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Address: 176 Splaiul Unirii, Bucharest
Phone: 021.330.79.00, 021.330.79.11,
021.330.79.14
Fax: 021.330.87.74
E-mail: cogito.ucdc@yahoo.com

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IN MEMORIAM ACAD. ALEXANDRU BOBOC

*Unfortunately, the academic philosophical world in Romania has lost, this spring which has been sad for all of us, **the academician Alexandru Boboc**, full member of the Romanian Academy, professor emeritus of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest.*

*In this issue of Cogito Journal we have chosen to pay homage to the personality of the distinguished **prof. PhD. acad. Alexandru Boboc**, member of **the Scientific Board** of this publication since its establishment, as he was the main supporter of this academic publishing project of scientific scope, both nationally and internationally. He was my mentor, my model of scientific and philosophical researcher, who supported and encouraged me in establishing Cogito Scientific Research Journal. He was the **CHOSEN MAN** to whom I appealed for scientific advice and coordination in this fascinating but particularly difficult process. He participated in the inauguration of Cogito Journal, in October 2009, within the philosophy circle of "Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University in Bucharest, as well as in other scientific events, international conferences dedicated to Dimitrie Cantemir's personality and work.*

*I find it extremely hard to write about his personality in the past, because I had a special relationship with this genuine scientific researcher in the field of philosophy. My meeting with **prof. PhD. Alexandru Boboc** was a huge chance that Providence offered me, for my academic professional evolution and for my development in the field of scientific and philosophical research. He was my guide and coordinator while writing the doctoral thesis on G.W. Leibniz's Metaphysics, but also a member of the national commission for obtaining my habilitation in philosophy, with the thesis: Philosophical and historico-philosophical research: inter and transdisciplinary approach submitted at the*

Institute of Philosophy and Psychology "Constantin Rădulescu-Motru" from the Romanian Academy.

*Being the most exquisite Romanian specialist in the field of modern and contemporary philosophy, as well as in the field of Romanian philosophy, keen on Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, but also on Cantemir and Eminescu, **the academician Alex Boboc** was Romania's representative at various World Philosophy Congresses, where he distinguished himself with remarkable works such as "Cantemir-Leibniz", and so on.*

*It is undeniably true that no man can reach perfection without a model. For me, **acad. Alex Boboc** was and will remain the model of the authentic intellectual who embodied in an admirably harmonious way the dianoethical (intellectual) and ethical virtues, the model of **GOOD MAN**, generous, modest, characterized by an unmatched soul nobility and intellectual finesse. Not coincidentally, he seemed to have chosen to leave this world with the same discretion and elegance with which he lived and worked. He died as an authentic philosopher who gave the measure of a fulfilled life dedicated to the love of wisdom, leaving behind a remarkable philosophical work, but also many disciples that he guided and formed as teachers and researchers. Eternal gratitude and appreciation in aeternum for this wonderful mentor and perfect intellectual whom I had the great honor to meet in my life and who helped me a lot!*

Prof. PhD. Hab. Gabriela Pohoacă

Editor-in chief Cogito

HORIA STAMATU – PERSONALITY AND CREATION

Ion Dur*

iondur@yahoo.com

Abstract: *After we explored, in another context, the surface of some references about the perception of literature by traditionalist Horia Stamatu, we will now analyse the potential and real exercise of the readings he has done on some Romanian creators and their works: Ion Barbu and Mircea Vulcănescu.*

Horia Stamatu's conclusion is: Barbu foresees his poetic trajectory and thus that of knowledge: from the turmoil of youth searching for his "heaven" and "expression" to finding it in "Secondary Game" and then to opening the sky in mystical and intellectual intuition.

Essay on Mircea Vulcănescu is a balanced and subtle one, and some of the philosopher's ideas, are faithfully and productively annotated by the publicist. The philosopher thus appears to us as a man of his time and of the Romanian society in which he lived, hoped and wrote with lucidity and realism.

Keywords: *personality, creation, Ion Barbu, Mircea Vulcănescu, secondary game, the Romanian dimension of existence.*

Apart from the Romanian diaspora, the name of Horia Stamatu (Stamatopol) (9 September 1912, Vălenii de Munte, Romania – 8 July 1989, Freiburg) is known to few ordinary people or intellectuals in Romania. In exile, he was known not only through printed books, but especially through his publications in newspapers and magazines written in Romanian.

He was a poet, journalist, essayist and translator (from San Juan de la Cruz, Jean Cocteau, Martin Heidegger) and lived about three decades in Greater Romania, the rest of his life (from 1941 onwards) being spent in the varied and tension-ridden space of Romanian exile (Paris, Madrid, Freiburg).

With a degree in Philosophy (1937) and two years of Law studies, he worked as a substitute professor of Philosophy and Romanian at the "Dimitrie Cantemir" High School in Bucharest (1936-1937); as editor of the "The Encyclopaedia of Romania" (1938-1941), under the leadership of Mircea Vulcănescu; and as chief editor of *The Annunciation*, an official of

* Professor Baia Mare Northern University Centre.

the Legionary Movement (in which he enrolled in 1937), a newspaper with which he had been collaborating since 1938.

After the Legionary Rebellion of January 1941, he leaves the country (“after a serious press conflict”, as he wrote to Sanda Stolojan on 6.IX.74) through Bulgaria, trying to reach Germany, but is taken prisoner and interned in the concentration camps of Rostock and Buchenwald (1942-1944). In Rostock he edits *New Era*, a legionary magazine, and also collaborates with *Axis* (also a Right-wing publication), whose editor he had been while in Romania. He then works (1944-1945), together with Paul Costin Deleanu and Crișu Axente, at the Donau radio station, for the Romanian section, a service then “available to the National Government of Vienna”, headed by Horia Sima (since 1945, Stamatu's political ties with any organization ceased).

In February 1946, indicted in the “war criminals” group (which included: Vintilă Horia, Ion Sân-Giorgiu, Metropolitan Visarion, Alexandru Gregorian), he will be sentenced in absence to life imprisonment (in 1961, by an order of the Romanian Ministry of the Interior, an APB was put on him in Romania).

He lived, successively, in a medieval monk cell in Freiburg (1946-1948), a city where he was a lecturer of Romanian language and literature in Hugo Friedrich's Department of Romanistic Studies and where he continued to study philosophy with Max Müller, the successor of Martin Heidegger; in Paris (1948-1950), at the Romanian Research Centre (whose director was Mircea Eliade); in Madrid (1951-1961) where he published extensively in Spanish, in the editing board of the *Romanian Freedom* and *Fact* magazines; after which he returned to the same German city in 1961.

Horia Stamatu used several aliases, especially when writing “service materials”: Martor, Juan Alba, Adrian B. Cosma, Al. Berceanu, George Brana, Chronografos Anonymos, Osea, V. Popescu.

Being part of the generation of the 1930s, the generation of Mircea Eliade, Horia Stamatu debuted as a poet in the magazine *The Flower of Fire* (1932), also led by a poet, Sandu Tudor, director of the publication *Faith*. His editorial debut was made with *Memnon* (1934), a book awarded the “Young Writers' Prize” by the Royal Foundations¹, together with Eugen Ionescu's *No*, Emil Cioran's *On the heights of despair*, Constantin Noica's *Mathesis or simple joys*. In the same year, before his book appeared, he published three poems (“Memnon”, “Poetic” and “Epilogue”) in “Anthology of Young Poets” (collection “Contemporary Romanian Writers”, under the aegis of the Foundation for Literature and Art “King Carol II”), compiled by Zaharia Stancu and Ion Pillat.

¹ The jury consisted of Mircea Eliade, Mircea Vulcănescu, Petru Comarnescu, Ion I. Cantacuzino, Serban Cioculescu, Tudor Vianu and Romulus Dianu.

During his exile he writes verses, articles and essays on the philosophy of culture or the history of the Romanian mind, texts published in *Destiny*, *The Journal of Romanian Writers*, *The Romanian Word*, *Romanian Freedom*, *The Word in Exile*, *Prodomos*, *Limits*, *Notebooks of Longing*, perhaps the most important. Among the books written in refuge we mention: *Recitative* (1963), *Dialogues* (1964; German and Spanish versions: 1968, 1971), *Counterpoint* (1969), *Punta Europa* (1970), *Kairos* (1974; Romanian edition 1995), *Journal* (1976), *Empire* (1981; Romanian edition 1996), *Cantata of Resurrection* (1982), *Prayer for Marianne's Day* (1983), *The Book of Kings and Emperors* (1984), *Ego Zenovius ...* (Romanian edition, 2001), *47 letters from Horia Stamatu* (Romanian edition, 2005), Paul Miron, *In correspondence with Horia Stamatu* (2007)².

After we explored, in another context, the surface of some references about *the perception of literature* by “traditionalist”³ Horia Stamatu, and examined the way in which he received the work of art (with its seminal nucleus positioned inside *intensive* time as a form of aesthetic immanence), we will now analyse the potential and real exercise of the readings he has done on some Romanian creators and their works.

We were tempted to call this text “Generation and creation” (the formulation belongs to Tudor Vianu), but we realized that a generation is validated in history by the personalities who mark it and who compose its axiological map. Horia Stamatu spoke, in 1982, of *the generation of '22*, the 20th century generation (just as Eminescu discussed the 1840s generation), which brought with it “the spirit of the great ruptures”⁴, as he wrote about generations in our literature. In fact, says the essayist, the phenomenon of generation – a modern discovery – has really revealed itself with the coming of Christ, in other words, the generation is a phenomenon of a spiritual nature.

1932 marked the 100th anniversary of the death of Goethe, a writer whose literary career extended over three-quarters of a century. It also marked, Stamatu observes, the beginning of a catastrophe by which the modern era was practically buried through a series of events: the

² We point out that certain references in our bibliography may be incomplete, due to a variety of reasons, which the advised reader can easily guess.

³ See the assumptions of Titu Popescu, *The Poet Horia Stamatu*, Printed in Germany, Munich, 1993, pp. 137-138.

⁴ Horia Stamatu, “Fifty Years: 1932-1982”, *The Romanian Word*, October 1982. We quote from the text, without any further reference.

“Roosevelt era” was born, the Weimar Republic collapsed and the first five-year plan in Russia ended, defining the economic future of a revolution which should spread worldwide.

Horia Stamatu considers that, for fifty years, 1932-1982, all the consequences of such events had already occurred, and that the twentieth century could be considered even then as bankrupt on multiple levels: spiritual, political, economic and moral. Notaries of the time could record it as the most catastrophic century in human history. The 1922 generation “felt the catastrophe, at least Romania wanted to avoid it, but was materially defeated.” Then he continues: “Spiritually, however, the Romanian people cannot be defeated, and if it has prophesized the end of the modern era, it will also engender those who, in the post-modern era, will rebuild the bases of the Romanian people”.

Fixed on the year 1932, Horia Stamatu's comment then folded on *the political rank* of Greater Romania from that moment. He found that the most prominent cultural personality was Nicolae Iorga, obviously from another generation. We have a completely different reception of the historian against the interwar argument of Stamatu the journalist. He sees in Iorga the author who wrote about most of the hypostases of our history: political history, cultural history with literature, fine arts, architecture, monumentality, the history of the Romanian Church, of commerce, books about our geographical space as well as the history of various forms of activity of Romanians. A modern historian, a complete historian. He was also a good Minister of Public Instruction and Religious Affairs, but with traces of compromise, such as that episode of student protests against a law of lawyers, when the protesters were suddenly brutalized by the forces of the gendarmes. Phases that illustrate in a way what Iorga himself would have said: “I am not me”. That is, one was the historian and the culture man, but the other was the politician, who, as one can see, usurped the former: “This was the schizophrenia of Greater Romania, which was transmitted without continuity. So: consistency just when you don't need it”.

Professor Nicolae Iorga, as Nae Ionescu also observed in 1932, “even though he had visionary perspectives, a wide historical understanding and, I would say, a conaturality for Romanian realities and the prophetic life of a great reformer”, was not able, as a politician, to form “the great revolutionary government to which we sometimes timidly aspired”⁵.

⁵ Nae Ionescu, “The problem of our state policy”, *Word*, January 27. 1932 – see Nae Ionescu, *The Weathervane*, Edition curated by Dan Zamfirescu, Bucharest: “The Weathervane”, 1990, p. 287.

Therefore, we are talking about personality and creation rather than generation and creation. Four years after the death of Ion Barbu (1961), a disappearance that “struck him like a frozen wind”, Horia Stamatu (re)reads the anthology *Looking Glass* (Publishing House for Literature, 1964, editors Al. Rosetti and Liviu Călin), asserting from the beginning that the poet had been silent for a long time, “in a “steady glory”, angry with “a cephalous and wingless century”⁶. As we know, it is a collection of poems from youth (an “over-gifted” youth), specific to the Parnassian stage, but there are in *Looking Glass* also poems of another bill, all of them surpassing what Parnassians had achieved, a century ago (the lyrics were later revised by the author for reprinting).

The evaluation of Barbu's poetic art was framed, first and foremost, within the framework of aesthetic references largely noticed by our literary critique, including the interwar one. The landscape given by “the rigor of the form, the manly accent, the plasticity and the importance of the images, the fervour of the speech and the elevation of the attitude” is thus noted.

Ion Barbu did not take, says Stamatu, a zigzag road, but had an existence built according to the law of hyperbole: “the constant relationship between all the points of the curve and the focus”. His early poetry distinguishes an inner world, expressing both a deepening of knowledge and a refinement of expression; it is a “continuous exploration of the mists towards the light of origins”, in order to know the Divine, as we find from “When the decline will come”: “With hands numbed by a long walk through the frost / I will return to myself when the decline comes; / I will descend to seek, lost in a corner, / The niche that burns with an unstoppable Divine fire.”

It was said that Ion Barbu's attitudes or positions were dominated by *sincerity*, even though we can also speak about “a kind of ceremonial praise and a show of anger”, a background of authenticity placed neither

⁶ Horia Stamatu, „Ion Barbu: *Looking Glass*”, *Prodomos, Christian brochure*, Freiburg, year II, no. 3-4, April 1965. We quote from the text, without any further reference. The Romanian critical space will not be indifferent to Ion Barbu's work, if one were to recall, around this moment, Basarab Nicolescu's book, *Ion Barbu. The cosmology of the secondary game*, Bucharest: EPL, 1968. An essay praised by Nicolae Manolescu, Marian Popa, Al. Piru, C. Ciopraga, Solomon Marcus, but in which Ov. Crohmălniceanu saw a kind of *prestidigitation* by which the author “consciously falsified the message”, as the essayist wrote to Horia Stamatu (Paris, 2 September 1981); Horia Stamatu will also write about Nicolescu's volume much later – see “Retrospective considerations”, *The Romanian Word*, November 1981.

under the sign of serenity nor or objectivity, as concluded by Monica Lovinescu⁷.

When rereading some *Prose pages* by Ion Barbu (1969, volume edited by Dinu Pillat), the critic of Radio Free Europe wondered (March 20, 1969) about the longevity and meaning given by context in the case of a pamphlet composition such as “The poetics of Mr. Arghezi” (*European Idea*, November 1, 1927), a text by Barbu that, when it appeared, generated various polemics. Since then, things had evolved under the encomyasis of a “delirium of praise”, under the narcosis of “appropriate hosannas”, the “moral bending” or “noisy kneelings” of Arghezi giving rise to the inevitable question: “how can poetry coexist with the overpowering baksheesh”?⁸

During this time, the critical opinions of Ion Barbu, a learned reader who, unlike others, found in Arghezi's poetry “a mosaic of settlements after a very primitive colour concern, never raised to the vibration and incandescence of *the interior mode*” (we note, ID; an immanentist statement consistent with H. Stamatu's understanding of *intensive literary time*). Thus, in the author of *The Right Words* (not a match of the senses!) Ion Barbu discovered “a poet without a message, rejected by the Idea as once by the maceration of ascetic life”, to whom the Psalms appear as “a parody of the holy mysteries”; finally, it is a “lazy” poetry, which emanates a “mechanical aesthetics”, of “Oltenian carpets”.

We brought under the same vault the *vocational reader* (of poetry) Ion Barbu and the *crafters of verses* Tudor Arghezi to suggest that the silent disturbances of the former, in his critical hypostasis of false osmosis between *being* and *poetry* reverberate with the way in which Horia Stamatu decodes, later on, the binomial of time-literature.

Let's return to Ion Barbu's poetry. In terms of quantity, Barbu's poetic work appears parsimonious, the author has a strong sense of self-censorship of value. He stated it without any reservations, for example in the chronological index of *Secondary game* (National Culture, 1930): “The pre-1922 production was left out, as it stemmed from an elementary poetic principle.”

Ion Barbu wrote *non multa, sed multum*, that is to say *multa paucis*, much in a few words, somewhat oxymoronically his poetry being related to essences carefully distilled to their symbolic form. Humanity itself is sublimated by the poet in an evolution that stretches from *personification* to *logos*, at its revelation. A process settled by Horia Stamatu's analysis through the poetic deconstruction of the Barbian cosmogony.

⁷ See Monica Lovinescu, “Ion Barbu the writer” (March 20, 1969), *Short waves. Indirect Journal*, Bucharest: Humanitas, 1990, p. 347.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 348. We quote from the text, without any further reference.

Here is the publisher's conclusion: "Barbu foresees his poetic trajectory and thus that of knowledge: from the turmoil of youth searching for his "heaven" and "expression" to finding it in "Secondary Game" and then to opening the sky in mystical and intellectual intuition"⁹. Beyond these, however, there remained a fundamental doubt of anthropology, namely: to what extent does the Cosmos remain only an *anthropic symbol* and man only a *cosmic symbol*?

Noting Ion Barbu's spiritual growth after the German interlude (1921-1924), Stamatu proposes a number of original aspects, in which the "glory which was about to marry the spirit of the poet" is evident, as shown in the volume *Secondary Game*. In the three cycles of poems ("Secondary Game", "Uvedenrode" and "Isarlic") we find contents such as "intellect", "Eros and logos" and "world".

Let us analyse now the hermeneutics of Horia Stamatu. In the first cycle, deprived of things and contemplating the Idea, the poet provokes an initiation through intellectual intuition, and through "Uvedenrode" he suggests that people are "slaves of the contingent, but at the same time visited by the absolute, by the embodied logos", so that "we share a sometimes sweet solemn, sometimes wild sad joy."

Familiar with the lexicon of the German language, with the usual geography of the areas, Stamatu translates Uvedenrode by "place without place", something located beyond "culture" and "legal and social laws": "Uvedenrode / Over fashions and times / Olympus", as Barbu himself says. Therefore, a situated structure is fruitful above all rational grounds.

In the poem "Dogmatic Egg", Stamatu found the climax of gradual eros, an eros made up of both fall and salvation, a balance that inclines depending on where we stand: "under the sign of necessity, with Venus, or within grace, with The Holy Spirit, which is, as in San Juan de la Cruz, the hypostasis of love, the mediator between us and Logos".

On another plane, the "Dogmatic Egg" shows one's *wonder* when faced with the mystery of the incarnation, as it contrasts so-called *modern man, erased and forgetful*, with the banal fruits of civilization; such as: the electric mother hen, no longer a source of amazement when it produces chicks like its flesh-and-bone-and-feather counterpart. But, added Stamatu, the incarnation remains a mystery, because, despite the inventions of technology, in the absence of live chicken, we cannot "fabricate" the egg. It is true that we no longer meet the archaic man, but there are still poets who are *amazed* by the mysteries.

⁹ We quote, without any other reference, from Horia Stamatu, "Ion Barbu: *Looking glass*", *quoted work*.

With the cycle “Isarlic”, Ion Barbu unreservedly resisted the Faustian man and used *history* through *contemplation*. After traveling from the intuition of the “idea” to the “mystery of life”, the poet tried the intuition of history, whose physiology is shaped by the relation between “transient” and “eternal” (here is a structure specific to philosophical meditation in Romanian interwar thinking, an otherwise traditional vein). Ion Barbu reiterates Eminescu's vision: “*the world is as it is*”; history is neither the face of good nor the face of evil, but is somewhere in the middle, *between* evil and good (not *beyond* evil and good, as in Nietzsche), as an antagonism of these poles; history thus becomes a “land of destruction and creation, which, in the true Romanian spirit, does not have to lead to the fanatic paroxysm of Turkish Janissarism (which would mean a destruction of Romania)”.

Ion Barbu chose, between *narcissism* and *communication*, the latter – thus settling on the fertile soil of a reply given to a West which was suffering a “nervous breakdown”, as Thomas Mann said, after the first world conflagration. After all, Barbu's conclusion, underlying the story, was simple: it resembled neither Western Faustian history, nor that of Turkish Janissarism, but signified a *double disobedience*: liberation from any tyranny (see *The Revolution of the Romanians* by Bălcescu) and, implicitly, from the tyranny of history as such, under the horizon of eternity (as in folklore and in Eminescu).

In other words, finding the geometric place of human perfection through spirit, the author of *Secondary Game*, concludes Horia Stamatu, points, poetically, towards an incontestable truth: “in the name of a contingent freedom the absolute cannot be sacrificed by tyranny against the spirit, endlessly animated by that “*longing without satiation*” which Barbu bequeaths to the Cosmos itself, and which is a longing for perfection”.

Stamatu's impression was that *Secondary game* was the *akmé* of Barbu's poetic creation. The proof is that he did not publish anything after this opus, except for short prose messages, “flashing, sometimes even crushing for one energumene or another.” And a “Word to the Poets” (1941), published by the journal *Pan*, in which he talks about the weight of choosing between the gullible and the Graceful, between delight and Salvation. He said it with his soul, “more religious than artistic”, he who tried through versification to give us “the equivalent of absolute states of intellect and vision, the state of geometry and, above it, ecstasy. I did not understand the melodious complaints of the poets”. As Ion Barbu himself spoke, with nostalgia, in the same appeal to the creators of verses, about the purpose of Poetry and of the Poet, a being whom he placed in the fourth position in society, after the Priest, the Teacher and the Warrior.

And thus ended the unusual “epistle”: “The world would lose an ornament of value if the tribe of these strange and delightful creatures were to be destroyed. What grief submerged the Ancients when sailors in the time of Julian the Apostate told how they had heard a bad-omened voice shattering the seas: “Pan, the great Pan is dead!” But the rumour proved to be a lie”.

Compared with Eminescu by the depth of the idea, by the concentration and intensity of the poetic expression, the creator Ion Barbu, by passing from the discursive to the elliptical, becomes *another* only through the “poetic mode”, as he himself said. If Eminescu, in poetry, offers us, says Stamatu (in a plastic chronicle published in *Romanian word* about “the painting and the painter's care at Radu Anton Maier”), “the illusion of a chain of reasoning”, Ion Barbu, “master of reasoning, abolishes in poetry the illusion of reasoning, like Rimbaud”. “Ion Barbu's lyric path was a permanent creative ascent, a continuous lifting of veils that covered the idea and prevented “ecstasy”.

In concluding his comment, Horia Stamatu quoted *in extenso* the poem “Edict” (ending the cycle “Secondary game”), a response given to the *mausoleum poem* “I have only one wish” by Eminescu, stating that, since then, “no one has said, in Romanian, so much in so few words”.

This exegetical episode did not obstruct the future reception of Ion Barbu, considered by Horia Stamatu “the absolute poet”¹⁰; a creator who meditated on “*hard irrecusable gold!*” (such as morality), with which you can make up for the eternity of lost time in the world to come, in a “cephalic and apteric” time; a gold different from the material and “easy” one you need for various kinds of economic transactions.

As the twentieth century appeared, “cephalic and apteric” (favourable to the development of the “head”, intelligence, but “wingless” when it came to creation and imagination), it still allowed some exceptions; among them G. Țițeica, of whom Ion Barbu spoke profoundly (1933), when the mathematician reached the honourable age of 60 years. The poet praised, in his master, the soul-forming spirit and, in geometry, the restorative spirit of “divine signs”. Moreover, he believed that future history would “enumerate him among the pioneers of a third Hellas, which, with the slow progress of the great mysteries, inevitably rebuilds itself in these places.”

¹⁰ Horia Stamatu, “Ion Barbu, the absolute poet”, *The Romanian Word*, July 1983. We quote from the text, without any further reference.

In a later interview, the same Ion Barbu stated that beyond the face of Țițeica appeared the figure of Abbot Zosima as a watermark.

Horia Stamatu resumes critical views from his 1965 essay. He is obsessed now, in 1983, by *the religious man* consubstantial with Barbu's poetic nature. He rediscovers the mystical option in that short and dense text, "Word to the poets" (1941), which he critically re-evaluates after its intuitive-mystical substrate was exposed by Ion Barbu in "Secondary game", in terms, Stamatu says, which send us to Jakob Böhme or Novalis. And the equivalent of the "state of geometry" to which the poet aspired is in tune with "the state of total tranquility reached in Tibet, endlessly turning the wheel of prayer". A state which, through *geometry*, culminates with *ecstasy*, which it indicates at the end of that strange and brief confession to the poet.

Recalling this "coming out of oneself" from the "Dark Night" of St. John of the Cross, Stamatu adds, to all these, an older finding that he rephrases: "a Titanism of the language that exalts the ineffable, in order to restore the essence of values dominant in the double world of "*res extensa*" and "*res cogitans*".

A work of European magnitude, "Secondary Game" is loaded with "mystical exhortations", even though Ion Barbu did not reach "the magnitude of the song of fate, death and resurrection" from a virtual phase in which he did not arrive. And in order to reconfirm the religiosity of the poet, the publicist finally quotes an edifying verse: "A thought brought, by rays and curvature / (Be thou the irreversible heavy gold!) / The ends of misty burial chambers / WONDERINGLY HE STARTED THEM, IN GOD".

Horia Stamatu dedicates a long essay to the philosopher Mircea Vulcănescu, also in *Prodomos*¹¹ We are in the middle of the seventh decade of the last century, when theoretically it seems that the so-called "obsessive decade" (Marin Preda) ended (but without ending) in Romania. Mircea Eliade's generation felt somewhat exhausted after being ostracized. Prison, the removal of name and work from the public circuit of values, the forced passage into eternity - these were the customs through which many of the generationalists had passed.

For the disaster survivors, some good fortune of rehabilitation came after 1964, when those who resisted the punishments were pardoned and when their signature palely returned in the public sphere, along with a

¹¹ Horia Stamatu, "Mircea Vulcănescu and his generation", *Prodomos*, no. 5, June 1966. We quote from the text, without any further reference.

weak presence in the agora. Constantin Noica leaves prison and finds a job at the Logical Research Centre in Bucharest; Petre Țuțea (once protected by Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu), also released from detention through the 1964 amnesty, prepares for a Socratic role; Mircea Vulcănescu had passed with sanctity and dignity in the world of the righteous; Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran and Eugen Ionescu were enjoying, in the West, the fruits of a certain notoriety; other members of the generation, those who had served the radical interwar Right, were protecting their cultural identity in the diaspora, some of them caring for *the idea of Romanianism*.

In such a context, Horia Stamatu attempts to analyse the place Mircea Vulcănescu and his generation occupied in the value tables of Romanian culture. He is impressed, as others are too, by the effigy of the *man*, “just and exemplarily honourable”, being unquestionably “one of the most devoted representatives of a generation whose impetus reminded, at one point, of the momentum of the 1848 generation”.

He also appreciated, with great reservations, the stage reached by Greater Romania in the interwar period, even though social, moral, economic and cultural mutations were still necessary in order to reach a satisfactory degree of culture and civilization. He found politicianism in the Romanian space guilty of regress, as the gap between village and city had not diminished, with all the momentum that the Peasant party manifested, less a “peasant” than a “politicianist” party, “a copy, sometimes ridiculous, of the old Liberal party”. As he saw something extremely fertile in *our royalty* until Carol II, the one who would have done nothing but *destroy Romania*.

Fighting politicianism, Stamatu believes, would have been the priority target of Vulcănescu's generation. Perhaps implicitly, we believe, and that because the essential horizon for those gathered around Mircea Eliade was mainly *cultural*. The accomplishment of the great cultural syntheses and the avoidance of political interference were present in the *spiritual itinerary* which Eliade fixed in a pamphlet from *Word* (1927). And also included in *the responsibilities* and *the calls* of this generation, says Stamatu, was a tempering of the country's modernization through Westernization “often too improvised and in contrast to the Romanian nature”. But Stamatu now accepts, by implication, the path of liberal evolution, the one that emphasized modernization *through ourselves*.

The same mix of politics was anathema when it came to Christianity. According to Vulcănescu, the Romanians are opaque to the phenomenon *of the crusade*, to the evasive connection between *the cross* and the crusade, a process that generates inhuman excesses, as evidenced by the disaster in Nicopole or by the *crusade of freedom* consumed under the eyes of his contemporaries.

Witnessing the ascension of the movement initiated by A.C. Cuza, student Vulcănescu opposed the idea of *defense* by the conjunction between *national* and *Christian*. Using different means for each of them, *the evil* that the historical struggle wished to remove was nothing more than the evil Christianity opposed. Even if Cuza used Christianity after the Western model, Christianity could at most temper the excesses of history. Hence the tendency of totalitarian systems to eliminate as far as possible any influences coming from Christianity, promoting, as we know, an ideology based on aggressive atheism.

In the midst of such a process, Mircea Vulcănescu represented “one of the great elect” by his attitude of “unassailable critical realism”, by the belief that social life could develop by appealing to a system of suitable ideas, by the emphasis on *peasantry*, a social group disappointed by the lack of solutions offered by bourgeois and revolutionary idealism. Hence Vulcănescu's choice for *an empirical sociology* and the rejection of solutions that would have come from a Spengler or Marx, foreign and anti-human in relation to the Romanian soul.

Opting for Christianity or re-Christianization, Vulcănescu was far from the pragmatism of the Right-wing movement, whatever the apparent validity of its intentions, of *defense* of Christianity. Putting together the historically marked purpose of restoring a state with the more distant, over-historical goal of *salvation* seemed to him just a compromise. He accepted, as we have seen, a correction factor coming from Christianity, whenever politics became aggressive and malicious. Not being here and now, the enemy of Christianity is unseen, because we find the authentic anti-Christian within the Christian, not in the “other” or in the non-Christian. De-Christianization, says Stamat, “is the work of Christians in our Western world (as opposed to Africa where Christians were Islamized)”.

The realism of Vulcănescu's vision and attitude were the benchmarks that ensured his balance, at equal distance to the Right or the Left. He manifested himself not as a “bourgeois”, as he was accused, but as a lucid thinker, not at all utopian. Faced with *the new Constitution* proposed by the plebiscite of Carol II, he said a firm *no!* because he clearly saw in such a fundamental law an annihilation, a burial of all Romanian freedoms. As he also denied the so-called *mysticism* of our people, or its *Messianic* mission. The first is a rare privilege and does not concern the people very much (history is a harsh proof, even when exceptions are allowed), and Messianism, after the coming of the Messiah, is a non-sense. Also impoverished by profound meanings are any combinations of these vocables: national mysticism or national Messianism, emptied of meaning

from the beginning, without any supposed depth, a kind of construction “à la roumaine” similar to the moment of 1848.

The deeply religious or real sense, the humility and piousness of the Romanian send neither to the Messianic or mystical, nor to a materialistic inclination in front of life. The Romanians did not invest with absolute any relative factor; neither did they proceed in reverse, perceiving in the key of the relative what belongs to the absolute, which is undoubtedly observed from their poetic and artistic creation (until the establishment of the totalitarian regime).

Taking advantage of the horizon of Max Scheler's meditation, Mircea Vulcănescu remains a spirit who has phenomenologically deepened, like no other, the idea of *Romanianity* (which is, we believe, also one of *Romanitude*), or *the Romanian spirit*, as he does, among others, in *The Romanian dimension of existence*¹². By giving man what is human, we find here our specific difference towards the West and its ethos. Romanians, says Vulcănescu, are “*somewhere beyond the Faustian and rational Good and Evil of modern Europe*”, and *the Humane* became in us *Humanitarianism*, a fortification that did not allow the state, until Stalinism, to endorse any ideology.

The hermeneutics of *humanity* undertaken by Vulcănescu is, conceptually speaking, highly persuasive and equally seductive. He proposed a cultural synthesis and original solutions to the problems of life, but only after an initial “deep destruction of Western ontology, from Plato to Nietzsche” will be realized. “Excesses, concluded Stamatou, and mistakes were made, but Romania did not practice the “consecrated horrors of hybris on both sides, in the name of biological or class racism, throughout the war.”

Vulcănescu's statements have an axiomatic certainty and the fullness of sapiential thought. For example, when noting the determinants of the Romanian spirit: “there's a specific kind of realism, with moments of magic and romance, and yet it is a real sui generis unity. Tragic human ethos, of a heroism resigned and minor for now, in daily existence. A powerful genius of the heart, today unmoved by sentimentality, for certain reasons. Relieved from sincerity and with a certain depth in the sense of life ... Unlike the European West, a great horror of Hybris. That is why he cannot take seriously the objective apparatus of life, be it the state itself, the new Moloch that threatens to engulf the future of culture. By itself, our spirit would never have reached a crisis caused by the revolt of things against man, like the present one (see Scheler)”.

¹² See Mircea Vulcănescu, *The Romanian Dimension of Existence*, Edition curated by Marin Diaconu, Bucharest: Publishing House of the Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1991.

Horia Stamatu does not elude, in his analysis, the dimension of *dialogue* that this “intellectual animator” called Mircea Vulcănescu had, whether we consider the atmosphere set up by the magazine and the circle *Criterion*, or we refer to the motivation he imprinted on spirits like Mircea Eliade or Constantin Noica (let's not forget from this chain the link, maybe initial: Vasile Băncilă). In this way a *symposium* was conceived as a kind of “public roundtable”, says Stamatu, which brought in dialogue representatives of important trends, young people who debated from various angles the latest news in the sphere of philosophy, literature, politics or the social in the period 1932-1935.

At that time, the appropriate syntagma: “activism of despair” and “historicism of resignation” became functional, two vectors that synthesized the essence of tendencies of the young generation. Two waiting horizons in a reductionist opposition: one of them had to disappear, to be practically absorbed by the other.

Horia Stamatu stated, in a footnote, that even in the space of Right orientation there were young people with different principles, having either one or the other of these two tendencies (characteristic of Romania's political past), meaning “some were more “political” and others more “cultural”; so that, through the imitative hybris of 1938, an “inflation of unselfish activism, with disastrous consequences” was reached.

The publicist then concluded (in 1966) that, since 1907, our history has been really tragic: “Too many Romanians have been killed by other Romanians, and this is not in their nature”. Because “the torment of the Romanian spirit in the mouth of an ideology so foreign to it cannot be compensated by anything”. *Romanianity* has been extremely distressed and the return to normal will occur when we will be free of “conceptual objective targets” (see the tyranny of ideology), and what Vulcănescu called a revolt of things against man. In other words: “A human being has to pass sovereignly ahead of the tractor, to be freed from the “engineers of souls” and to reach “*the overall ratio of the spirit to the totality of existence*”.

Stamatu's essay on Mircea Vulcănescu is a balanced and subtle one, and some of the philosopher's ideas, especially those that reached not only asymptotically the interwar political Right, are faithfully and productively annotated by the publicist. The philosopher thus appears to us as a man of his time and of the Romanian society in which he lived, hoped and wrote with lucidity and realism.

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INSTITUTIONAL ECO-PRAGMATICS VS. ANTHROPO-PRAGMATICS: PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES, RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

Nataliia Kravchenko,*

nkravchenko@outlook.com

Tetiana Pasternak**

tanya.pasternak@gmail.com

Abstract: *The paper introduces the concept of eco-pragmatics based on the principle of eco-centrism as the “selfless” interaction at interpersonal, social, intercultural and transnational levels. Institutional eco-pragmatics involves two types of strategies, which differ in degree of their eco-centrism and base on the prototypical values of “common good” and “compensatory justice”. “Common good” strategies are subdivided into environmental and pseudo eco-centric subtypes, the latter implying the civilizational interests of mankind related to the status of its common heritage. “Compensatory justice” strategies base on preferential treatment of the most disadvantaged individuals, entities or states granting them advantages that may be unprofitable for the privileges’ providers.*

Keywords: *institutional eco-pragmatics, compensatory justice strategies, “common good” strategies, eco-centrism.*

Introduction

The research relies on the present-day philosophical methodology which expands the boundaries of traditional ethics by incorporating nature / environment into ethical and humanitarian research and, vice versa, extends the concept of “ecology” to the level of “meta-ecology”¹, involving philosophical, socio-cultural, moral and ethical components. Such an approach implies the conceptualization of eco-centrism as a principle of balanced human / society relations not only with nature but also with all

* Professor, Head of the Chair of Romance and Germanic languages and Translation, National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv

** Associate Professor, National Academy of Security Service of Ukraine, Kyiv

¹ Gardashuk, T.V., *Conceptual parameters of environmentalism*. Kyiv: Parapan, 2005.

subjects and objects “responsible” for the harmonious environment of human beings. Moreover, the humanistic vector of relations from the man to the world, life and other humans (argued in the ethics of Russian philosophers Fedorov and Koutaissoff², Dostoevsky³, Solovyov⁴, Berdyaev⁵, Losskiy⁶, Frank⁷, Florenskiy⁸, Bulgakov⁹) is a basic prerequisite for the ecological attitude of humans to the nature. It is in tune with the statement of the famous Russian philosopher Solovyov¹⁰ “When self-interest does not reign in public relations between people, it will cease to dominate the relations between the man and the nature”.

Therefore, overcoming the anthropocentrism (and eta-centrism) in favour of eco-centrism, as extensively interpreted above, presumes particular eco-pragmatic strategies of the harmonious and “selfless” interaction at interpersonal, socio, intercultural and transnational levels without being limited to the “human–nature” relations.

Inasmuch the term “eco-pragmatics” is for the first time coined and introduced into linguistics and consequently, the eco-pragmatic strategies have not been explored in institutional framework, the paper aims to determine and specify their basic types and corresponding subtypes.

Institutional-discursive strategies embodying the eco-centric meta-discursive values involve: (a) strategies of improving relations between the man / society and the nature (nature protection facet); (b) strategies of restricting the own rights and interests (political, economic, national-cultural, public, sovereign, transnational, etc.) in favor of increasing the rights of others, usually the weakest and most vulnerable ones, in the need of help (compensatory justice facet); (c) the pseudo eco-centric strategies of protecting the “common heritage of humanity” as a subject of investigation, exploration and profitmaking;

² Fedorov, N.F., Koutaissoff, E., *What was man created for?: The philosophy of the common task. Selected works*. London: Honeyglen, 1990.

³ Dostoyevsky, F., *Writer's diary. Volume 1: 1873-1876*. Northwestern University Press, 1994.

⁴ Solovyov, V.S., In: S.L. Frank, ed. *A Solovyov anthology*. London: SCM Press, 1950.

⁵ Berdyaev, N., (2015), *The philosophy of inequality*. Available at: <http://www.berdyaev.com/bookfind.html>.

⁶ Losskiy, N.O., *Value and existence*. Moscow: AST, 2000.

⁷ Frank, S.L., *The spiritual foundations of society: An introduction to social philosophy*. Ohio University Press, 1987.

⁸ Florenskiy, P.A., *Theological works. 1902-1909*. Orthodox Saint Tikhon University of Humanitie, 2018.

⁹ Bulgakov, S.N., *Ever-shining light. Contemplation and speculation*. Azbuka, 2017.

¹⁰ Solovyov, *A Solovyov anthology*, p. 87.

Data and methods

The analyzed data have been collected from the international-legal discourse with the involvement of certain ethic-ecological, ethic-social and ethic-philosophical texts for the purpose of identification the prototype eco-ethical concepts.

The first step of analysis is identification of the prototype eco-ethical concepts viewed as a cognitive underpinning of eco-centric strategies. In that, we make use of selected analysis of ethic-ecological, ethic-social and ethic-philosophical texts with the focus on their topics (indexed by headings, key words, topic sentences) and names of the theories implying the concepts-ideas of the particular outlook. In spite of the differences in the theories they all somehow relate to the overcoming of anthropocentrism in order to create a new ecological ethics – the “ethics of non-dominating” and the “ethics of care”. In addition to the concepts of “non-dominating” and “concern”, other prototypical values of eco-ethical relationships include “self-improvement as self-denial”, “self-restriction in favour of others”¹¹, “humanism”, “equality in all respects”, “self-perfection”¹², “responsibility for others or to others”, “protection of nature in interrelation with safeguarding of human dignity”¹³, “compassion”, “solidarity”, “unity”, shared by all eco-centric theories.

The second step specifies the value-based discourse-forming strategies in the international legal discourse with the special emphasis on correlative and invariant strategies (suggesting their similar cognitive basis) in different domains of international legal communication. Our primary concern on this stage has been to identify the legal values’ opposition and their embodying strategies in terms of eco-centric vs. eta-centric framework. In that we rely on the studies of discourse as a cognitive-semiotic wholeness with the world-modeling properties in identification, construction and transformation of eco-ethical values and, in particular, on the concepts of discursive formation and discursive order by Foucault¹⁴ in their projection on the present-day eco-semiotics and critical discourse analysis, suggesting the link between individual contextual and situational models and cognitive structures in social conscience, legitimized by dominant discourses¹⁵. This theoretical-

¹¹ Schweitzer, A., In: E.R. Harold, ed. *Reverence for life: The words of Albert Schweitzer*. Bbs. Pub. Corp, 1995.

¹² Naess, A., ‘The deep ecology movement: Some philosophical aspects’. *Philosophical inquiry*, no. 8, 1986, pp. 10-31.

¹³ Jonas, H., *The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age*. University of Chicago Press, 1984.

¹⁴ Foucault, M., ‘The order of discourse’. In: R. Young, ed. *Untying the text: A post-structuralist reader*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 48-78.

¹⁵ van Dijk, T., Kintsch, W., *Strategies of discourse comprehension*. New York: Academic Press, 1983.

methodological background contributes to the understanding of eco-pragmatic strategies as a discursive mechanism of the human consciousness ecologization at individual, public and universal-civilizational levels. At this stage we apply the methods of critical-discourse analysis to explain how institutional, international legal and ideological contexts determine the choice of institutional strategies, their conflicts and supremacy, determining the corresponding verbal code and textual structures. And vice versa, we also aim to determine to what extent the international legal discourse in its eco-pragmatic facet may impact on constructing new international legal reality and, wider, on eco-centric rebuilding of the world by various discourses.

In specification of eco-pragmatic strategies we base on the definition of the strategy by Teun van Dijk as a global mental representation of the means of reaching a certain goal. It pertains to a global way of deciding, in advance, which kinds of action alternatives will be taken along a course of actions (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983: 65).

As an additional tool to specify eco-centric institutional strategies, their principal type, subtypes and hierarchy we also made use of taxonomy analysis, classifying the strategies according to their value-based (necessary and sufficient) characteristics.

Eco-pragmatic strategies in international legal discourse

In the framework of international-legal discourse we specified three basic groups of eco-pragmatic strategies (figure 1):




Figure 1. Eco-centric pragmatic strategies in International Legal Discourse

(1) “common good” strategies in their environmental and “common heritage” manifestations, with the concept of “common good” implying: (a) a harmonic relation between the man / society and the nature (nature protection facet) or (b) the civilizational (not limited to a nature protection) interests and needs of mankind related to the status of its common heritage (pseudo eco-centric facet);

(2) strategies of restricting the states’ rights / interests (political, economic, national-cultural, public, sovereign, transnational, etc.) in favor of increasing the rights of others even at the cost of reducing the scope of the own rights and freedoms (compensatory justice strategies).

The 1.a. subtype relies on a concept of “common good”, embodied by the strategy of granting the rights to nature, its objects and living beings (the concept of “common good” is opposed by that to the concept of “sovereignty”).

The 1.b. subtype bases on the concept of “common good” embodied by the trans-institutional strategy of granting the freedom of exploration and investigation of the terrestrial and extraterrestrial spaces, associated with *res omnium communis* that is common heritage of humanity (the concept of “common good” is also opposed here to the concept of “sovereignty”).

The second group of strategies bases on the concept of “compensatory justice” (with opposition to the concept of “legal justice”) corresponding to eco-centric strategies of giving preferences to those (individuals, entities, states), in need of help.

Unfortunately, the recognition of the importance of someone’s interests at the expense of self-interests is not a salient strategy of the international legal discourse. However, it is discernible to some extent in its different branches bringing up the following problems: (a) to assess the validity of eco-ethical values for construction of international legal world picture, that is: to what extent the eco-centric norms (the strategies expressing the readiness to renounce something in favour of others) are only declarations or a progressive vector of international law development; what are the verbal markers of the declarative or binding nature of eco-centric strategies; (b) to identify the values’ opposition, crucial to possible eco-centric vector of international legal discourse; (c) to argue that the international legal values of equality, sovereignty and freedom do not correlate with eco-centric strategies.

Nature protection strategies: degrees of “eco-centrism”

The first subtype of eco-centric strategies, identified in the international-legal discourse, constitutes the strategies of improving relations between the man / society and the nature that differ in degree of

their “eco-centrism”. This group relies on a concept of “common good”, embodied by the strategy of granting the rights to nature, its objects and living beings. The value of “common good” is opposed by that both to “sovereignty” or eta-centrism¹⁶ and anthropo-centrism¹⁷.

The analysis of the environmental international-legal documents shows that *eco-centrism* is manifested by the strategy of recognizing the partial legal personality of nature and its objects (primarily in the form of the right of nature and its objects to life).

In particular, in the UNESCO Declaration on Ethical Principles for Climate Change, the protection of the rights of nature is declared as a common value of the states: “Recognizing that climate change is a common concern for all humankind, and convinced that the global and local challenges of climate change cannot be met without the participation of all people at all levels of society.”¹⁸

The Convention on the Biological Diversity recognizes the rights of living beings to be preserved: “Affirming that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind.”¹⁹

According to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO countries have the right to apply measures to protect life or health not only of humans but also of animals or plants: “Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”²⁰

The “rights” of international watercourses concerning the preservation of their ecosystem are regulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: “Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses.”²¹

¹⁶ in case it refers to the intergovernmental regulation of the relationship between the nature and nationals

¹⁷ UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, (1997).

¹⁸ UNESCO declaration of ethical principles in relation to climate change, (2017), Available at:

<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/comest/ethical-principles/>

¹⁹ Convention on the biological diversity of living creatures, (1992). Available at: <https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf>

²⁰ WTO Agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, (1994), Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm

²¹ United Nations Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, (1997), Available at:

The environmental strategies differ in degree of their “eco-centrism”. The less eco-centric are the strategies of granting protection to the nature as an object of utilization and profitmaking. It partially overlaps with the institutional strategies providing the legal framework of *res omnium communis* manifested by “freedoms” for space, sea and air. At first sight, such strategies reflect the value of “common good” in its “altruistic” facet, since the states retransfer the part of their sovereign rights in order to preserve common value. However, even related to the eco-centric value of “common good”, such a vector of international law development is no longer eco-centric, since it basically relies on the *eta*-centric strategy of non-discrimination and equality within the framework of the “legal justice”.

For example, the “equitable and reasonable use” of an international watercourse as a constructing principle of The Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997), actually subordinates the strategy of protection and preservation of the shared natural resource to the strategy of granting the equal and mutually beneficial distribution and utilization of international watercourse. Consequently, the “sovereignty” is foregrounded here as a dominant legal value marginalizing the value of ‘common good’: “the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof for present and future generations”²².

Such a value disproportion is marked both explicitly: a) “Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse”²³; b) “taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse”²⁴ and implicitly – by passivation in combination with lexemes “utilization” and “benefits” that shift the normative focus from the rights of the natural object to the rights of its owners, presupposing, *inter alia*, the possibility of equal damage to watercourse by Watercourse states: “an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom”²⁵.

The most eco-centric is the strategies vesting the nature objects with the human rights (strategy of recognition the partial legal personality of

http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf

²² UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997, Article 8.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.* Article 5

²⁵ *Ibid.*

animals as the subject of rights) suggesting the intertextual relations with international human rights law. European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals recognizes the aggregate of domestic animals' rights, i.e. the right to: "accommodation, care and attention which take account of the ethological needs of the animal in accordance with its species and breed"²⁶.

To sum up, the value of "common good" can determine both *eco*-centric and anthropocentric (more precisely, *eta*-centric) vectors of the international law development, depending on the nature of the object of granted rights. If the rights are granted to nature, its living and inanimate objects, then the *eco*-centric strategy is applied. If the "common good" interferes with the rights of the state, it immediately involves the *eta*-centric strategies and the value dominance of sovereignty.

Pseudo eco-centrism: justice vs. freedom and equality

At first view, all international legal strategies associated with the value of "common good" (whether they pertain to the nature protection or to the regime of *res omnium communis*) are unalloyed the *eco*-centric strategies, since they "take into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole". In actual fact, only insignificant part of these strategies falls into the category of strategies under discussion.

Let us consider in this connection the principle of freedom which is the constitutive for International space law as well as for the certain norms of International sea law and International air law. This principle that apparently relies on the concept of "common good" motivates the trans-institutional strategy of granting the States the freedoms of exploration and investigation of spaces beyond their sovereignty, i.e. "freedoms of international waters", "freedom of exploration and utilization of the sea bed and its resources beyond continental shelf", and so on. Accordingly, at first sight it may seem that the international legal "freedoms" constitute the *eco*-centric strategy since such freedoms are associated both with the value of "common good" (they establish legal bases for "common heritage of humanity"), and the concept of "freedom" as an ethical category. However, in actual practice this facet of international legal values makes the rights of states equal, regardless of their economic status, which actually benefits the "space" and "sea" states. The freedoms for "the equals", which cannot be used by a number of states due to their limited technological and natural resources, are meaning-making for the concept of "legal / institutional justice" as the "equality before the law" (which in international legal discourse appears as "equality for the equals"). Legal

²⁶ European convention for the protection of pet animals, (1987), Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/168007a67d>

justice determines the vector of international law development associated with the meanings of “sovereignty” “homogeneity”, “proportionality”, and “non-discrimination”.

For example, a non-discriminatory regime as the main conceptual framework of the international trade cannot be considered as an eco-centric principle since it implies “equality for equals” (that is the “legal justice” facet) without taking into account the interests of those who can not benefit from such a regime without significant losses. Thus, both the National Treatment principle that prohibits the WTO Members from favouring their domestic products and services (GATT, 1947: Articles III; XVII²⁷) over the imported ones of other member countries, and the Most-favoured nation principle, which prohibits discrimination between imports irrespective of their origin or destination, prioritize the market access rights of the WTO members while disregarding the possible negative impact of the liberalization on the state of the different economies: “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties”²⁸.

As opposite to this vector, the eco-centric strategy of the giving preferences to those (individuals, entities, states) in need of assistance bases on the concept of “compensatory justice” as the “equality for the unequals” (which in international legal discourse actually appears as “equalization of conditions for achieving equal results”).

Eco-centrism under reservations: humaneness and generosity vs. sovereignty

Apart from eco-centric strategies embodying the value of “common good” there is a group of strategies of giving preferences to those (individuals, entities, states) who are in need of help, guided by such values as compassion, generosity, self-denial, under the conceptual sphere of “compensatory justice”²⁹.

Thus, all principal Conventions and Treaties (constitutive for the international legal branches) incorporate the expansion about taking into account ‘the special interests and needs of developing countries’. The strategy of taking into account the interests of disadvantaged entities (states, nations, individuals) is manifested by the rights and privileges

²⁷ General Agreement on tariffs and trade, (1947), Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm

²⁸ GATT, Article I.

²⁹ Kravchenko, N.K., *Discourse and discourse analysis: A brief encyclopedia*. Kyiv: Interservis, 2017, pp. 93-95.

provided for Land-locked States and Geographically Disadvantaged States, which: “shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region”³⁰.

The same strategy of defending the interests of the weak and / or disadvantaged is embodied by the UN general principles related to remote sensing of Earth by satellite, which lay the participating States under a commitment to transmit the data and information to States affected by natural disasters, or likely to be affected by impending natural disasters, as promptly as possible: “States participating in remote sensing activities that have identified processed data and analysed information in their possession that may be useful to States affected by natural disasters, or likely to be affected by impending natural disasters, shall transmit such data and information to States concerned as promptly as possible.”³¹

The same facet of the international legal discourse is manifested by the so-called Enabling Clauses, allowing the states to take temporary protective measures, i.e. by introducing: “prudential carve-out’ to safeguard the balance-of-payments and to ensure the integrity and stability of their financial system”³².

The derogations to the non-discrimination treatment in favor of developing countries are introduced by GATT Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) and have continued to apply as part of GATT 1994 under the WTO. They provide the Special Differential and more favourable tariff treatment by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries as well as differential and more favourable treatment concerning non-tariff measures.

The components of compensatory justice, i.e. “heterogeneity”, “compensation”, “differentiation”, “equalization” are highlighted here by the key lexemes referring to the special treatment reasons, tools and goals.

Reasons are denoted by designating the entities of additional rights (collocation “developing countries” ipso facto suggests particular inferential pattern: those requiring the help), and their corresponding attributes (special economic situation, financial and trade needs). Goals are explicitly pointed out by fixed expressions: “progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade situation”, “to safeguard the balance-of-payments”, “to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system”. Tools / methods are signified by nominations of

³⁰ United Nations convention on law of the sea (UNCLOS), (1982), Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm

³¹ UN General Assembly, 1986, Principle XI.

³² Annex on Financial Services.

regulatory treatment “the Special Differential and more favourable tariff treatment, more favourable treatment concerning non-tariff measures, protective measures”.

The reasons, tools and goals of more favourable treatment constitute in their combination the eco-centric strategy of equalizing the conditions for achieving equal results, which bases on the prototypical ethical value of “self-restriction in favour of others” (through the lens of international law it may be interpreted as “additional rights vs. international legislation integrity”).

The similar eco-centric strategy of granting the additional advantages to those in need of help is manifested by the Article 32 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which prescribes: a) “States Parties shall ensure respect for the cultural identity of migrant workers and members of their families and shall not prevent them from maintaining their cultural links with their State of origin”³³; b). “States Parties may take appropriate measures to assist and encourage efforts in this respect”³⁴.

All these strategies imply the same meaning “to give preferences / help to those in need of assistance” and fall into a category of eco-centric since: (a) their realization demands certain additional efforts from the State without bringing them any benefits in return; (b) they embody the eco-centric values of generosity as well as humaneness and compassion: “Considering the situation of vulnerability in which migrant workers and members of their families frequently find themselves owing, among other things, to their absence from their State of origin and to the difficulties they may encounter arising from their presence in the State of employment”³⁵.

The generalizing strategy of giving benefits and preferences for the weakest or deprived of the particular resources in comparison with others is discernible in discourses of international legal trade, international space law and international law of the sea. However, the value significance of such a strategy is diminished by the complex of legal disclaimers which actually subordinate the above moral (i.e. natural law) values to positive law values of equity and sovereignty.

In particular, in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea³⁶ the formulation of the rights of Land-locked States and Geographically Disadvantaged States is only one sentence long, while stipulations and

³³ International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ United Nations convention on law of the sea (UNCLOS), 1982.

reservations to it take up space in 69.1 and subsequent 69.2 (a, b, c, d), 69.3, 69.4, 69.5, 70.1, 70.2, 70.3, 70.4, 70.5. 70.1.

Basically all articles of the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers³⁷ (to the exclusion of the Article 32) and other documents related to the same problem, stipulate the realization of these rights with additional conditions.

Identified disclaimers are marked by conditional clauses (“migrant workers and members of their families: (a) Are considered as documented or in a regular situation if they are authorized to enter, to stay and to engage in a remunerated activity in the State of employment pursuant to the law of that State and to international agreements to which that State is a party”); parentheses (“if necessary”, “as the case may be”, “as may be required by”, “as may be appropriate”, “if requested”, “as is necessary”); clichés referring to the national jurisdiction, public health or morals (“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”; “For the protection of the national security of the States concerned or of public order (*ordre public*)”)³⁸.

The clichés referring either to the national jurisdiction or public safety, order, health or morals are somewhat the intertextual triggers dialogizing with the national legal texts and with semiotic sphere of national-cultural (social-cultural) and ideological texts since notions of “public safety”, “health” or “morals” restricting the scope of rights may be differently conceptualized in the national / ethnic world pictures.

Among other disclaimers that restrict the scope of rights by means of dialogizing with national-legal texts (thus acknowledging the sovereignty as the dominant international legal value) we identified different hyponymic nominations of the notion-hyperonym of “sovereignty”: national jurisdiction, legislation of the State, public order, national security and its metaphorical substitute “people’s life”. While modeling the values of specialized branches of international law in discourses, the disclaimers often operate by lexicon denoting the particular elements of legal relations subject to national jurisdiction (national activities, nationals, ownership, non-governmental entities, etc.).

As a result, the complex of legal disclaimers foregrounds the opposition between the eco-centric values of humaneness, compassion and generosity and the positive law values of equity and sovereignty. In our

³⁷ International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990.

³⁸ International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, Article 12, Article 13.

opinion, the disclaimers iconically reproduce the complicatedness of negotiation process caused by the value dichotomy between “common good” and “sovereignty”, “legal justice” and “compensatory justice”.

Consequently, compensatory justice comes in some collision with legal justice and somehow compromises the structural integrity of the particular international discourse (constituting certain international legal branch). Such a collision reflects the value opposition between eco-centric and *eta*-centric vectors of the international legal discourse manifested by the complex of antinomies (“common good” vs. sovereignty, preferences vs. freedom and equality, heterogeneity vs. homogeneity), determining the synergy of the international law and its further development.

Conclusion

The paper introduces the concept of eco-pragmatics as a new problem of linguistic research aimed at overcoming the anthropocentrism (and *eta*-centrism), in favour of *eco*-centrism conceptualized as the harmonious and “selfless” interaction at interpersonal, socio, intercultural and transnational levels without being limited to the “human–nature” relations.

The analysis of international legal discourse has identified two types of eco-pragmatic strategies, which differ in degree of their eco-centrism and base on the prototypical values of “common good” and “compensatory justice”. The first type, “common good” strategies, includes the strategies of taking into account the civilizational interests of mankind. They rely on the value of “common good”, opposed to the legal value of “sovereignty”, and incorporate two main subtypes: (a) proper environmental strategies differing in degree of their eco-centrism, (b) trans-discursive strategies associated with the notion of “common heritage of humanity”.

The second type relies on the value meaning of “compensatory justice”, opposed to “legal justice”, as the “equality for the unequals”, embodied by the strategies of giving preference to those (individuals, entities, states) in need of help.

The nature-protective subtype of the “common good” strategies recognizes the partial legal personality of the nature and its objects. Such strategies differ in degree of their eco-centrism, depending on the holder of rights: from the less eco-centric strategy of granting the protection to nature as the object of utilization and profitmaking (a focus of regulation shifts from the rights of the nature object to the rights of States – their owners) to the most eco-centric strategies of vesting the nature objects with the partial legal entity, that is with the rights granted to human beings.

Another type of the “common good” strategies encompasses the trans-discursive strategies of granting the freedom of exploration and investigation of the terrestrial and extraterrestrial spaces outside the states’ sovereignty. Despite their association with the value opposition between “common good” and “sovereignty” (with the “common good” supremacy), such strategies are the least or pseudo eco-centric since they equate the “freedoms” (that is, the rights) of unequal subjects, which actually benefit only one group of them. Legal value of “equality” (manifested by “freedom of exploration and investigation”, “a non-discriminatory regime”, National Treatment principle, Most-favoured nation principle, etc.) constitutes a meaning-making component of the “legal / institutional justice” as the “equality before the law” or “equality for the equals” opposed to the “compensatory justice”.

The second eco-centric group of strategies constitute the marginal facet of the present-day international law and relies on the value of “compensatory justice”, opposed here to “legal justice”, as the “equality for the unequals”, embodied by the strategies of taking into account the interests of the most disadvantaged subjects (individuals, entities, states), i.e. by granting them advantages that may be harmful for the privileges’ providers. Conceptual sphere of “compensatory justice”, structured by the value meanings of “compassion”, “generosity”, “self-denial”, is opposed then to the “legal justice”, which unfortunately remains the core value of the present-day international legal world picture constituting inherently *eta*-centric (that is, sovereignty-protective), vector of international law.

The value significance of the eco-centric strategies is depreciated by the complex of legal disclaimers that restrict the scope of eco-centric rights and foreground the opposition between *eta*-centric values of equity and sovereignty and *eco*-centric values of humaneness, compassion and generosity. The number of disclaimers iconically reflects the complicatedness of negotiation process caused by the above values’ opposition.

Compensatory justice, therefore, contravenes, to some extent, with legal justice, jeopardising the structural integrity of the international law. Such a collision shows the value opposition between the eco-centric and *eta*-centric strategies in the international law, presenting a number of antinomies (preferences vs. freedom and equality, common good vs. sovereignty, homogeneity vs. heterogeneity, etc.), which determine the synergy of the international law and its further development.

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SYSTEM AND SYSTEMATIC STINKERS AND THE QUESTION OF THE TWO DOGMAS OF EMPIRICISM BY QUINE

Kemi A. Emina,*

eminakemi@yahoo.com

Nelson Udoka Ukwamedua**

nelsonmeduam16@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Philosophy is an open-ended discipline and sometimes, it thrives on controversies. These controversies most times are created by scholars who come up and sting already and strongly accepted theories/traditions and this paper called scholars like these System and Systematic Stinkers of which Quine is one of those stingers. Quine expressed serious reservations about modern empiricism. He noticed that the reason why modern empiricism was able to affirm some statements as meaningful and others meaningless was because modern empiricism has been conditioned by analytic-synthetic cleavage and reductionism, which he called its (empiricism) dogmas. So, beaming these issues, this paper interrogated this contentions submission of Quine using the critical-analytic model. And it was apparent that Quine has changed the hard lining and the logical demarcation of the empiricists between analytic and synthetic statements into a distinction that should rather be made on pragmatic lines. He posited that to arrive at knowledge, the fields of human learning must align. This position not only shook the foundations of modern empiricism but it also shed more light on analytic philosophy and philosophy in general.*

Keyword: *Quine, Analytic, Synthetic, Reduction(ism), Dogmas, Empiricism. Pragmatic.*

Introduction

The western tradition of philosophy started with the Miletians and from there, it grew and developed through the epochs to the contemporary era. And its growth and development in the contemporary era has seen a lot of ground breaking point of views and postulations which has led to

* **PhD., Department of Philosophy, Delta State University Abraka Delta State, Nigeria.**

** **PhD., Department of Philosophy, Delta State University Abraka Delta State, Nigeria.**

some novel mode of speculation and traditions. And the scholars that have been able to successfully break the grounds with these novel schemes and postulations this paper prefer to call *System and Systematic Stinkers*. Flowing from the basic themes that characterized philosophy in the contemporary era, it can boast of breeding the highest number of these stinkers. And this made it the era with the highest numbers of stinkers while the ancient to the modern and very little in the contemporary epochs produced and are still producing the system builders. System stinkers are interested in questioning some already accepted philosophical truth, doctrines and traditions that the system builders have from the ancient era to even the contemporary era created, erected and also popularized. These stinkers are so-called because, they don't spend so much time writing volumes through the years but they just peck and sting a tradition and literarily set the world of philosophy on fire again as they interrogate the basic foundations of some of our most cherished and appreciated systems and doctrines. Indeed, these scholars sting like sharp mouthed animals like scorpions and other dangerous crawling animals. But the beauty of their activities as stinkers is that they take everyone by storm and surprise and the beauty of philosophy which is reasoned speculation is ignited as more perennial concerns are raised. This ignition and intellectual and philosophical awakening is apt because the stinging is also thorough and very systematic and this explains why it comes with an undying philosophic allure. In no particular order, some foremost *System and Systematic Stinkers* are; Wittgenstein (Language Games),¹ Joseph Fletcher (Situation Ethics), Edmund Gettier (the Fourth Condition), Whitehead (Process Thought-The Suffering God), Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (Evolutionary Humanism), Paul Moser (Volition Epistemology), Jacques Derrida (Deconstructionism), Francois Lyotard (Post Modernism), Noam Chomsky (Universal Language), Donald Davidson (Radical Interpretivism), Wilfred Sellars (The Myth of the Given), the scholars of the Frankfurt School and the list just goes on. However, one of the foremost of these *System and Systematic Stinkers* is Wilhard von oman Quine. He is the stinker that this research is concerned about here. He is most foremost because he pulled three major stings and in no particular order they are; the theory of *Naturalized Epistemology*, the theory of *Radical Translation/Ontological Relativity* and the *Holistic Theory Of Meaning* and *Pragmatic Inclusivity*. Interestingly, the last one *Holistic Theory Of Meaning* and *Pragmatic Inclusivity*, two of them were his responses to the questions that arose from his strong reservations and

¹ Even though the Language Game Theory is a correction of the pictorial theory by Wittgenstein, it can still be seen as a sting.

scathing remarks about the *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*. And this is the primary concern of this research paper.

Preamble

It is palpable from our routine experiences and in our philosophical discourses; that impulses are made known and communicated with the use of language. In doing this, words are combined in other to make good statements, sentences or prepositions. But, what seldom or never comes to our minds is the very fact that some of our statements and prepositions may not be meaningful and as such meaningless. It is taken for granted that words whose meaning are known from sentences imply the meaningfulness of such sentences, however, this may not necessarily be the case as there are some sentences which could be grammatically correct but are meaningless. This has indeed propelled philosophers to tailor and align their discourses towards analysis, in view of making statement really and truly meaningful. This enterprise of aligning towards analysis seems to have given rise to the distinction between the analytic and synthetic prototypes. It seems to have started in the modern era with Kant and resurfaced in diverse shades in the contemporary era with the logical positivists. Hence, a major player in that philosophical tradition, in the person of Rudolf Carnap fancied the distinction between logical frameworks and factual frameworks. In the estimation of Carnap, a logical framework is a linguistic framework where all of the internal questions formulable within it are seen as analytic, while it becomes a factual framework when at least some of the internal questions are formulable within it are synthetic.² This distinction of Kant and Carnap especially Kant seems to underscore the empiricist and the rationalist tradition. However, this whole discourse caught the fancy of Quine who rather inferred and/or deciphered from the distinctions the basic framework on which the empirical tradition in philosophy tends to hinge its foundations. Quine rather argued that the analytic - synthetic distinction appears to be the two dogmas that propel and sustain the argument and supposition of the empiricists. It is the disposition of this research to attempt a critical analysis of this supposition of Quine which later informed his postulation of empiricism without dogmas and which influenced his call for a practical application of rules instead of dogmas.

Empiricism: Empiricism is from the Greek word “*Empeiria*” which means experience. And modern empiricism holds a conception of philosophy that involves the analysis of concepts and propositions that

² Miller, A., *Philosophy of Language* (2nd ed.), London: Routledge Group, 2007, p. 88.

does not regard any form of speculation. They are of the opinion that apart from analytic statements in mathematics and logic, no other statements are to be taken seriously save for those that could be verified and confirmed by observation. Invariably and in the spirit of Hume's radical empiricism, they rejected metaphysical and theological assertions because for them, they are nonsensical or meaningless. For Quine, the two dogmas onto which empiricism stands are *Analyticity* and *Reductionism*. Quine went ahead to exposed these especially what they contain and also their constraints, that is, these two dogmas.

Background for Analyticity

Basically, in judgments that the connection of the subject to the predicate is thought of, for Kant, it is either the predicate B aligns with and to the subject A, as something which is contained in this concept A or B lies outside the concept A. Though it does not really stand in connection with it. The first of the cases is analytic while the second one is the synthetic. Therefore, analytic judgments are those whereby the connection of the predicate with the subject is seen through identity; while those in which this connection is without the identity should be called synthetic. Flowing from this then, it is palpable that analytic statements are *explicative* in nature and synthetic statements are *applicative* in nature. The one that add nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely breaks it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it can be seen as explicative. Conversely, that which add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it; are therefore applicative. Take for example, if I say, all bodies are extended, is just an analytic judgment. The reason is that, there is no need to go above and beyond the concept which I connect with the body so as to find extension as bound up with it. To catch up with this predicate, I only need to interrogate and analyse the concept i.e., to become conscious of myself which is the manifold which I always think in that concept. The judgment then is simply an analytic one. But when I say 'all bodies are curvy' the predicate is quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment.³ In plain terns, with an analytic judgment our knowledge we don't extend our knowledge in any way but the change is in synthetic, and all judgments of experience are all synthetic.

³ Smith, K, (trans.), *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, New York: Macmillan Press, 2009, p. 120.

The Argument of the Two Dogmas

In the estimation of Kant in an analytic sentence or statement the meaning of the predicate term is always contained in the meaning of the subject term. The implication of this is that the predicate does not add anything to the concept of the subject; rather it merely breaks it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it. For instance, 'all sisters are females'. The meaning of female is evident in the term sister which is appears to the subject in the sentence. The task of the predicate in the structure is to only make the subject simpler to comprehend. And in a situation whereby the predicate term stands outside the subject, despite the fact that it is of course connected with it, it is simply synthetic. In the first Dogma, Kant holds that the denial of analytical statement is self- contradictory. This is because Kant conceives of analytic statement as one in which the concept of the subject term includes or contains the concept of the predicate term, whereas a synthetic statement is not. On the notion of analytic statement, Quine points out the following shortcomings. The first point is that 'it limits itself to statements of subject-predicate term form. And the second point is that it appeals to the notion of containment which is left at the metaphorical level.'⁴ Owing to the fact that the definition given to analytic and synthetic statements by Hume and Kant are not clear enough, Quine attempts to give clarity to analytic - synthetic distinction by building on Kant's intention and restated analytic statement. Thus; a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meaning and independently of fact.'⁵ Quine the set out to attack the possibility and reasonableness of the distinction using the following schemes and themes.

Meaning: As part of the attempts to distinguish between analytic and synthetic statements, meaning is seen as a way out. But Quine opines that, this is only possible when meaning is confused with naming. He employ Frege's example of 'evening star' and 'morning star', which refer of the planet, 'venus'. This for example illustrates that different terms can mean the same thing; even though different in meaning. In his own opinion therefore, naming can be equated with extension, not meaning. He argues further that different predicates of general terms may refer to the same object, even when they do not have the same meaning he buttresses his argument with example that the general terms 'creature with a heart'

⁴ Quine, W.V.O., 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism.' *The Philosophical Review* 60 (1): 1951, 20-43. Reprinted in his work; *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harvard University, Press, 1953, p. 21.

⁵ Kaufmann, W., 'Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in F. Baird (ed.) *Philosophical Classics*, Vol. V, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1997, p. 289.

and ‘creature with kidney’ cannot said to have the same meaning even thought, they agree in extension. Nwaoigu argues further in the words of Quine that: ‘there is no assurance here that the extensional agreement of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ rest on the same meaning rather that accidental matters of fact as does the extensional agreement of creature with a heart and creatures with kidney.’⁶ The base line is that when we realize that meaning is not the same as naming, it would be clear that meaning is not a clue to the explication of analyticity.

Synonyms: This is another effort of Quine to point out the constraints inherent in the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this regard, he indicates that there are two types of analytic statements, which includes those that are logically true and as a result are explicitly analytic. For example, ‘no unmarried man is married’. Such a statement is always true in every re-interpretation. The other ones are those that can be transformed into logical truths by substituting synonyms for synonyms. For example ‘no bachelor is married.’ This can be made logically true as follows; ‘no unmarried man is married.’ In the estimation of Quine, this explanation of analytical leans on a notion of synonyms which is in need of clarification as much as analytical itself. As an attempt to completely exhaust the issue at stake, Quine examines Carnap’s attempts to explain analyticity by appealing to what he Carnap calls state of description. This involves assigning truth-value to atomic statements of language; such that complex statements are explained in terms of the atomic statements. In this case, a statement is analytic when it comes true under every state description. Responding to this, Quine argues that such can only work for the first type of analytic statements because they do not contain extra-logical synonyms pairs, such as ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried.’ It follows that the other type of analytical statements, which have to do with notion of synonyms are not covered by the description. And as a result, the problem of analytic-synthetic distinction remains.

Definition: Some philosophers are of the view that analytic statements of the second type can be turned into logical truth by substituting the definition of terms they define. In other words, ‘unmarried man’ which is the definition of the term ‘bachelor’ can replace it. Reacting to this, Quine argues that to appeal to the nearest dictionary will not solve the problem, since lexicography relies on the practical usage, which is denied from the notion of pre-existing synonyms. Which means that, if we

⁶ Nwaoigu, O.G.F., ‘Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ in G. Ozumba (ed.) *The Great Philosophers* (Vol. 3) (Awka: R & K Nigeria Enterprise, 2000, pp. 133 - 114.

would really want our definitions to accurately reflect actual usage, then it means that we will make sure that the definition only defines words in term with which they are synonyms. But this implies nothing other than the notion of synonyms. And the argument of Quine on this is that synonyms have not been adequately characterized and definition which is derived therefrom cannot be taken as the panacea to the problem of analyticity.

Interchangeability: It has naturally been thought that the synonyms of two linguistic forms are interchangeable in all contexts in which they occur without the loss of meaning. For Gottlieb Leibnitz, it is referred to as ‘interchangeability *salva veritate*.’ On the contrary, Quine argues that, there is no linguistic term that can be totally interchangeable in this sense. According to him, we are not concerned with synonyms in the sense of complete identity in psychological association or poetic quality; but only concerned with cognitive synonyms. He strongly stated that even the ‘interchangeability *salva veritate*’ does not even give a proper account of synonyms. This is because some heteronymous expressions might be interchangeable. Quine, however posits that, the sort of synonyms needed here are the ones, which will make an analytical statement turn into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. For him, therefore, to say that, ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are cognitively synonymous is to say that the statement ‘all and only bachelors are unmarried’ is analytical. As such, negating the fact that ‘bachelors’ can also mean degree holders. This is a mere application of cognitive synonyms which can help us in analytic-synthetic distinction.⁷

Semantic Rule: Here, Quine observes that some people think that the difficulty in separating analytical statement from synthetic statements is because of the vagueness of natural language. And as a result, they are of the opinion that analytical language with explicitly semantic rules will give a clear distinction. From the rules, it will be easier to know which statement of the artificial language is analytic. But Quine reasons that the difficulty here is that, the rules contain the word ‘analytic’ which we do not understand. We understand what the rules attribute analyticity to, but we do not understand the rules (i.e. analyticity) to those expressions.⁸

⁷ Pluhar, W.S., (trans.), *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1999, p. 56.

⁸ Alston, W.P., *Philosophy of Language*, USA: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964, p. 190.

Quine on the Second Dogma of Empiricism

This second dogma constitutes Quine's critique of reductionism, which is the consequence of the *verification theory of meaning*. This theory of meaning holds that the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it. The primary aim of the analytic philosophers is to analyse language and extirpate meaningless statements. It was in this light that the verification principle came in existence as the criterion for meaning.⁹ According to the verification principle, only statements that are analytic or synthetic are meaningful; thus the claim of metaphysicians in the Hegelian tradition is seen as meaningless.¹⁰ From these above, it is barefaced that this verification principle is against anything that is metaphysical in nature. This principle of verification is highly significant to the positivists' analysis of knowledge in the demarcation between what is analytic and what is synthetic as it concerns prepositions. Thus, the logical positivists held that "any statement without an object of reference that the sense can verify, except the case of analytic statements, is seen as only pseudo-statement, non-cognitive and nonsense."¹¹ With this, it is now palpable that the principle of verification makes good use of the method of observation and experiment in ascertaining statements and propositions that are meaningful and this duly takes and uses the method of science as the model for acquiring certain knowledge about the world. This means that science is the possessor of true knowledge and is the standard for rationality. It was in this light that Henri Poincare, a physicist and philosopher, held the view that experiment is the sole source of truth and that it is only experiment that can reveal novelty and achieve certainty. This view of Poincare is in tandem with Lakatos' view on scientific method as the paradigm of authentic knowledge.

Given this definition, analytic statement would be that which must be confirmed no matter what. In the same vein, two expressions would be said to be synonymous, if and only if, they are alike in point of method of empirical confirmation.¹² The verification principle in its first explicit formulation states that the meaning of a statement lies in its method of verification. The implication of the above is that, for a sentence to have

⁹ Nye, A., *Philosophy of Language: The Big Questions*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2008, p 77.

¹⁰ Jaegwon, Kim and Sosa, Ernest, *A Companion to Metaphysics*, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995, p 67.

¹¹ Beck, N.R., *Perceptive in Philosophy*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 2005, p. 43.

¹² Flew, A., *An Introduction to Western Philosophy, Ideas and Arguments from Plato to Sartre*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1971, p. 78.

cognitive, factual, descriptive or literal meaning, it must express a statement that could at least in principle be shown to be true or false or to some degree probable by reference to empirical observations. So, for Quine, a proposition is said to be verifiable in the strong sense of the term, if and only if its truth could be conclusively established in experience, but verifiable in the weak sense, it is possible for experience to tender it probable.

This led to the idea of radical reductionism which views the relation between a statement and the experience as a direct one. Radical reduction therefore set the goal of translating any significant statement into sense-datum language. This task was vividly embarked upon by Carnap. And in the estimation of Quine, such a view attributes all meaningful statements as a translation of direct immediate experience. Quine then had the impression that the dogma of reductionism is not isolated from the dogma of analytic-synthetic cleavage; he further reasons that there exists a kind of connection between the two dogmas. And despite the fact that Quine concedes to the fact that the truth of statement in general depends on language and extra-linguistic fact, he argues that the truth of statements are analyzable in linguistic components and factual components. Despite the fact that science depends on experience and language, this cannot be traced to individual statements when they are considered one by one. Rather, the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. It therefore means that the truth or the falsity of sentences or statements cannot be reduced to immediate experience. From his analysis and submissions, Quine posited that the 'Two Dogmas' are ill founded as they cannot be adequately established. After this, Quine did not only rebuff and jettison that dogmas, he rather was of the opinion that empiricism should be without Dogmas which is the theory of 'empiricism without dogmas.'

Empiricism without Dogmas

Quine holds that the totality of our knowledge and belief starting from geography and history, to physics even mathematics and logic are nothing but man-made fabric which impinges on experience. This is because all subjects are just interconnected. Though while some are somewhat peripheral and as such less important, others form the core of the whole core. However, the interesting aspect of these is that they are all resulting from experience but not limited to sense experience alone. Any conflict with experience at the peripheral, occasions readjustment in the interior of the field, such that everything that constitutes the system is affected. The occasional readjustment in the interior of the field necessarily brings about redistribution of truth values in some of our statements, leading to their re-evaluation. This entails re-evaluation of

others because of their logical interconnection. Stemming from this, Quine thinks that; “If the view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement (reductionism, the second dogma)... furthermore, it becomes a folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statement which hold contingently on experience and analytic statements, which hold come what may (first dogma).”¹³

Following from the above, any statement can be held true come what may, if we make enough drastic changes within the system (not peculiar to analytic statement alone). Quine, going further postulates that if the distinction between analytic and synthetic truth is jettisoned, we would realize that mathematics, science, metaphysics etc. are all of epistemological footing. They are all attempts to explicate what we have received from experience and all based on myths, fictions and unclarified assumptions. No discipline is better off in this sense. This is against the claims of Hume, Kant and the Verificationists in their theories, where they regard some explanatory models as meaningful (that is science) and others as meaningless (that is metaphysics, religion etc). Quine therefore brought to ruin the demarcation that was established between the analytic and the synthetic by advancing a more thorough pragmatism.

The Ontological Status of Quine’s Pragmatism

Quine’s demolition of the two dogmas of empiricism shows that Quine ascertained the fact that metaphysical expressions as well as other expressions rejected by the two dogmas of empiricism as meaningless are rather meaningful. Before Quine, science and its method was considered by many to be the sole, complete and satisfactory explanation of all phenomena. Consequently, they gave priority to science and assert that only scientific statements and those that depict immediate sense experience are meaningful, while metaphysical statements are not only nonsensical but also meaningless. It should be noted that the whole of reality is not limited to empirical realities alone and it is his position that reality also comprise of the empirical and ontological realm. Thus, science cannot and should not provide or be seen to be providing the totality of all that is meaningful and this supports the assertion of O’ Hear that ‘...science is not a complete account of the natural world.’¹⁴ It is therefore pertinent for science to be complementarily interwoven with other disciplines which it cannot access, so as to have a complete ad full appreciation of reality. Also, Quine’s contention of the two dogmas of empiricism gave religious statements or language and religion some very

¹³ Quine, W.V.O., ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism.’

¹⁴ O’ Hear, A., *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, London: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 208.

strong backing and background to operate. This is evident in our contemporary times which have strong adherence to scientific advancement and the rendering of religious claims irrelevant due to the fact that they are not immediately evident. Furthermore and interestingly too, Quine's pragmatism also has some vital and critical philosophical relevance. The ancient period of philosophical enquiries gave credence to metaphysics; hence it was seen as the core of philosophy, which is why it is referred to as first philosophy. But the two dogmas of empiricism attempted collapsing metaphysics into the dungeon. Quine's position has been able to liberate metaphysics which is the core of philosophy from its dungeon of irrelevance and to also ease it from the intellectual abuse and misunderstanding by the verificationists and empiricists, especially the thorough-going ones.

Concluding Reflections

Remarkably, Quine's position on the "two dogmas of empiricism" has been regarded by some scholars as a burden. This is because the ill-founded two dogmas that conditioned modern empiricism, as Quine postulated, is not strictly ill founded, but tenable and of strategic importance. This explains why, Rudolf Carnap tidied up a reply entitled 'Quine on Analyticity,' however, this work was not published until the year, 1990. Attending to the concern of Quine over the status of the sentence 'everything green is extended', Carnap reasons that the difficulty here is in the unclarity of the word 'green', namely in an indecision over whether one should use the word for something that is unextended, that is to say, for a single space-time point. Daily, it is never so used and one scarcely ever speaks of space-time points. Based on this, Carnap then stated that an exact artificial language is supposed to elucidate the problem by first of all defining 'green' (or its synonym) as something that is either necessarily or contingently not applied to space-time points. Worthy of note too is the fact that the likes of Paul Grice and Peter Strawson had scathing remarks to give on the 'Two Dogmas' in their article 'In Defense of a Dogma' (1956). Among other concerns, they reasoned that the skepticism of Quine about synonyms leads to skepticism about meaning(s). They posit that, if statements can have meanings, then it would also make sense to ask the question; 'what does it mean?' and if it makes sense to ask 'what does it mean?' then synonymy can be defined as; two sentences are synonymous if and only if the true answer of the question 'what does it mean?' asked of one of them is the true answer to the same question asked of the other. From here, both scholars came to the conclusion that, the issue of correct or incorrect translations would seem impossible going by the argument of Quine.

In the opinion of Gustav Bergmann, the two beliefs, that is, analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism should not be seen as two dogmas as Quine calls them, rather they should be called two cornerstones of philosophical analysis in the empiricist vein.¹⁵ In Bergmann's argument against Quine, he reiterated that the point of justification of dichotomy between analytic and synthetic statements is not that important; that we are not obliged to justify anything, not even, as some still believe induction. Hence, instead of applying the term justification, he would prefer to use explication in the cleavage of analytic and synthetic statements. In the same vein, L.P. Pojman is of the view that analytic-synthetic distinction should be discarded. He rather proposes an amended version of Kant's definition of analyticity that eradicates the metaphysical containment, which Quine strongly criticized. For him, 'analytic statements should be viewed as conditional statements in the form of modus ponens: if (A and B), then A; or if (A and B and C), then A and B.'¹⁶ He argues that analyticity as a conditional explication better exemplifies Kant's original intention and it does not pose a problem to the notion of synonyms. But unfortunately for him, it is not all the traditional examples of analytic statements that could fit into the definition.

Moreover, there are other philosophers like Samuel Gorovitz, Donald province, Rong Williams, Merill Province among others who reasons that there are some sentences that are clearly synthetic and others analytic. But between these extremes, there are many sentences and statements that appear to be analytic or synthetic but cannot be placed into one category with certainty. It follows therefore, that the distinction remains ambiguous. As such, Quine's position appears tenable. Apart from that, many questions that seem quite fundamental to us have not been answered. A good example of this is the nature of human soul. Another is the relationship between the soul and the body, among others. These are phenomena science cannot approach with absolute certainty. It therefore means that for science to arrive at integral and complete truth, it needs to cooperate with other disciplines, especially, those that have access to the level it cannot reach. Hence, metaphysics and other related disciplines can confidently provide this deficit on the part of science. This is the point Quine stressed in his argument against the "two dogmas of empiricism" which is that, to arrive at absolute knowledge, all the fields of human learning must come together. Confirming this position, A. O' Hear stated that; science is not a complete account of the natural world (since the natural world is not limited to

¹⁵ Bergmann, G., *Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*, London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967, p. 32.

¹⁶ Pojman, L.P., *What can we know? An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995, p. 201.

natural things), and it is premature, to say the least, to accept a metaphysical view whose cogency depend on the explanation of human mental and physical activity in neuro-physiological terms.¹⁷

It is *afortiori* that philosophy is a robust discipline and basks in the speculative euphoria and this is simply because it has scholars from different background, epochs, race, orientation, experience, tradition and disposition. However, it does not still mean the discipline is haphazard in its mode of comprehension and analysis. This is not also an excuse so scholars should use the perennial tool and objects of philosophy accordingly and not hide under these variables to push forwards a point of view that is not only poorly subjective but unaccepted and ultimately affronts the pristine nature and ambience that philosophy exudes. In this vein, the scholars who tried to justify, defend and also propagate the inane distinction of the analytic and synthetic distinction which appears to the pillars of modern empiricism should think strongly again about their position and disposition especially against the backdrop of the implication of their position philosophy as a second order discipline. This is flowing from the conviction that Willard Van Oman Quine has been one of the most influential philosophers leading the charge against traditional empiricism especially its unpopular perspectives. And this underscores why this paper refers to him as one of the foremost system and systematic stinkers. His classical essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951) shook the foundation of empiricism as he attacked the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. His work was influenced by both the analytic and pragmatic tradition. The core of this work has been centred on the meaning of statements. What criteria are to be used to assert that so and so statement is meaningful or meaningless. These (Kantian, verifiability) criteria as it were could not meet the set goal of finding what statements are meaningful and which are not. The different criteria of judging meaningful statements from meaningless ones by modern empiricists caught the attention of Quine. Upon enquiry, he noticed that the reason why modern empiricism was able to affirm some statements as meaningful and others meaningless was due to the fact that modern empiricism has been conditioned by analytic-synthetic cleavage and reductionism, which he called dogmas. Consequently, his criticism which shook the foundations of modern empiricism brought more light to the field of analytic philosophy and in the discourse of philosophy in general.

This is predicated on the premise that ultimately, analyticity is needed to explain and legitimate necessity. It is only when these two theses are accepted that Quine's argument holds. It is not a problem that the notion of necessity is presupposed by the notion of analyticity if necessity can be explained without analyticity. Thus it is apparent that Quine has changed

¹⁷ O'Hear, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, 208.

the hard lining and the logical demarcation of the empiricists between analytic and synthetic statements into a distinction that should rather be made on the strength of pragmatic considerations. He has also challenged the notion that there can be any direct empirical verification or falsification of single statement. The modern physicists belief in physical objects and the ancient Greeks belief in Homer's gods are simply two beliefs that find their place within different sorts of belief systems. But unfortunately, modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact and truths which are synthetic or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. However, his work on the two dogmas of empiricism could neither be relegated to the background nor considered a philosophical jargon, due to its impact in our world today. And, it is pertinent to note that Quine's position goes beyond mere affirmation of the meaningfulness of metaphysical statements to most interestingly correcting some philosophical extreme positions that have great influence on the individual, the society and on philosophical discourse. And this marks him out as one of the great system and systematic thinkers in the contemporary and the post-modernist era of philosophy. And this further buttressed the submission of The University of Sydney Professor of Philosophy Peter Godfrey Smith that this paper of Quine on the two dogmas of empiricism is sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth century philosophy.¹⁸

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¹⁸ Peter, Godfrey Smith, *Theory and Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 30-33 (Especially section 2.4 'Problems and Changes').

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GAVRIIL BĂNULESCU–BODONI AND THE ORGANIZATION OF MONACHAL LIFE IN BESSARABIA DURING THE RUSSIAN – TURKISH WAR (1806 – 1812)

Marin Şalari*

siluan77@mail.ru

Abstract: Among several problems, little or not at all researched in national historiography is the issue related to the organization and functioning of spiritual and clerical life, especially the monastic one, in Bessarabia during the Russo–Turkish War (1806 – 1812). This research study reflects the role of the Moldavian–Wallachian exarch Gavriil Bănulescu – Bodoni in organizing the monastic life in Bessarabia during this period. Based on published materials and especially the ones discovered in the State archives, the author describes the most important reforms carried out by the metropolitan in the monastic life of this period.

Keywords: Gavriil Bănulescu – Bodoni, reforms, monks, monasteries, exarch, dedicated monasteries.

The first decades of the current century are marked in contemporary historiography by an increased interest of researchers in the history of the spiritual life and, especially, the history of the Orthodox Church in Bessarabia in the nineteenth century¹. At the same time, not all pages of

* Doctoral student of "Dimitrie Cantemir" State University of Chişinău.

¹. Eşanu A., Eşanu V., Fuştei N., Past and present at Căpriana Monastery from Bessarabia. Paris, Căpriana Publishing House, 1997; Eşanu A. Eşanu V., Voroneţ Monastery. History, Culture. Spirituality, Chişinău, Pontos Publishing House, 2010; Căpriana Monastery (sec. XV–XX). Historical study, documents, books, inscriptions and other materials. Author and coordinator Andrei Eşanu, Chişinău, Pontos Publishing House, 2003, 564 p. + 24 p., photo. Co-authors: Valentina Eşanu, Fuştei Nicolae; Valentina Pelin, Ion Negrei; Цвиркун В.И. Материалы по истории Кишиневской Епархии первой половины XIX века. In: Стратум +. Знамения цивилизаций. Том. 6. Кишинев, Нестор Лемонусец»â. 2003. с.429-436; Candu T., The Church from Moldova in the 2nd half of the 18th century–the beginning of the 19th century. PhD thesis in history, 2009; Scutaru S. The Orthodox Church in Bessarabia between 1882-1918", PhD. thesis in history, 2010. Monasteries and hermitages from the Republic of Moldova, *encyclopaedic edition*, Chişinău, 2013, Цвиркун В.И., Кантарян Н.В. (Митрополит Владимир). Материалы к биографии протоиерея Михаила Березовского. In: The spiritual and historical-cultural heritage of the Russians in Moldova. Collection of articles from the scientific conference with international participation. Chişinău: *Notograf Prim*,

the dramatic history of the spiritual life in this region are properly studied and showcased. Among them is the history of the church, its organization and evolution during the years 1806 – 1812, carried out under the leadership of the exarch of Moldavia and Wallachia (Romania), metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni. It is to this historical page that the present study is dedicated. To its writing, largely contributed the free access to church and monastery archives and libraries, access that until recently was prohibited. The most important sources regarding this research topic are part of the fund no. 733 – Moldovan–Wallachian exarchic spiritual dicastery department, years 1808–1812 (in Russian: Молдо–валахская экзаршеская духовная дикастерия, 1808–1812 гг.) of the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova. In this fund are deposited files about the opening or liquidation of some monasteries and churches, about the transfer of the monasteries to the administration of the exarch. At the same time, there are documents about the raising of prayers in monasteries in honor of the victory of the Russian troops over the Ottomans during the Russo–Turkish War of 1806–1812. The economic sources contain information on the lease of the monastery's lands and of the various constructions (*acareturi*) located on these lands. Moreover, along with the above–mentioned, it has deposited also the decisions of the exarchate regarding the appointment of the representatives of the Moldovan clergy in various monastic positions.

The spiritual development of the Orthodox Church in Bessarabia as a whole and in the monastic organization in particular and their profound reformation carried out during the Russo–Turkish War of 1806–1812 are associated with the name of Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni. In the middle of the war, in June 1808, this hierarch was appointed as exarch of Moldavia and Romania². The promotion to such a high rank was determined, as even His Holiness acknowledged, by "the choice of the Monarch and of the Holy Synod³."

Among the first actions, G. Bănulescu–Bodoni decided to put into order the organization of the internal life of the monasteries. For this purpose, on November 28th, 1808, an instruction was published for the abbots of the monasteries. It forbade abbots not to accept novices without a "certificate", which would contain information that those who wanted to become monks were free, had no family, were not in any litigation, owed

2017. p. 132-140; Протоиерей Михаил Чакир – просветитель и религиозный деятель Бессарабиию Материалы Национальной научной конференции, посвященной 80-летию со дня кончины протоиерея Михаила Чакира (1861 – 1938), мун. Кишинев, 10 сентября 2018 г. Chişinău, *Tipografia Centrală*, 2020 etc.

². National Archive of the Republic of Moldova. Fund 733 (Moldavian–Wallachian Exarchal Spiritual Dicastery, years 1808-1812), inv. 1, d. 422, f. 4.

³. Ibidem. F.3.

nothing to anyone, were not subject to any service, or any debt⁴. Newcomers could only be given the right to become monks only after three years of novitiate, even after all this, novices could not be ordained as monks immediately. The diocesan bishop had to receive in advance a written testimony containing information, when did the novice come to the monastery, where he came from, how old he was, what studies he had, what profession he knew.

Additionally, it was attached a testimony from the clergyman of the monastery and other monastic brothers about the novice's behavior during the probationary period and whether he was worthy of being ordained as a monk. During this time, the one willing to become a monk had to be further subjected to a special spiritual evaluation, which would have confirmed the extent to which he learned the rules of monastic life, which involve obedience to the elder until the end of life, voluntary poverty, spiritual and physical purity. Thereafter, upon the hierarch's blessing, the abbot of the monastery was allowed to ordain the novices in monasticism and dress him in the robe⁵. In addition, through the *Instructions* of the Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni, the abbots were instructed to supervise the monks strictly so that they would not leave the monasteries wandering around the world, without any reason and without abbot's knowledge.

Particular attention was paid to the behavior of the monks, so that they would not transfer from one monastery to another without the will of their superiors, but if such a change was to take place, the blessing of the diocesan bishop was necessary. Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni's rules provided for the behavior of monks: monks of every nation and country had to be subordinated to the bishop and to remain silent, to take care of fasting and prayer, to remain in places where they have given up the world, not to interfere in church or everyday affairs and to not to participate in them, and leaving their monasteries; only if they have the permission of the bishop of the city, if need be. The one who will violate our guidelines, we decided to be alienated from the communication with the church, so that the name of God would not be mocked⁶.

The task of the exarch included the ordering of the documentation in the monastery and the strict record of the possessions, incomes and expenses. On June 15th, 1809, exarch Gavriil issued a decree according to which three registries "sewn with a cord and sealed with the seal of the Dicastery⁷" were instituted in each monastery of both principalities. In the

4. Stadnickij A. Gavriil Banulesko-Bodoni, Ekzarh Moldo-vlahijskij (1808-1812) i Mitropolit Kishinevskij (1813-1821). Kishinev, 1894, p. 208.

5. Ibidem.

6. Ibidem, p. 209.

7. National Archive of the Republic of Moldova. Fund 733, inv. 1, d. 48, f. 1.

first registry were to be registered all the movable and immovable goods of the monastery; in the second – the income, and in the third – the expenses. It was mentioned that the registration of income and expenses was to begin on January 1st, 1809. Also, it was also pointed out that, under these conditions, every abbot or leader (curator) was obliged to report to the Dicastery at the end of each year, or to the epitropy, which is responsible for the administration of church property.

Along with the above, metropolitan Gavriil made efforts to eliminate the influence of the Divans on the internal affairs of the monasteries. His Holiness strongly opposed the existing custom in Romania (Wallachia), according to which, after the death of the abbot of the monastery or before the appointment of another abbot, the local Divan, through its official process, carried out the inventory of the monastery's property. In fact, according to old customs, a new abbot was appointed only with the consent of the Divan. According to historians, this practice had two purposes: to subordinate monasticism to secular power and to protect monastic property from theft and embezzlement⁸. The hierarchy of the church took certain actions to combat the abuses by Russian soldiers committed on the estates of the monastery. For example, on June 27th, 1809, gunners, with the permission of Major Meyendorff, arbitrarily mowed the hay and let the horses graze on the lawn of Golia Monastery. Following the intervention of Metropolitan Gavriil, on July 24th, 1809, the Divan of Moldavia addressed Major Meyendorff with the proposal to use other places for grazing of the horses and artillery oxen⁹.

Also, the Exarch Gavriil also faced the over taxation of monasteries by the civil authorities. An example of this can be seen in his letter of August 16th, 1811, sent to the commander-in-chief of the Danube army, M.I. Kutuzov, in which Metropolitan Gavriil requested the exemption of the Romanian monasteries from the tax, for the establishment of an old people's home in Bucharest. This was explained by the fact that many monasteries were not able to allocate money because they were already burdened with debts. The metropolitan proposed the establishment of such an asylum on the basis of two hospitals that had sufficient income¹⁰.

Over the centuries, a large part of the monasteries in Moldavia were subordinated to foreign monasteries (from Jerusalem, Mount Sinai, Mount Athos), being called dedicated monasteries. These monasteries depended directly on the church and the monastic communities from the

8. Fuștei N., *The attitude of the Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu-Bodoni to some negative phenomena in the life of society and church during the exarchate of Moldova, Wallachia and Bessarabia (1808-1812)*. In: Tyragetia. Chișinău, 2012, nr. 2(21), p. 137-138.

9. Ibidem, p. 140.

10. National Archive of the Republic of Moldova. Fund 733, inv. 273, f. 4 și verso.

east. Dedicated monasteries paid an annual tax, called *embatic*. Following the reforms initiated by Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni, these old monasteries were gradually subordinated directly to the exarchate of Moldova and Wallachia.

Among the dedicated monasteries, there were some holy places subordinated to the monasteries on the Holy Mount Athos. For example, the Dobrovăț Monastery in Vaslui County and the Căpriană Monastery in Lăpușna County were dedicated to the Zonite Athonite Monastery. These monasteries paid an annual embatic of 1,500 lei¹¹. In 1813 there was a conflict between the representative of the Zografu monastery, archimandrite Antim, who was in Iasi, and the exarchic Dicastery of Chișinău. Antim stated that, when he was administrator of the Căpriană monastery, on August 5th, 1808, he concluded a contract with the Zografu Monastery, according to which the Căpriană monastery undertook responsibility to pay 12,500 lei per year. The Diocese of Chisinau categorically refused this, explaining the refusal by the fact that Antim did not have the right to conclude a contract with the Zografu Monastery, because after the entry of the Russian troops in Moldavia it was forbidden to have "any communication with foreign places..."¹². Moreover, he did not show the unproven contract not either in 1808, when the Dicastery requested information from all the monasteries regarding the amount of embatic paid by them, nor in 1811, when Antim was removed from the management of the monastery. Those from Chișinău pointed out that the annual income obtained by the Căpriană monastery was 15,950 lei and for this reason the monastery could not pay such a large amount, of 12,500 lei, to the Zografu monastery. The Dicastery concluded that, most likely, Antim, by trickery, increased by himself the embatic for the Zografu monastery. As such is the reason why it was decided to send the money directly to the monastery on the Holy Mountain, without the intermediation of Antim¹³.

Metropolitan Gavriil was a supporter of the idea that the dedicated type monasteries from Moldova and Wallachia should be subordinated to the Moldavian–Wallachian exarchic spiritual Dicastery. In this sense, the case of the monasteries located near the Ismail fortress is eloquent. After the occupation of this fortress by the Russian troops in 1809, at the request of the metropolitan and the following order of Sergei Kushnikov, the Church of *St. Hierarch Nicholas, the miracle worker*, which was

¹¹. National Archive of the Republic of Moldova. Fund 205 (Spiritual Dicastery of Chișinău), inv. 1, d. 136, f. 6.

¹². National Archive of the Republic of Moldova. Fund 205, inv. 1, d. 136, f. 16 verso.

¹³. Ibidem, F. 205, inv. 1, d. 136, f. 19.

subordinated to the Caracalu Monastery on Mount Athos, came under "supervision" of the monastery of the *Three Hierarchs* from Iași¹⁴.

By the order of Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni, in October 1809, two prayer books were sent to each monastic settlements dedicated to the Greek monasteries, "one in Wallachian and one in Greek languages" and tables with the days of the great holidays¹⁵. Among the recipients was the Căpriană monastery too.

During the reference period, the exarch Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni decided to fight against the influence of foreign monasteries on dedicated to them churches and monasteries from Moldova and Wallachia. On December 23rd, 1808, according to the decree of the Holy Synod, he obtained full power over these dedicated monasteries. According to this document, the exarch could prosecute the abbots of the dedicated monasteries for violating the regulations, and those who would not show obedience could be removed from the tenure and to have appointed other leaders in their place. The abbots had to send annual reports to Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni on the incomes and expenses of the dedicated monasteries. All the documents issued by them were to have the seal of the exarchial Dicastery¹⁶.

As expected, the abbots of the dedicated monasteries did not receive the new rules with great joy. In their annual revenue and expenditure reports, they often falsified data, claiming that expenditure exceeded revenue even by twice. The exarch, seeing that these abuses lead to the ruination of the monasteries, issued a provision according to which the abbots were forbidden to make loans without special permission from the Dicastery; all leases on monastic estates were to be certified by the Dicastery¹⁷.

The measures taken by the exarch generated open dissatisfaction from the abbots of the dedicated monasteries, who being supported by some boyars of Greek origin, in 1810, prepared a denunciation of Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni and forwarded it to the Russian senator V.I. Krasno–Milașevici, President of the Divans of the Land of Moldova and Wallachia, and of the Holy Synod. In the "denunciation", the abbots accused the exarch that he had tried to deprive them of the leadership of the dedicated monasteries. In addition, he was accused of, for no reason, replacing several abbots with people close to him. After receiving this "denunciation", V.I. Krasno–Milașevici sent a copy of it to the exarch, asking him to reply to the accusations. In his answer, Gavriil Bănulescu–

¹⁴. Ibidem, F. 733, inv. 1, d. 34, f. 11.

¹⁵. Ibidem, F. 733, inv. 1, d. 13, f. 1.

¹⁶. Stadnickij A. Gavriil Banulesko-Bodoni... p. 210.

¹⁷. Ibidem, p. 212.

Bodoni calls the abbots of the dedicated monasteries as Greeks greedy for money. At the same time, in his message, he explained that he forced the abbots to submit detailed reports of the sums of money, as they often committed abuses, and thus the monastic fraternities were left without means, and the monasteries were being ruined. He also said he had temporarily banned them from sending their own money to foreign monasteries until the end of the war. Regarding the accusation of removing some abbots, Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni reported that he released from office only the archimandrite of the *Archangel Michael* Monastery in Frumoasa, because he was already old, unable to manage the monastery and, moreover, his stubbornly opposed the distribution by the Dicastery of the designated registries of income and expenses¹⁸.

Fighting against the abuses of the abbots of the dedicated monasteries, the exarch Gavriil nevertheless looked with respect at the athonite monasteries. This is demonstrated by a letter given by the metropolitan in December 1808 to the abbot Spiridon, in which he was allowed to raise funds for the construction of a church at the Hermitage of the *Holy Prophet Elijah* on Mount Athos. In his letter, the exarch explained the motivation for his permission to collect donations, namely that "it is appropriate for Christians to help each other in any need and in any good intention."¹⁹

In those years, the Russian ecclesiastical model was gradually introduced in the churches and monasteries of the Danube principalities. This was facilitated, for the most part, even by members of the clergy, who followed the example of Russian clerics. Thus, for example, at the request of the archimandrites of Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia, between February 16th, 1809 and May 18th, 1810, Emperor Alexander I granted the right to wear a miter, a wand, a mantle with tablets and the right to sit on the carpet during the divine service to seven archimandrites: 1. archimandrite Cyril, ecclesiarch of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova; 2. archimandrite Chiril, first assessor of the Moldavian Spiritual Consistory in Iași; 3. archimandrite Ilarion from the Monastery of *St. Nicholas*, called *Dealu* of the Diocese of the Wallachian Metropolitanate; 4. archimandrite Ioan, abbot of the *Ascension of the Lord Monastery* from Neamț and of the Secu Monastery; 5. archimandrite Gavriil from the *Saint George* Monastery in Bucharest; 6. archimandrite Visarion from the *Assumption of Mary* Monastery in Cotroceni, Bucharest; 7. archimandrite Gavriil (Smirneanul) from the Monastery of the *Holy Voievods* from Slobozia, in Wallachia²⁰.

18. Stadnickij A. Gavriil Banulesko-Bodoni... p. 216.

19. National Archive of the Republic of Moldova. Fund 205, inv. 1, d. 265, f. 28.

20. Ibidem, F. 733, inv. 1, d. 98, f. 8.

Exarch Gavriil Bănulescu–Bodoni himself contributed to the establishment of Russian ecclesiastical ordinances in the principalities of Moldova and Wallachia. Thus, in his instruction from May 1810 to Metropolitan Ignatius leading the Wallachian Metropolitanate, provided for the following: in all monasteries and churches the divine services shall be conducted according to the statute of the Greek–Russian Orthodox Church, without any omission or changes; in all the liturgies shall be mentioned the sovereign Emperor and all his august family, the Holy Synod and the Exarch, in the sent forms; on public holidays it is obligatory to say prayers according to the newly printed booklets in Greek and Moldavian languages.

In conclusion, the following can be stated:

During the period of Garviil Bănulescu – Bodoni's exarchate, a series of reforms took place, which aimed at organizing and unifying the internal life of the monasteries. In this regard, various instructions were issued for the abbots of the monasteries, which determined their obligations, of the monks, as well as those who wanted to become monks.

In the years 1808–1812, several concrete actions were taken to bring in order the documentation of the monastery and the strict record of goods, incomes and expenses. Due to the order issued by G. Bănulescu–Bodoni, three records were established in each monastery.

Attempts by civil authorities to over–tax monasteries in Moldova and Wallachia were stopped.

The influence of foreign monasteries on churches and their dedicated monasteries in Moldova and Wallachia was ceased and the abuses of the abbots of dedicated monasteries were ended. The exarch was a supporter of the idea that the dedicated monasteries in Bessarabia should be subordinated to the Moldavian – Wallachian exarchic spiritual Dicastery.

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ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S DRAMA PERFORMANCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE "NATIONAL" DRAMA INDUSTRY. TAKING BEIJING PEOPLE'S ART THEATRE AND MAHUA FUNAGE AS EXAMPLES

Dong Jian*

dongjian198@sina.com

Abstract: *In the last decade, a series of plans and policies that had a significant impact on the development of China's drama industry have been adopted. One of these plans, "The Ministry of Culture's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Cultural Industries Development", proposed the development of theatrical performance by supporting the construction and renovation of theaters and other cultural consumption infrastructure, by guiding the social capital towards investing in cultural industries in various forms, and by promoting the technology of traditional cultural industries. The ideas and measures for the development of the cultural industry have greatly promoted the advancement of China's drama industry management. The article starts by presenting the development status and the specific issues of China's drama industry, and continues by exposing the corresponding measures taken by the state-owned and private enterprises to solve the problems. Taking Beijing People's Art Theatre and Mahua FunAge as examples, it further analyzes the development of theater operations.*

Keywords: *drama industry, theatrical performance, private and state-owned theatrical enterprises.*

1. Overview of the Development of China's Drama Industry

China's drama industry has continued its steady development in recent years. Drama groups have accelerated their integration and development with tourism, Internet, animation, urban planning, architectural design and other related industries, and new formats have been emerging. From the perspective of the theater industry mode, cross-border integration of theater performances and the use of novel formats have become the norm for theater companies.

* Ph.D., Associate Professor (Chief Announcer), Shanghai Theatre Academy, Department of Broadcasting and TV Hosting (College of TV & Film Arts), Shanghai.

In recent years, there has been an endless stream of theatre and performing arts products, such as the “Impression Series” and the “Romance of the Song Dynasty” show, which have received good response from the public¹. Taking *The Romance of The Song Dynasty* as an example, one could say that once it was released in 2000, it became the soul of Hangzhou Songcheng cultural tourism, with approximately 10 million visitors and revenues of RMB 0.2 billion in 2000 alone². In recent years, Gushuibe Town has developed a platform-type cultural space based on theater performance. The ingenious *Great Wall Theater* takes heaven and earth as the curtain and the Great Wall as the scenery among the mountains. It harmoniously places people, nature, and theatrical art on a unified platform. Drama master Tadashi Suzuki performed three ancient *Dionysus* Greek tragedies here, so that the Great Wall Theatre appeared in drama world instantly³. Historical relics and unique natural and cultural resources, which are difficult to copy, will become a personalized capital and cultural label of Gushuibe Town. At the same time, commercial real estate industry tried to integrate organically with the art of drama to create a “shopping mall + theater” or “commercial center + theater group” ensemble, such as Shanghai Metro City Lai Sheng Chuan Theater or Guangzhou Zhengjia Performing Arts Theater. As stated by Li Rui, official within the Cultural Market Department of the Ministry of Culture, “theatrical performances integrate emerging tourism performances, animation performances, and music festival performances, which not only enhances the product creation and operation model of theatrical performances, but also provides dramatic performances. Injected new cultural connotations expanded the financing channels for performances, promoted the brand concept of theater performances, and tapped the market potential.”⁴

From the perspective of the technological development, the theater industry has a wider application of high-tech systems and elements, such as sound, light and electricity to perform the transformation of digital technological achievements into cultural and artistic creation tools, and to

¹ Zhou R., Xiaofeng S., “Nightly feasts of sights and sounds for visitors looking for thrills”, *China Daily*, 2016, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/3dPuC2r>.

² Song H., Cheung C., “What makes theatrical performances successful in China’s tourism industry?”, *Journal of China Tourism Research*, 2012, 8(2): 159-173.

³ Tadashi S., “Some thoughts on drama and actors”, *Shanghai Theatre*, 2018 (04): 41-43 (in Chinese).

⁴ Yang H., “The Leapfrog Development of China’s Performance Market over Five Years: Internationalization Trends are More Visible”, *China Culture News*, 2012, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/2xPXiHZ> (in Chinese).

show virtual stage scenes in real stage performances⁵. Such endeavors not only enhance the effect of stage performance in all directions, but also improve significantly the stage control ability, a fact that has accelerated the development of the industrialization of drama technology in China. The use of digital technology has made the performance quite astonishing and the stage more dreamy and dazzling⁶, and some initiatives, such as the introduction of the musical *The Phantom of the Theater*, the adaptation of the stage play *War Horse* or the original drama *Sima Qian* have caused strong marketing responses, with a total ticket income in 2017 reaching USD 38 million from imported Western musical production alone⁷. The use of digital dancing has reached the realm of both realism and fantasy, as shown by the dance drama *Peacock*, with Ye Jintian's oriental poetic and aesthetic design and with the stage background adjusting to reflect the change of seasons, showing the beauty of the soul. With regard to the integration of art and technology, the theater industry still needs constant exploration and practice, and special attention must be paid to the cultivation of scientific and technological talents.

From the standpoint of the content of the theater industry, one could say that the style is more diversified and theater plays are mainly based on rehearsing classic repertoires⁸ and introducing foreign performances⁹. Among the plays, musicals are leading the way, with productions such as "The Ghost Story", "I, Don Quixote" or "One Step Up to the Sky". At the same time, in the pursuit of innovation and cultivating the audience, the small theater drama has become a breakthrough and has successfully attracted the attention of young audiences¹⁰, the Chinese comedy "Charlotte's Troubles" being a conclusive example. Opera performances, on the other side, are still based on traditional, classical shows with popular, famous indigenous artists. For example, the small theaters¹¹ in

⁵ Ye, D., "The Formation and Development of the Narrative Design Conception of Dramatic Dance under the Evolution of Technology", *Sichuan Drama*, 2018 (08): 20-25 (in Chinese).

⁶ Fu, M., "Panoramic Scroll and Three-dimensional Presentation of Chinese Drama in the 20th Century: A Review of Fu Jin's «History of Chinese Drama in the 20th Century»", *Southern Literature Circle*, 2018 (04): 91-95 (in Chinese).

⁷ "A look at imported Western musicals in China", *China Stage Connection*, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/2UWAuy5>.

⁸ Ma G., "On the Homogeneous Performance form of Chinese Classical Drama, *Drama (Journal of the Central Academy of Drama)*, 2018 (03): 105-116 (in Chinese).

⁹ Han, X., "The development direction of Chinese drama in the context of the market", *Music Creation*, 2018 (03): 117-119 (in Chinese).

¹⁰ Hu, Y., "On Three Types of Companion Texts in Drama Performances", *Sichuan Drama*, 2018 (06): 15-20 (in Chinese).

¹¹ Lu, J., "Research on the Operation of the Beijing Fengxing Drama Village, a Small Private Theater", *Tianjin Conservatory of Music*, 2018.

Beijing and Shanghai have launched excellent opera programs such as Peking Opera “Guanyu Guanyin” and Yue Opera “Love Circumstances”, which not only expand the influence of the drama in the hearts of the audience, but also receive the praise of the public. However, high-quality products with large attendance are mostly imported from abroad or adapted from classic repertoires. Original works are still lacking, several reasons for this situation being identified¹²: a first reason is related to the allocation of resources and operating capital of the companies which is small and cannot be virtually circulating; a second reason is that the quality of the indigenous productions is not high enough and goals of the plays are not clearly defined; the third reason refers to the fact that an “extensive” development similar to the manufacturing industry has emerged in China’s drama industry, which is rather based on quantity than on quality. Although there are many indigenous productions, they are rather hovering at the “low end” of the quality scale, therefore one could say that intellectual property products of high profits, high added value, and high-quality do not belong to the theater. Such a situation has limited the development of the theater itself, which has caused a series of problems. Given that, in the end, this situation is directly linked to data statistics, government support, human resources, and consumption capacity of China’s drama industry, it results that it is an urgent problem to be solved.

From the perspective of the drama industry marketing mode, the new media provide an important platform for the promotion and development of the drama industry, mainly through WeChat, Weibo, Internet TV, digital broadcasting and other media. For example, marketing in the ticketing strategy provides viewers with more choices and more personalized services. In addition, crowd funding for performances has broken the traditional way of performing operations, and has become not only one of the important financing models for the theater industry, but also a marketing promotion method that is currently enthusiastic for producers. Based on the marketing model of performance crowd funding, a new way to provide audiences with customized services has emerged. However, although this marketing mode exerts a favorable influence on the development of the theater industry, it is nevertheless inconsistent with the purpose of crowd funding for current performances, which may be utilitarian. Therefore, relevant specialists are required to effectively identify good and poor marketing models in order to obtain favorable

¹² Xu, T., “Developmental Status of China’s Cultural Industry”, pp. 145-165, in Jiang C., Li J., Xu T. Yang (Eds.), *Development of China’s Cultural Industry*, Beijing: Springer and Social Sciences Academic Press, 2019.

channels and promote the sustainable development of the theater industry.

2. Challenges Facing the Theatre Industry

In theatrical performances, statistical data, policies, resources, consumption and other issues are crucial problems that hinder the development of China's theater industry.

2.1 The box office of theatrical performance is inaccurate, "big, but not strong"

The most direct way to measure the success of a theatrical performance and the popularity of a play is the box office result, although this approach might be misleading. According to statistics from the National Center for Cultural Industries Research¹³, during 2017, the total economic value of China's performance market was approximately RMB 48.951 billion, an increase of 4.32% compared to RMB 46.922 billion in 2016, including: box office performances, rural performances, entertainment performances, revenue from performance derivatives and sponsorships, supporting entities and other services, and government subsidies. From the perspective of big data, the cumulative operating capital of China's drama industry has grown rapidly, but an in-depth analysis reveals that there are deviations in the box office statistics of China's drama. Objectively speaking, the first deviation refers to the fact that the box office total income reflects the evolution of the theatrical performance indicators, but the value-added chain around the theater industry also includes: stage art project income, theater rental income, consumer goods income etc. At the same time, the box office income statistics result covers a large number of government subsidies, thus it is not a true reflection of the box office. From a subjective perspective, the main reason for the current market boom is still relying on the country's large financial input. A second deviation refers to the fact that China lacks a truly large state-owned performance enterprise. According to the analysis of China's Center for Cultural Industries Research, in the first quarter of 2017 alone, the national box office revenue of theater performances was as high as RMN 324 million, an increase by 20.9% or of RMN 56 million compared with the same period of 2016. This is a very interesting data sheet, with more than 10,000 practitioners contributing digital shares. However, the difference between the average base and the overall market is too large, and the industrial institutions are relatively

¹³ *China Statistical Yearbook on Culture and Related Industries*, National Bureau of Statistics of China and Publicity Department of CPC Central Committee, China Statistics Press, 2018.

weak, therefore it is impossible to form a strong cultural industry with drama at its core.

2.2 Government's blind subsidy squeezes the private theater market

The uneven distribution of art resources has led local governments to create cultural performance, promote the development of local cultural markets, enhance the mobility of the local cultural industry chain, and invest a large amount of money and, ultimately, allocate fiscal revenue to the drama industry. In such circumstances, a new phenomenon has appeared, with some institutions being extremely preoccupied with “financial subsidies” and devoting their main energy to “running” financial subsidies, thus lacking creative innovation and development. At the same time, many private theater companies consider that performances are difficult to do as they cannot get financial subsidies, therefore one could say that the market has been disrupted by the local government's financial means. As a result, private enterprises are in unfair conditions compared to “subsidized” enterprises, which have received financial subsidies. Taking into account the competition, one could say that private enterprises have been suppressed, and the market economy has been unreasonably regulated. Although the problem of unfair competition was partly solved in 2013, when the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and other five ministries and commissions jointly issued a “thrift order”, which suppressed the “false” prosperity of the theater performance market, and also tested the self-regulation and reform capabilities of theater performance groups¹⁴, the stability and fairness of the theater performance market are still to be improved.

2.3 Lack of professional management and technical personnel

The lack of talents and theatrical professionalism are the biggest problems the theatrical performance crews are faced with. Taking only theater management as an example, it could certainly be said that a theater is a complex art institution, therefore the internal management of a theater is complicated. The stage management alone involves four aspects: lighting, sound, technology, and overall planning, yet a theater involves many other extremely complex parts and processes. For instance, the Beijing-located National Grand Theater of China (the National Centre for the Performing Arts) has a relatively complicated structure, with 21 major departments, 17 professional systems, 118 branch groups, and 112 majors. With China hosting a total of 2,478 modern theaters in 2019, many of

¹⁴ Zhao, P., “The Central Propaganda Department and other five departments issued a notice to stop luxury and promote frugality”, *Jinghua Times*, 2013, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/3bXZXhJ> (in Chinese).

them constructed in the last years, and with theaters with advanced equipment blooming across China, as Chen Ping, former president of the National Center for the Performing Arts stated¹⁵, it seems that construction is not the problem, yet management is.

Looking at China's drama industry, the problem of lack of talent, especially the lack of senior management talents, is particularly prominent, seriously affecting the development of genuine chain of drama industry and even hindering the advancement of the domestic drama industry. The China's Ministry of Culture's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Cultural Industries Development clearly states that responsible institutions will conduct rotation training for the leading cadres of the National Academy of Arts and Culture to instruct 1,000 drama writers, directors, and stage artists¹⁶.

Key talents in specific fields such as arts and crafts should assume responsibility in the demonstration and stimulation of artistic creation and production, should inspire and encourage the potential of the industry, and should achieve the prosperity and development of drama art.

2.4 The potential for theater performance consumption needs to be explored

In terms of content production, theatrical performance has always been no less than the scale of the film and television industry, yet in terms of theater, theater lines, consumer groups etc., the rate of improvement has lagged behind the film and television output. According to various statistics and analysis, in 2017, the Beijing People's Art Theater alone had 400 performances and box office revenues of more than RMB 48 million¹⁷. It can be seen that China's drama performance has a large market consumption potential and this potential should be effectively tapped. In large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, as well as in new cities that are gradually developing, consumer groups (especially formed of young individuals) have gradually strengthened their consumption concepts and economic weight, adding consumer support to the drama sector. However, the uneven distribution of art resources still constrains consumption in medium-sized cities. Although many cities have built modern theaters, there are often facilities without performances and performances without quality. If the problem of excessive concentration of

¹⁵ Xia, L., "China home to nearly 2,500 modern theaters", *Xinhua Net*, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/2X8akvg>.

¹⁶ *Cultural industry development plan in the "13th Five-Year Plan" of Ministry of Culture*, Ministry of Culture and Tourism of People's Republic of China, 2017, retrieved online (in Chinese) from: <https://bit.ly/2R8AdXQ>.

¹⁷ *China Statistical Yearbook on Culture and Related Industries*, 2018.

artistic resources in big cities is not resolved in the future, luxury facilities might become empty cultural “bubble projects”.

3. The Beijing People’s Art Theatre and Mahua FunAge as examples of the development of theater operations

For a long period of time, the development of theatrical performances in China has encountered a bottleneck. Faced with this situation, both the state-owned enterprises and the privately-run theater camps have implemented reform measures in line with their own development lines. Chinese state-companies such as Beijing Performing Arts Group, Anhui Performing Arts Group, and People’s Art Theatre have carried out corporate reforms that fit national policies and have adopted novel ideas. At the same time, starting from their own drama group system, private theaters such as Mahua FunAge, Shanxi Chang’e Culture and Art Co Ltd, and Shanghai Xuhui Yanping Peking Opera Troupe have focused on innovation and have been taking a different approach in order to meet the public’s expectations. For an understanding of the development and operation of the theater industry in China, the examples of the Beijing People’s Art Theatre and Mahua FunAge are quite relevant.

3.1 Beijing People’s Art Theatre

Although China has officially carried out a systemic reform of the theater industry, from a fundamental point of view the transfer of state-owned arts and cultural academies and institutions to private enterprises is only a formal reform, which has not solved the difficulties of the state-owned cultural entities. The Beijing People’s Art Theatre does not fall into the scope of China’s “enterprise reform and restructuring”¹⁸, yet not restructuring does not mean inaction. The Beijing Theatre placed a great emphasis on high-quality drama content, adopted the “driving force mechanism of reform”¹⁹ slogan, and quickly implemented a series of mechanism reforms, mainly focusing on small theater producers, dance development models, actor assessment, creation, development cooperation, etc., and launched “field”, “love impression” and other outstanding representations. Drama as a genre plays a positive role in implementing the reform of China’s drama industry and enriching the

¹⁸ Zu, L., *Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Restructuring and Firm’s Performance. Empirical Evidence from Chinese Enterprises*, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009.

¹⁹ Zhang, Y., *China’s Economic Reform: Experience and Implications*, New York: Routledge, 2018.

content of drama art²⁰. Since the beginning of its transformation, the Beijing Theatre has achieved a record of RMN 50 million box office revenues through the steady measures of “walking in small steps”, which has completely opened the industry market.

When analyzing the results of the reforms of small theaters, with a focus on the assessment of producers, actors, and brokers, one should take into account the importance of maintaining the smooth operation of the theater, the continuous update of the theater’s content, and the improvement of the level of interpretation. Such elements not only develop the potential of the theater, but also provide audiences with more outstanding and “fresh” dramatic works, to enrich the public’s vision. Ren Ming²¹, director of the Arts Council of Beijing People’s Art Theatre, pays attention to capitalizing on the new performance opportunities and on the strengths of personnel and focuses on inspiring “potential stocks”, that is, mature actors, because of their strong awareness and exquisite talents, being capable of examining the performing arts from a deep perspective and of having rich performances. Experience can be extremely important in both the career of a director and the activity of a theater, and, through practice, dramatic works can achieve remarkable results, an example here being Yang Lixin’s “The Alley of Xiaojing”²².

Besides its focus on people, Beijing People’s Art Theatre vigorously cultivates and encourages outstanding small theater producers to discover new repertoires, provide excellent economic consultants, nurture exceptional performing talents, and improve their own strengths from the inside.

At the same time, Beijing People’s Art Theatre does not neglect the expansion and improvement of external platforms, which are based on three essential aspects of strategic cooperation, performance development, and cross-border actions enhancement. In this process, the Beijing Theatre adhered to the strategic principles of cooperation, innovation and development, relying on modern technology, actively cooperating with many public performance service platforms, carrying out cross-border creations in many fields, and successfully completing the brand transformation of the theater. Through such actions, the image of the theatre has been significantly improved. Taking the Beijing Theater Operation Service Platform as an example, in 2017, the theater platform launched 107 shows with 200 outstanding performances, attracting about

²⁰ Wang X. “From Absolute to Alienation: the «National» Writings of Xia Yan Drama in the 1930s”, *Sichuan Drama*, 2017 (05): 28-32 (in Chinese).

²¹ Qi S., *Adapting Western Classics for the Chinese Stage*, New York, Routledge, 2019.

²² “Director of the classic «Koi Alley» resounds that it is not easy to discharge Beijing flavour”, interview with Yang Lixin, CCTV.com, 2018, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/2xNY8Vw>.

160,000 audiences to enter the theater. The organizer of this non-profit performance platform is the Beijing Municipal Cultural Bureau, which wanted to develop a government procurement program, i.e., “the government paid to procure theatre resources and rent them out at little or no cost to art groups so as to provide theatre access for some of the best stage works”²³. Through the combination of overall operations and publicity and marketing strategies, it has gained greater development space. According to relevant statistics, the Beijing Theater Operation Service Platform performed at a high attendance rate of 79.6% throughout the year 2017, with a cumulative box office revenue of more than RMN 23 million, becoming a leader in the industry²⁴.

3.2 Mahua FunAge

Mahua FunAge (hereinafter referred to as Mahua), a private company, first created the concept of “Happy New Year Stage Play” in 2003. In the following ten years, it quickly became a cultural hotspot in Beijing, being followed by many young people and growing into a domestic business, one of the best drama brands in the drama market²⁵. In 2017, Mahua hit a new peak of more than RMN 2.2 billion at the box office sales of “Shame Tekken”, with revenue up by 181.6% and a net profit up by 422.6% year-on-year²⁶.

Nevertheless, initially, the registered capital of Mahua was only RMN 300,000, and the company had no significant box office experience. Its success stems from a commitment to creative style. In terms of creativity, Mahua has a precise positioning as it adheres to a novel and unique comedy style, changes the profound design of traditional drama interpretation into an educational and entertaining form, focuses on the daily lives of ordinary people, and intelligently takes stock of current social events, which arouses the empathy and resonances of audience. Some of their productions, such as “Somali Pirates”, “Earl of Oolong Mountain”, “Clown Loves Beautiful” etc., have become the personality label of Mahua, attracting a large number of young people. In addition, Mahua focuses its activity on team creation, as Liu Hongtao, General Manager of Mahua described the production process: the screenwriter puts forward an idea,

²³ “Research Report for Performing Art Theatres Professional Development Skills and Higher Education Needs in China”, British Council China, Theatre Management Department, Central Academy of Drama, June 2016:15, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/2R92LjP>.

²⁴ *China Statistical Yearbook on Culture and Related Industries*, 2018.

²⁵ Xiao, H.F., *Youth Economy, Crisis, and Reinvention in Twenty-First-Century China. Morning Sun in the Tiny Times*, New York: Routledge, 2020.

²⁶ *China Statistical Yearbook on Culture and Related Industries*, 2018.

the idea leads to an outline and stimulates the actors, and everyone discusses each step together; finally, the personality of the characters is designed according to the characteristics and strengths of the actors²⁷.

Mahua is mainly performed in large theaters such as the Haidian Theater, the 21st Century Theater, and the People's Liberation Army Opera House. From the perspective of the business development mode, Mahua usually invests more than 40% of a play in publicity and carries out comprehensive and three-dimensional publicity and marketing based on channels such as TV stations, magazines, and the Internet. At the same time, Mahua adopts a very efficient commercial launch strategy, promoting its shows and plays through advertising intervention well before the production is ready to be released. This marketing strategy has brought considerable benefits to Mahua FunAge and played a positive role in promoting its development. In recent years, comedy has almost accounted for more than 80% of drama performances, and high box office movies have also been labeled as comedy, Mahua FunAge having a very important role in this development.

Looking at the successes of Mahua FunAge and Beijing People's Art Theatre, one could identify slight differences. Although Mahua FunAge also activates based on the policy of the new era, the focus is not on the operation of the troupe itself, but on innovative plays. This innovative strategy is not only in line with current consumption trends, but also with national supportive policies, as suggested by the decision of the China Cultural Industry Investment Fund to invest in Mahua shares at a price of RMN 46.92 / share, thus laying the foundation for the later listing of Mahua on the New Third Board Market²⁸.

Conclusion

While the development of China's drama industry is evolving at a relatively stable pace, it is nevertheless faced with many challenges and affected by the impact of multiculturalism. Based on the analysis of the operation and development of Beijing People's Art Theatre and Mahua FunAge, one could say that if China's theater performance operations are to flourish, the drama industry protagonists must conform to the requirements and characteristics of the times, rely on the new industrial chain structure, and combine new technologies and innovation as the core driving force. Therefore, any endeavor of improving the sector should start from the current development situation of the theater industry, yet aiming

²⁷ Lu, Q., "From stage to net", *Global Times*, 2012, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/2XbkhI7>.

²⁸ Liu, R., "Curtain Rising on Theater Investment", *CNBC*, 2013, retrieved online from: <https://cnb.cx/2V2zgBk>.

at carrying forward both traditional culture and innovative productions and at changing the industry's chain from production to sales. Such objectives are both relevant and necessary for solving the difficulties and bringing real value in the theater industry.

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*** "Director of the classic «Koi Alley» resounds that it is not easy to discharge Beijing flavour", interview with Yang Lixin, CCTV.com, 2018, retrieved online from: <https://bit.ly/2xNY8Vw>.

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*** *China Statistical Yearbook on Culture and Related Industries*, National Bureau of Statistics of China and Publicity Department of CPC Central Committee, China Statistics Press, 2018.

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MARRIAGE: RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL ASPECTS

Berveno Serhiy Mykolayovych*,

sbn.sbn@yahoo.com

Lazur Yaroslav Volodymyrovych**,

lazurs80@gmail.com

Mendzhul Marija Vasylivna***

marija_mendzhul@ukr.net

Abstract: *The article analyzes marriage and its nature on the basis of a multidisciplinary approach, taking into account religious and legal aspects. The study conducted its own survey in different cities and villages of Ukraine, which covered 2083 respondents. As a result of an all-Ukrainian poll, it was found that 1/3 of those involved in the survey support the state's recognition of church marriage, i.e. giving it the same legal status as secular marriage.*

The legislation of the EU member states on the regulation and recognition of church marriages was analyzed. It was established that in a number of European countries (in the Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, Czech Republic, Finland and others) the legal effect of the church marriage is the same as ordinary secular marriage.

Authors have concluded that it seemed unfair from the standpoint of the principle of equality in Ukraine and some other European countries not to recognize the church marriage.

Keywords: *marriage, religious rite, spouse, state, European Union, Ukraine.*

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has become a trigger to highlight many of the problems of today's globalized society and the need to ensure personal safety. At the same time, Ukrainian society has once again pointed its

* **Doctor of Law, Associate Professor, Honored Lawyer of Ukraine, Professor of the Department of Civil Law, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkiv.**

** **Doctor of Law, Professor, Dean of the Faculty of Law, Uzhhorod National University, Uzhhorod.**

*** **Candidate of Law, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of Civil Law and Procedure, Uzhhorod National University, Uzhhorod.**

attention to the importance of traditional values, including family, marriage, human freedom and even personal communication. If a year ago, for the most people, work and career were a priority in life, now health and family are valuable again. In European countries, the main reason for starting a family has historically been marriage, which has undoubtedly undergone significant transformations in most EU Member States, including the legalization of same-sex partnerships and marriages. The first country to allow same-sex partnerships was Denmark (in 1989), and later on either same-sex marriages or partnerships are allowed in most EU Member States. In Ukraine, as well as in such European countries as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the state does not recognize both same-sex marriages and same-sex partnerships. At the same time, the question arises, if states have legalized same-sex unions, then why all European states still do not recognize the religious marriages? In this study, we will consider a marriage from a religious and legal perspective, as well as try to answer the question.

The concept, religious and legal nature of marriage

Until the 1920s, only church marriages took place on the European continent. Scholars note that the state recognized marriages entered into according to the church rules in the presence of two witnesses, and in exceptional cases - outside the church. The main proof of the marriage was a record in the matrimonial book¹.

The question arises as to the understanding of the concept of "marriage" from a religious point of view. The Orthodox religion under marriage considers the sacrament of love, the eternal union of man and woman with each other in Christ². Eleanora Marakhovska cites the following notion of marriage according to the official teachings of Catholicism, as well as the provisions of the Code of Canon Law: "this covenant, if it is concluded between the baptized, has been exalted by the Lord Christ to the degree of the sacrament". The scientist also notes that marriage is recognized exclusively as a union between a man and a woman, which has a natural (divine) origin and that love between a man and a woman is a fundamental and innate vocation of every man, and such love is an image of God's absolute love for man, it is destined to give birth to offspring and thus be embodied in the common cause of preservation of

¹ Slyusar, Lyudmila, "The evolution of marriage in Ukraine: XVII - early XX century", *Demography and social economy*, (in Ukrainian), 2, 2011, p. 64–65.

² Tsebenko, Solomiya, "Modern Orthodox ideas about the human right to marriage and the family in the light of international standards", Lviv Polytechnic Publishing House, Lviv (Ukraine), (in Ukrainian), 2014, p. 149-150.

creation"³. Oksana Mullokandova believes that the classical canonical concept of "marriage" means "the fullest (physical, moral, economic, legal, religious) communication between husband and wife"⁴. Thus, Christian marriage is a sacrament, and from the standpoint that it was created by God, it is considered inviolable.

In the scientific legal literature on views on the legal nature of marriage, along with the traditional position that marriage is a "sacrament", the concepts of the contractual nature of marriage and the "marriage-partnership" are well-founded. M. Antokolska substantiates that the very concept of "marriage-sacrament" led to the proclamation of the indissolubility of marriages and, accordingly, the prohibition of divorce. Liberalization of family law took place only in the late XIX and early XX centuries⁵. We can agree with the position of Svitlana Shimon that in Ukraine family law regulates marital relations on the basis of the concept of "marriage status"⁶. The only thing, in our opinion, the elements of the contractual concept are also present.

The analysis of official statistics shows that in Ukraine there is a tendency to reduce the number of marriages. If we compare the number of marriages per 1,000 population, as of 2011 Ukraine was the leader in Europe with a rate of 7.8. The highest rate among European countries was in Cyprus (7.3), Lithuania (6.3), and the lowest in Bulgaria (2.9). However, as of 2017, our state already had a rate of 6.5, in 2018 - 6.0. In 2017, the indicators in Lithuania - 7.5, Romania - 7.3, Cyprus and Latvia - 6.8⁷.

At the same time, the number of religious marriages is declining both in Ukraine and in the EU member states, which is due to the transformation of values, the prevalence of actual marital relations without giving them formalization. As for Ukraine, the reduction in the number of religious marriages was also influenced by Soviet policy, which eradicated the church from all spheres of human activity and publicly condemned a

³ Marakhovskaya, Eleanora, "Modern interpretations of the Catholic Church's teaching on marriage and the family". *Visnyk KHNU im. V.N. Karazina. Series "Theory of Culture and Philosophy of Science"*, (in Ukrainian), 58, 2018, p. 55.

⁴ Mullokandova, Oksana, "Interreligious and interfaith family-marriage relations in Abrahamic religions (religious-legal aspects): dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Philosophical Sciences". Zhytomyr (Ukraine), (in Ukrainian), 2016, p. 46-47.

⁵ Masha V. Antokolskaia, "The Process of Modernisation of Family Law in Eastern and Western Europe: Difference in Timing, Resemblance in Substance", *Electronic Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 4.2, 2000. <https://www.ejcl.org/42/art42-1.doc>


⁶ Shimon, Svitlana. "Legal nature of marriage according to the Family Code of Ukraine". *Scientific journal of the National Pedagogical University named after M.P. Drahomanov. Series 18: Economics and Law*, (in Ukrainian), 28, 2015, p. 157.

⁷ Marriage indicators. EUROSTAT.

https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_nind&lang=en

person for participating in religious ceremonies. At the same time, our research showed that the long-term efforts of the Soviet authorities did not yield the desired results and the religious marriages are still important for Ukrainian society.


We conducted an all-Ukrainian survey and interviewed 2,083 respondents using the Google form⁸ from different cities (including such cities as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Uzhhorod, Odessa, Rivne, Chernivtsi, Lutsk, Ternopil, Dnipro and others) and villages of Ukraine. The number of respondents living in cities was 78%, in villages - 22%.



By age, the surveyed respondents were distributed as follows: up to 18 years old - 2%; 18-25 years old - 21%; 25-35 years old - 38%; 35-45 years old - 27%; 45-55 years old - 8%; over 55 years old - 4%. Thus, the opinions of all-age groups were taken into account, and the largest % of respondents (up to 45 y.o.) are in the age when most marriages are registered according to Ukrainian official statistics.


⁸ The form of the survey on the religious rite of marriage, (in Ukrainian). <https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc8VsABJHS7zwmZF7heuKO3BLIaLt1AH2YNNdeXh-6N-QvXUA/viewform>

Survey: "Do you want to enter into church marriage?"



The following results were obtained on the selected questions: 50.6% of respondents have already entered into a secular marriage and a church marriage; 21.4% - intend to perform a religious rite when concluding a secular marriage; 16% - have already entered into a secular marriage and there was no additional religious rite of marriage; 12.1% do not plan a religious marriage ceremony at all.

When respondents were asked if they support the idea to provide the same legal effect to church marriage as to secular marriage the results were the following: 705 respondents said "Yes", 691 respondents - "No" and 687 respondents were unable to answer.



Thus, more than a third of Ukrainian respondents who participated in the survey (34%) believe that the state should give equal legal status to

church marriage and secular marriage. This is quite a significant share, as well as almost a third were unable to answer this question.

Comparative analysis of the legislation of Ukraine and European countries on the recognition of church marriages.

According to the Constitution of Ukraine and the Family Code, only a man and a woman have the right to marry. The discriminatory approach to the age of marriage in Ukraine was eliminated on March 15, 2012, when the first part of Article 22 of the Family Code of Ukraine was repealed, and the same age for marriage was set of 18, regardless of gender. According to Part 3 of Article 21 of the Family Code of Ukraine, a religious ceremony is not a ground for a state to recognition of the concluded marriage⁹. Under exception there are religious marriages which were concluded before the moment of creation or restoration of bodies of state registration of acts of civil status. In other states that were part of the Soviet Union, church marriages are also not recognized. For example, Article 10 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation stipulates that marriage is registered only by civil status registration bodies. Article 15 of the Marriage and Family Code of the Republic of Belarus provides for marriage only in civil registry offices.

The analysis of the legislation of European states revealed many examples of state recognition of church marriages. For example, according to Article 657 of the Czech Civil Code, a marriage is a union of a man and a woman, which can be registered by a public authority authorized to do so or by a church¹⁰. In the Slovak Republic, the Law on the Family and on Amendments to Certain Laws of 11 February 2005 establishes equality between both civil and ecclesiastical marriages. According to Article 5 of this law, a marriage may be entered into by a clergyman who has the appropriate rank of a registered church or religious society. Such a marriage may take place in a church or other place, as provided by the internal rules of the church, a religious society for religious rites. If there is a threat to the life of one of the spouses, the marriage can be concluded in any appropriate place. According to Part 5 of Article 5 of the Law of the Slovak Republic "On the Family and Amendments to Certain Laws", the Church body before which the marriage took place is obliged to notify the relevant registration authority within three working days, indicating this fact.

Article 3.24 of the Civil Code of Lithuania establishes that a marriage is concluded by a church (denomination) in accordance with the procedure established by the internal (canonical) legislation of the respective religion. Important is the second part of this article, which states that both secular

⁹ Family Code of Ukraine, 2002, (in Ukrainian).
<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2947-14>

¹⁰ Czech Civil Code (in Czech). <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2012-89>

and religious marriage have the same legal consequences if the conditions of marriage established by Articles 3.12 - 3.17 of the Civil Code were not violated, and the marriage was concluded in the manner prescribed by canons of religious organizations registered in the Republic of Lithuania and recognized by the state¹¹.

In Poland, family relations are regulated by the Family and Care Code, which was adopted on February 25, 1964, and was last amended on November 30, 2019. According to Art. 1 of this code, a man and a woman have the right to marry both in the civil registry office and in accordance with the internal church rules. When choosing the second method, such a marriage is also registered by the state¹².

At the same time, according to Article 259 § 3 of the Romanian Civil Code, a religious marriage rite may be performed only after its registration with a public authority¹³. Although there is no such legal requirement in Ukraine, our survey revealed that some respondents in some churches were asked to confirm their secular marriage before a religious marriage ceremony.

In England, the Marriage Act of 1949 provided for the procedure for recognizing church marriages. This law stipulates that marriage according to the rites of the Church of England may be solemn and, in accordance with Article 5, concluded after obtaining a permit (special marriage license) granted by the Archbishop of Canterbury or another authorized person under the Ecclesiastical License Act of 1533 or another ecclesiastical body (general marriage license), certificate provided by the registrar (in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Marriage Act) [14]¹⁴.

In addition, the following European states recognize church marriage: Denmark (Marriage Act of January 1, 1970), Italy (Articles 82, 83 of the Italian Civil Code), Portugal (Article 1587 of the Portuguese Civil Code), Norway (Marriage Act of July 4, 1991), Sweden (Marriage Act of May 14, 1987), Finland (Marriage Act of June 13, 1929), etc.

Conclusion

The study showed that in a number of European countries (in Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Finland and others), the state recognizes church marriage as well as secular.

¹¹ Civil Code of Lithuania, (in Latvian). <https://www.infolex.lt/ta/60696>

¹² Family and Guardianship Code, (in Polish).

<http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19640090059/U/D19640059Lj.pdf>

¹³ Civil Code of Romania, Portal Legislativ, (in Romanian).

<http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/175630>

¹⁴ Marriage Act, 1949. <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/12-13-14/76/part/II/enacted>

From the standpoint of the principle of equality, it seems unclear the established approach in Ukraine and some other European countries not to recognize the church rite of marriage. This position is especially unclear for those states which have allowed same-sex partnerships and marriages, but at the same time do not recognize church marriages. Given the survey, which showed the support of more than 30% of respondents, it is advisable to amend the legislation of Ukraine and establish legal rules that would recognize church marriage and make it equal with the legal consequences of secular marriage.

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<https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc8VsABJHS7zwmZF7heuKo3BLIaLt1AH2YNNdeXh-6N-QvXUA/viewform> (in Ukrainian).

EGYPT'S SHIFTING FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES (2013-2018)

Dana Gabriela Pleșa*

danaplesa1977@gmail.com

Abstract: *In the Arab Republic of Egypt, the result of the “Arab spring” was the transition from a secular dictatorship to an Islamic democracy, followed by protests in the street and the takeover of power in the state again, by the army, in what could be considered a coup d’état. It can be argued that the initiated changes beginning with 2011 have not led to the establishment of another type of regime, but to a return at the existing situation during the Mubarak regime, the army taking over the power, again, in the state. After Hosni Mubarak’s removal, Mohamed Morsi came to power, democratically otherwise, in June 2012, a so-called moderate Islamist, representative of Muslim Brotherhood. After a period of insecurity and instability, Morsi was overthrown, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took over the power, the formation of Muslim Brotherhood was banned, and the pro-democratic revolutionary aspirations were reduced to silence. Following the presidential elections of March 2018, President el-Sisi won a new mandate, by removing any real political opposition. This article aims to analyse Egypt’s foreign policy during 2013-2018, from the coup d’état executed by the Egyptian army in July 2013 and until April 2018, when Abdel Fattah el-Sisi succeeded to obtain a second mandate as President.*

Keywords: *Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, coup d’état, USA, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey*

Introduction

On July 3rd 2013, the Egyptian Minister of Defence, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi performed a coup d’état followed by the arrest of President Mohammed Morsi. The event took place as a result of some massive protests in Cairo and in other cities in Egypt where millions of people participated. Protesters were dissatisfied with the Islamist policy of President Morsi. The President was replaced by Adly Mansour, the head of Constitutional Court and the Constitution of 2012 was suspended. Adly Mansour remained interim President until June 2014, when Presidential elections were organized. The elections were won by the ex-general and minister of defence, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who meanwhile changed the military uniform with the civil clothes in order to be able to candidate.

* PhD. student, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest.

Externally, he focused on the consolidation of the relationship with the United States, with whom Egypt has a strategic partnership. At the same time, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi improved the relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from which he received a consistent financial support. In addition, he avoided to position Egypt on one side or the other in the regional conflicts in Syria and Yemen. In regards of internal policy, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi followed three objectives, namely to prevent the reappearance of the Muslim Brotherhood as an important actor on the political stage, to change the precarious economic situation of Egypt by revitalization of the economy and to keep the extremism far from Egypt.

Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood

Since the beginning of the 1920s, the Egyptian political system suffered only two fundamental changes, from a constitutional monarchy placed under powerful British influence to an independent authoritarian state, in 1950s, in which the army played a guidance role and, beginning from 2011, when Hosni Mubarak's authoritarian state was overturned from power by a popular revolution. Thus, after the military coup d'état of July 23rd 1952, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt did not experiment a democratic form of government until the revolution from January 2011.

For 60 years, the Egyptian army kept control of a country of more than 80 million people. The remaining in power of this regime can be owed to some factors, among which the long-term conflict with Israel, widespread repression and the capacity to create a network of interests, which continuously adapted to new economic and social conditions. However, the lack of effective opposition movements can be considered, as well, a factor that contributed to the long duration of the authoritarian government that included the presidencies of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak.

The profound political and social cleavages caused Egypt to deal with the challenge of reconciling the religious faith, widely spread, with democracy. The army proved a decisive factor in maintaining the balance of power between secular, religious, liberal and political forces. Therefore, it can be argued that Egypt had begun to step into a new era, that of democratic development, after almost three decades of autocratic regime. Francis Fukuyama assesses that "a country is democratic if grants to its people the right of choosing their own government by secret vote, within regular, multiparty elections, on the basis of equal and universal suffrage of adult people"¹. Many of those who study political life of Islamist world easily realize, that in most Muslim states the concept of democracy, in the

¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The end of History and The Last Man*, Paideia Press, Bucharest, 1994, p. 46.

sense awarded by the occidental political sciences, can be found in an extremely diluted form. As well, although the concept of democracy is an important component of Islamic political speech, there is a significant difference between the manner in which the political elite understands this concept and the large mass of Muslim populations. Here it is what Laura Sitaru is saying in this respect: “Democracy that became the main line of speech in Arab-Muslim society continues to be perceived by the large mass of people as being the same type of system that in “revolutionary ideology” was called “bourgeois democracy” and associated with “colonialist occupant”².

On June 24th 2012, Mohammed Morsi, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, was announced the winner of the first presidential democratic elections in Egypt³. Thus, he became the first Egyptian President democratically elected. At the same time, he was the first Islamist leader from Arab world democratically elected as head of state. Morsi became the fifth President of Egypt and the first who did not come from the army. Since declared a Republic in 1953, Egypt has had only presidents that came from the military tier and whom, most of the time, took over the power by coups d'état⁴. Morsi's opposing candidate, Ahmed Shafik, was an ex-general of aviation who was supported and preferred by the army. However, Ahmed Shafik did not succeed to win, the army respected the population's expressed vote and did not intervene⁵. On June 30th 2012, Mohammed Morsi was officially appointed as President of Egypt⁶. Both Qatar and Turkey supported politically the coming of Morsi and of Muslim Brotherhood to power and also economically, especially after that he was appointed President⁷.

Historically, since the British occupation from 1882, Egypt gave birth to Islamic modernists at the end of 19th century. The main figure of this movement was an Afghani professor, philosopher and political activist

² Laura Sitaru, *Arab political thinking. Key-concepts between tradition and innovation* (preface by Lucian Boia), Polirom, Iași, 2009, p. 173.

³ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Named Egypt's Winner, Islamist Makes History", *The New York Times*, 24.06.2012, available at

<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html>, accessed on 21.02.2020.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Power Struggle Begins as Egypt's President Is Formally Sworn In", *The New York Times*, 30.06.2012, available at

<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/world/middleeast/morsi-is-sworn-in-as-president-of-egypt.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁷ Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zmary, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation*, *Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p.217.

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1836-1897), who stayed in Egypt for eight years and urged the Egyptians to fight against imperialism that devastated the Muslim societies and countries. Under these circumstances, in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood was formed as a reformist movement, the oldest Islamist political group in the Arab world. An Egyptian school teacher, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), established this group as an answer to the imperialism, colonialism and moral danger to the Islam in Egypt⁸. This movement combines the political activism with charity work and it is popular among the Sunni branch of Islam⁹.

The Egyptian Political Islam has always taken the form of some anti-colonial or anti-governmental movements, with the exception of the state authorized Islam, such as al-Azhar university in Cairo, associated with Al-Azhar Mosque in Islamic Cairo, the Egypt's oldest degree-granting university, renowned as "Islam's most prestigious university"¹⁰, and a few years of religious liberalisation under Sadat at the beginning of '70s. For over a century, the leaders in Egypt fought or compromised vis-à-vis Islam's resurrection that contested significantly the state and its ruling elites. The contemporary political Islam in its manifestations and origins has strong roots in the Egyptian experience. This experience had an international and regional impact upon the transnational Islam and the West. Consequently, although the Muslim Brotherhood is often considered a symbol of the world political Islam, it is rather a creation of nationalism¹¹.

According to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic law and values should have a central role in the political and public life. One of the well-known slogans of this movement is "Islam is the solution"¹². The organization is against the women and minorities' rights. In March 2013, the United Nations Organisation was preparing a declaration that referred

⁸ ***, "What is the Muslim Brotherhood?", *Al-Jazeera*, 12.06.2017, disponible en <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/muslim-brotherhood-explained-170608091709865.html>, (consulté le 20.02.2020).

⁹ Caroline Alexander, "Who Are the Muslim Brotherhood? Are They Terrorists?", *Bloomberg*, 15,05,2019, disponible en <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-15/who-are-the-muslim-brotherhood-are-they-terrorists-quicktake>, (consulté le 20.02.2020).

¹⁰ Edward Delman, *An Anti-ISIS Summit in Mecca*, *The Atlantic*, February 26, 2015.

¹¹ John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, Oxford University Press, 1996.

¹² Caroline Alexander, "Who Are the Muslim Brotherhood? Are They Terrorists?", *Bloomberg*, 15,05,2019, disponible en <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-15/who-are-the-muslim-brotherhood-are-they-terrorists-quicktake>, (consulté le 20.02.2020).

to the women's rights and stopping the violence against them¹³. As a response, the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt issued a statement consisted of 10 points in which condemned this declaration and its content. In the view of the Muslim Brotherhood, those mentioned in the UN document (the sexual freedom of women, the possibility of Muslim women marriage to non-Muslim men, the right to work, the right of travelling alone, the possibility to sue their husband for rape, equal rights for homosexual people etc.) are contrary to the Islamic ethics and would lead to the society's disintegration¹⁴. Moreover, women cannot have the same rights as men.

Because of the ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood, Sisi's administration, Saudi Royal House and the United Arab Emirates consider the Muslim Brotherhood a threat to the national security. In reality, they were afraid of the possibility that this organisation will get the power through free elections like it happened in Egypt at the parliamentary elections of January 2012¹⁵. The previously mentioned three states declared the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organisation¹⁶. Moreover, they also encouraged their allies to declare the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organisation. Only the Russian Federation declared the organisation as terrorist¹⁷ instead the United States¹⁸ and Great Britain¹⁹

¹³ Patrick Kingsley, "Muslim Brotherhood backlash against UN declaration on women rights", *The Guardian*, 15.03.2013, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/15/muslim-brotherhood-backlash-un-womens-rights>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

¹⁴ *Ibidem*

¹⁵ ***, "Muslim Brotherhood tops Egyptian poll result", *Al-Jazeera*, 22.01.2012, available at

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/01/2012121125958580264.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

¹⁶ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group", *The New York Times*, 30.04.2019, available at

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/world/middleeast/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

¹⁷ ***, "What is the Muslim Brotherhood?", *Al-Jazeera*, 12.06.2017, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/muslim-brotherhood-explained-170608091709865.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

¹⁸ Steve Holland, "Arshad Mohammed, Trump weighs labeling Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group", *Reuters*, 30.04.2019, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-muslimbrotherhood/trump-weighs-labeling-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-group-idUSKCN1S6159>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

¹⁹ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group", *The New York Times*, 30.04.2019, available at

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/world/middleeast/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

did not take this step. Currently, roots of the Muslim Brotherhood can be found in Turkey, the Gaza strip and Saudi Arabia²⁰.

On August 12th, 2012, a month and a half after Morsi's appointment in office, the Emir of Qatar, Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, paid an official visit to Cairo. In this context, the Emir announced that Doha offered 2 billion USD financial assistance to the Central Bank of Egypt²¹. From that date, Qatar has continued to offer economic assistance to Egypt. By May 2013, Qatar had offered economic assistance to Egypt in value of 8 billion USD²². In the same time, also Turkey offered economic assistance to Egypt. On September 30th, 2012 Egypt signed an agreement with Turkey according to which Ankara facilitated 1 billion USD²³.

Subsequently, however, Morsi tried, misusing the concept of democracy, to seize the total power, transforming Egypt into an Islamic theocracy, suppressing the minority created after 2012 elections, and violating the rights of this minority. On the other hand, there were no clear separations between the religious-social aspect of the current, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and its political materialization, the Party of Freedom and Justice.

Nasser's strategy²⁴ of country's literacy that, in the '80s, promised workplaces to all who would be granted a diploma, led to imbalances that produced consequences nowadays. The massive urbanisation of the cities Cairo and Alexandria, but also the villages' urbanisation led to the change of social relationships, consequently the Egyptian patriarchal system was affected. The urbanisation facilitated the youth's emancipation, who does not wish the return to the patriarchal system and to theocratic accents in the state leadership. It is one of the causes for which Morsi was removed

²⁰ Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zamy, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation*, *Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p.221.

²¹ ***, "Qatar pledges \$2bn for Egypt's central bank", *Al-Jazeera*, 12.08.2012, available at

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/201281261018425841.html> (accessed on 20.02.2020).

²² Maria Abi-Habib, Reem Abdellatif, "Qatar's Aid to Egypt Raises Fears on Motives", *The Wall Street Journal*, 17.05.2013, available at

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324031404578480771040838046>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

²³ ***, "Egypt signs \$1 billion Turkish loan deal", *Reuters*, 30.09.2012, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-turkey-loan/egypt-signs-1-billion-turkish-loan-deal-idUSBRE88ToG920120930>, (accessed on 21.02.2020).

²⁴ Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second Egyptian President, in power between June 23, 1956 – September 28, 1970, overthrow the Egyptian monarchy, nationalized the Suez Canal, fought against Israel and led a pan-Arabic unity campaign.

from power, because of his incapacity of accommodating the Islamist policy with the young generation's modern expectations.

The young people who demonstrated in Tahrir square are the first generation of Egyptians really emancipated that firmly reacted to the reduction of the acquired freedoms due to the Western civilization and culture access. It can also be argued that Morsi used extensively the political Islam concepts and transformed himself in the victim of his own incapacity of understanding the young Muslim generation's mentality. It can be concluded that these events marked the failure of the political Islam in Egypt.

The coup d'état of July 3th, 2013

On June 30th, 2013 took place massive protests organized by Tamarod, a movement created in April 2013 by a number of opposition forces. The movement had launched back in April 2013 a petition for the President's impeachment accusing him of authoritarian tendencies, non-compliance with the rule of law and of promoting an Islamist agenda inconsistent with the state secular principles²⁵. Tamarod called upon the population to protest on June 30th, 2013 because it was a symbolic date, marking a year since Mohamed Morsi' appointment into office. Millions of people participated at the protests asking Morsi to resign²⁶. Meanwhile, tensions between Morsi's supporters who encouraged the promotion of an Islamist policy and the opposition that saw the secularism as sole viable policy of state started to intensify.

On June 26th, 2013, four days before the planned protests, the minister of defence, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, warned that the army was ready to intervene in order to save the country from an internal conflict²⁷. Practically the army warned that in case the situation will not calm down, it could execute a coup d'état, as it did in the last 70 years in cases of internal crisis. This may be also interpreted as a message of intimidation addressed to the President Morsi in order to obtain his resignation. The protests of June 30th continued also on July 1st which led to an increase of tensions and instabilities within the society. Thus, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi

²⁵ Patrick Kingsley, "Protesters across Egypt call for Mohamed Morsi to go", *The Guardian*, 30.06.2013, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/mohamed-morsi-egypt-protests>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

²⁶ ***, "June 30, the tale of an epic civic uprising", *Egypt Today*, 30.06.2019, available at <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/72240/June-30-the-tale-of-an-epic-civic-uprising>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

²⁷ ***, "Egypt's army in position to make good on warning" *CBS News*, 26.06.2013, available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypts-army-in-position-to-make-good-on-warning/>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

from his position of minister of defence decided to offer an ultimatum of 48 hours to the two parties to solve the political crisis²⁸. As well, in Sisi's speech was mentioned also the fact that the army would not be involved in politics or in the government and that the protests represent an expression without precedent of people's will²⁹. Sisi's ultimatum was addressed especially to President Morsi. Because the situation remained the same, in the evening of July 3rd, 2013 General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced in a televised intervention that the President Mohamed Morsi was deposed and replaced by the head of the Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, and that the Constitution of 2012 was suspended. Morsi was put under house arrest. Together with him there were arrested also government officials and Islamic figures close to the Muslim Brotherhood and President³⁰. Adly Mansour remained in office as interim President until June 2014, when presidential elections were organized. The winner of the elections was the ex-minister of defence Abdel Fattah el-Sisi³¹. After winning the presidential elections, Sisi tried to keep Egypt away from the ethnic and religious turmoil that increased in the Middle East due to the Arab Spring. Also, Sisi avoided Egypt's involvement in the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites³².

Since assuming the power, Sisi had three objectives:

1. to prevent the recurrence of the Muslim Brotherhood as important actor on the political stage.
2. to change the precarious economic situation of Egypt by economy's revitalisation.
3. to keep the extremism away from Egypt³³.

The hypothesis according to which the Egyptian secret services and the United Arab Emirates played an important role in organizing the

²⁸ ***, "Egypt's army gives parties 48 hours to resolve crisis", *BBC*, 01.07.2013, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23133174>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ Patrick Kingsley, "Abdel Fatah al-Sisi won 96.1% of vote in Egypt presidential election, say officials", *The Guardian*, 03.06.2014, available at

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-presidential-election-vote-egypt>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

³² Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zamy, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation, Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p.215.

³³ Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zamy, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation, Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p. 224.

protests and of coup d'état in Egypt is very interesting. In March 2015, Mekameleen, an Islamist television channel that transmits by satellite from Istanbul, made public a series of recordings that, according to the television broadcaster, were made in an office of the Ministry of Defence before Morsi's dismissal. The Mekameleen broadcaster alleges that in the recordings is Abbas Kamel, Sisi's main assistant, speaking on the phone with Sedky Sobhy, the Chief of Defence at that date³⁴.

The two were discussing regarding a bank account controlled by the army and used at the same time by Tamarod, the movement that called upon the protests against Morsi. Abbas Kamel was trying to explain to the Chief of Defence that the army needs to take 200.000 USD from the money deposited by the United Arab Emirates in the account of Tamarod movement³⁵. Although the origin of the recordings was not confirmed, this scenario seems to be confirmed taking into consideration that immediately after Morsi's removal, the United Arab Emirates³⁶ and Saudi Arabia³⁷ began to offer substantial economic aids to Egypt. Soon after the coup d'état, the United Arab Emirates offered three million USD to Egypt and Saudi Arabia five million USD³⁸. In March 2015, Abu Dhabi announced that offers other two billion USD to Egypt and Riyadh four million USD³⁹. Therefore, after the coup d'état of July 2013, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the main economic supporters of Egypt⁴⁰. On June 14th, 2017, the Egyptian Parliament ratified a law that provided the cession

³⁴ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi", *The New York Times*, 01.03.2015, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi", *The New York Times*, 01.03.2015, available at [https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middle east/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middle-east/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html), (accessed on 20.02.2020).

³⁷ David Hearst, "Why Saudi Arabia is taking a risk by backing the Egyptian coup", *The Guardian*, 20.08.2013, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/saudi-arabia-coup-egypt>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

³⁸ Patrick Werr, "UAE offers Egypt \$3 billion support, Saudis \$5 billion", *Reuters*, 09.07.2013, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-loan/uae-offers-egypt-3-billion-support-saudis-5-billion-idUSBRE9680H020130709>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

³⁹ ***, "Gulf states offer \$12.5 billion aid to Egypt", *Al Arabiya*, 13.03.2015, available at english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2015/03/13/Saudi-announces-4-billion-aid-package-to-Egypt.html, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁴⁰ Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zmary, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation*, *Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p. 215.

of two islands from the Red Sea, Tiran and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia. The islands are placed strategically at the entrance of the Aqaba Gulf⁴¹. On June 25th, President Sisi approved the cession of the islands to Saudi Arabia⁴². This decision created tensions among the population that was obviously bothered by this decision. Moreover, the opposition accused the Egyptian President that he did that in return of the economic aid that Saudi Arabia offered him at the takeover of power⁴³. Both Ankara and Doha criticized the coup d'état of July 2013 that led to the dismissal of Morsi⁴⁴. After this event, both countries ceased to offer economic assistance to Egypt.

In an interview of 2016, Chuch Hagel, the Secretary of Defence between January 2013-November 2014, declared that Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were dissatisfied with Morsi's policy⁴⁵. At the beginning of April 2019, an Israeli politician and brigadier general in reserve, Aryeh Eldad, wrote an article in the local newspaper *Maariv* mentioning that Israel supported the coup d'état in Egypt⁴⁶. According to Eldad, Israel learned about Morsi's plans to cancel the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel and that he intended to send more troops to Sinai Peninsula⁴⁷. Furthermore, Morsi gave a special attention to the relationship with Palestine and Hamas allowing tacitly to the last one to intensify the attacks from Sinai Peninsula against Israel⁴⁸. Morsi offered logistic and economic support to Hamas and allowed it to move its

⁴¹ ***, "Egypt's parliament approves islands deal to Saudi Arabia", *BBC*, 14.06.2017, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40278568>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁴² ***, "Egypt's president ratifies islands deal with Saudi Arabia", *BBC*, 25.06.2017, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40395475>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁴³ ***, "Report: Saudi Arabia paid Egypt \$25bn for Red Sea islands", *Middle East Monitor*, 29.07.2017, available at <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170629-report-saudi-arabia-paid-egypt-25bn-for-red-sea-islands/>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁴⁴ Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zamy, „Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context”, in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation, Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p.217.

⁴⁵ David D. Kirkpatrick, "The White House and the Strongman", *The New York Times*, 27.07.2018, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/sunday-review/obama-egypt-coup-trump.html?>, (accessed on 10.02.2020).

⁴⁶ ***, "Israel was behind Morsi's overthrow: General", *Press TV*, 04.04.2019, available at <https://www.presstv.com/DetailFr/2019/04/04/592600/Israel-Eldad-Egypt-Morsi-coup-Sisi>, (accessed on 10.02.2020).

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Hard Choices*, Simon & Schuster, London, 2014, pp. 411-412.

headquarters from Damascus to Cairo⁴⁹. Obviously, this led to increased tensions between Egypt and Israel. Immediately after the coup d'état and takeover of power by Sisi, a significant bilateral relationship development took place between the new leadership in Cairo and Israel. In an interview for CBS News on January 6th, 2019, Sisi declared that the cooperation between Egypt and Israel has reached a level without precedent⁵⁰.

Most likely, the United States knew about Sisi's plans to remove Morsi and gave him green light to perform the coup d'état. Obama's administration was interested, on one hand, in Morsi's dismissal, due to his Islamist visions that could damage the regional stability, and on the other hand in Israel's satisfaction. At the same time, adopting a favourable policy towards Israel, Sisi was seen as an asset by the White House, taking into consideration the powerful Israeli lobby in Washington. Egypt is one of the most important allies of the United States in the Middle East and Washington offers annually to Cairo authorities 1.3 million USD for military aid⁵¹. From the takeover of the Presidency in 2014 until 2018, Sisi paid two official visits to the White House. One in September 2014⁵² and the second one in April 2017⁵³. During Donald Trump's mandate the relationship between US and Egypt intensified even more. Only in the period September 2016-September 2018⁵⁴ between the two leaders took place five meetings among which one at the White House and the others on the occasion of different summits of the United Nations Organisation⁵⁵. In April 2019, Donald Trump and el-Sisi met once again on the occasion of

⁴⁹ Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, *Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath: 2011-2016*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2017, pp.579-580.

⁵⁰ ***, "The interview Egypt's government doesn't want on TV", *CBS News*, 03.01.2019, available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-president-abdel-fattah-el-sisi-denies-holding-political-prisoners/?fbclid=IwARoKQTx5boX_Kl4St4PnWrEnAvtuVfG9_5dv-yV5k49z2MIg4stGoEtEg-Y, (accessed on 10.02.2020).

⁵¹ ***, "Sisi to meet Trump for fifth time in 2 years", *Egypt Today*, 24.09.2018, available at <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/58020/Sisi-to-meet-Trump-for-fifth-time-in-2-years>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁵² ***, "Obama meets with el-Sissi, says Egypt key to Mideast security", *The Times of Israel*, 26.09.2014, available at <https://www.timesofisrael.com/obama-meets-with-el-sissi-says-egypt-key-to-mideast-security/>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁵³ ***, "Donald Trump says US is 'very much behind' Egypt's Sisi", *Al-Jazeera*, 03.04.2017, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/donald-trump-welcomes-egypt-sisi-white-house-170403164810319.html>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁵⁴ ***, "Trump meets Egyptian leader, says ties have never been stronger", *Times of Israel*, 25.09.2018, available at <https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-meets-egyptian-leader-says-ties-have-never-been-stronger/>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁵⁵ ***, "Sisi to meet Trump for fifth time in 2 years", *Egypt Today*, 24.09.2018, available at <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/58020/Sisi-to-meet-Trump-for-fifth-time-in-2-years>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

an official visit of the Egyptian President to the White House⁵⁶. The relationship between the two leaders is a special one, Sisi being the first head of state who congratulated Trump after he won the presidential elections⁵⁷. The difficult economic situation from the moment of the coup d'état put Egypt in an immediate need for money in order to avoid a crisis. In this context, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates started to be actively involved. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi aimed in obtaining a greater influence at the regional level and the coming into power of Sisi was the appropriate moment for strengthening the relationship between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Practically, the two states filled the gap left by Turkey and Qatar⁵⁸. At the same time with Morsi's removal, Saudi Arabia provided Egypt 5 billion USD, other 4 billion in March 2015, other 25 billion USD in April 2016⁵⁹. This made Egypt dependent of the economic support of the States from Gulf, especially the one of Saudi Arabia⁶⁰. However, Saudi Arabia hoped that in exchange of its economic assistance, Egypt will support its policy in regards of the war in Yemen and also the war in Syria. Riyadh supports the Yemeni government and the rebels who fight against Assad. On the contrary, Sisi did not want to get involved given the fact that Assad's dismissal would have led to the coming into power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. In regards of Yemen, Egypt does not wish to be involved in order not to damage the relationship with Iran⁶¹. For Sisi, the religious and political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood represents a threat for the regional security⁶². The voting by Egypt, on

⁵⁶ ***, "Trump, Egypt's Sisi to discuss security during White House visit", *Reuters*, 09.04.2019, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-egypt/trump-egypts-sisi-to-discuss-security-during-white-house-visit-idUSKCN1RK2IR>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁵⁷ Robin Wright, "President Trump's Surprisingly Warm Welcome in the Middle East", 10.11.2016, available at <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/president-trumps-surprisingly-warm-welcome-in-the-middle-east>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁵⁸ Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zamy, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation, Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p. 217.

⁵⁹ Sharif Nashashibi, "Cut the hype: A Saudi-Egyptian break up is not imminent", *The Middle East Eye*, 25.10.2016, available at <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/cut-hype-saudi-egyptian-break-not-imminent>, accessed on (21.02.2020).

⁶⁰ Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zamy, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political, Economic and Social Transformation, Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p. 215.

⁶¹ Muhammed Magdy, "What do the Houthis need from Cairo?", *Al-Monitor*, 20.02.2020, available at <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/release-egyptian-fishermen-coincides-flights-yemeni-patients.html>, (accessed on 21.02.2020).

⁶² Mahmood Monshipouri, Anthony Zamy, "Re-evaluating Iran-Egypt Relations: A Look at the Evolving Geopolitical Context", in *Ak Party 15 Years in Power Political*,

October 8th 2016, of a resolution initiated by Russian Federation regarding Syria within the UN Security Council led to a tension of the relationship with Saudi Arabia⁶³. The main reason was that the resolution initiated by Russian Federation provided the cessation of hostilities between pro-Assad forces and rebels but did not mention also the stopping of bombings and building of an air prohibition zone⁶⁴. As a result, this would have allowed the continuation of bombardments against the rebel factions supported by Saudi Arabia. At that moment, the rebels were surrounded in a sector of Aleppo city by Assad's army and were bombarded massively by the Russian and Syrian aviation⁶⁵. Soon after this event, Saudi Arabia stopped the oil deliveries to Egypt without sending an official message in this respect. The oil deliveries were made based on an agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in value of 23 billion USD signed in April 2016 on the occasion of the Saudi King Salman visit to Cairo⁶⁶. Riyadh offered then to provide 700.000 tons of petroleum products monthly for a period of five years⁶⁷. On November 7th 2016, approximately one month after Egypt's voting in favour of the resolution initiated by the Russian Federation in the Security Council, Saudi Arabia announced officially that decided the interruption of oil deliveries to Cairo for an undetermined period⁶⁸. In March 2017, six months after the oil transports deferral, the Egyptian minister of oil issued a statement in which he mentioned that Saudi Arabia will resume the oil deliveries to Egypt⁶⁹. At the same time, the minister mentioned that Aramco, the Saudi state oil company, stopped the deliveries because of the reduction of oil production but also for the works

Economic and Social Transformation, *Insight Turkey* Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring 2017), p. 222.

⁶³ Security Council Fails to Adopt Two Draft Resolutions on Syria, Despite Appeals for Action Preventing Impending Humanitarian Catastrophe in Aleppo, Security Council 7785TH Meeting, SC/12545, 8 October 2016, available at

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12545.doc.htm>, (accessed on 21.02.2020).

⁶⁴ ***, "Saudi anger as Egypt votes with Russia in UN vote", *The Middle East Eye*, 13.10.2016, available at <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-anger-egypt-votes-russia-un-vote>, (accessed on 21.02.2020).

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁶ ***, "Saudi oil shipments to Egypt halted indefinitely, Egyptian officials say", *Reuters*, 07.11.2016, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-saudi-oil-idUSKBN1320RQ>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁹ Ehab Farouk, Eric Knecht, "Saudi Aramco to resume oil product shipments to Egypt soon", *Reuters*, 15.03.2017, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-saudi-oil-idUSKBN16M2GR>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

of maintenance of refineries⁷⁰. Certainly, this is only a pretext, the reason from the back of the oil deliveries stopping is the decision of Egypt to vote the resolution initiated by Russian Federation. Finally, the deliveries were resumed on March 2017⁷¹.

If in the foreign politics Sisi focused on the consolidation of the relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in the internal politics he tried to consolidate his power. On April 17th, 2019, the Egyptian Parliament voted a law that brought changes to the Constitution of 2014⁷². The new amendments provide the extension of the Presidential mandate from four to six years but without changing the limit of two mandates. This limit was imposed after the revolution from 2011⁷³ when Hosni Mubarak resigned after 30 years of holding the power⁷⁴. The changes provide also the creation of a Vice-president office⁷⁵ but also of another Chamber of the Parliament called Senate, constituted of 180 members⁷⁶ among which 25% must be women⁷⁷. Thus, the Parliament will have two Chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the

⁷⁰ ***, "Saudi Aramco resumes oil shipments to Egypt", *Middle East Monitor*, 16.03.2017, available at <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170316-saudi-aramco-resumes-oil-shipments-to-egypt/>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

⁷¹ Indrajit Sen, "Aramco delivers 4 oil shipments to Egypt in March", *OilandGasMiddleEast*, 10.04.2017, available at

<https://www.oilandgasmiddleeast.com/article-17178-aramco-delivers-4-oil-shipments-to-egypt-in-march>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

⁷² ***, "Egypt parliament votes to extend Sisi rule until 2030", *France 24*, 17.04.2019, available at <https://www.france24.com/en/20190417-egypt-parliament-votes-extend-sisi-rule-until-2030>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁷³ Raf Sanchez, "Sisi to stay in power in Egypt until 2030 after referendum 'victory'", *The Telegraph*, 23.04.2019, available at

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/23/sisi-stay-power-egypt-2030-referendum-victory/>, accessed on 22.02.2020.

⁷⁴ ***, "Egypt Revolution: 18 days of people power", *Al-Jazeera*, 26.01.2016, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution-160124191716737.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁷⁵ Ruth Michaelson, "Alarm raised over bill allowing Sisi to rule Egypt until 2034", *The Guardian*, 14.02.2019, available at

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/14/egypt-mps-approve-bill-that-could-keep-sisi-in-power-until-2034>, accessed on 20.02.2020.

⁷⁶ ***, "Inside Egypt's pro-Sisi constitutional changes", *Africa News*, 16.04.2019, available at

<https://www.africanews.com/2019/04/16/inside-egypt-s-pro-sisi-constitutional-changes/>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁷⁷ Raf Sanchez, "Sisi to stay in power in Egypt until 2030 after referendum 'victory'", *The Telegraph*, 23.04.2019, available at

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/23/sisi-stay-power-egypt-2030-referendum-victory/>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

Senate. Among these, two-thirds will be elected by the citizens' vote and one-third will be appointed directly by the President of Egypt⁷⁸.

At the same time, this law increases the powers of the President allowing him to appoint judges and prosecutors⁷⁹. Last but not least, the law provided also the modification of article 200 from Constitution at which it is added that the duty of army is to protect the Constitution and democracy of the state⁸⁰. This modification, that makes the army the guarantor of democracy, is dangerous for a democratic regime as it opens a Pandora's box. Under this chapter the army may intervene and take over the power whenever it is against some decisions of the President. Thus, the militaries from the upper echelons may place certain political decisions under the provisions of article 200 from the Constitution in order to motivate their decision of taking over the power. The law was submitted to a national referendum that took place for three days, during April 21st-23rd 2019. At the polling stations were presented 23.4 million people, that represent 44% from the population with the right to vote. Amongst these, 89% voted for the legislative modifications⁸¹. Thus, by the amendment of the Constitution, Sisi has the possibility to stand for other two mandates of President being able to remain in office until 2034⁸². Therefore, this legislative amendment allows him to remain in office for 20 years. The game played by Sisi sends Egypt back in Mubarak's time. In fact, Sisi desired the creation of an authoritative regime that bears the mask of democracy. The revolution from 2011 wanted to avoid precisely this, for the President not to remain in office for decades.

At the presidential elections from April 2018, Sisi won a second mandate. He was voted by 21.8 million voters, that means 41% of total number of citizens with the right to vote⁸³. In the presidential race, Sisi did not have an opposing candidate. According to *The Guardian*, those who

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁹ ***, "Inside Egypt's pro-Sisi constitutional changes", *Africa News*, 16.04.2019, available at <https://www.africanews.com/2019/04/16/inside-egypt-s-pro-sisi-constitutional-changes/>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸¹ ***, "Egyptians approve extension to President el-Sisi's rule", *Al-Jazeera*, 23.04.2019, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/egyptians-approve-extension-president-el-sisi-rule-190423180853792.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁸² Ruth Michaelson, "Alarm raised over bill allowing Sisi to rule Egypt until 2034", *The Guardian*, 14.02.2019, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/14/egypt-mps-approve-bill-that-could-keep-sisi-in-power-until-2034>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁸³ John Davison, Ahmed Tolba, "Egypt's Sisi wins 97 percent in election with no real opposition", *Reuters*, 02.04.2018, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-election-result/egypts-sisi-wins-97-percent-in-election-with-no-real-opposition-idUSKCN1H916A>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

could have had any chances against him stopped their electoral campaigns in January accusing intimidations and moreover, the main opposing candidate was arrested and his manager of campaign was beaten⁸⁴. The ex-Chief of Defence, Sami Anan was arrested soon after he announced his intention to candidate at the presidential elections. However, his candidature was rejected due to the fact that he did not resigned from the army⁸⁵. The same thing happened to the ex-Prime minister Ahmed Shafiq who withdraw from the presidential race after he had announced his candidature in November 2017⁸⁶. Moreover, the grandson of the ex-President Anwar Sadat was forced to withdraw his candidature⁸⁷. Therefore, it was aimed that Sisi's chances to be re-elected to be as high as possible and any candidate who could put him in difficulty to be eliminated. In August 2019 Egypt had only at the al-Aqrab prison about 1000 political detainees, most of them being members of the Muslim Brotherhood⁸⁸. Since Sisi's coming to power in 2014 and until January 2019, the Egyptian security forces had arrested about 60.000 of people. However, in an interview given to the American TV channel CBS, and broadcasted in January 2019, Sisi denied that in Egypt would exist political detainees⁸⁹.

To the extent that Sisi and the army have achieved a state triumph over society, the post-Morsi regime does not need a ruling party to maintain control and authority. Instead, the army and the police control a Parliament that consists of a loyal and fragmented elite. Unlike Mubarak, Sisi conducts a policy in which state institutions, especially the judiciary

⁸⁴ Ruth Michaelson, "Alarm raised over bill allowing Sisi to rule Egypt until 2034", *The Guardian*, 14.02.2019, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/14/egypt-mps-approve-bill-that-could-keep-sisi-in-power-until-2034>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁸⁵ ***, "Sisi: Egypt not 'ready for democracy'", *Middle East Monitor*, 22.03.2018, available at <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180322-sisi-egypt-not-ready-for-democracy/>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁸⁶ ***, "Ahmed Shafiq: Egyptian ex-PM withdraws from election", *BBC*, 07.01.2018, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42597803>, (accessed on 22.02.2020).

⁸⁷ ***, "Sisi: Egypt not 'ready for democracy'", *Middle East Monitor*, 22.03.2018, available at <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180322-sisi-egypt-not-ready-for-democracy/>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

⁸⁸ Ali Younes, "Egypt must end rights abuses of political prisoners: Amnesty", *Al-Jazeera*, 01.08.2019, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/egypt-human-rights-abuses-political-prisoners-group-190731201543809.html>, (accessed on 24.02.2020).

⁸⁹ Richard Hall, "Egypt's Sisi denies his country holds any political prisoners, but rights groups say tens of thousands detained", *The Independent*, 04.01.2019, available at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/egypt-political-prisoners-abdel-fattah-alsisi-president-cbs-a8710951.html>, (accessed on 20.02.2020).

and police, are united in support of the military regime as the only way to preserve their interests and autonomy towards society. The survival of the army and the regime are more interconnected than before, and the presence of the army and the police in the parliament prevents any political threat to the regime.

In Aziz's opinion, Sisi's political system does not restore those of his predecessors. Sisi does not want to tie his name to a new ruling party through which the business community can access state resources. Instead, he allowed the business elite to enter in the parliament as individuals. Thus, he frees himself from blending the interests of the regime with those of the elite and exercises closer control over them and their corrupt practices. The huge popular support that Sisi enjoyed following Morsi's dismissal gave him enough legitimacy to be President without a political party. He relied on the support of the forces that opposed the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the support of state institutions. Therefore, it has risen above politics and the eventual failure, so that he cannot be blamed if the Parliament and government fail to solve the socio-economic problems of Egypt⁹⁰. In the same time, without any organized resistance to his policies, Sisi regulates by decree and takes major policy initiatives such as energy cuts and subsidies, importing gas from Israel and raising taxes⁹¹. Neither the main international allies of Egypt, the United States Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, seem to be pushing for democracy. As a result, there is a reduced pressure on the army for accountability and transparency regarding how it operates.

In conclusion, we witness a reconfiguration of authoritarian rule in Egypt. Forms of repressive exclusion from authoritarian governance have replaced previous strategies for inclusion, cooperation, and redistribution of Mubarak's authoritarian governments. Compared to Mubarak, Sisi promotes a "presidential monarchy"⁹², where the president is above civilian politics and parties, is not linked to a dominant party and, as a result, allows him to remain in power for life and to exercise unprecedented unilateral authority, on both, state and society. For many political scientists, with the dismissal of Morsi and the election of el-Sissi in 2014, in the absence of serious opposition, the army closed an atypical democratic bracket for the history of Egypt.

⁹⁰ Lubna Abdel Aziz, *Catch the Al-Sisi Mania'*, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 2013, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/4103.aspx>, (accessed on 2.03.2020).

⁹¹ *Ibidem*

⁹² Housam Darwish, *Egypt Under Sisi: From An Authoritarian Dominant-Party System To Strongman Politics*, *JETRO-IDE ME-Review Vol.6* (2018-2019), (accessed on 2.03.2020).

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AFRICA AND ETHNIC CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Anthony Iyoha Emhenya*,

emhenya.anthony@edouniversity.edu.ng

Harriet Omokiniovo Efanodor-Obeten**

efanodor.harriet@edouniversity.edu.ng

Abstract: *This paper compares the management of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and South Africa with a view to underscoring the intricacies involved in the management of deep rooted and complex conflict in Africa. The paper proposes, among other things, that ethnic conflicts in Africa are fallout of colonialism. The piece relies mainly on secondary sources. It adopts thematic approach to elucidate the salient points. The choice of thematic approach was to ensure a discernible flow of discourse. The study reveals that the effects of colonialism are a common factor in ethnic conflict in Africa. It is the contention in this paper that ethnic conflicts in Africa are products of insecurity, instability and poverty manifesting in hunger and starvation. Where corrupt and rapacious political institutions found their ways to power in African countries, they served as catalysts to ethnic conflicts. The position of this paper therefore is that to effectively manage ethnic conflict in Africa is to address the causative factors.*

Keywords: *Ethnic Group, Conflict, Conflict Management, Nigeria, South Africa, Africa.*

Introduction

Experts in international studies and diplomacy are of the consensus that nowhere is conflict management more important and needed than in Africa. This belief is understandably so because about 45% of the world violent conflict is traceable to Africa. There is no intention to list here the adverse multiplier effects of ethnic conflict in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Sierra-Leone, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo,

* Department of Political Science and Public Administration Edo University Iyamho, Edo State, Nigeria.

** Department of Political Science and Public Administration Edo University Iyahmo Edo State, Nigeria.

Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya¹. It suffices to say that effect in the last few intervening years, the continent has come to be recognized as the most war torn in contemporary times. Interestingly, a good percentage of the African conflict has to do with ethnic identities. It has been a challenge for researchers explaining the reality of African conflicts using the prism of conceptual framework alien to the continent. In other words, the pattern of Africa conflicts is unique and lack semblance in most other continents. This is so for some obvious reason.

Africa is recognized as the world's second-largest and second most populous continent after Asia. Apart from the fact that it covers up to 6.0% of the earth's total surface area, its population put at over 1,333,773,866 Billion is considered to account for about 16.72% of the world's human population. Africa houses 54 countries with most countries having an archetypal plural society characterized by divergent languages, cultures and ethnic groups. It has the history of five major external colonial waves and three religious systems broadly speaking. The plethora of ethnic configuration together with external hegemonic influence culminated in ethnic conflict in Africa².

Western influence and national borders were not much of a concern. Co-existence was fashioned along socio-cultural, economic and geographical dictates. In other words, border delineation was never artificial but respected natural occurrences or barriers like rivers, desert or mountains. With the scramble and partition of Africa, there were apparent insistence on drawing border around territories of various colonial powers to isolate and delineate areas of hegemony. The implication of this is that some traditional ethnic enemies were forced to live side by side without buffer between them. Some ethnic groups were unusually caught on both sides of the partitioned area of control. The point to note here is that most colonial rules were merely for political gains but they in the process fanned the ember of ethnic conflict in Africa. All attempts for the colonial agents to wittingly or unwittingly involve in racial re-categorization of Africans to fit Europeans stereotypes was not only contradictory and incoherent but also induced conflict that was ethnic in nature. Indeed, there were also evidences of colonial applied quasi-scientific eugenics policies and racist

¹ Collier, P. "Development and Conflict", Centre for the study of African Economics, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 2004.

² Jike, V.T., *Ethnic Militia and Youth Rebelliousness in contemporary Nigeria*, Lagos: NISS Publications, 2002.

politics on Africans in experiments of misguided social engineering. All these laid the foundation for ethnic conflict in Africa³.

It is pertinent to note that there are still the persistent outbursts of ethnic conflicts in Africa. The persistent outburst of conflict shows that the strategies adopted by the international communities are not effective in de-escalating or preventing ethnic conflicts in Africa. The intractability of ethnic conflicts in Africa calls for a review of the mechanism involved in their management and resolutions. History have proven that African societies have strategies for resolving conflicts. Attempting to catalog the different conflict management techniques in Africa is unending because Africa is not homogenous society as the people are not the same, as much as there are so many commonalities. Unfortunately, very few studies have analyzed in comparative term conflict management strategies amongst and between African countries. Therefore, the intention in this paper is to first establish and compare the elements of ethnic conflict in Nigeria and South Africa as well as their approaches to ethnic conflict management which represents, to a very large extent, African designed approaches to ethnic conflict management. Lessons learnt from ethnic conflict management in Nigeria and South Africa can help improve the use of mediation locally, but could also assist others African countries in planning and defining the appropriate conflict management strategies. The first section deals with conceptual exposition as well as the framework of analysis while the next section of this discourse would be on justification of the choices of Nigeria and South Africa. The following section traces history of ethnic conflict in Nigeria and South Africa. The last section explored Conflict Management Mechanism in South Africa and Nigeria.

Ethnic group, Conflict and Conflict management: Conceptual Exposition

Ethnic encompasses distinctive cultural characteristics which are derived from the Greek word *ethos*, meaning people or nation. According to Henslin cited in Okunola and Adeboyejo⁴ it refers to people who are identified with one another on the basis of common ancestry and cultural heritage. Ethnic group can be seen as a community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth and origin. An ethnic group may also be described as group of people who

³ Rasheed, D., "Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship". Experts Group, Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program, Addis Ababa, 2003.

⁴ Okunola, R.A. and Adeboyejo G.O., *The State and the Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria*. In Albert and Eselebor (eds.) *Managing Security and Conflict in a Globalised World*. Ibadan: John Archers, 2016.

share common biological characteristics, territory, cultural symbols, value system and normative behavior. According to Otite cited in Okunola and Adeboyejo⁵ ethnic groups have an element of core territoriality, which implies identification with a particular spatial location within a state. Furthermore, Nnoli⁶ stressed that language is one of the major problems associated with ethnic group identification, as people of the same dialect/tribe are commonly classified as members of their ecological patterns and occupy distinct and fairly large continuous territories⁷. Technically in this study, ethnic group is viewed as a community of people who have the conviction that they have common identity and common fate based on issues of origin, kinship, ties, traditional, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a shared language. The implication of this perception is that while ethnicity may include tribes, race, nationalities and caste, it focuses more on sentiments of origin and decent rather than the geographical consideration. Thus, ethnicity in Africa can be perceived as the contextual discrimination by members of one group against others on the basis of differentiated system of socio-cultural symbol⁸. It is fundamental to note that there is an intertwined and mutually reinforcing character between ethnicity and conflict.

Conflict

The concept of conflict conveys various meaning. According to Karim⁹ one of the most cited definitions of conflicts regards it as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. In this sense, conflict may be conceptualized as a way of settling problems originating from opposing interests over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources among two or more parties that perceive incompatible interests or express hostile attitudes. It can also be seen as a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, belief, values or goods.

⁵ Ibid p. 26.

⁶ Nnoli 1978 ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension; Nnoli 1995 Ethnicity and development in Nigeria. Alersshot: Averbury.

⁷ Okunola and Adeboyejo 2016, *op.cit.*

⁸ Otite, O., *On Conflict, their Management, Resolution and Transformation*. In Otite and Albert (eds.) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2001.

⁹ Karim, A.A., *Reflection on security sector and conflict management in Nigeria's Fourth Republic*. In Albert and Eselebor (eds.) *Managing Security and Conflict in a Globalised World*. Ibadan: John Archers, 2013.

According to Otite and Albert¹⁰ conflict is a natural announcement of an impending reclassification of a society with changed characteristics and goals with new circumstances of survival and continuity. Ha further states conflict generally entails struggles, competition, rivalry for objects to which individuals and groups attach value. These objects can be material (scare resources, land, and employment, promotion in public service, and creation of new state or locality) or non-material (culture, language, religion) which according to Osaghae¹¹ tend to be mixed. Evidently, conflict suggest a state of competition and since there is no competition without some form of antagonism or desire to output the opponent. Conflict therefore makes meaning when understood as the manifestation of incompatibility of desires and interest¹². There are two sides to a conflict. Conflict could degenerate to non-productive results in the form of irreparable damages. It could also culminate in some beneficial outcome in the form of entity or emergence of new situation agreeable to the parties hitherto in conflict. The determining factor therefore is how a conflict is managed. This takes one to conflict management.

Conflict management

Conflict management simply put is the constructive handling of difference. Conflict management according to Omah¹³ has to do with the mechanisms that are put in place to prevent the outbreak of conflict. It is concerned with the regulation and control of a conflict that has already manifested. The purpose of management, in this sense, is to ensure that the negative or deleterious impact of such conflict is reduced. Zartman¹⁴ suggests, conflict management seeks either to prevent conflict from erupting into crisis or to cool a crisis in eruption. Krim¹⁵ perceived that conflict management must occur in a place atmosphere and context. However, conflict do not generally follow the demands of politeness. Hence, conflict mangers must be skillful to overcome the generally chaotic and disorderly scenes associated with the behavior of parties in conflict.

¹⁰ Otite, O. and Albert, O., *Aspect of Conflict on theory and practice in Nigeria*. In Otite and Albert (eds.) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum books, 1999.

¹¹ Osaghae, E., *Ethnic Group and Conflict in Nigeria*. volume 1. Ibadan: The Lords Creation, 2000.

¹² North, R., *Conflict: The Political Aspects in Encyclopedia of the social sciences*. New York: Macmillian, 1963, pp. 226-232.

¹³ Omah, E., *Meachanism of Conflict Transformation. The Nexus between Conflict, Security and Development*. Albert and Eselebor (eds.) *Managing Security and Conflict in a Globalised World*. Ibadan: John Archers, 2013.

¹⁴ Zartman, W., *Introduction*. In Zartman William (ed.) *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflict*. African Conflict Medicine. Boulder co: Lynne Rienner, 2000, 201-218.

¹⁵ Krim 2013, Ibid

Emotions or sentiments and irrationally must be controlled. The assumption in conflict management is that not all conflict can necessarily be resolved. This assumption marks the major difference between conflict management and conflict resolution. Contending or manipulating the conflict in such a way that it does not degenerate to irreparable damages is the focus of conflict management. No matter the difference, conflict management involves acquiring skills related to conflict resolution, self-awareness about conflict modes and conflict in your environment. Understanding the nature of conflict is very vital in conflict management.

Theoretical framework.

Essentially, theoretical framework seeks to lay the bacons establish the bearings and logical expression of a given research. John Burton¹⁶ human needs theory appears most apt a theoretical framework for the study of ethnic conflict management in Africa. John Burton¹⁷ defined human needs as a state of felt deprivation and necessity which have to be satisfied. The thrust of human needs theory is that groups fight because they are denied their biological and psychological needs especially as they are relating to growth and development. The human needs theory is significant and important as it shows how conflict can be managed and resolved through the satisfaction of basic human needs. Critically speaking these needs in the African setting have been identified as identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy. This framework explains conflict in Nigeria and South Africa being the focus of this study. The relevance of John Burton human needs theory to ethnic conflict management in Africa is that it goes beyond those theories that blame African conflict on a primordial past. The revelation of this theory is that ethnic conflicts are rampant in Africa not only because there are weak and ineffective institutions, unable to satisfy the basic human needs of their citizens. It is quite axiomatic that where non-negotiable needs are not met, conflict becomes inevitable. Nothing in the aforementioned theory preclude the use of other theories in explaining ethnic conflict management in Africa.

Choice of Nigeria and South Africa as a Comparative Case Study

Perhaps it would be necessary at this point to justify the selection of Nigeria and South Africa for a comparative case study, some salient points informed the decision. Nigeria and South Africa both emerge as regional

¹⁶ Burton, J., *The Theory of Conflict Resolution. Current Research on Peace and Violence*, 1986, 9(5):125-130.

¹⁷ Burton, J., *Human Needs Theory*. In Burton (ed.) *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*, 1990.

and continental giants. Nigeria reigns supreme in the Sub-Sahara or West Africa region while South Africa occupies the same position in the Southern African region.

Nigeria sits on one of the largest proven oil reserves in the world and as 2020 estimate has population of about 206 million to rank the highest among nations in Africa and equivalent to 2.64% of the total world population. It has reputation for being one of the fastest growing economies, the economy had an upward thrust average 2.58% growth as at 2020. Nigeria accommodates over 250 ethnic and linguistic groups with English being the official language. There are three major ethnic groups namely; the Hausa-Fulani, the Yorubas and Igbos. While the Hausa-Fulani are mainly Muslims, the Igbos are mainly Christians. The Yoruba have staggering numbers of these two religions. This is not to say the religious divide in any of these groups is absolute. There are always evidence of both religions in any chosen group¹⁸. Except for the continuous infiltration of the western culture, the ethnic groups in Nigeria have distinguishing life-styles.

South Africa, on the other hand, is also recognized for its wealth of natural resources being the world's leading producer of both gold and diamonds. With an estimated population of 67 million as at 2020, South Africa ranks as the most populous country in the southern African region and among the first five in African continents. Apart from the well-establishment legal system in South Africa, it has strong economic base with access to financial capital, numerous markets, skilled labour and world-class infrastructure to show for its resources and years of going through the mills. South Africa has long been polarized along racial lines. The country has about 11 ethnic and linguistic groups with English being the official language as it is in Nigeria. South Africa is mainly populated by indigenous Africans, coloured and Indians. The country has a history of racial discrimination with blacks being at the lowest stratum, indigenous Africans were forced to live in impoverished and segregated ethnic homelands under the apartheid regime. The apartheid policy has since been dismantled and replaced with democracy. It must however be noted that the institutionalized racism and discrimination in language, history and culture subsequently aggravated ethnic conflict in South Africa¹⁹.

¹⁸ Idada, W. & Alimi M.K.O., *Unemployment and poverty: Bane of effective governance, peace and security in Africa*. In Idada, W. and Momoh, L.R. (eds.) *Governance, peace and security in Africa*, Nigeria: Ambik press, 2014.

¹⁹ Adekanye, B., *Linking Conflicts Diagnosis, Conflict Prevention and Conflict management in Contemporary Africa: Selected Essays*, Ababa Press Limited, Surulere, Lagos, 2007.

Traces of Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria and South Africa

Nigeria and South Africa have histories of colonialism which perpetuated hatred and conflict among different ethnic groups. They both experienced British colonization. Prior to the scramble for Africa, both countries had European influence though on different scales. While there were evidence of early peripheral Portuguese contacts with Nigeria, it was mainly on commerce level. This is not quite the case with South Africa. Before the nineteenth century British colonial rule in South Africa, a large number of Dutch augmented by French Huguenors and Germans settled there. Their descendants, the Afrikaners and the coloured, remain the largest European-descended groups in Africa today. Large Indian communities also settled in South Africa. On the whole, the indigenous blacks formed about three-quarters of the entire South-Africa population. Ironically, the majority blacks suffered under the apartheid regime which was characterized by a high degree of oppression and discrimination. This in itself only opened and deepened ethnic conflicts in South Africa²⁰.

British colonial rule in Nigeria provided identities, languages and symbols for ethnic groups. Evidences abound that colonial rule was responsible for creating ethnic divisions and regionalism. The British found it convenient to adopt the divide and rule strategy which by design distance ethnic groups from one another in separate areas like “Sabongori” in northern Nigeria and “Abakpa” in Eastern Nigeria. This arrangement encouraged ethnic conflict²¹

The colonial rule in South Africa had the same pattern but with a more conflict prone approach. Mixed race was segregated from the white groups, through culture, residence, occupation and status. Policies were initiated to further deepen the differences among the mixed race. For instance, there were evidences of conflicts between Zulu and Xhosas, Ndebele and Venda, Tswana and Qwagwa. One interesting point is that in spite of the animosity, very few physical conflicts occurred between the dominant minority white and the black majority ethnic groups. This has been explained in terms of the strategy adopted whereby the white distanced their settlement and maintained minimal contacts²².

It is pertinent to emphatically posit that the policies of segregation or discrimination in South Africa acted as catalyst to ethnic conflict. The first

²⁰ Ahmed, A., “Poverty and conflict trap in Somalia” *Opinion on Somalia Current*, 2014.

²¹ Akinyele, M.H., “Ethnicity and religion in election 2003: potential conflict and resolution” *The constitution, a journal of constitutional development of September* Vol. 3 No 1., 2002.

²² Conteh-Morgan, Earl 1994 “The Military and Human Rights in a post-Cold War Africa,” *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 21, No. 1, Fall 1994, pp. 69-87.

half of twentieth century witnessed economic racism which consolidated the structures of white domination and black disenfranchisement and exploitation. The black South Africans were, by enactment of the 1913 black land Act, denied access to land ownership or produce food for themselves. There was also regulation of the job market such that skilled work was reserved for whites alone while black African workers were banned from organizing or forming trade union. The consequences of these were that Africans were forced to evacuate the major cities and settled in remote part of the country. There were limitations to the movement of blacks in cities. The erroneous assumption on which the discriminatory policies were built was the belief that Africans were both biologically and culturally inferior to whites and therefore incapable of running their own affairs. The resettlement of black majority only gave the white minority further opportunity to download their discriminatory policies. There existed a separate administration plan for the blacks. The blacks became a source of cheap labour to the white. In fact, institutionalized racism and apartheid took control of black people's lives and resulted in hardships, poverty, despair and diseases in the black settlement usually referred to as homelands. These low-life ingredients formed the platform for ethnic conflicts and violence in South Africa. The period between 1976 and 1980 witnessed the height of this violence in the mostly black populated towns of Johannesburg and Soweto where youth and school children drew the ire of brutal police repression. The actions of youth and children were in reaction to the separate administration plan for the homelands. Of particular relevance to this discourse was the detribalization within the colonial framework of South Africa. The ethnic dimension to this was that this was viewed as a calculated attempt to distance or exclude the black majority from administration of their own country²³.

Another approach to ethnic conflict as engineered by colonial rule was the use of divide-and-rule strategy to turn the facets of black against one another. Scholars have come to believe that the Zulu traditional ruler, Chief Mongosuthu Buthelezi was one of the forces influenced by the colonial masters to programme ethnic conflict among the black South Africans. Chief Buthelezi was lured by economic and political power in the homeland. He embarked on creating ethnic boundaries between the hikatha and the other ethnic groups. Chief Buthelezi became so associated with the apartheid leadership that then African National Congress (ANC) was forced to exorcise him from the party. Undeterred by this, Buthelezi

²³ Butts, Kent Hughes and Metz, Steven, *Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa*, DC, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. War College Monographs, 1996.

was known to have caused or escalated most ethnic conflict that occurred in South Africa between the 1980's and 1990's. The apartheid regime had no problem setting blacks against resources like jobs, social amenities and education through ethnic prism²⁴.

On the whole, it could be said that the immediate causes of the ethnic conflict in South Africa are traceable to the high rate of poverty, unemployment and the deliberate introduction of politicking and discrimination in the homelands. The apartheid favoured the Inkatha group who spearheaded the ethnic connotation to the conflict. The ensuring ethnic conflict intensified human carnage and destruction in townships. As already mentioned, the induced ethnic conflict manifested in the creation of rigid boundaries among the renowned ethnics like the Zulus and the Xhosas. Attempts by successive South African governments to find solution to the violence were actually cosmetic in approach as they were biased toward the Inkatha and the white Afrikaners. This window dressing approach to ethnic conflict spanned all through the 1980's and witnessed massive loss of lives and destruction of properties. Genuine respite only came with the introduction of reforms by then president of South Africa, F.W. de Clerk in the 1990's. The bold steps of de Clerk ushered in true democracy in South Africa. The reforms included the release of political prisoners like Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela who later became the President of South Africa in 1994.

Nigeria as much as South Africa has its history of ethnic conflicts interwoven with colonial transgression. The amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorate in 1914 suggests the bringing together of strange bedfellows. This turned out to be so because the various ethnic groups brought together by the amalgamation were not consulted. Needless to mention here that this British policy which was undemocratic and indeed autocratic led to ethnic conflicts. It has been argued that there were artificially drawn British boundaries that led to social re-alignment of ethnic groups. Each of these groups was forced to mobilize in a distinct geographical region that closely resembles the administrative boundaries of the colonial period. Ethnic groups strove to develop and re-assert their identities within each region. This engendered ethnic conflict and regionalist pressures²⁵.

Nevertheless, the colonial policy tilted towards introducing separate governments in the North and South for administrative convenience and

²⁴ Wanyande, P., "State Driven Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa", revised paper presented at the USAID Organised workshop on Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa May 21-23, Methodist House: Nairobi, 1997.

²⁵ Lawal. I.M., *Insurgency and the challenges of democratic order in Nigeria*. International Journal of Governance and Development (I.JGD). 4, 2, 2015, pp. 213-222.

better colonial grip on the Nigerian society. The policy was unmindful of growing ethnocentrism.

Alongside this was the introduction of indirect rule which was anathema to the management of tribal animosities in the colony. Indirect rule complicated the task of uniting the diverse elements into a Nigerian nation. The strategy distanced ethnic groups from one another. Indirect rule entrusted power to traditional rulers who corruptly used it in the villages to amass wealth, land and establish patronage and nepotism. The colonial laws which limited the mobility of Christian south to Muslim north only deepened and widened the ethnic conflict. Particular quarters were carved out for settlement by the non-indigenes. Unequal and differential treatment of ethnic groups arouse intense competition and resulted in educational, political and economic gaps²⁶.

In 1947, a colonial constitution divided Nigeria in three political regions namely East, West and North. The north was predominantly Hausa-Fulani and the largest region. The Igbos and Yorubas dominated the East and West respectively. The creation of these regions did not take into account the needs of the ethnic minority groups as they were lost in the majority. This strategic mistake was viewed as programmed ethnic dominance by the minority. The ensuing decade therefore witnessed the activated of ethnic consciousness among the minority. The struggle for independence was almost sacrificed at the altar of ethnic manoeuvres.

Such was the legacy left behind by the colonial rule. Since independence, ethnic politics had continued to intrigue the entire nation. Ethnic groups continually scheme to attract federal resources to their regions with mild regard for the generality of issues central to the entire nation. This was what characterized the Nigerian nation to the close of the first republic. Apparently, the military intervention that followed had its own share of ethnic rivalries. The coup and counter coups that culminated in the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970 had great ethnic undertones. Critically speaking, the Nigerian civil war itself is reminiscent of ethnic rejection of perceived continued dominance. The Igbos of Eastern Nigeria felt maltreated and threatened to secede from the federation. Essentially, the Igbos grievances were said to have been caused by the denied of their basic human needs and therefore conflict emerges. This situation captures the Nigerian civil war, sometimes referred to as the Biafran war. The war recorded one of the highest casualties ever known in the history of Nigeria. The argument really is that the ethnic laden war and the casualties thereof were indirectly traceable to colonial rule in Nigeria. The lumping together of incompatible ethnic groups by the colonial agents

²⁶ Rasheed 2003, Ibid.

presupposed the struggle for socio-cultural survival of the constituent groups.

Since the military was a product of the largest community, ethnic conflict and acrimonies crept into the military. Most coups that ever occurred in Nigeria had ethnic tint. Although almost all military governments advanced corruption as the major reason for coup. Ironically, the history of military rule in Nigeria is replete with corruption, ineptitude and confusion. These have manifested in complete economic quagmire and continued ethno-religious conflicts. The southerners had always viewed military regime with distrust as it was regarded as attempts to maintain a Hausa-Fulani hegemony in Nigeria²⁷.

June 12, 1993 is mostly remembered in Nigeria as the day the widely acclaimed free and fair election was held. The presidential election which Chief Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba from South western Nigeria won was annulled. The annulment was viewed to have ethnic undertone as the Muslim North was opposed to power shift to the South.

Conflict Management Mechanism in South Africa and Nigeria: Exploring the Indigenous and Modern Approaches

History and research have proven that traditional African societies had strategies for resolving conflicts before the advent of colonization. In traditional African societies, methods did exist to deal with conflicts, and this is motivated by societal harmony²⁸. Attempting to catalog the different conflict management techniques in Africa is unending because Africa is not a homogenous society as the people are not the same, as much as there are so many commonalities. However, in contemporary times, the African mechanisms are never considered as the first point of call. Western models are given first consideration, until they prove ineffective. For example, in South Africa, Ubuntu was also explored after the failure of the apartheid government and reconciliation commission was established based on the Ubuntu principle that sustainable peace gradually returned to South Africa²⁹.

The case of Ubuntu has to do more with the post-Apartheid era in South Africa. Ubuntu simply mean a variant of African socialism, togetherness, wellness, and the fact that we can do things together, but to work together will require consensus, will require partnership and the management of conflicts and all of those things. Osaghae³⁰ opined that the

²⁷ Idada, W. & Alimi M.K.O. 2014 .Ibid

²⁸ Zartman 2000, Ibid.

²⁹ Mbagwu, J.U., *Indigenous Approaches in Resolving Conflict in Africa: Women and Post-conflict reconstruction*. Ibadan: Ababa Press, 2016.

³⁰ Osaghae 2000, Ibid.

period after apartheid, what South Africa intellectual community tried to do was to tease out some ideological framework, within which the Africans will also show that they had alternative forms of conflict management. Ubuntu is a cultural thing, it is something applied, it is part of the definition of being an African; and it can be communal and so forth. Ubuntu is self-evident, and widely practiced virtually in every community in Africa. The elevation of Ubuntu to a pan African model is a factor that contributed to the success story as it played a role. The legal recognition, the social recognition given to Ubuntu was not just an imposition; it was simply a way of acknowledging and recognizing things that were already in existence. So, people were familiar with it³¹.

Falling back on the reason for the success story in the use of the Ubuntu in South Africa to transform the post-apartheid regime revealed that what they did was to legislate on Ubuntu to make it a conflict management mechanism that was accepted by all, both South Africans and foreigners, and the judgments reached were binding on the people. Ubuntu stopped being a rural conflict management tool, but was upgraded to the national level, and everybody accepted it as a viable, and worked with it. The question that arises when Ubuntu comes up in recent years is if South Africa operating within the framework of Ubuntu? The answer according to Mbagwu³² the answer is yes in principle. The principles of Ubuntu to a large extent have influenced South Africa, as she aims to resolve conflicts with the sole aim to reach a win-win solution. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa is based on the Ubuntu principles which aim to work towards a situation that acknowledges a mutually beneficial condition. Its emphasis is on cooperation with one another for the common good as opposed to competition that could lead to grave instability within any community³³.

With regards to ethnic conflict that arose from land dispute, in 1995, the national government department responsible for land, the DLA designed and constituted the National Land Reform Mediation and Arbitration Panel (NLRMAP). This formed the key element of a strategy to manage the conflicts that land reforms generate. The NLRMAP established a national panel of mediators, trained and accredited as a resource in preventing and resolving land dispute. The independent mediation service of South Africa (IMSSA) a mediation and arbitration body with extensive

³¹ Mbagwu, 2016, Ibid

³² Mbagwu, Ibid

³³ Masina, N., *Xhosa practices of Ubuntu for South Africa*. In Zartman William (ed). *Traditional Cure for Modern Conflict*. African Conflict Medicine. Boulder co: Lynne Rienner 2000, 201-218.

experience in managing labour and community disputes was also established³⁴.

In Nigeria, ethnic conflicts have been tackled through combinations of formal and informal management strategies. The informal or traditional approach to conflict management adopted by the Nigerian government is the use of dialogue, negotiations or bargaining. Government seeks the services of civil society organization, traditional rulers, opinion leaders, notables and influential individual in the society, religious leaders and organization, women organization etc, examples where this approach has been adopted are the Umuleri-Aguleri conflict, the Niger delta crisis, the Jos conflict, the Kaduna riot, Kano ethno-religious conflict etc.

Ethnic balancing, the state-ethnic quota systems in employment and admission into government schools, the establishment of unity schools and federal medical centre in all states of the federation. State and local governments were created to meet the needs and aspirations of some ethnic group for independent, and freedom from internal colonialism and self-determination. Similarly, the administration of General Babangida took a holistic approach to solving the causes of ethnic conflict in terms of development. The following were established; the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) in 1986, the Directorate of Social Mobilization in 1987 which focused on mass mobilization for self-reliance, social justice and recovery (MAMSER); Better Life for Rural Women in 1987, a programme initiated by the First Lady, Mrs Maryam Babangida. The establishment of People's Bank of Nigeria to provide loans without bureaucracy to the poor and common Nigerians; the establishment of a grassroots democratic two party system. These were done to end the politicization of ethnic cleavages and monetized politics and reduce the ethnic bound political clientelism³⁵.

According to Okunola and Adeboyejo³⁶, another method introduced to foster ethnic unity and reduce ethnic-religious conflicts in the country was the establishment of the National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) in 1973. It is a programme in which graduate of the universities and polytechnics both in Nigeria and outside are posted to serve the country for the period of 12 months outside their state of origin and communities. Based on the heterogeneity and plurality of ethno-tribal and ethno-religious differences in the country, the federal government initiated a body called the council of traditional rulers in Nigeria. This body consist of traditional rulers from

³⁴ Bosch, D., (ND), *Land Conflict Management in South Africa lesson learned from a land rights approach*.

www.fao.org/3/jo4ist/jo415toa.htm

³⁵ Okunola and Adeboyejo, 2016 Ibid

³⁶ Okunola and Adeboyejo, 2016 Ibid

different states and major tribes in the country, to meet regularly, with the aim of preventing, quelling and resolving any ethnic rivalry or conflict.

Nigeria's conflict management can be traced to her colonial experience. Post-colonial government inherited and adopted the colonial philosophy of conflict management approach to its repertoire of modern or formal conflict management strategies. By confronting ethnic conflict with greater violence was the hallmark and philosophy of colonial patterns of conflict management³⁷. For instance, the use of force and violence to quell ethnic conflict. Once there is an outbreak of violence, hobbie policeman often complemented by Nigerian Army and with the instrument of shoot at sight are dispatched to the scene of the incident to quell or arrest the situation. This type of conflict management approach was inherited and adopted from the colonial pattern of conflict management³⁸. This method was applied in handling the 1962 Western regional crisis in the South west Nigeria. Also, judicial litigations in managing conflicts has also been adopted. This approach demonstrates implicit confidence of the citizenry in the ability of the courts to effectively manage conflicts without biasness or favouritism. This approach was adopted for the Umuleri-Aguleri inter-ethnic conflicts.

Much of the successes of the various strategies adopted in South Africa and Nigeria have been achieved and recorded on conflict resolution. Although they have made considerable impact in preventing some conflict in the countries, it is noteworthy that, most of the conflicts are politically motivated, but fought under the umbrella of inter-ethnic or tribal differences.

Conclusion

Various governments in South Africa and Nigeria have applied and adopted different approaches aimed at solving ethnic conflicts and making a truce among warring groups in the countries. Yet, the problem of ethnicity and conflicts still persist. As one conflict is been quelled another spring up thereby defying all the strategies and instrument formulated to solving them and making permanent peace. In some cases, rather solving ethnic rivalry or conflict, conflict management strategies have resulted into neo-ethnicity and the emergence of new minority group assertions and the agitation for palliatives, even led to new conflicts. Therefore, any environment inundated with conflict. Poverty and insecurity are always accompanied with tension and anxiety. The elimination of these threats and enemies of man should be the number one programme of the

³⁷ Ake, C., *The unique case of African Democracy*. International Affairs 1993, 62(2):239-244.

³⁸ Ake Ibid

governments in Nigeria and South Africa. This will give rise to human development and a habitable environment for us all. Apart from the government's own role in tackling the increasing security threats through coordinated, strategic approaches, there should be concerted effort by all to eliminate this monster of insecurity from all ethnic groups.

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THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

Eren İrfanoğlu,*

eren.irfanoglu@alanya.edu.tr

Tolga Öztürk**

tolga.ozturk@alanya.edu.tr

Abstract: *Southeast Asia, since its early inhabitation, has formed a distinctive regional system thanks to its peculiar geography. The area that contains the Strait of Malacca, because of being at the crossroads of both internal and external regional water-borne trade and thus social interaction since ancient times, has gained a status of being the economic, politic and cultural hub of the region. The study argues the Southeast Asia regional system through two main periods; pre-colonial period and colonial period. The colonialism in the region has taken as the axis here since the Southeast Asia regional system has been established before and fully functioned until the advent of colonialism. During this period, Indian, Chinese and the Middle Eastern economic, politic and cultural influences spread to the region. The colonial administrations hit a fatal blow to the system and the economic, politic and cultural demography of the region changed dramatically. In the framework of this historical background, the study concludes that the recent Southeast Asian regionalism, rather than being a unique example, can be considered as a revival of the ancient Southeast Asian regional system.*

Keywords: *Southeast Asia, Regionalism, Regional System, the Strait of Malacca, ASEAN*

Introduction

Britannica defines a region as “a cohesive area that is homogenous in selected defining criteria and is distinguished from neighbouring areas or regions by those criteria”¹. According to this simple definition, the criteria

* **PhD. Candidate, Area Studies, Middle East Technical University - Political Science and International Relations Research Centre, Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, Turkey.**

** **PhD. Political Science and International Relations Research Centre, Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, Turkey.**

¹ Britannica, ‘Region’, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1998

<<https://www.britannica.com/science/region-geography>> [accessed 17 March 2019].

can be language and religion for the Middle East or may be the western values such as democracy for Europe. However, the defining criteria of Southeast Asia have not been clear due to its fragmented geography which results in a high level of diversity in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, mode of governance, etc.

Given Southeast Asia's fragmented geography and thus diversity, literature about the regionness of Southeast Asia is divided into two wings. The first wing scholars, also known as "point of origin" scholars, focus on political recognition rather than determining criteria to acknowledge an area as a region. Therefore, they suggest that it is not possible to see a distinct Southeast Asia region prior to the early 20th century. The second wing scholars, on the contrary, focus on pre-colonial interstate relations and cultural similarities. They argue that the regionness of Southeast Asia dates back far before than modern times.

The first wing scholars generally argue that "recognition" of Southeast Asia as a region coincides with the 1943 formation of Lord Louis Mountbatten's "Southeast Asia Command" during the Pacific War. However, a group within the first wing scholars suggests the background of using the name and determining the borders of the region dates back to the first contributions of European academia related to the issue, between the 18th and 19th centuries. The region was being discursively constructed through the geostrategic interests of the colonial powers before the term become a common use². In this sense, Legge argues, prior to World War II, the common tendency of the academia and politicians was to focus on constitutive parts of the region rather than considering it as a whole³. By considering regions as merely political units, the assertion of first wing scholars actually is that Southeast Asia needs the recognition by "contemporary" scholarship or politicians to be studied as a region.

Acharya, on the contrary, suggests that point of origin scholars ignore the interstate relations of Southeast Asia before the colonial era. The second wing scholars argue that the concept of Southeast Asia dates back as far as to 2000 BCE and above all, the region does not need recognition by academic or politic audiences of the West. To find out about the genesis of the region, rather than formal recognitions, one should focus on cultural similarities or homogeneity and region-wide patterns of interstate

² Farish A. Noor, *The Discursive Construction of Southeast Asia in 19th Century Colonial-Capitalist Discourse* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016) <<https://doi.org/10.5117/9789089648846>>.

³ J.D. Legge, 'The Writing of Southeast Asia History', in *In The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. by Nicholas Tarling, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 4–5.

relations, interactions and interdependencies⁴. In this vein, the contributions of Antony Reid are significant. Reid's analysis demonstrates that common cultural traits exist in Southeast Asian history. Reid argues the maritime interaction of the people helped shaping Southeast Asia as a region since intra-regional interactions were more frequent than with the extra-regional ones up until the 7th century. Reid also argues if it is about the recognition of the region by some authorities, China had recognized Southeast Asia far before the West did. The Chinese term "the *Nanyang*" (Southern Ocean) was used to refer to Southeast Asia in Chinese records⁵. In this regard, Acharya suggests the maritime trade connections caused a unity, yet in addition to that, served as a source of localisation. By localisation, Acharya means the independent adaptation processes of intra-regional groups. Therefore, in a way, while region functions as a unit, at the same time, it enjoys different intra-regional localities⁶. Wolters argues, because of the geography (thick forests, rivers, mountains, etc.), Southeast Asia embraces many centres in which local groups are highly attached to. However, that does not mean their complete isolation. It is rather their ability to localize information⁷.

Considering the diversity in addition to taking a glance to the map of the region, Southeast Asia seems like a fragmented or at best, a politically carved out, artificial region that the first world scholars would agree upon. However, the primary reason for this inclination is the academic biases that urge us to think of land as a connector and sea as a barrier. The mistake actually begins at this point. Andaya argues the fundamental failure of misunderstanding Asia in general and Southeast Asia, in particular, is not to give enough attention to the "sea"⁸. Since ancient times, the cement that holds Southeast Asia together is not the land but the water. Lockard quoted in Sukma⁹, "the sea unites and the land divides" is a more suitable approach to understand the interconnected nature of Southeast Asia. Shallow oceans of the region lead to maritime communication among the islands such as Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, and the Philippines, as well as with the mainland Southeast Asia by the estuaries of Mekong, Red, Chao Phraya, Salween, and Irrawaddy. Almost

⁴ Amitav, Acharya, *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia* (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 164.

⁵ A Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680: Expansion and Crisis*, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680 (Yale University Press, 1988), p. 6.

⁶ Acharya.

⁷ Wolters, pp. 16–17.

⁸ Barbara Watson Andaya.

⁹ 'Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Indonesia Finds a New Voice', *Journal of Democracy*, 22.4 (2011), 110–23.

all the water roads intersect in the Strait of Malacca which functions as the hub of economic, politic, and cultural interaction. The information gathered in the hub as a result of the interaction, then carried back to the other parts of the region and localized. Thanks to this “hub and spoke information network”, Southeast Asia, despite its diversity, operates as a region in the inner circle and as a crossroads for wider the East-West sea-borne interactions. In other words, the geography that diversifies the region is at the same time unites it. As a result, one can think that the constituent parts of the region are not culturally similar to one another, yet equally different than the other parts of the world. To comprehend this unique regionness of Southeast Asia, one has to focus on the historical significance of the Strait of Malacca which has functioned as the “hub” of the regional system during the pre-colonial era.

The Pre-Colonial Era: The Importance of the Strait of Malacca

*Just as all roads once led to Rome, so too maritime trade in Asia converged on the narrow sea route that became known as the Strait of Malacca.*¹⁰

The Strait of Malacca, beginning from the Malaysian peninsula, was exposed to a continuous migration (beginning 3000 BCE) from Yunnan which is in the north of today’s Laos and Vietnam. Those peoples known as proto-Malays drove the former inhabitants of the region to the hills and jungles and reside in the fertile lands of the region. Besides dealing with rice farming, they deal with fishery and trade. They intensely used boats across the seas and even oceans as far as to Madagascar. They were the first people to connect Southeast Asia with their seafaring abilities. The descendants of these people today are Jakuns of Malay Peninsula, also known as “*orang asli*” which means indigenous people. Another possible descendant of that proto-Malays is “*orang laut*” (sea people) who lived near coastal lines. The second migration again from Yunnan to the Malay Peninsula began around 300 BCE. These people known as deutoro-Malays bring new technologies to the region such as the use of iron materials. These new-comers mixed with their relatives proto-Malays and constituted the first Malay population in the area. Those people had animistic beliefs and because of their rice cultivation, had a social way of life. They had the most developed boats and capable of water-borne trade before the Common Era in Southeast Asia. They were the main trading contributors

¹⁰ Rosita Dellios and R. James Ferguson, *Thinking Through Srivijaya : Polycentric Networks in Traditional Southeast Asia*, 2005, p. 1.

between India and China as well¹¹. Proto-Malays established the information network centred in the Strait by their seafaring abilities.

The Strait had two important functions. The first is to be the passage of the East-West water-borne trade and the second is to be the centre of Southeast Asian Regional System. The Strait, as being the shortest and busiest sea passage, stretches nearly 805 kilometres between Indian and Pacific Oceans¹². In the outer cycle the Strait connects Europe-Africa-the Middle East and Asia, in the inner cycle connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. There are records dating back over 2,000 years of traders sailing their ships between China and Southeast Asia and between Southeast Asia and India. Chinese, Indian, Muslim traders were a common sight in the Strait. Southeast Asia's invaluable spices and gourmets were carried through the Strait and distributed to the world markets. The spices such as clove which is a plant native only to Maluku found in the Mesopotamian kitchen around 1700 BCE¹³.

The Strait, apart from being a mere passing road, was a venue for international and local voyagers to gather together. The constant wind patterns are decisive in this matter. The monsoon winds in the region were determining the sailing patterns up the East African coast from Madagascar to the Persian Gulf, and across to southern Japan and down to West Papua. These winds change direction, driven by temperature fluctuations in Siberia, Central Asia, and Australia. Typically, downwind was blowing down from India and China from November to April. From May to October, the reverse wind was blowing up to India and China and bringing back the vessels. ¹⁴.

The voyagers from various places had to wait in the Strait for the adverse monsoons to come for sailing to other directions. In the Strait, alongside merchants; numerous clerks, priests, political envoys were exchanging goods, cultural traits, political visions, etc. The information produced as a result of this social interaction during the waiting period, then distributed to the semi-periphery (today's Java and the Outer Islands) and the periphery (Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Philippines) by the local voyagers of Southeast Asia and

¹¹ Elvan Tong, 'Story of Malacca', *Australian Malaysian Singaporean Association (AMSA)*, 2010.

¹² Dellios and Ferguson, p. 1.

¹³ Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku; Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 1–2.

¹⁴ Heather Sutherland, 'Geography as Destiny? The Role of Water in Southeast Asian History', in *A World of Water: Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories*, ed. by Peter Boomgard (KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 27–70 (p. 29); Michael G. Vann, 'When the World Came to Southeast Asia Malacca and the Global Economy', *Education About ASIA*, 19.2 (2014), 21–25.

localized. As Sutherland argues, the trade and thus social interaction was “*felt throughout littoral zones, into estuaries, and up rivers; commodities and ideas were carried in sailing vessels, canoes and rafts, by pack animals and porters into apparently remote corners of the region*”¹⁵. This hub and spoke information network was systematized with the central powers of the Strait, namely Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca. These powers established functional relations with pre-colonial external powers; India and China.

B.J.O. Schrieke and J.C. van Leur suggest that there were mainly two types of polities in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. One is the inland-agrarian type such as Angkor and Mataram, and the second one is the coastal commercial type such as Funan, Champa, Srivijaya and Malacca¹⁶. Water is crucial for both types, yet for inland-agrarian kingdoms, water was important for wet-rice farming and the river to carry the highlanders’ goods to the coastal cities. However, for the coastal commercial type, the importance of water was lying on the water-borne trade relations. This makes coastal commercial polities more open to external influence and adaptable to the change. Therefore, the coastal commercial polities can be considered as the beginning points of the systemic change. It takes a while for inland agrarian polities to adjust accordingly. While there were effective coastal commercial polities of Southeast Asia such as Funan (1st – 5th century)¹⁷, especially Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca managed to reside at the heart of Southeast Asia regional system.

The centralization of the Strait in the regional system of Southeast Asia, firstly, strengthened with the emergence of the Srivijaya Empire in the area. During the 7th century, tributary relations between China resulted in the development of prosperous Srivijaya. The Strait under the control of Srivijaya, had become a chokepoint of the region economically, politically, and culturally¹⁸. Majapahit Empire, although its centre was in Java, has ruled approximately all the maritime Southeast Asia and referred to as the most powerful power in Southeast Asian history. The contribution of Majapahit was mainly to indoctrinate Javanese philosophy which suggests harmony and unity. Finally, Malacca Sultanate has embraced Islam and

¹⁵ Sutherland, p. 30.

¹⁶ B.J.O. Schrieke, ‘The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, 1 (1955), 1–82; J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History*, 2nd edn (W. Van Hoeve Publishers, 1967).

¹⁷ Kenneth R. Hall, ‘The “Indianization” of Funan: An Economic History of Southeast Asia’s First State’, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 13.1 (1982), 81–106.

¹⁸ Sutherland, p. 48.

strengthened the relations between the Middle East and Southeast Asia while not abandoning Indian, Chinese and local values.

After the decline of the Funan Kingdom around the 7th century, Srivijaya took control of the Strait of Malacca. Under the Srivijaya rule, due to the relations with Chinese and Indian civilisations, the Strait became economic, politic and religious centre of all Southeast Asia. The economic and politic centrality is related to Srivijaya-China relations in addition to the geo-strategic location of the Strait. The capital city was located in Palembang and after an unexpected Chola (South Asian Hindu Kingdom) attack, the capital moved to Jambi. Both Palembang and Jambi were located near important rivers poring to the sea in the east: Musi River and Batang Hari respectively. These rivers were the means of contact between interior parts of Sumatra and coastal areas. Srivijaya was established on unfertile soil. Unlike Java or the mainland Southeast Asia, the area containing Srivijaya was not suitable for wet-rice farming and that led to a lesser population in the area. However, rich gold and tin mines in the island of Bangka, plenty of fishes in the coastal area and non-timber forest product were valuable commodities that Srivijaya possess. In this regard, the commonly-held theory is that Srivijaya Empire was holding the Strait of Malacca under its control and the economy of the empire was dependent on water-borne trade and the relations with China¹⁹.

A while after the establishment of Srivijaya, 400 years-long civil war finally lasted and China was reunited under the Tang dynasty. The manoeuvre of the Tang dynasty to find an alternative for the Silk Road which was under the control of the Huns at the moment increased the importance of maritime roads between the East and the West. Consequently, since Srivijaya holds the Strait of Malacca which is the shortest road to reach the Middle East from China, it had enjoyed high economic gains²⁰. The ports of Srivijaya, mainly Malacca, functioned as the point where the regional products gathered and distributed to the markets of India and China²¹ Srivijaya, as the vassal of China, has sent pepper, resins, rattans, ivory plumes, birds' nest sea cucumber, and mother-of-pearl in return industrial dyes, iron, ceramics, and silk from China. These exchanges, in the Chinese records, were intermediary relations with barbarian others to collect their tribute and transmit to China as a symbol of loyalty. These relations lasted approximately seven hundred years. (Taylor (2003, 24) In the Chinese side, being a vassal of China was honorary and if the vassal is proved unworthy, China would give that

¹⁹ Dellios and Ferguson.

²⁰ Tong, p. 9.

²¹ Wolters, p. 32.

honour to another power. In 1380, China took this honour from Srivijaya and gave it to the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit.

During the Srivijaya rule, the Strait became a religious centre of the region as well. Srivijaya conducts regional inter-state relations according to the mandala system and resides at the centre of the Southeast Asian mandalas. The king was considered as the representative of the cosmic power. Accordingly, many kingdoms were loyal to Srivijaya. Srivijaya, since it was located in the sea roads between India and China, became a central point for Chinese pilgrims on their way to Nalanda, India which is a holy place for Buddhists. Today, one of the few sources about Srivijaya is the Chinese pilgrim, Yijing's writings who have visited the Palembang and later Jambi, the capitals of Srivijaya in 671-672 and later 680-695. In Yijings's writings, the capitals of Srivijaya were portrayed as the centres where Indian, Chinese and local pilgrims come together in great numbers.²²

The Strait under the Srivijaya rule had a cosmopolitan character. There were many residents from different cultures. Thus, the Strait was open to change and become the centre for new ideas as a result of interaction between people from different cultures. Besides, the extra-regional trade relations enabled Srivijaya to be aware of the developments out of the region. In addition to this, the diplomatic relations between Srivijayan elites and the outer powers were well-conducted. According to Dellios, Srivijaya by its unique structure represent an early manifestation of Southeast Asian regionalism from the 7th century to the 11th century. By this, Dellios suggests the example of Srivijaya gives us hints about 21st century Southeast Asian regionalism as well²³. After the Chola attacks in 1205, the Srivijayan Empire began to fall and finally sacked by Singhasari in 1288. The motive behind the Chola invasion was the Srivijaya's statue as a Chinese vassal. The Chola wanted to gain this position and control the sea routes²⁴. However, China favoured a Javanese Kingdom; Majapahit in this regard.

The Majapahit Kingdom has a considerable impact on Southeast Asia. After Srivijaya was invaded by a Javanese kingdom Singhasari in 1288. The Chinese emperor gave the honour of being its vassal state to Majapahit. Unlike Srivijaya, Majapahit was an inland kingdom of Java however, Majapahit ruled almost all of today's Indonesia and coastal areas of inland Southeast Asia in addition to the Strait Malacca. Considering the huge territories that it ruled, the Majapahit Empire can be considered as

²² Dellios and Ferguson, p. 10; Tong, p. 9.

²³ Dellios and Ferguson.

²⁴ P.K. Gautam, 'The Cholas Some Enduring Issues of Statecraft, Military Matters and International Relations', *Journal of Defence Studies*, 7.4 (2013), 47-62 (p. 59).

one of the ancestors of today's Indonesia. The Majapahit Kingdom contributed to the regional system by adding harmony and unity concepts of Javanese philosophy to the government mentality. It has to be noted here, being a Chinese vassal, at the same time means to coordinate the relations between China and the Southeast Asian powers²⁵.

Majapahit was an agrarian empire located in Java that ruled most of the Malay-Indo world. In addition to the tributary relations with China, Majapahit conducted one of the best examples of mandala type of relations within Southeast Asia. The times when Majapahit lives the golden era under the governance of Prime Minister Gadjra Mada (1331-1364), Majapahit had 98 tributaries of its own from Sumatra to New Guinea which covers the present-day Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Southern Thailand, the Philippines, and East Timor.²⁶ There were three important friends, *ari*, of Majapahit; Champa, Syangka, and Ayudhya (Ayutthaya). Champa considered as a friend because of they did not let Kublai Khan conduct an invasion to Java in the 13th century by using the ports of Champa. Syangka, in turn, opposed the Chola domination in the Indian sub-continent. The Chola was one of the main enemies of Majapahit. Therefore, Syangka was a friend automatically. Ayudhya was a friend because the kingdom was ruling almost all the mainland and they are better to be friends rather than enemies. Therefore, more or less powerful two kingdoms rather choose a cooperation path, most probably not to disturb trade relations²⁷. Strengthening Majapahit with its allies and the vast territory it governed, began to be perceived as a threat by China. As a result, China supported the Malacca Kingdom and economically weakened Majapahit lost its influence on Southeast Asia.

After the decline of the Majapahit Empire, Malacca Sultanate began to rise in a similar manner to the Srivijaya Empire. Malacca was located in the Strait. Chinese records state that in 1405 Malacca send envoys to pay tribute to the Chinese emperor. The acceptance of tribute by the Chinese emperor made the Malacca Kingdom their main port of grand Chinese voyages to the Indian Ocean led by Admiral Zheng He (Chen Ho). These voyages involved dozens of huge ships and thousands of sailors headed till eastern Africa and the Persian Gulf. Malacca's service as a naval base for

²⁵ Kenneth R. Hall, 'The Roots of ASEAN: Regional Identities in the Strait of Melaka Region Circa 1500 C.E', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 29.1 (2001), 87-119 <<https://doi.org/10.1163/156853101X00343>>.

²⁶ D.R. Sardesai, *Southeast Asia Past and Present*, 6th edn (Colorado: Westview Press, 2010).

²⁷ Pandu Utama Manggala, 'The Mandala Culture of Anarchy: The Pre-Colonial Southeast Asian International Society', *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, 1.1 (2013), 13.

China resulted in Chinese support of Malacca in regional disputes. Consequently, Malacca became a hub for maritime Silk Road trade²⁸.

The Malacca Kingdom, to attract the wealthy Muslim traders to its ports, converted to Islam soon after becoming the centre of Southeast Asia regional system. The king Paramesvara of Malacca married to a Muslim Princess of Samundra Pasai and entitled himself as Sultan Iskandar Shah. The conversion of the king to Islam trigger other maharajas of the Southeast Asian mandalas to follow Malacca and choose Islam as well²⁹. The conversion of Islam was occurred because of the trade benefits from the Muslim traders. By accepting Islam, Southeast Asia, particularly the Strait under the Malaccan rule became a centre of a wider attraction.

The Malacca Sultanate was responsible for Islam to spread Southeast Asia and remain until today³⁰. Malacca Sultanate quickly became a locus for the spread of Islam to the rest of Southeast Asia. The other powers surround Malacca gradually converted to Islam. Lockard argues many were attracted by Sufi ideas of Islam which were suitable with former beliefs of the region. In many aspects, Islam did not change the values system of the region, just added new ones. However, Islam in Southeast Asia, mostly Indo-Malay peninsula as an integrative part of the Islamic World, took a distinctive shape³¹. In the societal level, Islam has blended with former Hindu-Buddhist and animist beliefs.

In the 15th century the population of Malacca was around 100.000-200.000 include 15.000 foreign merchants generally in living in the port cities. The foreigners included Arabs, Egyptians, Persians, Turks, Armenians, Baghdadi, and Indian Jews, Ethiopians, Swahilis from coastal East Africa, Burmese, Vietnamese, Javanese, Filipinos from Luzon, Japanese, Okinawans, Indians (including perhaps 1,000 Gujaratis), and Chinese. 84 languages were spoken in the Malacca Sultanate. All Malay Peninsula and Sumatra were loyal and respectful to the Sultanate by religion and their kinship relations caused by marriages. In Malacca Sultanate, the language of the population was Malay. Because of the trade relations and the centrality of Malacca, the Malay language was the *lingua franca* of the region³².

Malacca, alongside being the centre of trade relations, was also the centre for the Malay world. In Malacca, the Malay language was spoken

²⁸ Craig A. Lockard, *Southeast Asia in World History* (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 67.

²⁹ Dellios and Ferguson, p. 6.

³⁰ Nicolas Tarling, *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. From Early Times to c.1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

³¹ Lockard, p. 71.

³² Lockard, pp. 68–69.

throughout the trading ports in Malay-Indonesian archipelago. The Malay language was also understood in other parts of Southeast Asia and mostly in trading ports. Since the Malay language considerably easy to learn, that gave Islam an upper hand. Because the Arab traders easily learn Malay language and had the chance to communicate with the rest of Southeast Asia. In the trading ports, the local traders learn about Islam and translate it to their localities. Gradually, the Arabic alphabet took place in the Malay language and Malay language borrowed many words from Arabic alongside cultural and political values. In the mid-15th century, the number of Islamic Sultanates increased through water-borne commerce. As Lieberman argues the 15th century was the time a Malayo-Muslim coastal commercial culture from Sumatra throughout Southern Philippines³³. Malacca Sultanate is the last centre of the Southeast Asia regional system before the advent of the colonial era. The importance of the Strait was established as an economic, politic, and cultural hub of Southeast Asia. However, the Western invasions of the region, particularly the Strait, changed the dynamics of Southeast Asia and the region never fully recovered.

The Colonial Era: The System Interrupted

The Southeast Asia regional system was maintained for nearly 800 years. During this period, the central powers such as Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca played important roles as the centres of the system. The influences from India, China, and the Middle East flowed into the region and strengthened the system substantially. However, with the advent of Western colonialism to the region in the 15th century, the system was begun to be altered in the favour of colonialist powers. They imposed their hegemony on the region beginning with the Strait of Malacca and changed the course of maritime trade roads. Additionally, the colonialization of India and weakened China had negative effects on the maintenance of the Southeast Asia regional system since these two fronts were essential components of the system.

Firstly, the Portuguese captured the Strait of Malacca and tried to eradicate local customs and imposed high taxes on visiting merchants. Later, the Dutch dominated a vast territory in the maritime and impose the plantation and the transmigration policies which affected the region's economy and the demography. The British, in turn, led to the fall of India and China which were having crucial importance for Southeast Asia economically, politically and culturally. Besides, the British caused the

³³ Victor Lieberman, 'Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies; Structuring Southeast Asian History', *Modern Asian Studies*, 27:3 (1993), 478–572.

division of the Strait into two pieces; Malaysia and Indonesia, today three, by the establishment of Singapore.

The colonialization of Southeast Asia began with the Portuguese invasion of the Strait in 1511 and lasted over a hundred years. During this period, several policies of the Portuguese caused an interruption for the Southeast Asia regional system. First of all, The Portuguese dominated world-wide spice trade by holding the Strait which was the shortest sea passage for Malukan spice to reach European markets. Eventually, the local traders lost much of their gains from the spice trade. Secondly, to strengthen control in the Strait, the Portuguese tried to eradicate Islamic influence and replace it with Roman Catholicism. For that purpose, the Portuguese used brute force and compelled the Muslims to convert or leave Malacca. Finally, they applied high taxes to the seafaring merchants passing through the sea passages. Thus, Muslim, Indian, Chinese, and many local traders bypassed the Portuguese ruled ports.

The Portuguese policies led to the loss of the Strait's importance. The Strait once was a gathering place of intra and extra-regional merchants, pilgrims, and home for many people from the different religious and linguistic backgrounds, became empty, dangerous and thus insignificant. The mandala and the tribute systems suspended due to the lack of a regional centre. Consecutively, regional interaction means blocked and the Strait lost its importance as the information hub.

The Portuguese could not become the new central power of the region and sustain the system. In this regard, Lockard suggests that the Portuguese were ignorant of local customs and their brutality led to their marginalisation in the eyes of the Asians³⁴. Besides, Sardesai argues, the Portuguese were devoid of administrative capabilities unlike the Dutch and the British³⁵. The Portuguese never was able to influence Southeast Asia in spite of holding the centre; the Strait. The conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese represents the turning point for the beginning of Western Colonialism. After that, the colonial powers gradually began to come to Southeast Asia. The western world began to impose their values such as capitalism and later industrialization to the region.

In 1641, the Dutch captured the Strait after long-lasting battles with the Portuguese. The Dutch took over a wreck from the Portuguese. The Malacca was nothing like its glorious past. It lost its cosmopolite character and being centre of attraction by seafaring merchants. The Dutch initially

³⁴ Lockard.

³⁵ D.R. Sardesai, 'The Portuguese Administration in Malacca, 1511–1641', *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 10.3 (1969), 501–12
<<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0217781100005056>>.

tried to revive the entrepôts however, the city was never fully recovered³⁶. The Dutch turned their attention to establish a new port in Batavia³⁷ and focused on cultivation, colonial expansionism, and transmigration. These three policies were the main reasons for further change in Southeast Asia regional system.

The main purpose of the Dutch in the region was benefiting from the fertile volcanic soils of Java. The Dutch established a settlement in Batavia, now known as Jakarta, in 1619. They tried to establish plantations in Java and benefit from the agricultural gains. The Dutch soon after left the administration to a public-private organization, The Dutch East Indian Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*). The company initially focused on the spice trade. However, later it turned its attention to another sector. The company introduced coffee planting to the region in 1696 which was quite suitable to Javanese soils and high in value. Between 1726 -1878 the Dutch was controlling 50 to 75 percent of the world's coffee trade. The huge portion of the Dutch industrialization compensated by their gains from coffee trade, including building a national rail road system. The Dutch developed the Cultivation System in 1830 which was forcing Javanese people to grow sugar, rice and other valuable crops in addition to coffee³⁸. By the Dutch, especially maritime Southeast Asia became more integrated inside, yet got separated from the water-borne trade networks of the region. The crops harvested in Java carried to the European market passing through the Straits of Sunda which was under Dutch rule.

Another Dutch colonial policy was the expansionism. As a result of Napoleon Wars in Europe, the Netherlands wanted to take control of the whole archipelago to prevent the invasion of other colonists and deal with the bankruptcy they faced by extending colonial lands³⁹. Initially, they established alliances against other colonists by sharing some of its profits with the local chiefs. The Dutch were good diplomats and understand the alliance based structure of the region. However, their alliance was temporary and based on opportunistic reasons. The peoples under local chiefs inevitably followed the policies of their rulers and subsequently the Dutch⁴⁰. Afterward, the Dutch wage wars against the local rulers. It started with the Padri War in 1821 and lasted until 1838. In addition to that, the

³⁶ Lockard, p. 85.

³⁷ Cesar Adib Majul, 'An Historical Background on the Coming and Spread of Islam and Christianity in Southeast Asia', *Asian Studies*, 46.1-2 (1976), 1-14 (p. 8).

³⁸ Lockard, p. 93.

³⁹ Jan Breman, *Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and The Colonial Order in Southeast Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 176-77.

⁴⁰ Christiaan G.F. De Jong, 'A Footnote to the Colonial History of the Dutch East Indies', 2013 <<http://www.cgfdjong.nl/>> [accessed 25 March 2019].

Java War occurred between 1825 and 1830. Between 1859 and 1863, the expansion continued towards local states such as Banjarmasin and Lombok. Aceh was conquered in 1903, and Bone in 1905. Almost in 1910, the Dutch reached its final territorial extent which includes the mainly Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Sulawesi and West Papua.⁴¹ The Dutch, as a result of its expansionist policy, united almost whole maritime Southeast Asia under the single rule, similar to the Majapahit Kingdom. However, they were not ruling the Strait of Malacca anymore. Therefore, the lands under the Dutch control disconnected from already outmoded Southeast Asia regional system.

One of the introduction of the Dutch to their colonial lands was the transmigration. The transmigration policy of the Dutch led to a huge change in the demography of maritime Southeast Asia. Transmigration is basically the dislocation of people from over-populated to sparsely-populated areas⁴². In Java, Madura, and Lombok, the population was quite dense in contrast to the Outer Islands; Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi and lately West Papua (Irian Raya). These over-populated areas caused some problems such as unemployment, over-cultivation, landlessness, land fragmentation and deforestation⁴³. To solve these problems, the Dutch colonial government began to implement transmigration policy in these areas. The Dutch considered recruiting the surplus population of Java (mostly) to the Outer Islands of the colony to settle and work in newly established plantations⁴⁴.

Another advantage of transmigration was to assimilate the peoples of the Outer Islands to control all East Indies, so the distribution of the Javanese population would lead to strengthening the centre authority and familiarization of the people of all East Indies⁴⁵. For that purpose, the Dutch colonial government tried to establish an environment in the Outer Islands which resembles those in Java.⁴⁶ By that, the colonial government was aiming the comfort of Javanese migrants to practice their agricultural skills and cultural traits. In other words, they tried to build imagined Java

⁴¹ Steven Drakeley, *The History of Indonesia* (USA: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 37–39.

⁴² Aanton Setyo Nugroho, 'Evaluation of Transmigration (Transmigrasi) in Indonesia: Changes in Socioeconomic Status, Community Health and Environmental Qualities of Two Specific Migrant Populations' (Kagoshima University, 2013), p. 5.

⁴³ J. Hardjono, *Transmigration in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 16.

⁴⁴ Mariel Otten, *Transmigrasi: Indonesian Resettlement Policy, 1965-1985; Myths and Realities* (Copenhagen, 1986).

⁴⁵ Hardjono.

⁴⁶ Otten.

villages in the Outer Islands⁴⁷. There was a simple logic behind that aim. Java was the centre of the Dutch colonialism and Javanese people had the perception of superiority of Dutch and accept their authority. The Outer Islands were conquered by the Dutch colonial government but in the minds of tribal people, there was a lack of consciousness of superiority and authority of the Dutch. The Dutch colonial government was aiming to pacify the tribal people and assimilate them by using Javanese people and their civilization which has the authority of the Dutch colonial government. Therefore, all East Indies would be mentally under control of the Dutch colonial government.⁴⁸ Some of the rules determined for the prerequisite of transmigration are solid proves for the Dutch colonial government's main project; select families; families are the foundation of peace and order, don't select former plantation labourers; they are %90 of the source of discontent in the colonies, don not allow colonial marriages, they are source of unrest⁴⁹.

The first transmigration project was accomplished in 1905 under the Dutch colonial rule. Between 1905 and 1911, 6.500 people migrated to the Outer Islands. In the second stage, between 1911 and 1922 the government accelerated transmigration by investing more money, thus the number of total migration during this period became 17.000 people. In the following period, the Dutch interest was declined because of huge expenditure. However, the increasing demand for Javanese migrants from the Outer Islands by landholders led to another increase of transmigration. As a result of that, between 1932 and 1941, around 162.000 people were migrated. After that time Japanese occupation started and the project compulsorily abandoned⁵⁰.

Mainly three colonial policies of the Dutch above, dramatically altered interconnected character of Southeast Asia regional system. However, on the other hand, the lands under the Dutch colonial rule, almost all modern-day Indonesia, were territorially integrated and mostly Javanised. During the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, the territories of the new country determined according to the Dutch colonial lands. Indonesia elites (most of them are Javanese), in a way, were inherited its "national" boundaries from the Dutch.

⁴⁷ Abidin Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Taylor & Francis, 2014), pp. 136–38.

⁴⁸ Carmel Budiardjo, 'The Politics of Transmigration', *The Ecologist*, 16.2/3 (1986), 111–16.

⁴⁹ K.J. Pelzer, 'Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics', *Journal of Geography*, 45.3 (1946), 125–27 (p. 210) <<https://doi.org/10.1080/00221344608986533>>.

⁵⁰ Colin MacAndrews, 'Transmigration in Indonesia: Prospects and Problems', *Asian Survey*, 18.5 (1978), 458–72.

The British colonialism policies were also effective in Southeast Asia regional system. Firstly, the British divided the Strait into two sphere of influence after the agreement between the British and the Dutch colonial administrations. The importance of the Strait increased again under British rule. Secondly, as a result of industrialisation and thus mass production in Europe, Asian products became invaluable. Asia in general and Southeast Asia, in particular, became areas of extracting raw material to nurture mass production means in Europe. These products again sold in the Asian markets. Eventually, the region became poor and far from its glorious past.

The British and the Dutch signed a treaty related to preventing any conflict in Southeast Asia and over the Strait. According to Anglo-Dutch treaty of London in 1824 (Treaty of Commerce and Exchange) between Great Britain and the Netherlands signed in London 17 March 1824), the Dutch gave up all its territories in the mainland to the British, including the Malacca Strait, in return, the British agreed not to spread its hegemony into the Malay Archipelago, south of Singapore. With this treaty, the Dutch were free to exercise authority in Sumatra and other Indonesian islands. Therefore, the Strait divided into two spheres which have lasted even until present days⁵¹.

The agreement between the British and the Dutch was timely and serving for the British interests. The British established trading posts in Penang in 1786, Singapore in 1819, and Malacca in 1824. In 1869, Suez Canal opened and the importance of Cape of Good Hope declined, so the Straits of Sunda⁵². The voyages from Europe were ditching Cape of Good Hope and directly reaching the Malacca Strait by passing through the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea and Indian Ocean⁵³. Throughout this sea route, the hegemony of the British were prevailing. The British increased the importance of the Strait by the ports that they establish and made the area again a hub for East-West trade. The British led to a considerable revival of the Malacca, yet as well caused a division of the Strait into two pieces; Malaysia, and Indonesia.

The British was ruling three important ports; Penang, Malacca, and Singapore which they have called the Straits Settlements. British made Singapore which is located in the southern tip of the Malacca Strait a

⁵¹ B. Harrison, *South-East Asia: A Short History* (New York: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1966).

⁵² Mohd Hazmi, 'Straits of Malacca and Singapore : Pride of the Malay Archipelago, Priceless Maritime', *Jurnal Hadhari Special Edition*, 2012, 109–27 (p. 115).

⁵³ George Bogaars, 'The Effect of the Opening of the Suez Canal on the Trade and Development of Singapore', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 28.1 (169) (1955), 99–143.

centre for trade shipping activities between India and China and obtain high commercial gains. Many Chinese tradesmen migrated to Singapore and the island became the new centre of water-borne trade activities of Southeast Asia⁵⁴. It can be said that by 1860s Singapore had become the successor of Srivijaya and Malacca with a different flavour though; British colonialism.

The British transformed the Straits Settlements a political and economic centre by establishing formal and informal control over nine sultanates, includes some in the southern Siam. This can be considered as a revival of the mandalas. The sultanates were having their autonomous governments but they were ruled by the British. The British maintained the system of Sultanates and do not change the political culture. As a result, they hold the colonial area together rather easier. Besides Chinese and Indian merchants immigrated to today's Singapore and Malaysia changed the demographics of the area. The British favoured aristocratic Malay chiefs, wealthy Chinese merchants and urban Indian traders. That caused the creation of blocks in the society which made them easy to rule⁵⁵.

Another influence of the British to the region was the introduction of "mass production". After the Industrial Revolution, for the first time in history, the products produced in Europe became more valuable than the products of Asia. By the British leadership, Europe began to sell its products in the Asian markets. The Industrial Revolution accelerated the systematic colonialization of Southeast Asia considered improved technologies owned by the Westerners⁵⁶. Within that period Britain was the superior Western power in colonialism mainly because of their leading role in the Industrial Revolution. Until the Industrial Revolution began in the 1700s in England, European goods were not demanded in the Asian markets. However, with the revolution Europeans made products inexpensive such as textile products and penetrated the Asian market. Once the Westerners came to Southeast Asia, it was not a decaying and impoverished region. Rather it was prosperous and a dynamic region. However, in the 18th and 19th century the region changed dramatically. The westerners were obtaining minerals and crops for export and overshadowing commercial activities.

The Western colonialism in Southeast Asia was harsh and system changing in many aspects. However, some of the traits considerably remained. Some of the powerful states such as Siam, Vietnam, Burma, and Aceh resist nearly 400 years to European political control. However, the heart of the system was in the hands of Europeans so indirectly these

⁵⁴ Lockard, p. 98.

⁵⁵ Lockard, p. 100.

⁵⁶ Lockard, p. 93.

strong states affected at least economically. Western colonialization hit a fatal blow to the system and the region took a rather different shape from the Golden Age or Age of Commerce with the Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca at the centre. The colonial period caused malfunctioning of the Southeast Asia regional system. The interaction channels were blocked and the colonized territories governed by the individual colonists.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of Southeast Asia, there was always a centre which is responsible for the Southeast Asia regional system to work. This centrality was fairly geographic. The geostrategic position of the Malacca Strait was giving the holding power to guide the rest of the region. The external influences such as Indian, Chinese and Arabic were flowing into the region through the Strait and contributing to the central power's ability to coordinate the regional interactions. After a long lasted period of colonialism in Southeast Asia, many dynamics have changed in this sense. However, the 20st century developments can be interpreted as the revival of the ancient Southeast Asia regional system. The unexpected success of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in this regard, can urge us to think that current Southeast Asian Regionalism might be an extension of the ancient Southeast Asia regional system.

ASEAN was established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. ASEAN has been criticised in the literature as being lack of institutionalized structure, binding rules and a purpose of supranationality⁵⁷, and as being nothing more than a “talking shop”⁵⁸. However, in the shade of these criticisms, ASEAN has developed and diversified its domains from security to economics, democracy promotion, conflict moderation, etc. Besides, considering ASEAN Plus processes, ASEAN Regional Forum, or East Asian Summit, one might assert that Southeast Asian states are also in the driving seat of wider Asia-Pacific regionalism⁵⁹. Naturally, these developments resulted in the question that what is the secret of ASEAN?⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Sheldon W. Simon, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: Beyond the Talk Shop?’, *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, 2013.

⁵⁸ Tobias Ingo Nischalke, ‘Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-Operation: The “ASEAN Way”, A Real Spirit of A Phantom?’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 22.3 (2000), 89–112 (p. 106).

⁵⁹ Sheldon W. Simon, ‘ASEAN and the New Regional Multilateralism The Long and Bumpy Road to Community’, in *International Relations of Asia*, ed. by David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

⁶⁰ Mark Beeson, ‘ASEAN’s Ways: Still Fit for Purpose?’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22.3 (2009), 333–43.

Considering the history of the region, one may infer that the above-mentioned criticisms lack a historical perspective. They would be valid only if one thinks that Southeast Asian Regionalism was a mere product of the 20th century. Thinking why such an organization including almost all of Southeast Asia established with the initiatives of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore with the support of Thailand and Philippines (the core of the Strait and semi-periphery) may urge us to trace back the roots of the organization in the history. Today, Indonesia as the first among equals and *de facto* leader of ASEAN⁶¹, in a way, functions as the central power of Southeast Asia Regionalism. The secretariat of the organisation resides in Indonesia's capital Jakarta.⁶² Similar to the times when the ruling elites of Southeast Asia send envoys to Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca, the modern states of the region rally in Indonesia to discuss the regional affairs and take decisions. On the other hand, ASEAN Plus processes can be considered as the continuation of the mandala system in which the central mandala coordinates the relations between the regional powers with extra-regional ones⁶³. Indonesia's regional policies such as "dynamic equilibrium"⁶⁴ to coordinate the relations between extra-regional great powers, "global maritime fulcrum"⁶⁵ to revive the maritime identity, "shuttle diplomacy"⁶⁶ to moderate ideational divergences among ASEAN members, "value promotion missions" to spread democracy and human

<<https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570903137776>>; Shaun Narine, 'ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the "ASEAN Way"', *Asian Survey*, 37.10 (1997), 961–78; Peter Drysdale, 'ASEAN: The Experiment in Open Regionalism That Succeeded', *ASEAN@50, The ASEAN Economic Community Into 2025 and Beyond*, 5 (2017), 64–86.

⁶¹ Christopher B. Roberts, *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order*, ed. by L. Sebastian C. Roberts, A. Habir (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015); Kavi Chongkittavorn, *The Future of ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation*, ed. by Larry Maramis Surin Pitsuwan, Hidetoshi Nishimura, Ponciano Intal Jr., Kavi Chongkittavorn, *ASEAN@50: The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials*, The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials, 2017, VOLUME 1, p. 254; Bama Andika Putra, 'Indonesia's Leadership Role in Asean: History and Future Prospects', *IJASOS- International E-Journal of Advances in Social Sciences*, 1.2 (2015), 188 <<https://doi.org/10.18769/ijasos.82584>>.

⁶² 'ASEAN Secretariat' <<https://asean.org/asean/asean-secretariat/>> [accessed 17 March 2019].

⁶³ Pandu Utama Manggala, 'The Mandala Culture of Anarchy: The Pre-Colonial Southeast Asian International Society', *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, 1.1 (2013), 1–13 (p. 11).

⁶⁴ Leonard C Sebastian, 'Indonesia's Dynamic Equilibrium and ASEAN Centrality', *ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) Blueprint*, October.14 (2013), 9–24.

⁶⁵ Sean Quirk and John Bradford, 'Maritime Fulcrum : A New U.S. Opportunity to Engage Indonesia', 15.9 (2015), 11; Sulaiman Yohanes, 'Global Maritime Nexus : Towards A Grand Strategy for Indonesia ?', *RSIS Commentary*, 2017.

⁶⁶ Kishore Mahbubani, 'Indonesia's Big-Hearted Spirit in ASEAN', *The Straits Times*, 2018, 1.

rights to the rest of the region can be considered as Jakarta's efforts to be the new "hub" of ancient Southeast Asia regional system. In this vein, although not completely, this study suggests that reading ASEAN today through the lenses of Southeast Asian history can be a good alternative to study unexpected success⁶⁷ of the organisation.

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⁶⁷ Kishore Mahbubani and Kristen Tang, 'ASEAN: An Unexpected Success Story', *Cairo Review*, 29 (2018), 110–16.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN FORMEN, DIE DER KAPITALISTISCHEN VORHERGEHN BY KARL MARX

Sabin Drăgulin*,

dragulinsabin@yahoo.com

Angelo Chielli**

angelo.chielli@uniba.it

Abstract: *The essay examines the complex relationship between methodology and historiographic research in Marx's works. In particular, fundamental texts such as the Introduction to the Critique of political economy were considered and, especially, the Grundrisse; in the latter, particular attention was paid to Formen, die der Kapitalistischen Vorhergehn. The authors attempt to reconstruct the deep bonds that link the theme of continuity / discontinuity typical of historical processes with another considerably important theme, that of the abstract-concrete opposition proper to methodological reflection.*

Keywords: *historical process, abstract-concrete, continuity-discontinuity, mode of production, economic formation of society.*

Introduction

One of the crucial nodes of Marxian reflection concerns the critique of the necessity of that form of development within which economists structure their theoretical elaborations. This necessity, unproven, recalls a story concept, though never explicitly mentioned by certain authors, whose careful evaluation is necessary in order to overcome the unilateral vision of classic political economy¹.

* Prof. PhD., Faculty of Political Science and Administration, “Petre Andrei”, Iași.

** Associate professor, The Faculty of Political Sciences, University “Aldo Moro”, Bari, Italy.

¹ On the relationship between political economy and philosophy in Marx see the first chapter of the volume di M. Godelier, *Rationalité et irrationalité en économie*, Librairie Maspero, Paris, 1966, tr. it. *Razionalità e irrazionalità nell'economia. Logica e teoria strutturale nell'analisi economica*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1970, pp. 1-89. See also what

For Marx² the present is able to explain the past (i.e. the anatomy of man explains that of the monkey) as long as it is capable of self-criticism. Historiographical activity constitutes itself as scientific knowledge only from the perspective of self-criticism of the present. By self-criticism of the present one must not understand the activity of a subjective consciousness which, idealistically, even when separate from its own object, summarizes and includes in itself the evolution of the real. The self-criticism referenced by Marx is an objective movement that is at one with the domain of abstraction. This means that abstract categories “although they are valid – precisely because of their abstract nature – for all ages, are however, in that which is determined by this abstraction, the product of historical conditions - and possess their full validity only for, and within these conditions”³. This present – as well as the present of both Marx and bourgeois society – is distinguished by a specific “quality”: the category in which bourgeois societies express their relationships and through which it is possible to understand their own structure, allowing them “to penetrate at the same time the structure and the relations of production of all forms of past societies, on whose ruins and with whose elements it was built, and of which there are still residues just partially exceeded, while that which was just mentioned in few words has developed in all its meaning”⁴.

The privileged opinion states that the present point of view offers and demands, however, methodological accuracy, in that sense where it does not have to reach the extreme measure of cancelling all historical differences between the present and the past, and to see in the latter only the first: this is the error of the so-called historical evolution, which

he writes M. Dobb, „La critica dell'economia politica”, in AAVV, *Storia del marxismo*, vol. 1, *Il marxismo ai tempi di Marx*, Einaudi, Torino, 1978, pp. 93-117.

² For an overall picture of Marx's thought see A. Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels: leur vie e leur oeuvre*, 4 voll., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1955-1962.

³ K. Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, (Rohentwurf) 1857-1858*, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1953, Italian translation *Lineamenti fondamentali della critica dell'economia politica - Fundamental characteristics of the critique of political economy. 1857-1858*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1974, vol. I, p. 32. On the subject of abstraction in Marx see C. Bonevecchio, „Astrazione”, in *Dizionario Marx Engels*, edited by F. Papi, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1983, pp. 27-30; always valid the volume of E. V., Il'enkov, *Dialektika abstraktnogo i konkretnogo v "Kapitale" Marksa*, Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moskva, 1960, Italian translation, *La dialettica dell'astratto e del concreto nel Capitale di Marx*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1975 and the article of C. Luporini, „Il circolo concreto-astratto-concreto”, in *Rinascita*, n. 24, 20 ottobre 1962, republished in F. Cassano, *Marxismo e filosofia in Italia*, De Donato, Bari 1976, pp. 226-239. Useful indications also in L. Nowak, *U podstaw marksowskiej metodologii nauk*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1971, Italian translation, *La scienza come idealizzazione: i fondamenti della metodologia marxiana*, il Mulino, Bologna, 1977.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

considers the forms of the past as necessary intermediate stages, in order to reach a mature form. In this conception there is no space for self-criticism, and Marx casually notes that the bourgeois society is an antagonistic form of development: self-criticism is not introduced as a unique moment separated from the movement of the real, but is a function of contradictions, radical in itself.

Method

The epistemological intrusiveness of the present in the past⁵ would happen, in fact, “although the simple category may have existed, historically, before the actual one, it can only belong in its full intensive and extensive development to a complex social shape/form, while the more actual category was already totally developed in a less developed social shape/form”⁶.

Here, Marx places a distance between the development of social forms and the relative determination of existence. A simple category (for example, that of material possessions or of money) can historically exist before the actual, objective category (for example, property or capital). However, the simple category, in its intensive and extensive development, belongs to a complex social shape. On the contrary, a concrete category can also be introduced in completely developed form even in a less developed living totality. Therefore, social categories and shapes/forms possess, individually, an inner historicity not synchronized in comparison with the others, being able in themselves to present the case of one concrete category in a specific, arrayed social configuration. On the contrary, all the potentialities of a simple category can be sufficiently explained only through an advanced, living totality. This is the meaning of the Marxian expression “antediluvian existence”⁷ of the simple categories, stating that “the simplest abstraction that modern economy places at its apex and which expresses an ancient and valid relation for all forms of society is introduced as practically true in this single abstraction only when dealing with the categories of modern society”.

Why does this happen? Until the separation of those specific ways in which a manifest category comes true is actually realized (for instance, taking as an example the concept of work, one passes from the idea of a

⁵ A brief overview of the historical process in Marx can be found in J. Topolski, *Oltre il determinismo e il volontarismo: la concezione marxiana del processo storico*, in C. Mancina (edited by), *Marx e il mondo contemporaneo*, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1986, pp. 263-276. Also very interesting, for our purposes essay of, P. Vilar, *Marx e la storia*, in AAVV, *Storia del marxismo*, vol. 1, *Il marxismo ai tempi di Marx*, Einaudi, Torino 1978, pp. 60-90.

⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

particular job to that of “work in general terms”), the presence of a developed totality, in which no modality is predominant, remains necessary. Marx writes; “the most general abstractions only arise where a totality of elements is given the richest concrete development, where a single characteristic appears as common to a great number, even to a totality of elements. Then it stops being thought about only in a particular shape or form”⁸.

Wherever such a situation is accomplished, the abstract/simple category becomes the point of departure of political economy. In other words, the simple abstraction, as manifestation of an ancient and necessary relation in every form of society, is only considered to be “true” inside the mode of existence of bourgeois society.

Some years before the *Misery of philosophy*, Marx had challenged, in few but dense lines, the problem of temporal disconnection.

In the first instance, Marx finds that economists had explained the origins of production as being determined by a certain type of relationships - the bourgeois ones - but were not in a position to show the origin of those relationships, that is - the real movement generating them, the “movement of the (same) thing”⁹. Subsequently¹⁰ he utters one important affirmation relative to the entirety of production relationships that form a totality in any given society. Or, how are we supposed to observe, or comprehend, this totality? We can - as classic economists do - limit ourselves to placing these relations of production in a chronological type of succession (while remembering that chronological succession is none other than the logical form of movement). In this way, however, the totality is disarticulated, and this happens because of the simultaneity of all its components. How can, then, an ideological construction which transforms the totality in many distinct societies that succeed each other in time, harvest the simultaneity of totality itself?

The simultaneity that characterizes the totality is given by the specific form of the connecting parts which compose it, a form which, if not correctly understood, leads to the creation of a unilateral, therefore false, relation instead of a chronological one¹¹.

⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

⁹ K. Marx, *Misère de la philosophie. Réponse à la philosophie de la misère de M. Proudhon*, (Paris, 1847), Italian translation, *Miseria della filosofia*, Rome, Newton Compton Editors, 1976, p. 82.

¹⁰ See the *Third observation* in the second chapter of the *Misery*, pp. 84-85.

¹¹ On these aspects see: Helmut Reichelt, *Zur logischen Struktur des Kapitalbegriffs bei Karl Marx*, Europäische Verlagsanstalt GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, Italian translation, *La struttura logica del Capitale in Marx*, De Donato, Bari, 1973, pp. 155-167. Of considerable interest what they write Aldo Schiavone, *Per una rilettura delle «Formen»: teoria della storia, dominio del valore d'usa e funzione dell'ideologia*, in

The difference between the form of simultaneity and the form of temporal succession is clearly explained by Marx, in the *Grundrisse*. For instance, it appears obvious that any scientific discourse about society originally starts by determining the levels of land-related income and of real estate, both categories connected to agriculture, which represents the main means of production in all sedentary communities. Nevertheless, as Marx explains, to position this chronological beginning as a logical principle of social science is an error. Indeed, in every social form there is one determined type of production predominant on all others, that decides and defines relations inside the totality. It is precisely the domination that this form of production exercises on all the others which indicates the scientific criterion; and this overthrowing of temporal succession will open the gap through which the real connections and their inner relationships to the totality can be perceived. Marx writes “it would be therefore inopportune and erroneous to arrange economic categories in the order in which they were historically determined. Their succession, instead, is determined from their inter-relation in modern bourgeois society, and that is exactly the opposite of what is usually considered their natural relation corresponding to the succession of their historical development”¹².

This passage directly leads us inside another famous Marxian text, which will be discussed in the second part of this forthcoming essay, *Formen, die der kapitalistischen Produktion vorhergehen*¹³.

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¹² K. Marx, *Lineamenti*, quoted work, p. 35.

¹³ This text is part of a wider manuscript composed by Marx between 1857 and 1858. The writing was published for the first time in Moscow in 1939-41 with the title *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, quoted work, pp. 94-148.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROFILE OF THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL-PARLIAMENTARY SOCIETY AND OF THE SOCIO-ELECTORAL MENTALITY OF THE LAST PERIOD

Dacian Vasincu*

dacian.newdeal@gmail.com

Abstract: *This article analysis certain stages of the evolution or involution of the socio-political mentality of the post-December Romanian society, with the identification of a social chronology and a paradigm of a state of parabiosis.*

In addition to the chronology of the evolution of Romanian parliamentarism - as the main pillar of the current political class -, it can be considered in the historical cycle of public influence the PRINCIPAL - AGENT model, which has its origins in the process of analysing the representation of democratic systems in European Union. Also, in the analysis of this system I consider 4 fundamental stages and demonstrated by the current reality: Pillar I - (1989 - 2009) - Social deconstruction ("The end of illusions"), Pillar II - (2009 - 2029) - Social statement ("Social Depression"), Pillar III - (2029 - 2049) - Social reconstruction ("Social Aggregation"), Pillar IV - (2049 - 2069) - Social development ("Social Solidarity"). The outcome of these pillars / stages also depends on the way in which current political actors manage to go beyond their short-term role and learn to educate themselves in order to have a medium- and long-term vision of the decisions taken.

Keywords: *parliamentarism, political class, principal-agent model, parabiosis, geopolitics, legitimacy, preferential vote.*

From the study of the constitutive elements of the Romanian legislature (the basis of the current political class) during the last three decades of democratic regime, it is observed that a series of changes have manifested (which depending on their character, we can call evolutions and involutions). The most important changes took place during the 2008-2012 legislature, after the introduction of the uninominal voting system, while maintaining the principle of proportionality. The combination of these two voting systems: uninominal and proportional led to the emergence of an oversized parliament and the accentuation of the phenomenon of political migration. The failure of this experiment led to

* * **PhD. student, Faculty of Political Science, SNSPA, Bucharest.**

the return in 2016 to a classic form of the electoral system more adapted to current times, to vote on the list.

As in many other states with a participatory democracy, in Romania¹, since the 1990s, the need to transform the parliamentary system from a centralized and unicameral level had emerged, specific to the totalitarian regime, to a level of delegation of decisions, by the participation of the local communities in the nomination of the candidates, within a bicameral system, composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, by the division of attributions.

This way of organizing the Romanian political regime allows us to have an image, to say a "mirror" of the way in which political actors, who received the popular vote understood their role to manage the preferences of the electorate to meet the interests of power groups and the interests they belong to or represent.

Based on the above, during this study I will try to identify an evolution/involution² of the profile of the Romanian parliamentary society related to the mentality of the Romanian people, in the context of the political situation reflected in the first months of 2020.

I chose to present in this first part of the study, an experiment that allows us to show our ideas. Thus, starting from the main agent-model and the theory of delegation, which has its origin in the process of analysing the representation of democratic systems in the European Union, of Professor Iacob Stempien from the University of Lodz - Poland³ and the study of the evolution of the post-December political elite of Professor Sergiu Simion, from the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Bucharest, it can be identified certain chronological pillars of the evolution of the mind of citizens' representatives in parliament, a mind that can represent either a vulnerability or an advantage in shaping the mechanism of the Romanian political-parliamentary system.

Analysing the democratic systems according to the theoretical concepts and the way they were applied in practice, we observe that the nation, the people, etc., have the attribute of sovereignty and its exercise aims at reaching a stage of well-being. As Giovanni Sartori tells us, the purpose of any parliamentary action must be the well-being of the citizen.

¹ P. Hirst, *Representative Democracy and Its Limits*, Oxford: Polity Press, 1990.

² Marius Ghilezan, "30 years / Evolution or involution?", In *România Libera*, 23.12.2019, <https://romanalibera.ro/opinii/30-de-ani-evolutie-sau-involutie-817897>, (accessed 21.05.2020).

³ Iacob Stempien / Jakub Ryszard Stempień, Use of the "Principal-Agent" model in the process of investigating and analyzing representative democratic systems, 2012, University of Lodz, file: /// C: / Users / admin / Downloads / Jakub% 20Ryszard% 20Stempie% 20.pdf, (accessed 19.05.2020).

More precisely, let us not forget that a consolidated democratic regime is based on a series of theories that refer to the roots of the political system, which indicates that citizens want the individual, the society that is a creation of individuals to be more important than the state. In short, the way political organization should reflect: *ergo, demos-sites should be more important than kratos. The government / state should be the servant of the people (not the other way around)*⁴.

Representative democracy is a remarkable type of democracy. According to Philippe Schmitter and Terry L. Karl⁵, representative democracy is a political system through which people are accountable to citizens in a public forum. According to this concept, citizens must take action through their representatives who have an ambivalent attribute: competition and cooperation. The application of these principles leads to two fundamental hypotheses which must be emphasized in this regard.

First, the main goal of democratic governance actions should be common: welfare / sovereignty. Secondly, in contemporary democracy the concept of sovereignty is expressed indirectly, through representatives. With the emergence of territorial states and their modern forms, nation states, the model of direct democracy, found in the Greek polis can no longer be applied. As a result, a third of the two basic premises emerges: *in representative democracies there is not only a division between political authority and all citizens (society as a whole), but there is also a main relationship (citizens, society) - agent (political authority, in this case the parliamentary elite)*. This explains why sociological and political analyses of contemporary democratic systems use the "principal-agent" model. The model presented is based on the theory of agents, and agents, in our case, are elements of the parliamentary political class, as reported in the last 30 years.

Based on this model (principal-agent) I will try to start the first chronological stage of the evolution of the Romanian parliamentary society:

1. **Between 1990-2000** individuals who became decision-makers, through political parties that either established or re-established and formed the new politico-parliamentary elite, or was composed of people who represented the interests of power groups under the influence of structures and the second and third echelons of the Romanian Communist Party, or came from among the historical parties that survived the

⁴ Giovanni Sartori, *Theory of Democracy Reinterpreted*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2008.

⁵ See Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "The types of democracy emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America," in *Volten*, 1992 and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Clarifying consolidation" in *the Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1997.

communist progeny. The latter came and re-established the historical political formations (PNT, PNL, and interwar PSD). The political struggle at the beginning of the '90s between these groups that organized and wanted to win the vote of the citizens led to the creation of cleavages still alive in Romanian society, expressed by (University Square, mineriads, etc.) but also a form of privatization of "public wealth" represented by cases of high corruption (collapse / assisted destruction of large industry, layoffs in the economic sector, the first major acts of corruption associated with financial cannons BANCOREX, International Bank of Religions, bankruptcy of SIDEX, TEPRO scandal - Iasi, the CARITAS pyramid game, the FNI business, etc.)⁶.

2. Between 2000-2008, the political class, starting from the way it legitimized itself in front of the citizens during the campaigns for participation in the parliamentary elections, was divided dichotomously between quasi-right and quasi-left, between "defenders of justice" and oligarchs. The public discourse focused on the pro / contra dichotomy. Symbolically speaking, the pro camp found some of the new post-December elites who understood the discontent of the masses and wanted a greater democratization of state structures by promoting (in a general sense) a reform of partisan interests by democratization and taking steps towards the state of law (promoted right-wing doctrinal principles and concepts, but which had to limit its discourse from the need to attract that part of the left electorate that was not found in the methods of government or in the proposals to modernize the Romanian society proposed by the left), administrative decentralization and reduction of corruption at the level of local and central powers. The opposition camp included political representatives who reflected the interests of power groups and interests built during the communist period and who were accused of maintaining neo-communist attitudes and conceptions, but who were presented with a language and style specific to democratic forms of democratic-Western⁷ communication.

⁶ For a comprehensive picture of Romanian society during this period, I recommend Dan Pavel, *We will only succeed together! An analytical history of the Democratic Convention*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2003.

⁷ The terminology I advance, quasi-right and quasi-left is not specific to political science or political sociology but I use it to strengthen the perception that exists at the level of local specialists that in the Romanian political space were not built parties to maintain a classical ideology: liberal, social - democratic, Christian – Democrats is, etc. Considering the specificity of the specific internal situation, due to both the transition phenomenon and the influences exerted by the new neoliberal model, imposed following the fall of the USSR in 1991, which led to the emergence of globalization and global society, domestic parties were forced to apply governing economic measures that were not

3. **Between 2008 – 2014**, a new series of politicians appeared, the so-called “young wolves”, who in the first decade of the legislative decade had a limited political power compared to the already existing one ... but who very quickly contradicted the rudimentary and constant behaviour of parliamentarians appeared immediately after the revolution ... These new young wolves are divided into two categories: the first category includes individuals characterized by the promotion of a pragmatic policy, focused on self-interest and the desire to have access at all levels of decision-making, the second category includes those individuals who have been influenced by Western ideas and education, who have promoted a way of doing politics in which they have combined the ambition of self-interest with that of group interest (according to the principle : if it will be good for me, for others it will be good too), but also for the drawing of a cold, rational political vision, without the political sentimentalisms existing in the past⁸.

4. **In the period 2014 - 2020**, among this second group, leaders begin to stand out, supported by internal groups that take power in parties and therefore in parliament. The parliamentary elections of December 2016 are significant for this period because we are witnessing a new period in which pragmatism becomes dogma in domestic politics, being applied to achieve short and medium term objectives: centralized control of institutions, especially judicial ones, trivializing the concept of “corruption” at the current political level, the geopolitical resettlement of Romania in the context of regional conflicts (through actions of rapprochement either with the West, or with the China-Russia binomial or more recently with Israel), with the risk of eliminating compromise options.


4.1. During this period, especially between 2017-2020 as an under sizing of the current realities, the concept of autocratic leaders in counties - in cities is recrystallized (known in the press by the expressions "southern barons", "group of nine (liberals)", “parliamentary boys in service”, “Don Livache”, “Moldovan troika”, etc.) - who being part of all parliamentary parties minimizes Romania’s modernization efforts from 2003-2013 (European integration, the concept of the rule of law, Euro-Atlantic accession, liberalization of the economy, forecasting of living standards, etc.).

specific to their own doctrine. This phenomenon has led to a doctrinal "weakening" of the parties.

⁸ Dacian Vasincu, “The uninominal parliamentary vote from the perspective of the evolution of the parliamentary elections of 2008 and 2012 - analysis on the socio-electoral profile of the current parliamentarian”, in Revista *Punctul Critic*, no. 02 (12) / 2014, ed. European Idea Cultural Foundation.

These forms of expression of power within the parliament were and are influenced by two major global crises, which also affected Romania: the economic crisis triggered in 2009 and the state of emergency caused by COVID 19. Of course, the actions promoted by these power groups have acted and are acting at the level of parliament are reflected, in the media, or on social platforms that have emerged as a result of the spread of the Internet. The impact that this information, which comes from several sources, and often analyses the same subject differently or contrary, was observed by the behavioural analyst and psychologist Sergiu Simion, from the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Bucharest. He analysed the Romanian political class from the perspective of the adaptable mentality of the people. Its conclusions are as follows:

"After more than 25 years of chaotic social evolution, the Romanian citizen resembles the famous Archimedes. He is looking for political, social, cultural and moral landmarks and desperately wants a foothold, but these landmarks and this foothold no longer exist in our social space. Romanian society went from a state of chaos specific to the '90s to a state of parabiosis, becoming a prisoner of a criminal political class that practically reset the system of traditional social, cultural and moral values, values that resisted even under communism. Therefore, these landmarks and this point of support cannot be given by the official representatives of the system, whether it is about a criminal political class or the cultural personalities who have endorsed through their lack of attitude and inaction, this whole period when they did not directly contribute to resetting the values (...)⁹.



The state of parabiosis of the Romanian society in the conception of the psychologist Sergiu Simion:

⁹<https://sergiusimion.blogspot.com/2016/07/elita-ascunsa-romaniei.html>, (accessed 21.05.2020).

To the question: How was it possible to create this state of parabiosis, by the appearance of a ruling class hidden in the legislative acts it issues, having only the role of overturning the system of values and moral confusion in Romanian society? The sociologist answers:

"This became possible by resetting the entire social framework, respectively by destroying traditional standards and moral landmarks and gradually resetting the entire system of values of Romanian society and upsetting them by the technique of "Chinese drop". The essential question is how can the system of cultural and moral values that represent the backbone of a society and a nation be destroyed?"

In communism, the dehumanization of society began with "non-Orwellian language" and the degradation of language which meant "maintaining totalitarian power by controlling language" and emptying its content ("wooden language")¹⁰, and in post-communism, and applying the same as a rule, it began by abolishing moral censorship, conferring a right of citizenship on social primitivism, and generating a social jungle in which the system of moral and human values of a normal and democratic society is upset or even reversed.

The general hypothesis is that this whole operation of destroying the moral and cultural standards of Romanian society was launched by the team of activists and security guards who took power in 1990, but was actually carried out by leaders and blackmailable intellectual leaders in each field of activity"¹¹.

In support of all these theories, if we take as a reference the year 1989 which was a crucial year because it triggered the essential changes for the evolution of Europe and the world and we establish by convention at 4 stages the historical cycle and the active life cycle of a citizen, then we could estimate what might follow in the coming decades and what the chances are that the generations that relate to that year will truly catch a profound social change. Thus, in addition to the chronology of the evolution of Romanian parliamentarism - as a pillar of the current political class -, it can be considered that the historical cycle of public influence, according to the main model (Romanian electorate) - agent (parliamentary political society or politicians) detailed above, will take into account 4 fundamental stages and demonstrated by the current reality (each with the associated economic, social and psychological costs):

I - (1989 - 2009) - Social deconstruction ('The end of illusions')

¹⁰ About the wooden language I recommend the study signed by Lavinia Betea, „Communication and speech in" WOOD LANGUAGE "of the communist regime, in *Argumentum*, no. 3, 2004-2005, AXIS Academic Foundation Publishing House, pp.36-64.

¹¹<https://sergiusimion.blogspot.com/2016/07/elita-ascunsa-romaniei.html>, (accessed 21.05.2020).

- II - (2009 - 2029) - Social statement ("Social depression")**
III - (2029 - 2049) - Social reconstruction ('Social aggregation')
IV - (2049 - 2069) - Social development ("Social solidarity")¹²

Professor Sergiu Simion advances a conclusion that supports the analysis in the article:

"After the experience of the 26 years already wasted, Romanians no longer trust a (proven) criminal political class and by ricochet nor in civil society and its official representatives who failed to offer a credible opposition to what happened in political and social space. The only chance would be a reform of the state (unlikely in the next two decades or a reform of an inefficient civil society and unable to withstand the pressure and temptations of the political class reform that would clearly distinguish it from its clones and "<<civil society in civilian style>>"¹³.

Simion's conclusion is important because the reality of Romanian life has shown and demonstrated how, in the last three decades, the number of civic activists who have changed their principles and camp, some becoming civil servants or even politicians, has grown steadily. Of course, the author's intention is not to criticize the process of penetration of elements specific to civil society within power structures. The problem that arose was how different union leaders, for example, used their own position within the organization to build a successful future political career. We refer to the concept of "morality" in politics which is an important element in assessing the stage of democratization of a political regime.

As these reforms have no initiators in either the state or the civic sector because there is no such interest, citizens are in fact self-employed and free to lend credit to any court they wish. The solution in this case would be a long-term assessment of the social prestige of social leaders, respectively an assessment in which moral values become mandatory principles. This type of assessment makes a democratic and European society and a genuine civil society mandatory for a state governed by the rule of law, all the more so as in our country, citizens with a criminal record can run or keep their parliamentary mandate.

This solution has the role of observing if certain theories specific to the theory of modernization can be applied to the Romanian society, in the conditions in which both Romania has known and knows certain specificities¹⁴.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Sabin Drăgulin, Silvia Rotaru, "Presidential 2014: Victor Ponta and the surprise of failure", in *Sfera Politicii*, volume XXIII, no.3 (185), 2015, pp. 115-134.

In this variant, citizens could evaluate political and social actors according to an independent grid of the current political and social system, a grid that excludes such strong political and social dependencies today¹⁵.

This grid can be the basis of a future occupational standard necessary for a profile of the Romanian political class in recent years.

The model of the 7-dimensional grid, tested for the first time at the level of the Swedish parliamentary system, is adapted for the case of the Romanian parliamentary political class:

Moral legitimacy (the degree to which citizens consider political and civic leaders as moral and contributing to the common good);

Pragmatic legitimacy (the degree to which citizens are interested in political and civic leaders and consider political and civic leaders activity as beneficial for themselves);

Cognitive legitimacy (the degree to which citizens consider the presence of political and civic leaders as normal and taken-for-granted);

Emotional legitimacy (how citizens feel about political and civic leaders);

Status (the degree to which citizens define political and civic leaders as a powerful and highly ranked group);

Reputation (the degree to which citizens associate political and civic leaders with a positive image);

Uniqueness (the degree to which citizens think political and civic leaders are special).

The grid with the 7 dimensions can be applied by itself in the case of personalities very interested in the Romanian universe and who have major social, financial and cultural contributions (speaking of academics, scientists, doctors (such as Prof. Rafila, Dr. Mustafa who became opinion leaders during the coronavirus pandemic), economists (for example a young apolitical analyst: Iancu Guda) and other unknown leaders due to marginalization and censorship of the media subordinated only to political issues). We are talking about an elite made up of personalities independent of the current political-parliamentary system, but who know and understand Romania better than many current political factors.

As a provisional conclusion, all the above standards show that we are witnessing an involution and a possible parliamentary bankruptcy if, in addition to the need for an evaluation/occupational standard of the selection of people to be elected parliamentarians, there is no attempt to

¹⁵<https://sergiusimion.blogspot.com/2016/07/elita-ascunsa-romaniei.html> (accesat 25.05.2020).

reform the way of election¹⁶: an acceptable alternative solution for current and future parliamentary leaders would be that of the PREFERENTIAL VOTE ON THE OPEN LIST (election of the person nominated from the list of candidates of the parties participating in the elections), selecting the quality of as many votes as possible for the respective political party but also the competition within its own party.

The introduction of these methods would ensure the overcoming of the "Social Report" (Social Depression specified above) and the start before all the analysed scenarios of the period of social and economic well-being also called "Social Reconstruction".

But such a success would mean having a parliamentary political society consisting of real agents of the main purpose of public opinion: parliamentarians of the interest of the Romanian nation (according to the main-agent model). The effect of the last 30 years imposes such a need.

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¹⁶ For a broad understanding of the electoral systems in the European Union, I recommend Simon Hix, Bjorn Hoyland, *The Political System of the European Union*, MacMillan Education UK, London, 2011.

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WHO KILLED FASCISM? THE DILEMMA ABOUT THE END OF THE REGIME^{1*}

Giulia Chielli*

chielligiulia@gmail.com

Abstract: *The twenty-fifth of July 1943 Benito Mussolini lost the support of his most trusted men during a night that will be remembered as “the Grand Council Night”. Starting from that moment, thousands of words have been written asking how and how come the Duce fell. Military or monarchy golpe? Violent death or natural death of the regime? The essay supports the hypothesis of the regime's crisis due to external causes, mainly the negative outcome of the conflict.*

Keywords: *Grand Council, Benito Mussolini, Dino Grandi, 25th July 1943, Italy.*

Introduction

As is the case for every historic episode debated, much has been written concerning the events of the night of the Grand Council. The bibliography available does not skimp on the reconstructions made by historians², let alone the memories and diaries³ of those who took part in that meeting. The abundant amount of material at our disposal has not yet put an end to this historical and theoretical debate. In fact, the problems that hinder the drafting of an accurate reconstruction and analysis of what happened are diverse and in varying order. The main problem is that of variety and discrepancy of the testimonies. It is not surprising given the importance of that night and the impact it had on the following story, that

¹ The citations from Italian texts have been translated by the author.

* **Graduated in International Relations at the University of Bari Aldo Moro, with a thesis in History of Treaties and International Politics entitled “La Spagna di Franco tra la Gran Tentación e la neutralità”. She carried out numerous study stays abroad (France, Spain).**

² Confrontation between: G. Bianchi, *Perché e come cadde il fascismo. 25 luglio 1943: crollo di un regime*. Mursia, Milano, 1982; R. De Felice, *Mussolini l'alleato*, v. 2. *Crisi e agonia del regime*. Einaudi, Torino, 1990; E. Gentile, *25 luglio 1943*. Laterza, Bari, 2018.

³ Agreement between: D. Grandi, *Il mio Paese. Ricordi Autobiografici*, Mulino, Bologna, 1985; D. Grandi, *25 Luglio. Quarant'anni dopo*. Mulino, Bologna, 1983; A. De Marsico, *25 Luglio 1943, memorie per la storia*. Laterza, Bari, 1983; C. Scorza, *La notte del Gran Consiglio*. Palazzi, Milano, 1968; E. Galbiati, *Il 25 luglio e la M.V.S.N.* Editrice Bernabò, Milano, 1950.

almost all the hierarchs present at the meeting wanted to give their own version of the facts. There are, however, mostly versions written after some time which are affected by the impact of subsequent events and which, for the most part, were drafted with the intention of presenting a defense memory of their work rather than a true and precise chronicle of the facts. Therefore, in the absence of an official memorandum⁴ it is essential to read the interventions of the protagonists objectively, keeping in mind all the limits of the case.

To this first order of problems is added a second one involving a broader institutional context. If what they spent in the Sala del Pappagallo⁵ were decisive hours, it must not be forgotten that there was at least one other great protagonist: the Crown. At this point it is necessary to investigate what and how incisive the interactions were between the King and rebel hierarchs, and, above all, how the act of replacing Mussolini and his arrest by the sovereign should be interpreted. What one ultimately wonders is how the change at the top that took place between the 24 and 25 July is to be qualified.

The problem becomes relevant in the moment when the attempt to analyze how deep the intervention of Fascism was to the detriment of the Albertine Statute, and what, from the ancient constitution, remained in the regime established by Mussolini. The King's decisive intervention, which was substantiated in the dismissal and arrest of the Duce, was delayed. According to what Grandi has written, the sovereign expected a constitutional foothold that could justify his actions⁶, a foothold that was provided to him by the vote of the Grand Council.

But what was the nature of the Grand Council? Did it have the necessary prerogatives to express that vote, which was considered as *conditio sine qua non* of Vittorio Emanuele's action?

⁴ To elaborate on the question of the absence of the memorandum, see the analysis of E. Gentile, *25 luglio 1943*. Laterza, Bari, 2018, pp. 20-44.

⁵ The *Sala del Pappagallo* is a hall in Palazzo Venezia in Rome where the meetings of the Grand Council were held.

⁶ In D. Grandi, *25 luglio quarant'anni dopo*. Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983, p. 308, Grandi writes: We only wanted to restore the command and authority to the King, creating the conditions for the restoration of the constitutional monarchy and the Statute. To succeed in winning what everyone, and in the first place the people of the court called "the constitutional scruples" of the sovereign, appeared a dark point and one of the greatest difficulties. Today it seems inconceivable that such a concern could have existed if one thinks of that moment of extreme gravity for the country, of the national tragedy that subsequently occurred, and also of the ease with which the sovereign had succumbed to so many tears caused by the dictatorship to the constitution itself. And yet, that is how it is. The sovereign had always said and made people say: "First give me a vote against Mussolini".

The Grand Council: origin and functions

The institution and the role attributed to the Grand Council are part of a more general process of fascistization of the State and its institutions that led to the creation of the “Monarchical state with a totalitarian regime” of which Gentile speaks⁷. The Fascist revolution did not produce any new institutions all of a sudden. The process was slow and gradual, and the existing institutions were often maintained, even though their function and appearance changed remarkably. Thus, the Albertine Statute was the frame within which the Regime painted its canvas; a frame of which, in any case, Fascism never undoes, though the ancient constitution remained but a simulacrum. On the other hand, the flexible nature of the Statute facilitated this process by allowing amendments to the Basic Charter to be made by means of simple ordinary laws.

The normative interventions that changed the connotations of liberal Italy were diverse; only those useful to reconstructing past history will be cited here. The Grand Council of Fascism came to be in 1922, becoming a body of the PNF (National Fascist Party) with the duties “of stimulus, orientation, integration”⁸. In the following years, up to 1928, the Grand Council gave life to institutions “progressively absorbed by state organization”⁹, reason for which, according to Ranelletti, in 1928 it felt the need to elevate the Grand Council to a supreme body of the State¹⁰. Moreover, it is necessary to add two other normative interventions to this fundamental transfer that are useful for tracing the course of “an incremented transformation of the Statute”¹¹.

The first takes place in 1925 when, with the law of attributions of the head of government, the executive’s role becomes reinforced at the expense of that of the Crown, the Chamber of Deputies and the ministers. The second intervention is the reform law of the representation of the Chamber, approved in 1928 (a few months before that of the constitutionalization of the Grand Council), and whose purpose was to divest the Chamber by substituting the deputies with men “appointed by the Grand Council and voted for in public elections”¹². It was the obituary of the representative-parliamentary system, which in fact, sanctioned the

⁷ This expression is taken from E. Gentile, *25 luglio 1943*, p. 56.

⁸ O. Ranelletti: *Il Gran Consiglio del Fascismo e la forma dello Stato italiano*, *Rivista di diritto pubblico e della pubblica amministrazione*, S. 2, 2 (1929) p. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ The reform in question was enacted in virtue of the law of 9 November 1928.

¹¹ F. Lanchester: *Il Gran Consiglio del Facismo e la monarchia rappresentativa*, *Nomos. Le attualità nel diritto*, 3/2017, p. 3.

¹² E. Gentile: *25 luglio 1943*, p. 57.

concentration of power in the hands of the single party and the government.

To the combined arrangement of these interventions, which in themselves had already distorted the monarchic-liberal structure, was added the aforementioned constitutionalization of the Grand Council of 1928. The latter became competent to deliberate on the appointment and dismissal of leading figures of the Party, on the regulations and statutes, on the list of the appointed deputies. Moreover, the prerogative that made the Grand Council a prominent body was that which regarded the issues that required their consultation. In particular, it was expected that the Grand Council be heard on all matters of a constitutional character, among which were specifically listed: “the succession to the throne, the attributions and prerogatives of the Crown; the composition and functioning of the Grand Council, the Senate of the Realm and the Chamber of Deputies; the attributions and prerogatives of the Head of Government, Prime Minister, Secretary of State and the Holy See; the international treaties that involve change on the State territory and the colonies, that is, renouncing the purchase of territories”¹³.

It is worth mentioning that this norm that was set up, brought an actual attack on the prerogatives and the royal authorities; even the role of the King (“the attributions and the prerogatives of the Crown”) and succession to the throne (remember that according to art. 2 of the Albertine Statute, the law of succession applied was Salic law), became matters that fell under the Grand Council dominion, that being the Head of Government who presided. Therefore, in a certain way, the Grand Council was in a preeminent position with respect to the two Chambers – allowing them to deliberate on the list of deputies as well as on the composition and functioning of the Senate and the Chamber, and as for the Crown, this allowed them to have a voice (even if only in opinion) about hereditary matters and their attributions and royal prerogatives. Thus, a constitutional regulation came to be whereby the body, presided by the factual bearer of the executive, was able to exercise a power capable of undermining the very source of the executive power¹⁴.

Finally, it is necessary to add that to the supreme body, the duty of redirecting and updating the list of ideal successors who could take on governmental matters when holidays came up were also included.

¹³ The law of 9 December 1928, regulation and attributions of the Grand Council of Fascism, art. 12, available for consultation in A. Acquarone, *L'Organizzazione dello stato totalitario*. Torino, Einaudi, 1995, pp. 493-495.

¹⁴ Remember that according to art. 5 of the Statute “the king has only executive power” and that the aforementioned law of 1925 on the attributions of the Head of Government affirmed that the power was exercised by the king through his government.

However, this list was never drafted although it was a legal means to guarantee succession. Now, if the Grand Council was so designed by the law that elevated it to a state body, how did it evolve in practice? That is to say, from 1928 to 1943, how did it carry out the tasks attributed to it by law? In order to have an idea of this, Dino Grandi's testimony can help to understand it:

“Now the Grand Council had never voted, and the Council was unaware of this parliamentary procedure. The law of 1928, constitutive of this body, had provided for the enactment of its rules of procedure. In fact, such rules were approved on 9 April 1929. But they were never applied, Mussolini always opposed them, stipulating this practice: the Grand Council discussed, but did not vote. At the end of each meeting, the dictator, after having listened to the objections and speeches with benevolent curiosity, intervened to summarize and conclude the debate, and with the approval of the assembly, he presented a deliberation prepared either by him or for him beforehand. Sometimes it did happen that the Grand Council expressed a contrary or different opinion from that of which the dictator solicited. In this case, the discussion was adjourned and the matter was not spoken of again. Mussolini did not want any votes (...)”¹⁵.

Actually, the law of “constitutionalization” of the body (that of 9 December 1928), art. 2 had already established that the Head of Government preside the Grand Council, “he summons it when he deems it necessary and sets the agenda”¹⁶. It is evident that the collegial nature of the assembly found a first great limitation in its own birth certificate. Besides, it is necessary to add that on matters of a constitutional nature, the opinion of the Grand Council was mandatory but not binding. The result was a highly hierarchical structure in which Mussolini had never had any difficulty in imposing himself during the meetings. Thus, the importance of the Grand Council had gradually faded away, so much so, that the last session was held in 1939.

¹⁵ D. Grandi: *25 luglio quarant'anni dopo*, p. 226.

¹⁶ The law of 9 December 1928, regulation and attributions of the Grand Council of Fascism, art. 2, available for consultation in A. Acquarone *L'Organizzazione dello stato totalitario*, pp. 493-5.

Coup d'état?

Once the legislative and constitutional framework was clear, it is best to go back to the question that started this narrative; that is, on the night between 24-25 July, the Grand Council provided the necessary prerogatives to express a vote against the regime and decree, therefore, its end? According to the answer given, there are different opinions. Bianchi summarizes the problem by writing:

“Coup d'état of the Savoy Monarchy, carried out in the shadow of the betrayal of a military clique and the defection of the highest hierarchs in the Grand Council, on 25 July 1943, or the logical epilogue of the Mussolini regime and immanent corollary of domestic and foreign policy and fascist intervention in the Second World War”¹⁷.

Without a doubt the prevailing orientation agrees in considering the events of 25 July as the fruit of a coup d'état distorted by the Monarchy and the military and made possible by the betrayal of the hierarchs who put their signatures at the bottom of the Grandi agenda. Two coups had been warped, as Gentile claims¹⁸, one by the military under the direction of the sovereign, and the other, whose nature of a coup d'état is yet to be verified, by the Grand Council's rebellious hierarchy.

In supporting the thesis of the monarchical coup d'état, Pombeni postulates the violation of the laws of succession (art. 3 of the law of 9 November 1928) by the King in the moment he dismissed Mussolini, appointing Badoglio as his successor¹⁹. However, the list that should have indicated the possible successors was never drafted, and no one had ever requested that one be made; therefore, the King, on appointing a new Head of State, was not bound by any indication whatsoever.

As for Mussolini's dismissal, the issue is more complex. In the assembly of the Sala del Pappagallo, those who wanted the substitution of

¹⁷ G. Bianchi, *Perché e come cadde il fascismo*, p. 3.

¹⁸ See text of E. Gentile, *25 luglio 1943*.

¹⁹ P. Pombeni, in *Demagogia e tirannide. Uno studio sulla forma-partito del fascismo*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1984, pp. 324-325 writes: “From a point of view, strictly constitutional, what happened was an actual coup d'état: keep in mind, in fact, that not only was Mussolini removed without even considering the vague laws of succession provided by the “Fascist Constitution”, but also, all the laws relative to the functioning of the state that were regularly promulgated for twenty years, were considered fallen. [...]. From a formal point of view of the PNF, they actually had a formidable weapon against the king: they could have accused him of having violated the laws that he himself had promulgated and could claim the preservation of the powers that he was always entitled to under the law”.

the Duce or the end of the regime is a debated matter. It is plausible to retain that no one among the hierarchy was fully aware of the consequences of the vote, precisely because it was an anomaly of the system in an extraordinary context (that of a military debacle). Indeed, the Grandi agenda invited the King to regain command of the armed forces, but never mentioned, nor even implied, the Duce's dismissal²⁰.

This reflection again leads to the theory of a coup d'état carried out by the sovereign since it was the King who gave the order to arrest and replace Mussolini. Nonetheless, the coup d'état theory is not limited to the hypothesis of the King ordering a subversion of the current order. Merlini, among other authors, support the thesis of a coup d'état from within the same regime:

“It is true that the removal of the head of government by the King was required by law. It is also true, however, that the new head of government was not disclosed to the Crown of the Grand Council, based on what article 13 of the law of 1928 prescribed. Therefore, the function of the Grand Council as “guarantor of perpetuation of the regime”, that was at the

²⁰ What follows is the context of the Grandi Agenda (approved of with 19 favorable votes), available for consultation in R. De Felice, *Mussolini l'alleato*, v. 2. *Crisi e agonia del regime*, p. 1541: “The Grand Council, meeting these days of supreme trial, above all, turns its complete attention to the heroic fighters of all the military forces, side by side with the people of Sicily, whose highest shines the univocal faith of the Italian people, renewing the noble traditions of strenuous valor and indomitable spirit of sacrifice of our glorious Armed Forces. Having examined the internal and international situation and the political and military conduct of the war, it proclaims the duty of all Italians to defend, at all costs, the unity, independence, freedom of the Fatherlands, the fruits of the sacrifices and efforts of four generations from the Risorgimento to today, the life and future of the Italian people; affirms the need for the moral and material union of all Italians in this grave and decisive hour for the destinies of the Fatherland; declares that, to this end, the immediate restoration of all state functions is necessary, attributing to the Crown, the Grand Council, the Government, Parliament, the Corporations, the tasks and responsibilities established by our statutory and constitutional laws; invites the Government to pray to the Majesty the King, to whom the heart of the whole Nation turns faithfully and trustingly, that he will, for the honor and salvation of the Homeland, assume with the effective command of the Armed Forces of land, sea and air, in accordance with article 5 of the Statute of the Kingdom, that supreme initiative of decision which our institutions attribute to him and which have always been, throughout our national history, the glorious legacy of our Augusta Dynasty of Savoy”.

root of its constitutionalization, failed. However, the approval

of the Grandi agenda by the Grand Council in such a form

that it certainly constitutes a “lack of confidence” in the head of government (not provided for in the current regime), and the voluntary failure to indicate a successor are more like a coup d’état by the monarchy than a coup d’état within the regime.

But it was an exceptional circumstance: the only one that could,

beyond the form of government established by Fascism, restore

to the King that provisional dignity as head of State that he,

and through his own fault, had lost in 1928”²¹.

Therefore, according to Merlini, the constitutional failure must be placed in a moment before the Duce’s arrest and the end of the regime. Failing in their functions and prerogatives, the Grand Council took the responsibility for the “golpe”, justifying the following actions of the King. However, to this interpretation, there could be the objection that the hierarchy present at the meeting did not want the Fascist regime to end. In fact, some of them thought of saving Mussolini, lifting the weight of military power by restoring it to the King, a sort of buck-passing, that should have limited the consequences that a military defeat would have had in the Fascist regime²². The reason why no successor was appointed is attributable to the Grandi agenda which did not provide for a change that evidently would have dragged the whole institutional organization with it, putting the survival of the Fascist dictatorship in grave danger.

The common denominator among the hypotheses presented so far is the assumption that there was an institutional discontinuity due to either non-compliance with the rules or an act of force which generated the events of 25 July. And still, not everyone agrees. According to Lanchester, the constitutional justification of the Head of State’s intervention lies in the exceptional emergency condition due to the invasion of Italian

²¹ S. Merlini: *Il governo costituzionale*, in R. Romanelli (editor), *Storia dello Stato italiano dall’Unità a oggi*. Donzelli, Roma 1995. pp. 48-49.

²² E. Gentile, *25 luglio 1943*, p. 261, writes: “The invitation to the king, more than being an act of deference towards the sovereign and his constitutional powers, was meant to put pressure on the head of State to get him actively and personally *involved* in the resistance organization in enemy invasion, just as Vittorio Emanuele had done in the aftermath of Caporetto”.

territory, and so the regime change which resulted from it, would be but a consequence of legitimate royal action:

“The Grandi agenda is therefore formally placed with the Regime (and yet does not mention – unlike that of Farinacci – somehow the Head of Government), but form and substance highlight its collapse, and so, one can consider the action of the Sovereign and of the Badoglio Government as a consequence of “kissed rhymes”. The exceptional nature of the situation, characterized by the invasion of part of the national territory and the bombing of the capital, justified, even under the Statute, the intervention of the Head of State, while Mussolini’s arrest and the regulations aimed at the cancellation of the institutional structures of Fascism by the Badoglio Government, constituted a consequence”²³.

To the same conclusion concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the Duce’s dismissal, Ghisalberti, contrary to what Lanchester states, claims that the reason of the validity of what the Sovereign implemented, is to be sought in the Grand Council’s vote, a vote expressed in the context of legality. This is because, in his opinion, by virtue of its constitutionalization, the Grand Council was not enslaved to the will of its leader but was endowed by a certain autonomy which allowed it to express its opposition towards the Duce. Consequently, the coup d’état theory would not stand because there can be no talk of a change of regime that took place against the laws in force. In the same way, the King’s initiative and the appointment of a successor not designated by the Grand Council, are justified by the assumption that those powers exercised by the King had been conferred on him through the approval of the Grandi agenda²⁴.

²³ F. Lanchester, *Il Gran Consiglio del Fascismo e la monarchia rappresentativa*, pp. 3-4.

²⁴ C. Ghisalberti, *Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848/1948*. Laterza, Bari 1991, pp. 381-382: “Actually, if the constitutional forms were fully observed in the course of the

To sum up, according to this interpretation, we would be faced with a regime change that took place in accordance with the rules in force at the time. And the rule in force was the one that endowed the Grand Council with decision-making autonomy with respect to the Head of Government who presided over it.

Actually, the law of 1928, although it reserved to the Prime Minister a prominent role within the body, had never denied the collegial nature of the Grand Council, and consequently, that of the decisions made there. Furthermore, art.2 of the above-mentioned law, consented that the head of the assembly decided on the agenda. Now, “refusing to propose his own agenda, as it always happened at the end of the meetings, and accepting to put to a vote first the Grandi agenda, and ending the meeting after its approval, the Duce legitimized it as an official act of the Grand Council”²⁵.

Actually, it was Mussolini’s ambiguous attitude that prompted Emilio Gentile to reflect on a different conclusion from those presented so far; a conclusion that sees Mussolini “accept the vote of the Grand Council and his destitution by the government as his own act of abdication for extreme bitterness and repugnance, even if it was decided by the King”²⁶.

procedure that led to Mussolini’s removal and to Marshal Badoglio’s designation as the Council President, can be argued. He who considers the Grand Council as a body lacking its own will because it is always and solely destined to reflect the will of the Head of Government, and lacks the will to externalize any form of disagreement and opposition, is led to believe that the event of 25 July 1943 must be considered the same as a coup d’état carried out by the Monarchy against the regime and its leader. Those who instead start, as is more just, from the consideration that the constitutionalization of the Grand Council had attributed to it an autonomous responsibility and a power of expression of a collegial will, even dissimilar and dissenting from that of the head of Government who presided over it, must consider fully legitimate the vote expressed in that dramatic meeting of 25 July, and consequently, the revocation of Mussolini by the sovereign. (...) Nor the fact that Vittorio Emanuele III had proceeded to appoint a new prime minister in the person of a soldier, not designated by the Grand Council, as successor to the head of the government and indeed, extraneous to the executives of the Fascist Party, while this and that were dissolved, can give further input to the thesis of those who saw in the events of 25 July the realization of a coup d’état. Indeed, it was the Grand Council itself, the supreme constitutional body of the regime, that invited the King to sum up those statutory prerogatives that guaranteed him, in the absence of a normal parliamentary dialectic and precise nominative indications from a political class truly representative of the country, the power to choose the Council President and his ministers”.

²⁵ E. Gentile: *25 luglio 1943*, p. 243.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278, Gentile writes: “Mussolini’s demeanor during the twenty-four hours, from 5pm on 24 July to 5pm on 25 July, would have been nothing other than a ruse to finally find a way out of the train of history, on which he had intended to lead Italy, now that, because of him, it was a way of derailing towards an inevitable catastrophe”.

Conclusion

In reality, the thesis of a coup d'état, whether it was monarchical or from within the regime, does not hold. In the former case, it is difficult to speak of the King's reaction that expresses a clear discontinuity with the former regime, to such a point that, as a historian like Salvemini, who speaks of the forty-five-day government as a "fascism without Mussolini"²⁷. Likewise, one cannot speak of a distorted coup d'état and implemented in the Sala del Pappagallo just because, as has already been underlined, a fundamental element was missing: the hierarchy's intention to put an end to the regime. More likely, one could speak of an action that gave way to an "unknowing coup d'état". All things considered, those who speak of a coup d'état confuse the effect for the cause: the golpe (royal or by the regime) would have given rise to a change at the top, and actually the consequence of an ongoing process that had been on hold for some months, particularly when the military situation deteriorated, foreshadowing an existence of conflict very different from what was expected.

Even the hypothesis of an action of the Grand Council which expresses continuity with the institutional system and state legislative seems forced. The "return to the Statute" that some rebellious hierarchs hoped for, was nothing but a utopia. The statute, still formally in force, ceased to exist the moment in which the regulatory interventions of the regime had distorted the rationale that justified it and kept it alive.

So to call for a return to the statute to re-do an article, the fifth, whose de facto dictate was no longer in force, was an operation that, in terms of feasibility, were no different from the resurrection of the dead²⁸. Now if

²⁷ G. Salvemini: *L'Italia vista dall'America*, 2 vols. Feltrinelli, Milano. 1969, p. 163. The idea that the Americans had was not very different. On 26 July 1943, the New York Times published an article in which the concerns for a change in government, that did not convince all of the Allies, were well expressed: "Prof. G.A. Borgese of the University of Chicago, former University of Milan professor who left Italy twelve years ago because he would not take the Fascist oath, declared (...): I am glad to see that the arch criminal of Fascism has left his seat of power. (...) But the Allied must be careful to avoid another Darlan regime in Italy. Marshal Badoglio was responsible for the Ethiopian campaign and can be held responsible for many of the terrors of Fascism. Remember also that King Victor Emanuel allowed Fascism to grow". "The American people must make no mistake, this may be just the transfer of power from one Fascist to another," said Judge George L. Quilici, chairman of the Italian-American victory council. *Fall of Mussolini is hailed in Chicago: Italian Leaders hold Italy will soon quit war*, Special to the New York Times, 26/07/1943, p. 5.

²⁸ On this, consult F. Lanchester: *Il Gran Consiglio del Fascismo e la monarchia rappresentativa*, pp. 17-18. Lanchester introduces the concepts of a limit of elasticity and breaking load applicable to a constitution, the Albertine Statute for its flexible nature. According to the author, "The limit of elasticity, that is, the permanent deformation of the statutory system can be, therefore, already detected with the law on the Grand Council of

this operation had been successful and had managed to effectively reinstate the Statute, in its previous form, even by using fascist tampering, then yes, one could have spoken of a coup d'état intended in its definition of immediate change to the existing law. But it did not happen.

Although the NFP had already disbanded on 27 July, and shortly thereafter there was the suppression of the special Tribunal for the defense of the State, the collegial organizations to the Fascist Party, the Chamber of Fascists and of the Corporations, the Grand Council itself²⁹, was never reestablished, even because of the tragic bellicose Italian situation and German presence on the national territory, a normal dialectic which was part of the Statute as well as the Monarchy. In essence, the change from a dictatorial regime to a provisional strange one that seemed to be hybrid in as far as the sovereign did not dare fulfill that coup d'état, which, according to some, he would have merited had he led it. All the more, not even at an international level can one speak of a disruption of the status quo. Badoglio's first proclamation did not delay in reassuring the German allies by confirming Italian commitment in the struggle against the Anglo-Americans, in a clear reaffirmation of continuity with the former regime.

The real change of the regime – understood as a true form of resistance to Fascism, carried forward knowingly, with the clear objective of restoring a form of government different from the former one – happened at a later time, what with the civil war between partisans and republicans with the turning point of Salerno and with the war of liberation. Both interventions that came on 25 July can be qualified as an unknowing coup d'état (that of the hierarchs of the Grand Council), and an aborted coup d'état (the King's), attempted in the hope of saving themselves³⁰. The intermediate phase, that goes from 25 July to the proclamation of the republican Constitution (the moment in which one can officially speak of a new form of government, as well as of state), can be characterized, according to Villone, as “a constituent phase in which a confrontation opens between the options of the new constitutional laws

Fascism, which subjected the same royal succession to its scrutiny, but other more serious creaks related to the breaking load can be identified with regard to the formal structure (not substantive already vulnerable of the statute) with the law on the tidal wave of the empire and with the reform of the Chamber of bundles and corporations.”

²⁹ M. Villone: *L'alba dell repubblica*. Online manual. Il tempo della Costituzione. Napoli, 2008. p. 5. <http://scriptaweb.eu/Catalogo/iltempo-della-costituzione>. Free availability for consultation at: <http://scriptaweb.eu/Catalogo/alba-della-repubblica>.

³⁰ Contrary to what Grandi affirms, it is improbable to believe that, with the vote of the Grand Council, the hierarchs wanted to provoke the Duce's fall: that would have been an inconsiderate move possibly resulting in unforeseeable and dangerous implications. For its part, the Crown meant to rid itself of what had become a burden – a Duce who had lost both his charisma and authority – without but a set in motion, a mechanism of total institutional upheaval that could have dragged with it the monarchy itself.

that will be measured”³¹. At first, this changing context was an advantage to the Crown.

Once Mussolini was arrested, - it was a relief for Vittorio Emanuele III, who could finally get rid of the man, who for twenty years had questioned his role – the King worked on a process of purging the dictatorship from Fascism, but fundamentally maintained the authoritarian regime: he was very careful not to remove the ban on instituting political parties and repression to safeguard national security that characterized the 45 day government to be actually more ruthless than that of the regime that he had just declared fallen³². On naming Badoglio – if we accept Ragionieri’s reconstruction as true – the Monarchy used the prime minister as an insignificant figure making his own important decisions in both foreign and domestic policies³³.

However, at this point, if the hypothesis of a coup d’état is excluded, and the thesis of a legal change that was produced from within the regime is discarded, who caused Mussolini’s fall?

Mussolini attributes his fall to the bellicose defeat that was going on in the battlefield³⁴. In fact, without wanting to deny the existence of fracture and contradictions inherent to the regime, it is without a doubt, that before the outbreak of the conflict, these were managed without great difficulty by the Duce. The dissention, which in 1943 broke out in several episodes of strikes, was kept silent by the system of repression; the internal front to the regime, the fascists, was knitted to the figure of Mussolini, who has been enjoying charisma and holding strong as the leader of Italy for almost twenty years. The Monarch, the only one who would have had sufficient authority to undermine the Mussolini project, found refuge in apathy that had relegated him to an extra role. Even internationally, Fascism enjoyed the sympathies of some British and American conservative sectors, who considered it a good means of contrasting the bogeyman of communism, and at the same time, a danger certainly smaller compared to the threatening German revisionism. The regime was, all things considered, well established and stable for almost two decades after its birth.

³¹ M. Villone: *L'alba della repubblica*, p. 5.

³² E. Ragionieri: *Storia d'Italia dall'unità a oggi*. Vol. IV. Einaudi, Torino, 1976. p. 2335.

³³ Ibid. p. 2336.

³⁴ B. Mussolini: *Opera Omnia*. Edited by E. Susmel and D. Susmel. 35 Vols. La Fenice, Firenze, 1951-1963. Vol. XXXIV, p. 279. Supporting this thesis, the RAI TV program “Il Tempo e la Storia” of May 31, 2017, can be viewed. Professor G. Sabbatucci takes part in the program. Last viewing was April 11, 2020.

Undoubtedly, it was the war that changed the cards on the table. Since the proclamation of Italian participation, the awareness of the country's military unpreparedness had favored the birth and worsened the cracks in the internal front. On the international front, the British and American conservatism that had endorsed Fascism was now fighting it. The worsening fortunes of the war had then exacerbated internal disputes and loosened the grip of repression on the territory, opening a breach in the authoritarian blanket from which the opponents of the regime as well as the starving population could take advantage of. The allied invasion of Italian territory had definitively compromised the charisma of the leader, plunging the regime into a crisis without solution.

In conclusion, it can be said that the so-called coup d'état was nothing more than a heteronomous process (therefore neither internal to the regime nor internal to the state institutions) which resulted, on the one hand, from a war now lost, and on the other hand, from the Anglo-American decision not to accept the survival of the opposing totalitarian regimes³⁵.

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³⁵ The alliance with the Soviet Union categorically prevented the acceptance of the survival of Fascism despite the benevolence with which it had been welcomed at the time of its affirmation.

content/uploads/2018/01/Lanchester-Gran-Consiglio-Nomos-3-2017.pdf.

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<http://scriptaweb.eu/Catalogo/alba-della-repubblica>

ESTABLISHING A HETEROLINGUAL WORLD

Abdullah Al Mamun Bhuiyan*

bhuiyan@kku.edu.sa

Abstract: *Currently, there are approximately 7000 living languages in the world and all are not equally valued and used; only imperial languages enjoy prestige and attention. Some factors like large population, enriched literature, powerful societies, political influence, social status, strong economy, economic investment and well-built cultural background play behind the persuasion of few dominant languages. The ruthless impact of these languages falls on marginalized and endangered one. Perishing of a language does not only take away a language, rather it accompanies the history, culture, identity, thought and biodiversity of a society. A number of recent studies have shown that environmental knowledge embedded in indigenous names, oral traditions and taxonomies is often lost when a community shifts to another language¹. On the other hand, in this globalized and digital world, there is no way to keep the distance from the influence of powerful languages. It is important to realize that all languages bear different world outlooks, cultures, social values, and lifestyles whether they have a strong political, economic and social backgrounds or not. Since indigenous and endangered languages provide us hidden knowledge and education about history, culture, food habit and even medicine; language documentation, protection and promotion are mandatory in this trajectory situation of the mankind. Therefore, in this paper, the author discusses the importance of caring all languages in the world.*

Keywords: *language diversity, communication tool, endangered languages, protecting languages, language investment.*

Introduction

Currently, “6,909 known living languages”² prevail in the world and among this plethora of languages; only a few like English, Spanish, French, Arabic and Mandarin Chinese are dictating the world leaving strong marks on politics, economics, culture, media, and intellectual fields for several

* Lecturer, Department of English, College of Science and Arts, Tanumah, King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia.

¹ UNESCO's *Endangered Languages Programme*. (n.d). Retrieved from <http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/FlyerEndangeredLanguages-WebVersion.pdf>

² Sallabank, J., 2010, *Language Endangerment: Problems and Solutions*. eSharp. Retrieved from https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_141050_en.pdf

decades. The most powerful languages as native language and L2 language are demonstrated in the following table³.

Country	Native speakers	L2 speakers
English	400 million	700 million
Mandarin	960 million	No information
French	80 million	230 million
Spanish	470 million	100 million
Arabic	420 million	No information
Russian	150 million	260 million
German	90 million	15 million
Japanese	125 million	No information
Portuguese	215 million	250 million
Hindi	260 million	120 million

The influence of the above-mentioned languages is as profoundly rooted as it seems like there are only a handful languages in the world. All eyes are on these languages as they are cyphers of a good job, decent salary, social position, economic development and prestige. This language polarization left a blind spot on other languages as dominating languages ensure a person a better life and preeminence. Besides, constitutional, political and legal barriers are also in some ways compelling people to sideline their own languages. That means “linguistic systems are affected by the socioeconomic and political conditions of individuals”⁴. These derogatory consequences have bad influence on endangered languages mostly which have no written documents and used by a handful number of people. Concerning this, UNESCO states that “with the disappearance of unwritten and undocumented languages, humanity would lose not only an irreplaceable cultural heritage but also valuable ancestral knowledge embedded, in particular, in indigenous languages”⁵.

Since the world is running after the cream of the crop, it is the responsibility of individuals, society, language institutes, and nation-states to popularize and preserve their own languages. Therefore, in this paper,

³ Vincent, (2017, September 5). The 10 Most Powerful Languages in the World. Retrieved from <http://lifehacklane.com/the-most-powerful-languages-in-the-world-1/>

⁴ Boada, A.B., Language policy and planning as an interdisciplinary field: towards a complexity approach. *Current Issues in Language Planning*, (14(3-04): 361-281). doi: 10.1080/14664208.2013.829276

⁵ UNESCO’s *Endangered Languages Programme*. (n.d). Retrieved from <http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/FlyerEndangeredLanguages-WebVersion.pdf>

the author focuses on different perspectives of shielding languages as it is the crucial digital phase to protect all languages whether they are collectively significant or trivial. Following aspects can work as catalysts to empowering and popularizing native endangered and minor languages.

Importance of Language Investment or “Langvestment”

Language investment does not only mean financing money to documenting language; rather to promoting, popularizing and practicing languages among people. For example, there are thousands of books on Greek and Latin languages; however, they are regarded as dead languages for narrow scope and lackluster using of these languages. In contrast, Hebrew, the almost dead language, is rejuvenated by the Israeli people and it took more than 120 years to bring it to this position which was initiated by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda in 1881. “A hundred and fifty years ago, Hebrew was not a spoken language. It was literally nobody’s mother tongue. Today, more than 9 million people speak Hebrew and, for the majority of them, it’s their native tongue”⁶. That means, the sustenance of a language depends on the users of that language. If the investment simultaneously covers the recording, popularizing and exercising, and securing monetary assurance of endangered language users, we can tackle the extinction of the jeopardized languages. Therefore, language preservation can be divided into four phases. They are described below.

Funding to protect languages

Protection of endangered languages majorly depends on government funding though there are organizations which are working and funding relentlessly despite having little impact on the language revitalization program. Here, Alaska can be a good instance; Alaska is well-known for their language preservation program; the concerned authority there also facing shortage of funding.

In March 2018, Alaska House Representative Dan Ortiz called for a state of emergency to protect the 20 Indigenous languages in Alaska. Yet Alaska is well-known in the world of Indigenous language revitalization (ILR) as being a leader in developing and implementing creative community-based programs and initiatives to promote and preserve its languages. The problem is not a lack of community interest or willingness, but rather a lack of funding. The great majority of Alaska’s ILR programs are funded through universities, private organizations, and small federal grants.

⁶ Hebrew Language Day: The revival of the language of the Bible. (n.d.). Retrieved May 01, 2020, from <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/israelexperience/history/pages/hebrew-language-day-the-revival-of-the-language-of-the-bible.aspx>

Sustainable funding from the state or the federal government is not available, leading to a state of linguistic emergency⁷.

Alaska is one example of many around the globe; Moseley (2010) lists 2464 endangered languages from 160 countries, and the great majority of these are underfunded and under-resourced, making language revitalization a challenging task⁸.

If we focus on the monetary support of some developed but linguistically enriched countries, it is just a nutshell. For instance, First People’s Cultural Council in 2018 published a report where it is seen that the investment of different countries is highly disappointing.

The following chart demonstrates the expenditures of the government of 10 countries on Indigenous Language Revitalization ILR (in CAD)⁹:

Country	Per-capita (Indigenous)	Per-capita (Total)	Percentage of GDP
Spain	\$1,329.77	\$58.37	0.1690%
Norway	\$783.38	\$8.14	0.0082%
Scotland	\$526.45	\$8.45	0.0180%
New Zealand	\$267.06	\$40.25	0.0787%
Wales	\$108.85	\$19.58	0.0594%
Brazil	\$47.83	\$0.20	0.0018%
Sweden	\$29.03	\$0.09	0.0001%
Australia	\$18.82	\$0.51	0.0008%
United States	\$5.64	\$0.14	0.0023%
Mexico	\$0.09	\$0.02	0.0002%

⁷ Bliss, H., (2018, September). A Global Perspective on Costing Indigenous Language Revitalization. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from <http://www.fpcc.ca/files/PDF/Publications/Bliss-Global-ILR.pdf>

⁸ ibid

⁹ ibid

Comparisons between countries reveal a wide range of costing models; whereas Spain, Norway, and Scotland all spend upwards of \$500 per Indigenous person on ILR, Mexico spends less than 10 cents¹⁰.

Recording (Using technology)

Technology specially artificial intelligence can be a blessing for preserving and reviving endangered languages. Here, several technological giant companies like IBM and Google have come forward to make apps and devices for endangered languages. For instance, Google's TensorFlow is a machine learning system which "has a comprehensive, flexible ecosystem of tools, libraries and community resources that lets researchers push the state-of-the-art in ML (Machine Learning) and developers easily build and deploy ML powered applications"¹¹. [On the other hand,] Jason Lovell ... co-founded a Facebook Messenger chatbot powered by IBM Watson artificial intelligence that understands and replies to users in both te reo Māori and English¹².

Besides, smartphone apps can be play a big role in spreading and popularizing indigenous and endangered languages as there are more that 3.5 billion smartphone users in the world now. Commercially, this is not viable for software companies; but, for ecological balance of the world, government agencies should take primary initiatives by monetary supporting of software developing individual who are working on language protection as well as software companies. Here, Lindsay Williams can be a good example; she made a list of Apple app link, Android App link and direct web link of above 100 indigenous and endangered language resources¹³.

Organize Your Language as a Communication Tool

For globalization, mainland business and technology, the world is coming in our grasp day by day. In the present world for business communication, you need to know at least two languages: English and your mother language. Goyolin and Zarate suggest that "if you know more languages, you have the opportunity to understand the business world because the increasingly multilingual and multicultural nature of global

¹⁰ *ibid*

¹¹ Ibaraki, S. (2018, November 27). Turning To AI To Save Endangered Languages. Retrieved May 01, 2020, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2018/11/23/turning-to-ai-to-save-endangered-languages/>

¹² *ibid*

¹³ Ultimate List of Language Learning Resources. (n.d.). Retrieved May 01, 2020, from

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-Yqo5P3GvP3fFU_JZU9tbG_9bbeLiSiiPhSLWkiBb9g/edit

exchanges has raised questions about traditionally monolingual and monoculture nature of language education”¹⁴. In the current competitive global world, you cannot predict that your powerful language will facilitate your communication. For example, if we glance over the booming economy of Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, is the evidence enough that tomorrow’s business community will be widely immersed in the Arab world. Moreover, in twenty years, because of the expansion of the business world in Asia, many students will have to become bi- or tri-lingual¹⁵. That means the story of knowing good English will open all opportunities for you, is coming to an end within the next fifty years. It is already evidenced in the business domain ... British companies often miss out on export opportunities because of a lack of relevant language skills¹⁶. This goes without saying that it is the right time to make your language attractive and important along with the economic development of your nation.

If we consider the English language, we see that English is used as lingua franca and as a de facto in communication for a long time. It did not take place in one day. It took more than 100 years to give it today’s position.

For example, in 1888, Alexander Melville Bell presented World English, a scheme of revised spellings intended to help learners acquire the language. Later on, Jean-Paul Nerriere talked about the pragmatic form of English constructing of 1500 words, intended to make it possible for everyone in the world to understand everyone else. The goal of taking these initiatives was to establish a community, without territorial boundaries, of people who use English; to make it useful not just normal but also prestigious; and to market it as a language of riches, opportunity, scholarship, democracy and moral right¹⁷.

These initiatives are also supported by economic, political and colonial influences, and also by sophisticated education and media, and sometimes also by military force.

The Irish language is also another good example as it was almost extinct just 100 years ago.

¹⁴ Kramsch, C., (2008), Ecological perspectives on foreign language education. *Language Teaching*. (41(03): 389-408). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/S0261444808005065

¹⁵ Axelson, B., (2014, May 27). *The future of foreign languages*. Retrieved from <http://www.scholastic.com/browse/article.jsp?id=7540>

¹⁶ Hitchings, H., (2014, May 27). What’s the language of future? Retrieved from HTTP://WWW.SALON.COM/2011/11/06/WHATS_THE_LANGUAGE_OF_THE_FUTURE/

¹⁷ *ibid*

This language was in danger of dying out because many Irish, after centuries of English rule, identified more with England than with their native isle. That changed as Ireland became an economic hot spot in a while. The so-called "Celtic Tiger" economic boom of the late 20th and early 21st centuries may have saved the Irish language from extinction. Tourism boomed, and suddenly it became chic to speak the mother tongue. Still, Irish has a long way to go. While schools teach it as a mandatory subject, the language is spoken in few homes¹⁸.

In the face of struggles, in a roundabout way, we can say that it is the right time to epitomize your language as a commodity with the help of technology. Now, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is playing a crucial role in preserving and spreading indigenous endangered languages. For example,

ARC Centre of Excellence for the Dynamics of Language (CoEDL), is working to transcribe and preserve endangered languages... CoEDL partnered with Google in 2017 to develop machine learning technologies to process the audio recordings. Thus far, this data has been used to develop AI models for 12 Indigenous languages in Australia¹⁹.

If you can make your language significant and appealing along with trade and industrial development of your nation, your language will get more stable and standard position to the world community; here efforts of FPCC can be a good model.

First Peoples' Cultural Council (FPCC)...to support the revitalization of Indigenous languages, arts, culture and heritage in British Columbia, works with local communities to archive linguistic data and produce teaching programs and apps through its First Voices platform. First Voices' latest innovation is a Keyboard App that enables users to type in over 100 Indigenous languages on any app in their mobile device, including social media, e-mails and word processing²⁰.

¹⁸ *The Armenian Language & its Place in the Indo-European Linguistic Family*. (n.d). Retrieved from <http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/curiosity/topics/8-european-languages/>

¹⁹ Ibaraki, S. (2018, November 27). Turning To AI To Save Endangered Languages. Retrieved May 01, 2020, from

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2018/11/23/turning-to-ai-to-save-endangered-languages/>

²⁰ *ibid*

Self-Awareness

A person's [language], cultural, ethnic, or religious identities are likely to have a significant influence, either conscious or subconscious, on their beliefs, behaviour, values, and attitudes²¹. [Among all these identities] native language of people is like a treasure-house, generation after generation stores up the fruits of the deepest movements of thought and the history of events²². Native language represents society and views of the people of that particular society by verbal communication, written documents, literature and so forth. Native language becomes resourceful when this language is preserved, documented and practised as it should be. If a group of people unfortunately extinct for any natural calamity, an epidemic—their written documents will represent their language, society, people, culture, opinions, thoughts and most importantly their orthography. The compendium is that it is the responsibility of a particular group of people and nation-state to protect their languages. Above all, language protection and language learning require dedication, persistence, devotion, motivation and support from everyone living in the community. Here, Kuldip Musale from India's Western Maharashtra state is a good exemplar. He belongs to a remote nomadic tribe, and he recorded songs and voices of elders on his smartphone when he got the chance to go home as he studied onboarding schools²³. This instance stands up for an individual who can also play a vital role in preserving his or her mother tongue.

In preserving a language, at firsthand, written manuscripts are the best way to preserve and protect a language, for instance, Hebrew was almost a dead language and desire of Israeli people to use Hebrew in writing books, documentation, education, official documentation and daily use has defended a dead language from being extinct. Moreover, they recognized Hebrew their national language as it holds their identity.

On the other hand, self-awareness and nationalistic view are also essential for protecting a language, for instance, the Basque language of

²¹ Working with people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. (2010). *Child Safety*. Retrieved from Queensland Government. Retrieved from <https://www.communities.qld.gov.au/resources/childsafety/practice-manual/prac-paper-working-cald.pdf>

²² Spirkin, A., (1983), Philosophy as a world-view and a methodology. *Dialectical Materialism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/spirkin/works/dialectical-materialism/index.html>

²³ Das, B., (2013, December 29), Social media rescues dying Indian languages. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/social-media-rescues-dying-indian-languages-201311277047252312.html>

northern Spain and southern France is struggling, but a strong Basque nationalist movement in Spain has kept the number of speakers steady²⁴.

However, manuscript of a language can be a lost labour if the written documents of the language are not handled properly from one generation to the next one, for instance, during Qing dynasty in China, Man language was used as the “national language” and there were a huge amount of books and documentaries written by Man and more than 200,000 pieces still exists now²⁵. However, there are now 1000 speakers of that language²⁶. It is under their impression that the extinction of this society will lead those documentaries not to be understood and their archaeological values also cannot be appreciated. That means written documentation and nurturing of a language should be done simultaneously.

On the whole, everybody from a particular group, big or small, should realize that their languages are theirs. They may learn powerful languages like English, French, and Spanish for their survival, but most important for them the language that they can speak to their parents, their grandparents, beloved one without having to bother about the popularity of the language.

We should comprehend that English can be a language of power politics does not mean English is superior. By using, for example, Swahili, we will be able to express many feelings and emotions that we cannot express by using Standard English. Moreover, making your language popular and substantial means making your literature and culture admired, along with the business opportunity of your country. Here, the internet can play a dynamic role. By making videos and audios on one's one language, he or she can upload it on YouTube, Facebook or other social media sites within limited cost and effort which will make an endangered or minor language known to others from any corner of the world.

Focusing on Some Specific Regions or Countries

On the ground of protecting languages, it is impossible to work on so many languages at the same time at different places. According to Sallabank, “63% of languages exist in Asia and Africa (Asia: 33% and Africa: 30%)”²⁷. Since languages are perishing quickly, it is ideal to work on more languages within a short distance, less effort, limited budget and speedily.


²⁴ *The Armenian Language & its Place in the Indo-European Linguistic Family*. (n.d). Retrieved from <http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/curiosity/topics/8-european-languages/>

²⁵ Zhang, C., Ma, Q., (2012). The Protection of Endangered Languages in Mainland China. *Theory and Practice in Language Studies*. (Vol. 2 (4), pp. 713-718). Finland: Academy publisher.

²⁶ *ibid*

²⁷ Sallabank, J., (2010). Language Endangerment: Problems and Solutions. *eSharp*. Retrieved from https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_141050_en.pdf

Regarding this point, Nichols “proves that diversity of language stocks are found to be higher in coastal regions, and lower latitudes, and in wetter and less seasonal climates, but lower in continental interiors, high latitudes and in the dryer and seasonal climates”²⁸. [Based on the classification of Nichols it can be said that] “linguistic diversity is most densely concentrated in the most ecologically rich areas of the world, such as Papua New Guinea or central Africa”²⁹. For example, in Nigerian 500 languages are used; within Gombe, Bauchi, Parts of Nassarawa, Plateau states 83 languages are used as shown in the following map³⁰.




²⁸ Wendel, J., & Heinrich, P., A framework for language endangerment dynamics: the effects of contact and social change on language ecologies and language diversity. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*. (218: 145-166). Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2012.

²⁹ Hieber, D., (2014, September 14). Rethinking Ecolinguistic Diversity. Retrieved from <http://dlc.hypotheses.org/570>

³⁰ Nigeria Map 3. (2015, January 01). *Ethnologue Languages of the World*. Retrieved from http://www.ethnologue.com/map/NG_03

In addition, if we come across Papua New Guinea, 820 languages or 11.86% of world languages are used and the total number of population is only 5,545,268. Among these languages 196 ... languages are considered extinct or endangered by UNESCO. On the other hand, 742 languages are used in Indonesia³¹. In coda, it can be said that if we just document languages of above-mentioned countries, we can cover almost 30% languages of the world.

Number of languges which have five or less number of speakers in the world
 Source:<http://www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/index.php?hl=en&page=atlasmap&lid=2738>



On the other hand, if we concentrate on 130 critically endangered languages which has five or less number of speakers, we need to cover only 28 countries. Remarkably, almost 60% (74 languages) of these languages are enclosed by four countries: United States of America, Brazil, Australia and Vanuatu. The following pie chart shows the sharing of the aforementioned languages country wise³².

³¹ Top 20 Languages by Number of Languages Spoken. (2015, January 06). *World Languages and Cultures*. Retrieved from

http://www.vistawide.com/languages/20_countries_most_languages.htm


³² *UNESCO Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger*. (2020, April 10). Retrieved from

<http://www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/index.php?hl=en&page=atlasmap&lid=2738>

Besides, even if we concentrate on languages which have six to ten speakers, the above-mentioned countries covers around 60% of languages. The chart is shown below³³.

Languages which have six to ten speakers in the world

Source: <http://www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/index.php?hl=en&page=atlasmap&lid=2738>



meta-chart.com

Further, if we deal with a limited number of languages which are the most endangered languages and have less than 1000 speakers, it is easy to document them as soon as possible. Here it is better to start with auditory and visual documentation than written one since written documentation is time-consuming. There are 1135 endangered languages listed by UNESCO and published in the Guardian newspaper, have less than 1000 speakers, and they are classified as severely endangered, definitively endangered, vulnerable, critically endangered languages. Some of these are described below regionally which have less than 150 speakers.

[In North America], the Yuchi language of Oklahoma, United States, has only five speakers. In Canada, Lakota, which is spoken in only one community and Oneida, an eastern language, now spoken in three communities. In Mexico and Central America, Ixil is spoken by about 60 people in Guatemala and southern Mexico. Another language Kickapoo is spoken by about 150 people in Mexico and the United States³⁴.

³³ ibid

³⁴ *America: country or continent?* (2014, December 30). Retrieved from Curiosity website: <http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/curiosity/topics/10-north-american-languages/>

In South America, Ache, spoken by a group in Paraguay, and Leco has only 20 remaining speakers in Bolivia³⁵.

In Europe, the Saami languages, spoken by a few hundred people in Scandinavia, are endangered, and Vilamovian, a language of the Wilamowice village of southern Poland, has only about 70 speakers remaining³⁶.

In Asia, India's Sirmaudi language is on the verge of extinction and Ruga, of southern India, has only 100 living speakers³⁷. In Japan, the number of native speakers of Ainu is estimated to be between 15 and 40³⁸.

Spotlight on Dispersed Indigenous People

Due to urbanization, securing a better life, land disputes, collisions with the majority, converting religion, epidemic, ignorance, education and migration, indigenous people are dispersed and scattered from their traditional community areas. Hussain in his writing says that [in the then East Pakistan] “the Pakistan government built a Kaptai Hydro – Electric Dam at Chittagong in 1962”³⁹. As a result of this project thousands and thousands of hill people became internally displaced and lost everything, many of them became a refugee in India and Myanmar⁴⁰. Chakma Chief (an indigenous group of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh) shows disappointment regarding this displacement. He says, “tens of thousands of people in all of the three districts—hill people and ethnic Bengali residents who were displaced by the Kaptai Dam in 1960; almost the entire population of the indigenous Khyang people...have been affected”⁴¹. In consequences, indigenous groups who used to live where they had mutual understanding, profound knowledge about the ecosystem of that area and there was the possibility of coining and borrowing new words. Beyond question, we can say that by dislocating indigenous people this process of language evolution and knowledge sharing from generation to generation have been bidding adieu. Same situation was

³⁵ 25 Crazy facts about languages. (2014, December 31). Retrieved from <http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/curiosity/topics/9-south-american-languages/>

³⁶ *The Armenian Language & its Place in the Indo-European Linguistic Family*. (n.d). Retrieved from <http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/curiosity/topics/8-european-languages/>

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ How to say “happy new year” in different languages. (2014, December 31). Retrieved from <http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/curiosity/topics/6-japan/>

³⁹ Zahed, I.U.M., (2013). Conflict between the government and the indigenous people of Chittagong hill tracts in Bangladesh. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. (16(5): 97-102). Retrieved from www.iosjournals.org

⁴⁰ *ibid*

⁴¹ Gain, P., (2000). Life and Nature at Risk. *The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Life and Nature at Risk*. (pp. 01-41). Dhaka: Society for Environment and Human Development.

created in Brazil on the Mearim and Pindaré rivers used to live the Krenyé, the Kukoikateyê and the "Pobzé" group of people, however, in 1855 an epidemic swept through, killing many of them and forcing others to flee⁴². On the other hand, in 1789 a smallpox epidemic decimates the Eora Aboriginal people of Port Jackson, Botany Bay and Broken Bay in Australia⁴³.

In 1972 when Martín von Hildebrand, founder, and director of Gaia Amazonas and the Colombian Amazon (COAMA) programme, traveled into the heart of the Colombian Amazon he saw that the indigenous people were heavily in debt to the local rubber traders and the indigenous people who were under the control of Christian missionaries were forced to reject their local religion, language and culture in order to embrace the Christian way⁴⁴.

It is already proved that people of a community should live together to exchange their language, culture, traditions and lifestyle from one generation to another. Supporting this idea Alexander Vujic says that "Homogenous minorities [i.e. geographically concentrated] have more opportunity to preserve their language and culture in education through medium of mother tongue, while dispersed minorities, whose only opportunity is more often just to learn their language, are strongly faced with assimilation processes and loss of their language and culture"⁴⁵. Therefore, ensuring a congenial environment for indigenous or minor communities is the precondition before ensuring language and cultural rights. People of endangered communities should realize that their self-esteem is flagged through their language and culture.

Special Policy for Protecting Endangered Languages

[A specific language policy is important for protecting endangered and minor languages because] "any actions taken concerning languages

⁴² Dispersion and coalescence of the timbira peoples. (2015, January 23). Retrieved from website: <http://pib.socioambiental.org/en/povo/timbira/1822>

⁴³ Korff, J., (2014). Aboriginal history timeline (1770–1899). *Creative Spirits*. Retrieved from <http://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/history/aboriginal-history-timeline-1770-1899>

⁴⁴ Hildebrand, M., (2007). *The Colombian Amazon: An Indigenous Peoples' Journey*. Retrieved from The Gaia Foundation website: <http://www.giaiafoundation.org/the-colombian-amazon-an-indigenous-peoples-journey>

⁴⁵ Emmons, K., (2009). *Bilingual teaching heads to the front of the class in Vietnam*. Minority Rights Group International. Retrieved from website: <http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=662>

will affect the daily lives of the people who use those”⁴⁶. If a language is subordinated and unrecognized, it will obviously create a bad impact in using that language. As far as usage is concerned, subordinate languages are characterized by constant incursions on the part of the dominant languages in all areas of use, leading to a narrow and limited functionality, creating a vicious circle that feeds on and exacerbates the subordination⁴⁷. In this circumstance, language policy plays a vital role in shielding and empowering a language, and even the normalcy of a country, for example, 1952 language movement in the then East Pakistan on all hands was against making Urdu the sole state language of Pakistan and later on, that movement gradually turned into the liberation war of Bangladesh.

Regarding language policy and planning Cooper says that “the stated aim of language planning is to trigger specific transformations in the linguistic practices of a given human community, and language planning was born with a markedly prescriptive character: because language is the primary factor in the cohesion and homogenization of human societies, the configuration of the homogenous linguistic system (standard) and the rational management of diversity (multilingualism regulation) was, therefore, also the emerging tools for emerging nations in the post-war context in the 1960s”⁴⁸. Therefore, it is important to establish a specific language policy which recognizes all languages mostly which are insignificant, powerless and marginalized.

Improving Economic Condition of Endangered Language Community

The economy has a big influence on the using of the native language. Since the global economy is controlled by the speakers of handful languages, it is the tendency of the human being to sacrifice his or her language for a better life and ensured job opportunity. Besides,

it is well known that economic growth or the desire to achieve it can drive language lose... dominant languages such as Mandarin Chinese and English are often required for upward mobility in education and business, and economic assistance often encourages recipients to speak dominant languages⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ Fouces, O., (2010). (Eco)linguistic planning and language-exchange management. *MonTI2trans*. Retrieved from

http://rua.ua.es/dspace/bitstream/10045/16449/1/MonTI_2_14_trans.pdf

⁴⁷ *ibid*

⁴⁸ *ibid*

⁴⁹ Underwood, E., (2014, September 2). Languages are Being Wiped Out by Economic Growth. *Science*. Retrieved from

<https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/09/languages-are-being-wiped-out-economic-growth>

It does not only happen with endangered language communities but also major language speakers. For instance, in the Indian subcontinent countries, efficacy in all skills of English is considered to be as a positive quality rather than knowing perfect Bangla or Hindi for getting a good job, though they have millions of users. Since these major language users have big communities and well-built background, they have little impact compared to have endangered language comprised of few users.

At this point, government and individual sponsorship can play a big role in changing the economic condition of deprived indigenous and endangered language users, for instance, “Manx language which was declared dead by UNESCO in the 1990s, ameliorating of the situation was spearheaded by activists like Stowell and driven by lottery funding and a sizeable contribution (currently £100,000 a year) from the Manx government”⁵⁰.

As well, job opportunities should be created within the area of the endangered speakers where the working language would be their mother tongue. It will encourage the minor people to learn their mother tongue. Even the newspapers, books, medium of instructions at school, road signs and billboards should be written in their language beside the national language which is done in the Isle of Man regarding reviving Manx language⁵¹. It will inspire them to have a positive attitude about their own language. As a result, people will be confident to use their own languages for economic activities.

Conclusion

We should realize that language diversity is not a problem rather it is a blessing for us. However, the problem remains with constant users of the language. Concerning this issue Sallabank mentions that

only about 80 of the 6000+ languages in the world have more than 10 million users, it is clear that the vast majority of languages are used by relatively small numbers of people. It is thought that 95% of the world’s languages have less than 1 million native speakers/signers, with an average of approximately 6000 users per language⁵².

⁵⁰ Manx: Bringing a language back from the dead. (2013, January 31). *BBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21242667>

⁵¹ Manx: Bringing a language back from the dead. (2013, January 31). *BBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21242667>

⁵² Sallabank, J., (2010). Language Endangerment: Problems and Solutions. *eSharp*. Retrieved from https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_141050_en.pdf

On the other hand, Wittgenstein says that "...the speaking of a language is a part of an action or a form of life, and ... a language [is] deeply rooted in human life, social and physical reality" ⁵³. By recognizing and rehabilitating a language, we can save a language, a culture, a society and world vision of a group of people. People should concur with the idea that their languages are part of their identities. Rebuffing a language means indifferent to the identity of a group of people. Realizing the plight of an endangered language, United Nations has announced 2019 as the International Year of Indigenous Languages to increase public awareness. Therefore, distinguishing a language is the first step to protecting that language. In addition, ensuring a congenial atmosphere for co-existence of all languages leads to the fortification of linguistic and cultural diversity in the world.

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LINGUOCOGNITIVE ASPECT OF METAPHORIZATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TERMINOLOGY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY SPHERE

Elena Syrotina*

o.mishak@nubip.edu.ua

Abstract: *The article deals with the cognitive mechanisms of metaphorization in biotechnological terminology of the English language. Metaphorical nominations preserve the consistency laid down in the terminology during its construction and based on the classifications that have developed in this field of knowledge, and also introduce their consistency into the terminology system. In terms of the theory of conceptual metaphor, the main donor zones have been indentified within terminology under consideration. Donor zones are viewed as source of metaphorical nominations of biotechnological terms. The main categories of varieties of metaphorization of the studied biotechnological terminology are analyzed. The author examines the definitions of the studied biotechnology terms, simultaneously distinguishes the lexical meanings of source-words and their semantic components involved in the transmission of meaning. It is concluded that the processes of metaphorization have demonstrated extraordinary activity in terminology, being based on the use of signs of some subject spheres to refer to others.*

Keywords: *metaphorization, biotechnology, terminology, terminological unit, term formation, conceptual metaphor.*

Introduction

Rapidly growing scientific and technological progress gives rise to ever new branches of science and technology, which, in particular, are developing their lexical and terminological apparatus. The study and description of terms arising in new branches of knowledge is one of the relevant areas of modern linguistic research. Of course, the field of biotechnology, which has been developing actively in recent years isn't exception.

Biotechnology is one of the relatively young subject areas. It is being processed. This actualizes the study of the current state and patterns of terminology development of this area, which is necessary for a deeper understanding of the modern dynamics of the formation and verbalization

* **PhD. in Pedagogy, lecturer at National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine.**

of the world scientific picture of the world, as well as the prospects for its further development.

The dynamic development of biotechnology generates new concepts, that require a nomination. It often occurs on the basis of commonly used vocabulary by selecting semantic features that are relevant to the designated object.

One of the most effective mechanisms for creating terminological units is a metaphorical nomination. Metaphor terms are represented widely in various fields of biotechnology and rooted firmly in its terminology.

As a rule, a metaphorical term reflects the accumulated experience of specialists in a certain field of knowledge and creates new knowledge, enriching the corresponding terminological area.

The question of the role of metaphor in the formation, structuring, and functioning in the biotechnological terminology remains insufficiently studied, which in combination with the high performance of metaphorical models and the effectiveness of metaphors in modern biotechnology indicates the relevance of our research.

Thus, the relevance of this study is determined by the fact that, on the one hand, metaphor is an important part of language and needs further study, and on the other hand, there are no scientific papers on the study of metaphor in the English biotechnological lexis. At the same time, the latter is one of the important thematic groups, as it nominates the phenomena and processes that each person encounters on a daily basis.

The analysis of the scientific literature

Metaphor is a linguistic concept: it is inherent in all languages at all times, but it does not lose its relevance today. Modern science knows several areas in the study of metaphor and the processes of metaphorization. Today, the most common theories that explain the mechanism of metaphor are semantic and cognitive ones.

Despite the large number of modern linguistic works devoted to metaphor as a phenomenon of language (A. Vezhbítska 1990, V. Gak 1998, N. Arutyunova 1998, V. Telia 1988, O. Vorobyova 2006, Jabotinskaya 2001, O. Selivanova 2013, etc.), and metaphor as a cognitive mechanism (R. Boyd 1980, T. Kuhn 1980, P. Reeker 1990, G. Lakoff, M. Johnson 2003, E. Kittey 1987, S. Kyoveches 2005, E. McCormack 1990, H. Ortega-y-Gasset 1990, E. Kubryakova 1994, A. Chenki 2002, etc.) the very fact of constant reference to this topic indicates its inexhaustibility.

Scientific studies of many researchers (O. Zubkova, 2008; E. Lapynya, 1988; S. Myshlanova, 2002; M. Ozingin, 2010; P. Prach, 1990; Sinelnikov, 2014; V. Telia, 1988; A. Chernyshova, 2008 and others) are

devoted to the study and functioning of metaphor on the material of professional languages.

At the same time, metaphorization as a way of forming terminological units of biotechnology has not yet become the subject of a separate linguistic study, which prompted us to address this problem.

The purpose of the article

The purpose of the article is to characterize in the cognitive aspect the mechanisms of metaphorization in the English language terminology of biotechnology sphere.

Materials and methods of research

The study of biotechnological terms metaphorization in the cognitive aspect was carried out on the basis of lexicographic data recorded in English dictionaries: Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary¹, Collins English Dictionary², Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English³; terminological dictionaries on biotechnology: Glossary of biotechnology and genetic engineering⁴, Glossary of biotechnology and genetic engineering⁵.

The main methods used in the study were the differentiation and identification of terminological units in the biotechnology sphere, formed by metaphorization.

Definition of the term "metaphor" in the scientific literature

There are many definitions of the term "metaphor". Thus, J. Maruso claims that metaphor is "a way of expression, considered as the transfer of an abstract concept into a concrete plan by a kind of abbreviated comparison or, rather, substitution"⁶

According to A. Reformatsky, "metaphor, that is, transference", is the most typical case of figurative meaning. The transfer of the name in the metaphor is based on the similarity of realities in appearance, shape, color, value, position, nature of movements⁷".

¹ *Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, 2005, p. 1572.

² *Collins English Dictionary. 6th ed. Harper Collins Publisher*, 2011, p. 949.

³ *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. 3rd Ed.*, 1995, p.1668.

⁴ Zaid, A., Hughes, H., Porceddu, E., Nicolas, F. *Glossary of biotechnology and genetic engineering*. Retrieved from www.fao.org/3/ax3910e.pdf

⁵ *Glossary of biotechnology for food and agriculture*. Retrieved from www.fao.org/3/y2775e/y2775e07.htm#TopOfPage

⁶ Maruso, J., *Dictionary of linguistic terms*. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2004, p.155.

⁷ Reformatsky, A.A., *Introduction to linguistics: a textbook for universities*. Moscow: Aspect-Press, 2001, p. 83.

O. Selivanova understands metaphor as "the most creative means of language enrichment, a manifestation of language economy, semiotic regularity, manifested in the use of signs of one conceptual sphere to denote another"⁸.

The researcher believes that within the modern linguistic and synergetic scientific paradigm metaphor serves as a powerful attractor, in other words as a parameter of self-organization, as a factor of preservation and development of the terminological system in language and provides creative mechanisms of any professional field of knowledge, since the abundance of human's cognitive capability induces the need for new linguistic designations⁹.

For a long time, the role of metaphor in the process of scientific cognition has been studied mainly in the framework of the philosophy of science, but with the advent of the theory of conceptual metaphor by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson a new approach to the problem of metaphorization of scientific knowledge was formed¹⁰. It occurred in the paradigm of modern cognitive linguistics.

According to this theory, metaphor is a property of thinking, but metaphorical expressions and utterances in language are only a superficial expression of the conceptual metaphors underlying them. Thus, within the theory of cognitive metaphor, the definition of metaphor acquires a new essence – it is "the understanding and perception of one thing in terms of another"¹¹.

G. Lakoff and M. Johnson formulated a clear conceptual theory of metaphor. They described a conceptual metaphor as the intersection of knowledge about one conceptual area with another conceptual area. With regard to the conceptual field, it must be said that conceptualization is the process of defining a set of cognitive features (including categorical) of a phenomenon of the real or imaginary world that allows a person to have, store in consciousness and add new information to any particular concept and idea of this phenomenon, to distinguish it from other phenomena.

This theory provoked a lively discussion and became extremely popular among linguists. For example, I. Kobozeva considers the metaphorical relationship between meanings from the position of G.

⁸ Selivanova, O.O., *Linguistic Encyclopedia*. Poltava: Environment, 2010, p.388.

⁹ Selivanova, O.O., Kohnityvne pidgruntya metaforyzatsiyi rosiys'koyi linhvistychnoyi terminolohiyi. *Uchenye zapysky Tavrycheskoho natsyonal'noho unyversyteta ym. V.Y. Vernadskoho. Seryya «Fylolohyya. Sotsyal'nye kommuniykatsyy»*. Symferopol', Vol. 26 (65). No.1, 2013, p.286.

¹⁰ Lakoff, G., Johnson, M., *Metafory, kotorymi my zhivom: per. s angl. Pod red. Baranova A.N.* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo LKI, 2008, p.256.

¹¹ Lakoff, G. Johnson, M., *Metaphors we live by*. The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980, p.27

Lakoff and M. Johnson as follows: “conceptual metaphor is informally defined as a way to think about one area through the prism of another, transferring from the source to the target area those cognitive structures (frames, figurative schemes, etc.), in terms of which the experience related to the area of the source was structured. Metaphorical relations between the meanings of polysemous words and metaphorical expressions are reflections of conceptual metaphors in the language...”¹².

Thus, the metaphor-term is a way of organizing cognitive activity, which belongs not to purely linguistic, but to conceptual phenomena¹³, belongs to the sphere of thinking and "enriches the understanding of human actions, knowledge and language"¹⁴.

In the concept of metaphorical models of G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, the available source domain and target domain are interpreted as donor domain and recipient domain in the studies of other authors.

O. Selivanova defines the donor zone as "a subject (conceptual) sphere that supplies its own signs to denote another subject area (recipient), in which they become metaphorical names"¹⁵.

Sources of metaphorization in terminology of biotechnology sphere

In the terminological system under study, the associative and terminal parts of the names of biotechnological processes and objects act as recipient zones, and the donor zones are the zones of other conceptual spheres, which supply them with their own signs.

Thus, based on the theory of conceptual metaphor, let us define the source spheres (donor), including information about the object, phenomenon, event, used to denote the object or phenomenon in another sphere of knowledge (recipient's sphere (goal)). Such donor zones of metaphorical nominations within the field of biotechnology are: HUMAN WORLD, SPACE, ARTIFACTS, UNREAL BEING.

After analyzing the English biotechnological terminology we came to the conclusion, that one of the most productive metaphors for the creation of terminological units is anthropomorphic. At anthropomorphic metaphorization there is a transfer of names from the donor zone HUMAN WORLD to the recipient zone BIOTECHNOLOGY.

¹² Kobozeva, I.M., *Lingvisticheskaya semantika: ucheb. 6-ye izd.* Moscow: LENAND, 2015, p. 179.

¹³ Lakoff, G., Johnson, M., *Metaphors we live by* The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980, p.25.

¹⁴ Arutyunova, N.D., *Metafora i diskurs.* Teoriya metafory. Moscow: Progress, 1990, p.6.

¹⁵ Selivanova, O.O., *Linguistic Encyclopedia.* Poltava: Environment, 2010, p.143.

The dominance of anthropomorphic metaphor is due to the anthropocentric approach, which made man with his needs and features of worldview the main object of study. Comparing the surrounding reality, person passes everything through himself, through his/her own experience. In biotechnological terminology, anthropomorphic metaphor is one of the most productive, because human consciousness tends to perceive the outside world in close associative connection with personal experience of a biological and social nature. As V. Telia noted, "the basis of tropical mechanisms is the anthropometric principle, according to which the human is the measure of all things." This principle is manifested in the creation of standards or stereotypes that serve as a kind of reference point in the quantitative or qualitative perception of reality"¹⁶.

The transfer of nominations from the commonly used terminology into biotechnological one is based on similarities in form, function, analogies, for example, with the actions that people perform in everyday life, family relationships, biological characteristics, certain parts of the body, with physical and psychological characteristics of people, complex associations etc. In this sense, technology, like human beings, performs various functions.

Linguistic analysis of metaphors in the field of biotechnology allows us to identify the following semantic groups among anthropomorphic metaphors:

1) metaphors used as a source of words that characterize family ties, for example: *mother plant, sib-mating, sister chromatid exchange, multigene family, foreign DNA, spore mother cell*.

2) metaphors that draw analogies between human qualities and biotechnological processes and objects: *passive immunity, silent mutation, hypersensitive response, hypersensitive site, temperate phage, temperature-sensitive mutant, competent cell*.

3) metaphors that use as a source material a group of vocabulary associated with human life or denote actions in everyday life, for example: *chromosome jumping* – a technique that allows two segments of duplex DNA that are separated by thousands of base pairs (about 200 kb) to be cloned together; *chromosome walking* – a technique that identifies overlapping cloned DNA fragments that form one continuous segment of a chromosome; *carrier molecule* – a molecule that plays a role in moving electrons through the electron transport chain.

4) metaphors that draw analogies between objects of biotechnology and parts of the human body, for example: *microbody, zinc finger, Barr body*.

¹⁶ Maruzo, J., *Dictionary of linguistic terms*. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2004, p.174.

5) metaphors that transfer human social behavior to the terminology of biotechnology: *candidate-gene* – a gene whose function suggests that it may be involved in the genetic variation observed for a particular trait, e.g., the gene for growth hormone is a candidate gene for body weight¹⁷; *candidate-gene strategy* – an experimental approach in which knowledge of the biochemistry and/or physiology of a trait is used to draw up a list of genes whose protein products could be involved in the trait¹⁸; *nurse culture* – culturing cells from a suspension culture on a raft of filter paper above a callus tissue piece (nurse tissue). The filter paper serves to prevent tissue union but allows the flow of essential substances from the nurse to the isolated cells¹⁹; *host* – an organism that contains another organism or a cloning vector²⁰.

The conceptual sphere SPACE as a donor area for terms in the field of biotechnology is a very important part of metaphorical names. SPACE is one of the basic categories of human worldview and consciousness. Defining the physical limits in which human life occurs, space, at the same time, is one of the "fundamental" (A. Vezhbitskaya) concepts. With their help, people perceive, comprehend, create the world. These concepts are represented in almost all languages of the world. In the terminology of biotechnology, the basis of metaphorical transposition are frames of a spatial nature, which are used to nominate the shapes, sizes and parameters of genetic manipulation objects, their location and the processes of genetic modification. An analysis of the terms made it possible to identify several subgroups of the source spheres of the donor zone SPACE, which were conditionally called metaphorical models of point, line, shape, distance, location. Let's consider them in more detail:

1) metaphorical models of point: *wilting point (WP)* – the moisture content of soil at which plants start to wilt, but not to the extent that they fail to recover when placed in a humid atmosphere. cf. permanent wilting point²¹; *hot spot* – a chromosomal region where recombination appears to occur more frequently than expected²².

2) metaphorical line models: *cell line* – a cell lineage that can be maintained in culture. A cell line arises from a primary culture. It implies that cultures from it consist of several lineages of the cells originally

¹⁷ *Glossary of biotechnology for food and agriculture*. Retrieved from www.fao.org/3/y2775e/y2775e07.htm#TopOfPage

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ *Glossary of biotechnology for food and agriculture*. Retrieved from www.fao.org/3/y2775e/y2775e07.htm#TopOfPage

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Ibid

²² Ibid

present in the primary culture²³; cell strain – a strain of cells having specific properties or markers derived from a primary culture of a cell line by selection or cloning²⁴; *packaging cell line* – a cell line that is designed to produce viral particles that do not contain nucleic acid. After transfection of these cells with a full-size viral genome, fully infective viral particles are assembled and released²⁵; germ line – a member of a cell lineage (the germ line) leading to the production of gametes. In mammals, germ cells are found in the germinal epithelium of the ovaries and testes²⁶.

3) metaphorical form models: *quadrivalent* – a chromosome configuration visible in late prophase and metaphase of the first meiotic division, where four chromosomes are linked by chiasmata²⁷; *replicative form* (Abbreviation: RF) – the molecular configuration of viral nucleic acid that is the template for replication in the host cell²⁸; *zig-zag -DNA* – a form of DNA, in which the double helix is wound in a left-hand, instead of a right-hand, manner²⁹; *equatorial plate* – the figure formed by the chromosomes in the centre (equatorial plane) of the spindle in mitosis.

4) metaphorical distance models: *genetic distance* – a measure of the genetic similarity between any pair of populations. This is measured on the basis of variation in a combination of phenotypic traits, allele frequencies³⁰; *catabolic pathway* – a pathway by which an organic molecule is degraded in order to release energy for growth and other cellular processes; degradative pathway³¹.

5) metaphorical models of location: *hypersensitive sites* – regions in the DNA that are highly susceptible to digestion with endonucleases³²; *hypervariable region* – the parts of both the heavy and light chains of an antibody molecule that enable it to bind to a specific site on an antigen³³; *intergenic regions* – DNA sequences located between genes; they comprise a large percentage of a genome and have no known function³⁴; *cambial zone* – region in stems and roots consisting of the cambium and its recent derivatives³⁵; *constant domains* – regions of antibody chains that have the

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Ibid

same amino acid sequence in different members of a particular class of antibody molecules³⁶; *variable domain* – regions of antibody molecules that have different amino acid sequences in different antibody molecules. These regions are responsible for the antigen-binding specificity of the antibody³⁷; *insertion site* – a unique restriction site in a vector DNA molecule into which foreign DNA can readily be inserted³⁸; *terminator region* – a DNA sequence that signals the end of transcription³⁹.

Conceptual field ARTIFACT is productive for English biotechnological terms because one of the principles of metaphorization is subject-centrism. Sources of metaphorization are the conceptual spheres: “Housewares and household objects”, “Building constructions”. In this case, biotechnology objects are presented as objects created by human labor. Examples:

1) metaphors that involve the realities of human life in biotechnological terminology, for example: *replication fork* – Y shaped structure associated with DNA replication. It represents the point at which the strands of double-stranded DNA are separated so that replication can proceed⁴⁰; *gene shears* – RNA molecule that can catalyse chemical reactions, often cutting other RNAs⁴¹. *mosaic* – an organism or part of an organism that is composed of cells with different origin⁴²;

2) metaphors used as a source of words nominated buildings constructions: *cDNA library* – an collection of cDNA clones⁴³; *bridge* – a filter paper or other substrate used as a wick and support structure for a plant tissue in culture when a liquid medium is used; *gene bank* – the physical location where collections of genetic material in the form of seeds, tissues or reproductive cells of plants or animals are stored; *gene construct* – an engineered chimeric DNA designed to be transferred into a cell or tissue⁴⁴; *bridge* – a filter paper or other substrate used as a wick and support structure for a plant tissue in culture when a liquid medium is used⁴⁵.

The fourth group consists of terms, the metaphorical motivator of which is chosen from the donor zone UNREAL BEING. They are a small

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Zaid, A., Hughes, H., Porceddu, E., Nicolas, F. *Glossary of biotechnology and genetic engineering*. Retrieved from www.fao.org/3/ax3910e.pdf

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Ibid

part of the metaphorical names in the studied terminology of biotechnology. Examples of such terms. *Chimera (or chimaera)* – from chimera, a mythological creature with the head of a lion, the body of a goat and the tail of a serpent. An organism whose cells are not all derived from the same zygote. 1. Animal. An individual exhibiting two or more genotypes in patches derived from two or more embryos. An individual derived from two embryos by experimental intervention. 2. Plant. Part of a plant with a genetically different constitution as compared with other parts of the same plant. It may result from different zygotes that grow together, or from artificial fusion (grafting); it may either be periclinal chimera, in which one tissue lies over another as a glove fits a hand; mericlinal chimera, where the outer tissue does not completely cover the inner tissue; and sectoral chimera, in which the tissues lie side by side. 3. A recombinant DNA molecule that contains sequences from different organisms. *Chimeric DNA* – a recombinant DNA molecule containing unrelated genes; chimeric gene – a semi-synthetic gene, consisting of the coding sequence from one organism, fused to promoter and other sequences derived from a different gene. Most genes used in transformation are chimeric⁴⁶.

Conclusions

Thus, based on the analysis of terminology in the field of biotechnology, we can conclude that metaphorization is a common phenomenon that needs attention from linguists. The processes of metaphorization have demonstrated extraordinary activity in terminology, being based on the use of signs of some subject spheres to refer to others.

Donor zones of metaphorical nominations in the biotechnological terminology of the English language are HUMAN WORLD (43.5%), SPACE (26.3%), ARTIFACTS (22.5%), UNREAL BEING (7.7%).

This study does not cover all categories of metaphors found in biotechnological terminology, but analyzes the largest of them.

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⁴⁶ *Glossary of biotechnology for food and agriculture*. Retrieved from www.fao.org/3/y2775e/y2775e07.htm#TopOfPage

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