EUROPEAN UNITY: DESIDERATUM AND STATE OF FACTS

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Abstract: The article is an attempt to show that one of the remnants of the "Cold War", manifested in the default knowledge, is the current paradigm of the "dialogue" of the humanisms, paradigm in which "dialogue" means confrontation. This "confrontation of humanisms" is mainly due not to material causes, but to spiritual factors: on the one hand, it is due to the decisive influence of the current political ideologies, how they manage to impose "the grid" by which the ideological alternative and the dialogue with the others are perceived; on the other hand, it is due to some intrinsic factors of the mere humanisms in opposition (competition).

Keywords: paradigm of dialogue, dialogue as confrontation, confrontation of humanisms, political ideologies.

The long "cold war" years and of confrontation in all plans of social life could not leave behind them ideological or psychological aftermath (sometimes-ideological and psychological). Ideologically, the remnants of the "cold war" consist not only in theories and theses supported explicitly by the politicians, but also, - in a deeper and more hidden plan-, in the operation of mental schemes, algorithms and "forms" in which are "cast" and "processed" the problems posed by the political practice or those raised by the ideological dialogue itself. We will try to prove further that one of these schemes of the years of confrontation, manifested in the default (tacit) knowledge, is the current paradigm of the "dialogue" of the humanisms, paradigm in which "dialogue" means confrontation. We will see that this "confrontation of humanisms" is mainly due not to material causes, but to spiritual, but objective factors:[1] on the

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[1] We do not disclaim that at Hegel the contraries are presumed to each other, forming a whole; on the contrary, at Hegel the whole ("the totality") can be only a battlefield. We reproach, together with other authors, *the reduction of the whole to the two terms* (encoded "A" and "anti A", as well as the reduction of the relationship between these to battle (that is to a contradiction non-mediated by non-A").

Reading Hegel together with Alexandre Kojeve from *Introduction to the reading of Hegel* (Cluj, Biblioteca Apostrof, 1996), namely the Division A of chapter IV of the *Phenomenology of spirit*, entitled "Independence and dependence of self-consciousness - Master and servant" (*ibidem*, pp. 107-115), we see how the concept of recognition "will present first the appearance of the inequality of the two self consciousnesses [i.e. of *two people who face for recognition*] or of the expansion of the medium term [i.e. the mutual recognition] to the extremes [*the two that are facing each other*] which, as being extremes, are opposed to each other and *only one is recognized, the other just grateful*" (underlined D.B.; *ibidem*, p. 20).

Commenting, Alexandre Kojeve writes: *"In a first instance, the man who wants to be recognized by another does not want to recognize him in his turn*. If he succeeds, the recognition will not be mutual

one hand, to the decisive influence of the current political ideologies, how they manage to impose "the grid" by which the ideological alternative and the dialogue with the others are perceived; on the other hand, to some intrinsic factors of the mere humanisms in opposition (competition).

In the psychological plan, the confrontation years left behind a series of "habits", "reflexes" still strong in conducting the ideological dialogue; there is still a cohort of analysts who are looking at everything with a suspicious restraint or even with a declared distrust and looking everywhere for hidden reasons of political actions and ideological positions generated by the new mentality in connection with what was called the "general European process". As always in such cases, they find them, because these ones, even if they are fictitious, satisfy the presuppositions of those who are seeking them; we are dealing with a typical situation in which "who seeks, finds!".

The psychology founded on a thinking structured by the linear rationality, which makes them unable to see the world differently than broken and governed by conflicts such as "A-anti A", does not allow them to grasp the absolute novelty of the current problems, to formulate them in new terms, characteristic to them. For example, some contacts are seen as opposed to others, and the dialogue of certain persons is considered a danger to others, according to the principle: "if two persons find a common language, it is not good for the third one".

1. A stringent desideratum: the unity of action against global challenges

In the opinion of the most lucid observers and analysts of the current international life and of the global problems of the contemporary world, according to the most active politicians of the time who lie on the ridge of the new wave of the world relaxation, the policy under which some are opposed to others inexorably already belongs to the past. The policy which relies on non-harmonized contradictions and on the possibility of handling them for one's own interest became not only ineffective, but also extremely dangerous. If it turns out yet to have a short-term and a "local" efficacy (for example, in some Eastern European countries), in the long term and in a global approach of the future, it is shaping by now as being anti-productive, as a self-murderer policy.

A stringent imperative of our times is the common activity of peoples, of governments, of international organizations in order to survive-all! – to the

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and reciprocal: "he will be recognized, but he will not recognize the one who recognizes him" (underlined D.B.; the text printed with italic character belongs to Kojeve - *ibidem*, p. 21).

In Kojeve's "reading", the struggle between opposites to Hegel supposes, necessarily, the recessivity of the one of the two terms and the final victory "of the other": *"the struggle for recognition could be completed only by the death of one of the opponents - or both at the same time"* (*ibidem*, p. 24). This Hegelian model of the contradiction transcends the framework of the "struggle for recognition" in The *phenomenology of spirit*; it pervades the entire work. Therefore, we cannot agree with those who see in Hegel's dialectic a theory of complementarity. The Hegelian model was taken over by Marx, in the theory of class struggle. The historical refutation of this theory must be connected to the absence of the idea of complementarity, with the elusion of the other elements of the system ("non-A") and with the prejudice that one of the two terms must prevail and the other must disappear.

nationalist, nuclear and ecological danger. These threats can be countered only jointly and not separately (even less against each other). It is, in substance, to re-think the contradictions, to understand and treat them as expressions of unity, to no longer reduce them to the idea of war, according to the Hegelian model.[2] In our opinion, this model was not invented by Hegel; he only emits it from a longstanding practice of "socialization", corresponding to a certain objective stage of globalization of history. Entered the mindsets, in the spiritual culture, in the modern scientific knowledge, it was made abstract from here by Hegel, who put it in front of the "socialized humanity." Today, this mankind can no longer be recognized in it than with the price of a false image of his own destinii, of a false self consciousness. The coming late on the scene of the universal history of the hegelian model of contradictions may be paid, if it continues, with the highest possible price: dispossession of the future.

A whole range of analysts of global problems mankind faces find that it lacks a vision of a viable global future. We quote from the statements of an interlocutor of the publicist Ioniță Olteanu, with whom he has maintained several *Dialogues about peace*[3]: "Around the world, the economic and social policy, but also the external one are based on a specific image for global development (...). Basically, all this policy is based on the image of a global future which seems to lead inexorably to the maintenance of human suffering and conflicts, because of the obvious disparities between the privileges of the rich and the misery of the poor; due to deforestation, soil erosion, water pollution, and other destructors of the environment; because of changes of species of plants and animals, soil composition, climate, etc. If these trends continue, in the future, conflicts appear as imminent. The inter-conditional issues listed, all constitute aspects of a global fundamental crisis. This crisis is real and unprecedented in history. There is no output solution that does not involve a fundamental change to how we perceive ourselves, we understand our aspirations, we seek new ways and we found relations with the environment that surrounds us" (Willis Harman, Director of the Institute of Noetic Sciences in San Francisco).[4] Another interlocutor (Rajni Kothari, Director of the Centre for research of developing societies in Delhi) considers that "human perspective is based on survival and transformation or, expressed in a more conventional language, on peace and development, two dimensions which are deeply interrelated. Contemporary human condition arises (...) from the poorness of the two dimensions. The result: the vision on an integral and unified future – based on solidarity and a common destiny - is more distant than ever in the past. So, the changing, the transformation must begin with our

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[2] We find such a point of view, for instance, at one of the most prominent representatives of European humanism in the 20th century, which was considered during the first world war, "the conscience of Europe": Romain Rolland. Evoking a discussion carried with him on the eve of the outbreak of war, Stefan Zweig was writing: "He was saying that it's time to become vigilant (...). *That forces which incite to hatred, according to their inferior nature, more vehement and more aggressive than those advocating conciliation (...). That the absurd was obvious and the fight against it is even more important than our art*" (S. Zweig, *Orele astrale ale omenirii*, Bucharest, Editura Univers, 1973, p. 202).

[3] I. Olteanu, *Speranța în om,* Bucharest, Ed. Politică, 1987.

[4] *Ibidem,* pp. 262-263.

minds, with the ways in which we perceive, understand and reflect the world we live in".[5]

It can be seen that the two interlocutors of the Romanian journalist (as, indeed, most of its 12 partners in *Dialogues about peace*) believe that "the current situation is a new dramatic phase in the struggle for survival of humanity, whose stakes are high, the arena being a globe, and the actors - people of the world" and that this situation "should be understood by all those pursuing peace"[6]. A second common view is on the need for a new way of thinking and approach of global issues, without which the evolution of the world towards an ecological or nuclear disaster seems inevitable.

Commenting the assertion of Johathan Schell who wrote in his book Earth's Destiny: "there is no other solution to the nuclear dilemma than to reinvent the world, Willis Harman, said "It was not only a smart remark, but rather a deep diagnosis. There is no possible solution in the framework of our common perception of the world. And, however, it may be, namely, the possibility that the world be re-perceived and therefore transformed so that the dilemma should be solved".[7] In order to support the idea that the change of perceiving the nature of the problem makes it possible for a solution, the American teacher illustrates it with the help of the well-known game called "rallying points" (see Annex 1).

In this study we propose such a fundamental change of perceiving a problem whose solution is vital to safeguard civilization from a generalized and permanent catastrophe: the problem of unity of action of all social and political forces of the contemporary world, advocating one way or another, in order to avoid the catastrophe, to overcome the current crisis in a human and humanizator direction. (For the time being, we will conventionally name these forces by the term "progressive forces"). In the traditional perception of the world and in the political mentality that corresponds to it, this issue does not have a viable solution, the desideratum contained in the name we gave it being perceived and - even being! - utopian.

How is it possible, however, its transformation into a realistic desiderate, how is it possible to fulfill? To give an answer, let's see which is the situation in fact and how it is perceived by the progressive forces itself.

2. The state of facts: the absence of communication and the quarrel of humanisms

So far, the concerted action of all progressive forces of the contemporary world is not achieved, and today it appears as a goal as stringent as it is unlikely.

Why? The question was asked many times in the history of our century, especially on the occasion of political and military catastrophes (as were the two world wars, the establishment of totalitarian regimes, the outbreak of destructive national, ethnic or religious conflicts). Every time we addressed the question: *"Where were the progressive forces? What have they done to prevent the catastrophe? If they have taken, however, something, why did they not manage to avoid it?"*.

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[5] *Ibidem*, p. 281.
[6] *Loc. cit.*
[7] *Ibidem*, p. 260.

The responses were numerous and diverse, but can be grouped into two main categories:

1. The relationship between violence and reason, barbarism and culture, morality and amorality, nihilism and faith, humanism and anti-humanism would prevail by virtue of complex and occult determinations, the first term of each report: *violence, cruelty, amorality, nihilism, anti-humanism;*

2. Individuals and groups who share a humanist moral would suffer a serious handicap, because they can not use opponents' means (under the axiological homogeneity between the purpose and means of any coherent action, would become like them, would betray their own nature, would pass, eventually, to the other side of the "fence" that separates the human from the inhuman); however, opponents can afford to use any means of action without betraying their nature (their own cynicism and nihilism, their own amorality), which they would provide *ab initio* tactical superiority (if not strategic superiority).[8]

It is obvious that the "mystical and speculative" paradigm and the "moralist-psychological" one does not explain the difficulty of achieving unity of action of "forces of good" in their fight against evil. In our opinion, this difficulty arises from the very nature of Good, which is a culturally developed value, as opposed to evil, arising spontaneously from the pulses of the human nature[9] or from complex social relationships insufficiently humanized in practice. Freud's fundamental thesis is that man can only survive in society, but society involves repression of instinctual impulses, a process that ends in culture, as a form of human misery. Marcuse's thesis (*Eros and Civilization*, 1955) is that, in principle, we can achieve a society in which primary instincts can not be suppressed by culture and culture is not a suppression of primary impulses: a "non-repressive society", in which man be *happy and a social being*.[10]

Erich Fromm speaks (in *The anatomy of the human destructivity*, 1973) by aggressive and destructive pulses of human nature, but also by social conditions "which generate aggression", and by the existence of "symbolic universes of aggressiveness in thinking, language and behaviour"[11], approaching a lot to the ideas about the nature of human aggression formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (*Coments on Agression*, 1956).

As opposed to the idea of Good, on which man rests after a "cultural detour" whereby the human nature is socialized, surpassing the original zoological

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[8] About the role of instinctual pulses and their report with the systems of values (culture), as well as about their role in the history of civilization, have talked, in the context of the impressive theoretical constructions, Freud, Jung, Fromm, Marcuse, etc. The thematization of this point of view that is near to the above-mentioned idea can be found in Herbert Marcuse (H. Marcuse, *Scrieri filozofice,* Bucharest, Editura Politică, 1977).

[9] "The evil is by definition that which threatens the Good, that which is treated as a value', says Konrad Lorenz (K. Lorenz, *Aşa-zisul rău. Despre istoria naturală a agresiunii*, Bucharest, Humanitas, 1998, p. 287), researcher we should consider as one of the most knowledgeable connoisseurs of Evil. It seems significant that a thinker who is able to reconstruct "the natural history of aggression" proposes, however, at the end of his famous "Treaty on Evil" (*idem*, pp. 280-294) as antidote to the numerous forms of aggression, a cultural construction, in which education, culture, humanities, arts, science and even humor have a very important place.

[10] H. Marcuse, *op. cit*.

[11] E. Fromm, *Texte alese,* Bucharest, Editura Politică, 1983, pp. 450-497.

selfishness, Evil appears (1) either *as a reflex of needs which are not symbolically processed (i.e. culturally uncensored*, (2) whether *the resultant of social volunteer mechanisms*, which is reflected in the consciousness of subjects as occult and implacable forces, as "fatalities". According to our opinion, the key difference between "Good" and "Evil" is that the first cannot exist - and could not appear - than as a construct of human creative activity, while the second is a spontaneous result of socialization. Incidentally, in contrast to the Good, which is definable in positive terms (what gives it also the status of teleonomic value), Evil is definable only negatively (compared to the Good).[12] On the other hand, the ideological processing of the Evil, its theoretical justification is a borderline case, and, anyway, a late acquisition of culture; it is the expression of the skewed interpretation of the two sources of Evil set forth above, or arise from the absolutization of the one and the elusion of the other (e.g., "the new right", which defines only the first source, and fetichizes it, and it turns the second one into a mystical force referred to as the "Power".[13]

Of course, when we talk about the positive non-definition of Evil, we do not think of the possibility of weak definitions, for example the ostensive definitions: *"It's bad*!", because such a definition does not remove the question, therefore, *"But why?".* And the only plausible answer to this question is: *"Because it is not good*", makes it necessary to further define the Good. Really definable is only the Good, because this idea is always associated with forms of legitimation (explanatory mechanisms, of logic foundation, etc.) which are sufficient, transforming the idea into an autologic idea. To the limit, the Evil also can be legitimated, but with the price of its presentation as Good, what happens in the case of all anti-humanist ideologies which are considered the only "truely progressive", and some are auto-defined as "revolutionary". The doctrinal development of Evil assumes a condition which conflicts with the objectives of any anti-humanist ideology, namely the establishment on universal characteristics of human nature, as well as the promise of a way to universalize the history, to unify the human genus.[14] The difficulty arises here: in need of conciliation particularist objectives, specific to irrational concepts, with the universal importance indispensable to the doctrinary type legitimation. The universalist claims of ultra-nationalist movements (like German fascism) are "universalist" only in terms of the belief on the right these movements have to dominate other peoples, to universalize by an imperialistic imposing. "It is clear – Fukuyama writes - that fascist ideologies cannot be

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[12] Here's what writes one of the most representative thinkers of the new right: "We should not hide it: this end of century needs a summary of positive aspirations, which, so far, have been depicted as disparate. This synthesis is equivalent to the current status of the human condition" (A. de Benoist, *O perspectivă de dreapta*, Bucharest, Editura Anastasia, 1998, p. 19). If we didn't know that we quote from the work *A perspective of the right* by Alain de Benoist, we might think that we read one of the representatives of the traditional European left.

[13] *Ibidem*, pp. 224-237.

[14] When we say "language" we do not refer to the "vocabulary", which may be common, but to the meaning given to the terms of this vocabulary. For example, the word "aggression" exists in the vocabulary of all members of the UN, but it took 30 years to negotiate its meaning (1945-1975), to develop a generally accepted definition of legal terms of "aggressor" and "aggressed".

universalist such as Marxism and liberalism; but the structure of the doctrine can be transferred from one country to another.[15]

In this sense, the "new right" was, indeed, an absolute novelty. In their attempt to recover the traditional right of the inferiority complex it showed to the left, the "new philosophers" gave for the first time to the Evil a universalist type doctrine basis, basing their anti-humanist conclusions on an universal model of the human nature; of course, for this they had to replace the traditional right myths with myths analysis (Dumezil) and the pure ideological discourse with the scientific discourse inspired by genetics and ethology (Lorenz).

But let's come back: "the new right" is, in our opinion, a borderline case in the European culture; as a rule, the Evil of dressed up with doctrinaire clothes, with the price of disguising in Good. A point of view which complements our assertion has been made by Radu Florian, who was speaking by the "humanizing vein" and of the "dehumanizing vein", co-existence that he calls "impurities of the culture" and which he considers one of the sources of its reduced role (of the culture) in daily life, of its big failure, of its significant contribution to the collapse of human.[16] Thus worded, the problem raises a different issue, namely, that of discrimination of the two veins: The danger of this dehumanizing vein is the difficulty of its decelation, since it didn't always had (has) an autonomous incarnation, in works clearly separated from the humanist ones, most often being interlaced with the humanizant one (…). From the ancient religious and moral texts, such as the Bible, until the work of many rationalist thinkers, renowned writers, can be found this combination of humanizant values with other harmful and deshumanizant, which disseminate disdain for other people, hatred and violence" (idem). Such an anti-maniheist approach raises the question of whether this adversarial matrix may not be retrieved in each ideology, if to a critical examination we should not encounter humanizant ideological formations (concepts, ideas, desires, etc.) in concepts considered to be anti-humanist, and vice versa, deshumanizant ideologic formations in humanistic in humanist concepts. In other words, if the social function of ideologies should be assessed according to their overall significance, and not on behalf of an alleged "purity", of a "divine" consistency and coherence, not found in ideological creations of humanity. A possible affirmative answer would have important implications on re-thinking the ideological dialogue in the contemporary world.

Turning to the author recalled above, he said only that the contradictory matrix of the spiritual culture has influenced the pre-doctrinal levels of the social conscience: "these 'impurities' of the intimate fabric of spiritual culture (…) produced and aired a starred moral conscience, a labile, heterogeneous and loose philosophical and moral reason, where elevate concepts and ideas coexist alongside with vile preconceptions, unreasonable mentalities, offensive for human freedom and dignity. (…) They were amplified by the fascizant and fascist ideologies of the inter-war decades, focusing on the image of the "alien–enemy", presented as the source of all social and economic frustrations, of the Evil, but also

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[15] F. Fukuyama „La fin de l'histoire?", în *Commentaire*, nr. 47 / Automne, 1989, p. 461.
[16] R. Florian, „Cultura spirituală şi neumanitatea secolului", în *Societate şi cultură. Noua alternativă*, nr. 2 / 1991, p. 5.

by the Stalinist ideologies fixed on the obsession of "class enemy" absurdly extended up to its own adherents".[17]

Being culturally conditioned, concepts about what Good is (or should be) are much more powerfully determined concretely-historically, with pregnant traces of historic space/time diversity; from here the great difficulty of establishing common objectives and strategies into the action of forces which are truly "the material bearers" of these concepts.

This is our answer to the question formulated at the beginning of this paragraph. It can be understood more easily using the model "the pyramid of pluralities" (Annex 2). The difficulty of laying down objectives and strategies of action common to all progressive forces is explained by *the great diversity of political languages* which are essential "instruments" in setting strategic priorities, objectives and directions. [18] The semantic content of the political language is determined, by the ideological references specific to any progressive force.[19] The ideological references are in line with a certain "horizon of life"[20], so with *a complex system of traditions and living conditions*-economic, socio-political and cultural. The real diversity of horizons of life, implicitly of the concepts about the world (i.e. about society and about the man), of the ideologtical references and of the political languages is *the early stage of the process of universality of history.*

The great issue that will be tackled at all levels of reflection consists precisely in *surpassing the gap between the current stage, still incipient, of the universalization of history and the urgent need to achieve the unity of action of the progressive forces of our age.*

The idea of "the generic unification of the human", of the transformation of human society in a particular subject of the world-sized (quasi-mon-diale) thought has been formulated recently. And the proposed solutions can be classified as follows:

1. human society will be unified by each individual's spiritual perfection (universalist religions proposing an absolute ethics, the case of Christianity which

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[17] *Ibidem*, pp. 5-6.

[18] For instance, in the ideological vocabulary of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, terms like "freedom", "righteousness", "equality", "humanism", etc. have had a meaning different from that which they received subsequently, in the ideological vocabulary of the Marxist socialism. The dependence of the language on the ideological vocabulary was developed elsewhere (D. Borțun, "Omogenizarea socială și înflorirea personalității", în *Revista de filosofie,* nr. 5/1980).

[19] We have developed the concept "horizon of life" in order to conceptualize that concrete-historical form of praxis where is employed a subject (individual or social group) and which cuts its register of social relations it produces and reproduces (which therefore, a variant historically determined by the "human essence"). As a result of developments made elsewhere (2), we defined "the horizon of life" as *the assembly of the experience of a subject (individual or group), circumscribed to the system of needs and related means of satisfying them, system objectively determined by the place of the subject in the group structure of society*.

[20] This is what Marx and Engels demonstrated when referring to terms like "ownership", "family", "moral, "education", "homeland"; behind the bourgeois meaning of these words there is the ideological reference of the bourgeoisie, led, in turn, by its horizon of life; in the ideological reference of the proletariat, they acquired a new meaning (K. Marx, F. Engels, *Manifestul Partidului Comunist*, ed. a IX-a, Bucharest, Ed. Politică, 1969, p. 52-57).

is preaching the oneness with Christ as a result of which all men would become "sons of God" and – to some extent - the Enlightenment);

2. human society will unite under the pressure of an external danger, so under threat of an extra-land enemy (solution formulated in classical Russian literature);

3. human society will unify at a planetary scale following the completion of the objective process of universalization of history (philosophy of romantic origin, in particular the post-Hegelian one). Such diagnostics were offered by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who saw in communism both "the humanism achieved" and the completing of the process of universalization of history; in their view, communism will mean "the empirical existence of people on a world history ground instead of the local one"[21], which is possible only on the basis of the universal development of productive forces, along with which are established "universal connections between the people".[22]

If we decide not to take into consideration the fancy character and, anyway, unwanted for the second "solution" and we intend to take seriously all three, without any discrimination, we note that neither is applicable to the current crisis, because: 1'. In our century, increasingly few people manage to establish any contact with the divinity, and the evolution of events does not entitle us to believe that in the near future things will stay otherwise. As writes an important representative of Christianity, "a fatal shortcoming always makes selfish and cruel people reach the top and everything slips again in misery and ruin. In fact, the machine breaks down. People are trying to make it function with an inappropriate fuel. (…) I think that if you look at the present state of the world, it is very clear that mankind has made a huge mistake. We are on the wrong road. And if so, we need to go back. To return is the fastest way to advance.[23] In principle, we can agree with the "return path" preached by C. S. Lewis, but no matter how "fast" would appear this "way forward", it seems that history time no longer has the patience. 2. the danger that threatens today's human society as a whole is not its exterior but its interior; it is not extra-terrestrial, but as terrestrial as possible. Quoting again Allan Bloom, "the enemy are we!". 3. the universalization of history is, when we think it dialectally and not in the form required by the bourgeoisie in the modern era, as propagation from the "center" to the "periphery" of a civilization considered "superior", a lengthy and contradictory process; in its current stage you cannot bet on him in the conception of ideological unification of human and not even of its "good part" ("progressive forces"). Far from allowing the avoidance of the generalized and definitive catastrophe, the universalisation of history is hardly a trend, which, on the contrary, needs to avoid the catastrophe for becoming mature. It is about the "spontaneous order" (emergent order), not about the order which can be modeled by people's arbitrary action.

The last amendment is the main explanation of the fact that the future cannot be predicted or designed only in the terms of "realization of humanism" (Marx), of the exercise of the "universal and uniform status" (Alexandre Kojev) and not even

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[21] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Ideologia germană*, Ed. de Stat pentru Literatură Politică, Bucharest, 1956, p. 35.

[22] *Loc. cit.*

[23] C.S. Lewis, *Creştinismul redus la esenţe*, Societatea Misionară Română, 1987, p. 37.

in those of the "universalization of Western liberal democracy", of the "triumph of the idea of Western" (Fukuyama). It must be *invented in the terms of the survival, of the safeguard of human civilization.*

THE GAME CALLED "RALLYING POINTS"
(*apud,* I. Olteanu, *Speranța în om,* ed. cit., 1987, p. 259)

We are given a group of nine points, arranged in a square in three by three strings. We are asked to unite them all by straight lines drawn in such a way as points to form a "bead", and the pen cannot be lifted from paper, each point being reached only once (fig. 1).

Figure 1:

●   ●   ●

●   ●   ●

●   ●   ●

Normally we assume, without grounds, that the tip of the pen must remain within the square, where there are no solutions. But changing the perception on what is possible and leaving the lines to exceed the limits of the square, the solution easily appears (see Figure 2).

Figure 2:

INTERPRETATION. The same happens with "global dilemmas": as long as some preconceived ideas persist, there is no hope for a solution. Changing perception would bring some hope. What is not possible in a perceptible referential, becomes possible in another referential; as it also happens in the case of ideological or cultural references.

"PYRAMID OF THE PLURALITY"

In the current stage of universalization of history (and in the context of the present world forces report), the trial to communicate is the following:

LANGUAGES → ALWAYS, through different languages (= "deaf dialogue");

IDEOLOGICAL REFERENTIALS → RARELY, due to the difficulty of grasping the existence or the possibility of existence of another referential (different from the one shared by each interlocutor);

CONCEPTS ABOUT THE WORLD → VERY RARELY, due to the fact that the other philosophical concepts appear as illegitimate (= dogmatism, sectarism);

CULTURAL HORIZONS → ALMOST NEVER, due to the belief that other cultural horizons are not significant (= etnocentrism; "eurocentrism", "panamericanism" etc.);

HORIZONS OF LIFE (ECONOMIC, SOCIO-POLITICAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF TODAY'S WORLD) → NEVER, because of the belief that it would needlessly complicate the problem, because the current diversity of the world is whether an "eternal" state, whether it could be surpassed by neocolonialist strategies).