance processes, depending on the general circumstances, economic, social and historical climate, personal or group needs and habits, etc. Thus, we will try to present the headdress of women from where these ethnicities come and make a comparison with what head covering meant to the Romanian women in the areas of concern.

As known, the main fund of garments from proto-Illyrian period, namely from the Neolithic and the Bronze Age, was preserved and further developed by the Thracians and Illyrians, which further perpetuated within Romanians, Albanians and Greeks[13], developing in the three cases depending on the course of history, which, although similar in some moments, yet so different, as we tried to emphasize in the brief review of recent history. Thus, the old traditional elements in the composition of the types of folk costumes (of which an essential element is the headdress) during the period to which we refer, were competed by some elements derived from own conceptions or borrowed, just those we try to emphasize in this material.

When we refer to own conceptions of the popular creator, we consider the inspirations and artistic taste of the anonymous who created them or of the group from where the creator comes, and inspirations or even copies of the aulic elements which, not infrequently, were foreign, especially from the Greek world, understood, assimilated and then expressed in a re-modelled Romanian language. During the Phanariote epoch, the Turkish costume was long known in the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), and this period has no other role than to prohibit formally any foreign influence, any European presence in the Eastern traditional outfit and life.[14]

In this context, as a distinctive element of ethnicity, satisfaction of faith, of apotropaic nature, headdress involved many ornaments, especially when it was occasioned by one of the most important rites of passage from the status of a virgin to a woman, specifically, the wedding. This is due perhaps to the fact that this part of the body, the head, is associated to the soul and spirit, in particular in the Balkan peoples' faith.

It must also be emphasized the attitude of ethnic women we have considered in this material, on the two components of the head – face and hair – as symbols of

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[13] Florea Bobu Florescu, *The Costume*, in *Romanian Popular Art*, Bucharest, 1969, p. 279, passim.

[14] Al. Alexianu, *Fashions and Clothes from the Past*, Bucharest, 1971, p. 57.

physical strength and sexual maturity, of virtue and personality. It also should be also considered the faith in which any of those we refer to had grown and matured: Christian (Orthodox or Catholic) or Muslim. It is interesting to note that in both faiths (Christian and Muslim) there is a way to cover the hair for activities within the household or work, to which it adds one, concerning the visual contact with the outside world, especially with men who are not part of the family.

An equally important thing is that the Romanian women's head arrangements involved actually three distinct phases: a) hair combing and tying; b) hair braiding and fixing; and c) head covering[15].

We must emphasize that there is a clear distinction between the way married women and young girls covered their heads. The latter, often wore their hair uncovered, only in rainy weather or winter were covering it with a simple scarf or "binder" – which in Gorj County was a white "tulpan", black "boştea" or batik. In most areas, girls up to 8 – 10 years were combed with their hair over their heads, braided into a ponytail that formed, most often, on the top of the head. After this age to their marriage, hair was parted and caught in braided pigtails, left free on their back; on holidays or *nedei* (villages fêtes occasioned by a patronal festival), the girls were adorning their tails weaving in them silver coins or wore "coronet woven from small coins"[16].

Young girls from Voislova, Caras-Severin, combed until marriage with "wide *cica* (braided pigtail) thrown back down, that means more twisted tail braids (*cicute*), so that *chica* was wide as a *bresire* (belt), so long as the hair was." Other times were two *cici* (braided pigtails) tied, "on the back", with *primb* (ribbons). On the forehead and ear, the hair was done *cocor* (corners), wavy *drot* (hair curling machine) and on the forehead, as adornment, they wore *lacite* (ribbons) of beads or *bechite* (ribbons) consisting of 3 – 4 rows of coins, each row consisting of about 20 silver or gold coins (those who had). Seasonal flowers were worn at ears (geraniums, gladiolas) or *tremurişi* (gilt wire spirals); in winter they wore artificial flowers, intensely coloured in different colours. In winter, the girls tied under the chin with cloth (batik) made of different materials and vivid colours. "At dancing, we combed with many *motcici* braided at neck or ears like *pitarai*, and who had abundant hair, we were doing many braided *cicute* and tied them nicely with string or coloured *primb*."[17]

This way of tying the hair in pigtails braided in three strands and worn on the back, is an element identified since the Bronze Age, subsequently certified by the Dacians, Illyrians[18], and Slavic ethnicities. Thus, traditional hairstyle for unmarried young Bulgarian women was in many braids that could be tied by a single ribbon. In the north and west of Bulgaria, young girls wore bands decorated with feathers, coins, flowers and ribbons.[19] Thus, hair that was always

[15] Elena Secoşan, Paul Petrescu, *The Folk Holiday Costume in Romania*, Bucharest, 1984, p. 40 (unnumbered).

[16] Georgeta Stoica, Virgil Vasilescu, *The Folk Holiday Costume in Gorj*, Tg. Jiu, 1971, p. 40.

[17] Petru Opruţ, *Voislova*, Timişoara, 2008, p. 165.

[18] Florea Bobu Florescu,T*the Costume*, in *Romanian Popular Art*, Bucharest, 1969, p. 279.

[19] Liz Mellish, *Bulgaria: Ethnic Dress*, in *Berg Encyclopaedia of Word Dress and Fashion*, Vol. 9, 2011, p. 414.

uncovered had to be defended against the evil, envy or admiring eye, which, in the popular tradition, would stimulate the evil forces consciously or unconsciously. That is why various combinations of apotropaic objects were used, with varying colours; their glow, smell and clanking were intended to distract attention from the uncovered hair and direct it to that part of the decor.[20]

However, in some areas of Greece, such as northern Attica, little girls wore along with their festive costume head coverings like those of the married women, to which we must emphasize the presence of small gold crowns – *koronatsi*[21], or in Roumlouki (Macedonia) to which the head cover was similar, only slightly differentiated by the age and marital status of women; thus, they all wore at the festive costume, *maglikoutaria*, a head jewel consisting of a set of chains to which coins or corals were attached hanging[22]. This type of cover is considered by some authors as coming, as shape, from the old helmets of the troops of Alexander the Great[23]. The young Albanians wore ribbons or flowers in their hair; only the wealthy ones or those whose parents were part of certain trades attached also coins in their hair. Interesting to note that worldwide the Balkans (including Romanians), the most common hair ornament is the coin. But a small observation should be made here, specifically, the coins are either made of gold or silver or small coins – *mahmudele* (coin Cedid Mahmudiye, Mahmud II, Kostantiniyye mint, Ottoman Empire) or coins with a diameter greater that have, in some areas of Greece, Serbia and Albania, a double-headed eagle on the reverse. In the eighteenth century and nineteenth century, the double-headed eagle spread a lot, knowing a particular development in the Balkans, especially on the gold and silver thread embroidery and on the silver jewelleries for costumes.[24] For Greeks, we hold the information that to adorn their heads and chests, women used Austrian coins (two or four forints), which were imported in large quantities.[25]

Another element that can be seen as common to Greek women and some Slavic ethnicities, and we refer here particularly to Serbian and Croatian women, same as in some areas of Mehedinți, is how the girls wore their hair braided in pigtails crossing their heads like a crown[26].

During the traditional wedding ceremony of Romanians, the "covering" time was important, being treated with the solemnity and importance of a rite of passage, which included propitiating items or items helping the young woman's fertility. In Gorj, for example, from that moment, the hair was combed parted on

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[20] *Bulgarian Folk Costumes – Symbols and Tradition*, Supplement to issue 3 / 2003, Year 3, ***, p. 21.

[21] Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, *Greek Costumes. Collection of the National Historical Museum*, Athens, 1993, p. 96.

[22] For more details see Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, *idem*, p. 180.

[23] Vasilios Aligiannis în http://history-of-macedonia.com/2009/09/27/the-greek-folk-costume-of-roumlouki-macedonia/.

[24] Marina Marinescu, *From the symbol to the Decorative Costume: Doble-headed Eagle in the Balkan Decorative Art*, in *Roads and Travellers in the Balkans*, p. 172.

[25] *Idem*, p. 174.

[26] Florea Bobu Florescu, *idem*, p. 289.

one side, and the pigtails were gathered in a bun on the nape. Specific to Gorj was a long cloth or *peşchir*, as it is called in some villages. Wear of cloth demanded a specific hair combing, thus "over the pigtails gathered at the back in a bun, a *conci* was applied, a piece of metal in the shape of a truncated cone crafted by the village blacksmiths[27]. The *conci* was interwoven between the strands of hair not to fall, and was covered by *peşchir* or cloth."[28]

In Romanaţi area, starting with the wedding day the woman wore a simple red fez or with a black silk tassel (probably of oriental influence – as it can be identified as the head covering of women in the Iconium region[29]), mounted on top of the head and fastened with long stained glass pins. A silk veil was worn over the fez, with ends on the back or wrapped around the neck with one end on the back and one in front. The girls from wealthy families wore beneath the veil, a red fez with silver coins sewn in the area of the forehead[30].

The fez, as head covering, is found at Greek women, Macedo-Romanian, thus, Christian, as well as at women from Albania, Croatia or Pomak, thus, Muslim, but that probably has an oriental influence. It should be noted that if for Christians, position in the social hierarchy was stated in particular by the value of ornaments that were worn, in the Muslim world – see also the Pomaks – this position was presented including by the chromatic language. Returning to the fez, it was found mostly in three colours (red, black or white); the red one is specific to Romanian women. It was intended to both cover the hairstyle (bun or braided hair) and as support for the main ornaments that adorned the head. Another element, almost inextricably linked to fez to both the Albanian, Macedo-Romanian, Serbian, Croatian woman, and to some Greek women, is the tepelik (in Turkish, with tepeluk as derivation in Albanian, tepelaks in Serbian, tepeliki or tepes in Greek or tas in Macedo- Romanian). It is circular in shape, made of a slightly convex disc, decorated with oriental and Greek motifs. The circular shape can be ensured by fitting coins into concentric circles as scales. In addition, coins can be hung to it, in a single link or by a chain of several centimeters, or mounted on the fez, slightly covered by the tepelik. In some Muslim-majority areas, and in other areas where the Oriental culture imposed its influence, we meet the tepelik applied directly on the hair. Returning to the red fez, some Greek women (especially in the Megara area) or Romanian women, even those in Vlaşca, lack of tepelik is complemented by the existence of *fruntare* made of coins or assembled components, similar in shape, to which coins or crosses were attached. We find with no exception the presence of metal in the headdress, element that, perhaps, had first an apotropaic role, especially against the evil eye.

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[27] This "conci", throughout history, has been also made of bone or even bark.

[28] Georgeta Stoica, Virgil Vasilescu, *idem*, p. 42.

[29] Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, *idem*, p. 208. Although it is a Greek woman's costume, it should be noted that a large part of Asia Minor during the Byzantine period in the eleventh century (i.e. from 1071 to 1081 and until 1307) was conquered by Seljuks and organized in the Sultanate of Rum with residence first at Nicaea and then at Iconium – Greek name, or Konya – Turkish name. (see Bogdan-Petru Maleon, Ion Toderaşcu, *Istoria Bizanţului*, Iasi, 2009, p. 38).

[30] Georgeta Stoica, Rada Ilie, *Traditions and Costums from the Olt County. Câmpia Boianului, Olt and Romanaţi Areas*, Bucharest, 2007, p. 26.

A habit which I believe is worth mentioning here is encountered at the Pomak ethnics, where a potential groom did not receive permission to marry until he brought a silver tepelik to the girl's parents. Today some families accept one made of aluminium because not everyone can afford a tepelik made of silver. It can be done by cutting an aluminium disc, engraved with geometric patterns by the groom or his relatives.[31]

Interesting to note the similarity between the components of the head coverings of Pomaks[32] (not identified as ethnic minority in Romania) and those of Romanian women in the Romanati area: a fez over which the "cloth" was applied, the addition of artificial hair and metal coins. The difference that occurs is mounting the tas on Pomak women's fez compared with the tassel hanging of the Romanian women in Romania.

In the Salamis, Greece, the women wore with the ceremonial and wedding costumes a small fez with golden tas and silver coins, a black batik folded in the manner of a ribbon and a silk shawl – *bolia* – with golden thread, in waves[33]. In the area of Ayia Anna, Greece, the head covering for the festive costume consists of a red scarf with coins and ornaments – *bersania* – and a white silk shawl – *bolia* – embroidered and fringed; the outfit is completed by gold earrings[34]. The Albanian brides' veil was decorated with coloured yarn tassels. Among the metal ornaments of head decorations, especially crafted, it should be noted a small, black, filigree tas, covered with cloth or velvet. They were characteristic of many areas of the North, for example Malësi e Madhe (Shkodra district), Drenica (Kosovo), etc. Some head coverings, mainly of silver filigree, stoned with coloured stones or gold coins, were positioned in front of a very high tas, with the back side being covered by a cotton terry that hung free on the back. Such head coverings were widespread in the nineteenth century in many areas of northern Albania, where they could be found even in the twentieth century, especially at young brides.

Prior to the twentieth century, the head of Bulgarian brides was adorned in complex styles, with multiple braids of hair; in the north and southwest, brides wore a specific band of decorative metal chains, forming a crown[35].

Brides in Voislova, Caras-Severin, wore a cloth on their head with hand-sewn flowers. Over it, they fixed a crown of natural flowers and the *bechita* on their foreheads, a necklace with coins, which were from the forehead to the top of their heads.[36]

The head covering of married Christian women fulfils not only a practical and decorative role, but first of all, ensures the custom requirements that no married woman should show her hair, as practically required by the Scripture:

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[31] Fatma Nur Başaran and Banu Tipigil Gürcüm, *A Reflection on Pomak Culture in Modern-day Turkey: Traditional Female Clothing and the Bride's Wedding Outfit*, in *Folklore Nr. 118 (August 2007)*, p. 224.

[32] A detailed description and relevant to Fatma Nur Başaran and Banu Tipigil Gürcüm, *idem*, p. 219 passim.

[33] Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, *idem*, p. 14.

[34] Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, *idem*, p. 36.

[35] Liz Mellish, *idem*, p. 414.

[36] Petru Opruț, *Voislova*, Timişoara, 2008, p. 165.

But I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God.

Every man who prays or prophesies with his head covered dishonored his head;

But every woman who prayed or prophesied with her head uncovered dishonored her head: for that is even all one as if she were shaven.

For if the woman be not covered, let her also beshorn: but if it a shame for a woman to be shorn or shaven let her be covered.

...

Judge in yourselves: is it comely that a woman pray unto God uncovered?

Doth not even nature itself teach you, that, if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him?

But if a woman have long hair, it is a glory to her: for her hair is given her for a covering.

But if any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom, neither the churches of God.[37]

In the Romanian Banat region of mountains, the head covering is the *conci*; made of velvet with applications and embroidery of coins and thread.[38] The *conci* is formed from a single rectangular piece of fabric that is finished on one side of it with a much longer strip. After folding the piece, the *conci* receives a cap-shaped, almost round, of which, in the back, are attached some coloured tassels. "*Cealma*[39], *căpiţa cu bani, tulbeat, tabla, ciula*" are all headdresses related to the *conci*, but having specific forms and worn in different areas; however, they all show the exceptional craftsmanship and artistic refinement of weavers from Timis area[40].

Specific to married women in Banat, especially in the Almăj, Valea Bistrei, Clisura Dunării, are the *ceapsa*. In various forms, with a horn, two horns, cap-shaped, flat and oval, are worn with batiks, headscarves and less with *vălitori*, having various colours; lighter tones for younger women, chromatic becoming darker with age. The *ceapsa*, according to their shape or to their cover, received coins as additional elements.[41]

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[37] The Holy Bible, Set forth in 1611 and commonly known as the King James Version, 1 Corinthians 11, 3-6; 13-16.

[38] Nastasia Anis Bogdan, *Handicraft and traditional textile art from Banat County*, The Centre for Culture and Art of Timiş County,

http://www.ccajt.ro/material/timisiensis/arta_textila_traditionala.pdf

[39] Prof. Ciprian Cipu; Prof. Adrian Scorobete, *Cap. IV. Fabrics, Stitching and Embroidery*, in Prof. Ciprian Cipu, *Banat. Tradition and History* in *Timisiensis. the Magazine of the* Centre for Culture and Art of Timiş, Timişoara, 2013, p. 35

[40] Prof. Ciprian Cipu; Prof. Adrian Scorobete, *Cap. IV. idem.*

[41] Georgeta Stoica, Paul Petrescu, *Dictionary of folk art* Bucharest, 1997, subvoce; Emilia Pavel, *Women's hairstyles and headwear, elements of unity and continuity in the Romanian folk costume*, in *Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Nr. XV – XX,* Vaslui, p. 204 – 214; Narcisa Ştiucă, *Roşcani, a village for the 3rd millenium*, Deva, 2000, p. 129.

Similar to this type of cover, in the Danube Plain, the *mecheleţ* or *chemeleţ* was worn (a form of kamelaukion)[42] which, on the wedding day, in some areas, was made of coins[43] and probably has a strong Byzantine influence, keeping almost intact the crown shape framed by earrings at temples.

Macedo-Romanians, wear at their hairstyle top "something round called amour[44]." Behind the hairstyle there is a *tas* often formed of silver pieces. A hat is under it, over which one can see the tails called *cusiţă* or *păltăniţă*[45].

An important place within the ornaments on the traditional costumes of Serbian women is occupied by various and numerous head ornaments, such as tiaras, *tepeluk* (tepelik), hairpins, earrings and other jewelleries such as *procelnik*, *ukosnjak* and *podbradnik*. In addition to the noble materials and the beauty of their shapes, the ornaments of diadems, earrings and *procelnik*, express the workmanship. There are also various types of earrings from Serbia and Macedonia (fourteenth to nineteenth centuries), of which the most remarkable, both as number and manufacturing delicacy, are the star-shaped earrings in the jewellery centres in Kosovo, Macedonia and Metohija[46].

Along with an old costume that was worn before 1890 by the women of the Vasojeviq clan, Montenegro, women wore their hair in pigtails, in which silver coins or less valuable coins were woven. Nahija women were using small ornaments, corals and stones for decoration. On their heads, they wore a hat of fine black or red cloth, decorated with coral beads, to which a coin was hung. Under the corals, there was a string of beads of different colours. Women in Reka Ljeva were fixing their head covering with two or three silver, large pins, with much decorated heads. In other areas in the north, a simple cord to which were caught 4 to 5 coins, replaced the tas with coins. The cord was tied directly to the hair and a head covering of richly decorated cloth was placed over it (e.g. Women in Shoshi).[47]

We cannot end the chapter of head coverings without mentioning a custom practiced by Macedo-Romanian, at the birth of a child, i.e. the Fates (Groom): "When the guests left the table, a boy walks with a tray to everyone and gathers *mahmudele*, which then are sewn to the child's fez."[48]

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[42] *In the southern part of Vlasca County, but not generally, nowadays is worn a wheel, made of iron or wood, wrapped with a cloth. Local name is „chemelet", as we found from Mr. Remus N. Begnescu, a teacher from Pietrele village.*

[43] Ioana Gabriela Duicu, *Metal adornments: history and tradition in the Romanian County*, Bucharest, 2014, sheet of paper „chemeleţ".

[44] Large hair pin women wore on the top of their heads and which, at the upper end is wound in a ribbon with very small glass beads, to Tache Papahagi, *Dictionary of the Aromanian dialect*, Academiei Printing House, Bucharest, 2013.

[45] Tache Papahagi, *Images d'ethnographie Roumaine (daco-roumaine et aroumaine)*, MCMXXX (1930), p. 178.

[46] Jasna Bjeladinović Jergić, *The Ethnographic memorial collection of Hristifor Crnilović = Etnografska spomen zbirka Hristifora Crnilovića* [autor teksta kataloga Jasna Bjeladinović Jergić], p. 3.

[47] Gjergji Andromaqi, *Albanian Costumes Through the Centuries*, Tirana, 2004, p. 260 - 262.

[48] Tudor Pamfile, *The Romanian People's Mythology, 2nd* vol., Bucharest, 2008, p. 90.

4. Conclusions

By presenting several metal ornament elements we wanted to draw attention to the major similarities which were created through the intercultural links formed both through imposition, but mainly through direct interaction, developed in an environment where political conflicts could not influence the man in his 3 defining elements: self, community and his and community's spirituality.

The headdress of female traditional costume from Oltenia and Banat has common elements with those found in various ethnic groups, both in Romania and in the traditional costumes from other Balkan countries. These headdress ornaments either were kept as such or have been shaped over time, acquiring areal specificity.

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Costumul de Dolj (Folk costume
from Dolj County)*

*Femeie cu fes şi „codan de şvanţi",
învelită cu maramă (Woman with cap
and "codan by Svante" coated with veil),
apud Elena Secoşan, Paul Petrescu,*
Portul popular de sărbătoare din
România*, Bucureşti, 1984, 6. Costumul
de Romanaţi (Folk costume from
Romanaţi)*

*Paysanne Malisor (tribu le long de la
frontière Monténégrine), femme chrétienne
de Skodra, femme musulmane de Skodra
(Peasant Malisor (tribe along the
Montenegrin border), Christian woman
Shkodra, Shkodra Muslim Woman), apud
Hamdy Bey,* Les costumes populaires de la
Turquie en 1873, *Constantinople, 1873,
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LE SAVOIR ARTISTIQUE ET LE VOYAGE CHEZ L'ÉCRIVAIN MAXIME DU CAMP

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Abstract: Maxime Du Camp became well known in the 19th century French literature not only as Gustave Flaubert's close friend but also as a traveller-writer, author of many travalogues and important photographer. This article aims to illustrate the author's vast artistic knowledge, which he acquired through the so called 'artistic instruction journey', an elite pedagogical and social institution which started in the 17th century, of which he became a genuine representative two centuries later.

Keywords: travel, art history, museums, painting, Holland, Rembrandt, art criticism.

Maxime Du Camp Du Camp met en œuvre le projet de l'écrivain-voyageur qui n'a qu'un seul modèle: l'encyclopédie. Dans ses récits il se plaît à déployer son savoir scientifique, historique, mythologique, et pas dernierement, artistique. Ainsi, se donne à voir comme connaisseur d'art, qui fréquente les musées, les galeries, les expositions, qui peut faire des commentaires avisés sur les œuvres d'art, qui reconnait facilement les différents styles d'architecture des édifices rencontrés: cathédrales, églises, palais, châteaux. C'est également dans cette perspective que Du Camp semble se rapprocher des voyageurs français du XVIIe siècle, où l'on assiste à l'émergence du **voyage d'instruction artistique**, sous la forme du «grand tour» européen[1]; celui-ci, en tant qu'institution_pédagogique et sociale, comprend en ensemble, avec quelques détours et variations, le Nord de la France, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas, l'Allemagne et bien-sur la Hollande (qui, nous allons l'illustrer dans les pages à suivre, suscite le plus vif intérêt de l'auteur, qui y fait le tour de ses plus importantes villes pour visiter ses musées d'art). Dans ce type de voyage, il s'agit de visiter les grands centres culturels, de s'initier aux œuvres d'art et aux monuments, et aussi d'étudier l'histoire, les mœurs et la vie culturelle. Ce périple est ainsi, en général, un tour des villes et, de surcroit, il signifie un voyage marqué par des arrêts plus ou moins longs, où l'accent est mis sur l'inventaire des richesses culturelles et artistiques.[2]

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[1] A l'époque, à la différence, par exemple, du voyage en Orient, qui contribue à créer le sens des distances et qui suggère bien souvent une atmosphère itinérante, le grand tour tend à ignorer le voyage en tant que tel, en attribuant aux détails du parcours un caractère purement fonctionnel, mettant l'accent sur les richesses culturelles et artistiques rencontrées.

[2] Pour plus de détails sur le voyage d'instruction artistique et du «grand tour» européen au XVIIe siècle voir Friedrich Wolfzettel, *Le discours du voyageur. Pour une histoire littéraire du récit de voyage en France, du Moyen Age au XVIIIe siècle*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1996, p. 210-222.

Parmi les peintres dont il regarde les toiles dans les musées que Du Camp visite, le plus souvent durant son voyage en Hollande, nous énumérons: Rubens, Van Dyk, Rembrandt, Veronese, Van Gogh, Salvator Rosa, Van Leyden, Van Bree, Breughel, Van Der Eeckout, Van Der Meer, Van Der Velde, Vernet, Boucher, Gerard Dov, Van Ostade, Van Haarlem, Paul Potter, Crayer, Canaletto, etc., mais l'artiste qui l'impressionne le plus et auquel il consacre le plus grand nombre de pages est **Rembrandt**. Il avoue même qu'une «seule toile magistrale» de cet artiste vaut son voyage à Rotterdam.

En connaisseur avisé, il part dans ce voyage, après avoir rigoureusement préparé des livres contenant une documentation critique sur les peintres et sur leurs toiles qu'il verra: «Vous qui me connaissez, mon ami, vous vous doutez bien que je ne suis pas parti de Paris sans fourrer quelques vieux livres.»[3]

L'attitude du voyageur envers les toiles qu'il valorise et qu'il regarde «amoureusement», comme il l'avoue, est celle de dévotion, de vénération de vive émotion, comme s'il se trouvait dans un espace sacré, dans les hauteurs du vécu spirituel, qui le rend insensible à toute autre chose, même aux explications de son guide sur les édifices les plus importants de la ville, explications qu'il trouve inutiles: Je n'écoutais guère ce que me disait mon guide; il voulait me conduire au palais des Stathouders, au palais des Etats-Généraux; je ne pensais qu'aux tableaux; nous gravîmes les degrés du musée et je vous avoue que le cœur me battait un peu lorsque je franchis la porte, du sanctuaire où, dans toute sa gloire, s'épanouit un des plus triomphants chefs-d'œuvre de Rembrandt.[4]

La vue des toiles, dans toute leur variété, détermine l'écrivain, situé déjà sur la position d'un vrai critique d'art, à se lancer dans des jugements sur la distinction entre le vrai talent à vocation, qui devrait être toujours animé par le vécu profond, méditatif, spirituel, étincelant, par la recherche incessante de l'au-delà, et son imitateur, un «singe» qui seulement reproduit le vrai peintre, et qui ne peut pas éveiller des émotions artistiques. La comparaison entre les toiles magnifiques de Rembrandt et celles de son élève, Van der Eeckout, dont Du Camp considère qu'il l'a «copié jusqu'au plagiat», en est un exemple suggestif:

Voici bien les mêmes attitudes, les mêmes agencements, la même composition générale, les mêmes effets de lumière tentés sinon trouvés. Où est cette âme qui rayonne divinement dans chaque œuvre du maître? Où est cette vie qui déborde? Où est cette puissance formidable qui vous secoue comme une main de Titan? Je ne le vois pas, je ne les sens pas.

C'est qu'il ne suffit pas de composer sa palette d'après un maître, de peindre avec ses pinceaux, d'étudier son procédé, d'imiter sa composition. L'habileté matérielle, ne vaut et ne mérite que lorsqu'elle est au service d'un talent réel, donné par la nature, agrandi par l'étude, fécondé par la méditation, regardant sans cesse, au-delà [...]; leurs imitateurs habitaient la terre, rampant comme

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[3] Maxime Du Camp, *En Hollande*, Malassis et de Broise, Paris, 1859, p. 27.
[4] *Ibidem*, p. 32.

des culs-de-jatte, se croyant des ailes parce qu'ils voyaient voler les autres.[5]

En connaisseur du domaine de la peinture, Du Camp identifie les éléments négatifs de la composition d'un tableau qu'il n'hésite pas à faire remarquer et à flétrir: des nuances mal associées ou même «criardes», des contours secs et «nerveux», un abus des détails, certains tons chromatiques exagérés qui «tirent l'œil et le fatiguent», une trop grande importance prêtée aux objets, au détriment des figures, qui détermine le regardeur à considérer une telle toile comme «de troisième ou quatrième ordre».

Il réussit non seulement à distinguer la valeur artistique et son revers, mais il décèle des analogies, des correspondances entre les différents peintres, importants ou mineurs, entre leurs créations et l'espace culturel qui a marqué leur vision artistique: «Van Der Meer est un rude peintre, qui procède par teintes plates largement appliquées, surhaussées en épaisseur; il a dû visiter l'Italie. C'est un Canaletto exagéré.»[6]

L'auteur se plaît non seulement à analyser les toiles, avec leurs gammes chromatiques, inflexions de lumière, etc., mais également à commenter des thèmes représentés par ces tableaux, qui souvent l'invitent à réfléchir, à philosopher là-dessus. Le thème de «l'injustice» de la justice, celui de la mort, de la légalité, de la sécurité, que lui suggère la vue d'un tableau du musée d'Amsterdam, le plonge dans des interrogations rhétoriques et l'amène à des jugements personnels à leur sujet:

Hélas! C'est bien là la justice humaine! On a tué, elle tue; puis elle dit: ma balance est d'aplomb, car il y a autant de sang dans un plateau que dans l'autre. Est-ce légal? Oui! Est-ce juste? Non! La mort n'efface pas la mort. Toutes les fois qu'un crime est commis, c'est que les préposés à la sécurité de la société n'ont pas fait leur devoir; et ils doivent, en ce cas, être frappés d'une amende qui vienne en aide à ceux qui pâtissent du meurtre commis. Vous réprimez, c'est fort bien: prévenez ou réparez, ce sera mieux. [7]

Il ne serait pas difficile de remarquer la prédilection de Du Camp pour la vraisemblance, pour la recherche et l'exactitude des détails, pour la pulsion de la vie, la mécanique du corps vivant ou mort, rendues par la peinture, lorsque l'auteur d'une telle toile est un grand peintre comme Rembrandt.

Il serait intéressant de noter qu'un pionnier de la photographie, qui a traversé des déserts, des campagnes, des villes et villages pour réaliser ses plus de deux cents calotypes, affirme que ***la peinture*** est située au-dessus de l'art photographique et de la poésie, par son expression de la vérité, par sa finesse de

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[5] *Ibidem*, p. 48.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 36.

[7] *Ibidem*, p. 38. Pour la relation de conditionnement entre la société humaine et la terre sauvage, voir Laurent Margatin, «Paysage et géographie poétique du romantisme allemand à Julien Gracq», in S. Meitinger, *Espaces et paysages – Représentations et inventions du paysage de l'Antiquité à nos jours*, L'Harmattan, Paris, p. 247.

nuances et par sa beauté: «Le daguerréotype n'a jamais été si vrai, la poésie n'a jamais inventé plus beau.»[8]

Dans l'analyse qu'il fait de la toile de Rembrandt, *La leçon d'anatomie du professeur Tulp*, qu'il voit à Amsterdam et qu'il considère être d'une beauté absolue, il comprend parfaitement le génie de Rembrandt, qui, considère-t-il, devient un autre dieu, recréant la réalité dans ses mille nuances, par une minutieuse recherche, par une science de composition inégalable, par l'émotion artistique qu'il transmet, par sa fidélité au «miracle» de la vie. La manière dont il approche l'œuvre d'art dans sa totalité, fait de l'écrivain un vrai ***critique d'art*** qui décrypte le message artistique, en regardant au delà des premières impressions, du premier contact visuel avec la toile. Il retrace graduellement les étapes de la perception du tableau, en créant un vrai récit, que l'utilisation du présent narratif contribue à dynamiser.

Nous allons suivre de près un commentaire qu'il fait du tableau de Rembrandt appelé *Garde de nuit*, qu'il considère, pour cette raison, le comble de l'art:

> [...] **au premier aspect** c'est une grande confusion, c'est une sorte de tohu-bohu d'ombres et de clartés où l'œil cherche en vain son point de repère: ces gens courent et se heurtent; ce n'est pas une foule, c'est une bousculade; **puis, peu à peu**, quand le regard, accoutumé à cette surprise de la couleur, a reconquis sa sérénité, on voit la scène se débrouiller, chaque figure s'animer de son expression, et **on comprend** alors que ce qu'on avait cru être du tumulte n'est que la vie telle qu'elle a dû se manifester au moment même choisi par l'artiste, on ne conçoit pas que ces miliciens empressés puissent avoir, à cet instant précis qui les représente, d'autres attitudes, d'autres gestes, d'autres physionomies. C'est là le comble de l'art, et c'est ce que j'admire surtout et avant tout dans Rembrandt. [9]

Il est évident que notre regardeur peut surprendre l'essence du message artistique dans chaque ligne, dans tout trait et l'amorce de tout geste, au delà des apparences, de la confusion, des ombres, et il semblerait que l'artiste dévoile sa composition seulement dans la mesure où un connaisseur avisé tel que Du Camp le fait.

Dans la manière dont il se représente l'espace de la toile, on décèle toute une gamme d'éléments qui appartiennent à la morphologie de l'image photographique: les modalisations de la lumière, qui produisent l'image non seulement par un effet d'éclaircissement, mais aussi par un effet d'obscurcissement. Il est attiré par l'art des clairs-obscurs, par les contrastes plus ou moins forts d'ombres et de lumière, qu'il considère une approche réussie et une pratique artistique savante.

En s'intéressant à la distribution de la lumière dans le même tableau, il fait mention des «clairs-obscurs», de la projection de «l'ombre», de la «demi-

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[8] *Ibidem,* p. 40.
[9] *Ibidem*, p. 137. C'est nous qui soulignons.

teinte», des «jours frisants», éclairés par des «clartés de convention», des «blancs» qui reluisent, de «l'éclat uniforme», du «relief», etc. Quant à la représentation des inflexions chromatiques, il convient de remarquer le fait que l'écrivain a une attitude esthétique particulière, attribuant à la couleur une gamme très variée d'épithètes, qui sont peu communs pour une notion aussi abstraite que celle de la couleur, et à travers lesquels il se plaît à la personnifier; dans la vision de Du Camp, elle peut être «étourdissante», «aveugle», «dangereuse», «coupable», «affolée», «prise de vertige», créant par elle-même un spectacle orageux, que l'écrivain n'hésite pas à mettre en récit. Il semble ainsi pénétrer dans l'espace même du tableau, qui, par sa force saisissante, l'«étonne», l'«éblouit», l'«écrase», comme Du Camp l'avoue dans des termes hyperboliques:

> La couler de ce tableau est devenue proverbiale; elle est étourdissante, elle est aveugle, elle est poussée aussi loin que possible, au-delà elle serait dangereuse, j'allais dire coupable; elle procède par empâtements violents reliés entre eux par des glacis que les restaurations ont un peu fatigués; mais, parfois aussi, elle semble affolée et comme prise de vertige lorsqu' elle s'enlève en reliefs réels sur les fraises blanches et sur les damasquinures des gorgerins. Ce tableau est un chef-d'œuvre moins par sa beauté que par force saisissante. Il étonne, éblouit, écrase. [10]

Ce qui est remarquable, c'est la préoccupation particulière de Du Camp pour la manière dont on devrait regarder, approcher des tableaux d'un musée, ce qui tient à des coordonnées spatiales, telles que leur emplacement, leur hauteur, la distance entre eux et par rapport au sol, l'angle le plus convenable sous lequel il soit vu. Il fait aussi mention des coordonnées liées à l'éclaircissement, qui devrait être variable, approprié au spécifique chromatique de chaque tableau: la lumière pourrait être intense ou modérée, et venir de directions diverses: d'en haut, d'à côté, etc. Dans sa conception, le regard porté vers un tableau, qui est une création autonome, est en lui-même une maîtrise qui suppose des démarches tout à fait spéciales: il faut ajuster la réalité immédiate à la réalité virtuelle, représentée, de l'œuvre d'art. En connaisseur d'art, il est au courant des diverses interprétations traditionnelles des tableaux célèbres qu'il prend la liberté de compléter, d'ajuster et parfois même de mettre en doute, de contester: «[*La garde de nuit*» de Rembrandt] est peut-être le tableau le plus étrange que j'ai vu, et j'en ai vu beaucoup. On n'est pas encore d'accord sur ceci: l'artiste a-t-il voulu représenter une scène de nuit ou de jour? Le sujet n'est point un chaos, comme on l'a dit; il est fort simple et se débrouille de lui-même avec facilité.» [11]

Pour ce faire, il dresse des parallèles, souligne certaines correspondances entre les différents plans et personnages des tableaux, juge des renversements des rôles des personnages, en analysant ainsi des détails qui paraissent insignifiants selon les critiques, mais qui représentent pour lui des arguments en faveur de sa thèse:

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[10] *Ibidem,* p. 139.
[11] *Ibidem*, p. 132.

[…] près du capitaine, et comme établissant le parallélisme lumineux avec la jeune fille du second plan, marche le lieutenant […]; ce personnage secondaire est devenu principal, et de cette fille il a fait l'héroïne de ce tumultueux rassemblement. Elle est charmante; […] à sa ceinture pend un poulet blanc attaché par les pattes et une bourse pleine flottante au bout de ses longs cordons. (Je vous dirai plus tard pourquoi ce détail insignifiant en apparence, me semble **prouver** que la scène ne représente pas une ronde de nuit et se passe en plein jour).[12]

Il continue à contester les interprétations classiques du tableau analysé par lui (qui soutiennent que l'action se passe durant la nuit, et que les personnages sont des bourgeois recevant un prince), en illustrant sa position par un enchaînement de déductions, de justifications logiques, de détails qu'il trouve révélateurs pour son analyse. Il fait mention de ces interprétations traditionnelles sous la forme d'interrogations rhétoriques et finit par les réfuter avec plus de vigueur, pour réitérer, pour renforcer sa propre opinion, selon laquelle cette toile présente une scène de jour et non pas de nuit, dont les personnages sont des miliciens et non pas des bourgeois. Ainsi, se donne-t-il à voir comme un véritable découvreur, décrypteur du message artistique:

Est-ce une garde de nuit? Je ne le crois pas! Nulle torche! Nulle lanterne! ce ne sont pas, comme on l'a cru, des bourgeois qui sortent en hâte, le soir, pour aller recevoir je ne sais quel prince étranger; ce sont des braves miliciens de la ville […] Rembrandt a été payé par un certain nombre de miliciens pour faire leurs portraits (leurs noms inscrits en font foi), il les a groupés, selon les besoins de sa composition, dans l'exercice d'une de leurs occupations les plus fréquentes. S'ils s'élancent le soir afin de recevoir un prince, pourquoi le lieutenant est-il peu surpris qu'on lui flambe un fusil jusque sur son chapeau? Ils vont à la cible, et voilà tout. La scène se passe en plein jour.[13]

Ainsi, il fait preuve d'une maîtrise remarquable des termes d'architecture, qui paraissent être propres à un vrai spécialiste du domaine. Ses descriptions et ses analyses regorgent de métalangage architectural: «pilastres», «portiques et chapiteaux corinthiens», «tourelles», «pentagones», «meneaux à biseau», «abat-son», «caissons chardonnés», «nef avec des bas-côtés», «transept», «fleuronnement de piliers», «balustrades tréflées et trilobées», «rinceaux de la renaissance», «courtines», «merlons», «ogives en accolade ou rétrécies», «gothique flamboyant», etc. Dans la description d'une église d'Hollande, dédiée à St. Mathieu, il semble déceler, déchiffrer une variété d'éléments d'architecture spécifiques aux courants artistiques du quatorzième, du quinzième, du seizième siècles, qu'il identifie comme s'il lisait simultanément un livre sur l'histoire de l'architecture européenne. Dans les descriptions des temples de l'Antiquité, des

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[12] *Ibidem*, p. 130.
[13] *Ibidem*, p. 140.

cathédrales, des églises, des palais, des châteaux, des manoirs, des bâtiments officiels, tels que les hôtels de ville, les gares, les musées, qu'il visite durant ses voyages en Europe, en Afrique et en Asie, le voyageur témoigne d'un impressionnant **savoir architectural**, qu'il a élaboré rigoureusement à travers ses lectures encyclopédiques et il est un très bon connaisseur des courants et mouvements artistiques et des siècles qui leur correspondent: le gothique, la renaissance, le baroque, le néoclassicisme, le néogothique.

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